THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

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Founded by JAMES KNOWLES

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A MONTHLY REVIEW

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UNEMPLOYMENT

It is a common habit of political speakers and writers to assert that 'the present is a critical period in the history of the country.' With other expressions which are common form, it has become almost meaningless But there is no doubt of the truth of the description as applied to the next twenty years of British history. For the first time in human experience a highly industrialised country possesses an electorate practically as wide as its whole adult population. That electorate is thoroughly interested in public questions and prepared to pronounce its own opinions upon them. Yet at the same time, through no fault of its own, its power of criticism, of distinguishing good coin from base, is not nearly so developed as is its interest On the other hand, the questions upon which it will be asked to pronounce are among the most complex and confusing.

In past years public discussion has in turn centred upon theological, constitutional, educational questions, each in their turn. To-day economic problems are the centre of controversy.

They are the very questions on which superficial judgments are most likely to be wrong. At the same time, the fallacious view is easy to grasp; the exposure needs deeper thought and more penetration. But if the risk of error is great, the result of making a serious mistake may be peculiarly disastrous for a country in the position of Great Britain. We are the first in the voyage of exploration through a new North-West Passage, with reefs and winds and currents which have never been charted. Germany, the country nearest to us in this evolution, is still a decade behind and will be able to use our successes or mistakes for her guidance. Our ship, moreover, has no watertight compartments. In a new country, only partially developed, the natural growth may repair and make good the effects of mistakes. Again, a country rich and self-sufficing in natural products and an exporter of raw materials need not be so apprehensive about the possible loss of oversea markets. But we are an old and settled and highly industrialised nation dependent on our export of manufactures for obtaining our necessary supplies of food and raw materials. A serious mistake may mean a disaster from which we shall find it hard to recover. Is it wrong, then, to regard the next twenty years as critical—until democracy has gained a knowledge and an experience equal to its power and its interest? This is a reason for care, not for pessimism. We possess one invaluable asset in an innate moderation and a real kindliness which showed itself even in a moment of aberration, like the General Strike. Can the parties to industry work together and face the trials before them with common forbearance and understanding? Can the people have the issues in great questions so placed before them that instinctive good sense can play its part without being overborne by sentimentalism or prejudice? If so, the long channel can be navigated with safety to its further end. Then, and only then, will there be for the first time a complete democracy based on security which will endure.

An early and significant test of the ability of the new democracy to deal with difficult economic questions will be its treatment of the present problem of unemployment. Those who disagreed with other views propounded by Sir Oswald Mosley in the debate in the House of Commons immediately after his resignation can agree with one of them. He put forward a plea—as the present writer had done some time ago—for a careful and authoritative examination of the problem of unemployment, so that the issues involved should be made as widely known as possible. Indeed, the question deserves such consideration for its own intrinsic importance. There can be few who are interested in public affairs to whom it does not cause anxiety. For nine

years—that is, ever since the country emerged from the great slump of 1921 which followed the cessation of the war—the average annual total of the Live Register of Unemployment has been in the neighbourhood of 1,200,000. The figures have been affected by crises such as the General Strike; they have also shown a seasonal fluctuation, rising in the winter and falling in the summer, but never appreciably below the 1,000,000 mark. Public imagination has, however, recently been much impressed by the fact that in the last eight months they have risen steadily until they reached the abnormally high figure of 1,775,000 in the first week in June—a time of year when the figure has generally been at its lowest.

Pessimists tell us that the country is 'played out.' Optimists argue that the unemployment figures convey a grossly exaggerated impression of the state of affairs. Praise or blame is bestowed on successive Governments—with greater or lesser justice. What would be more valuable would be a full analysis of the problem itself. What do the figures really mean? How serious are they? So far as the trouble is serious, what are the causes of it? If the causes are ascertainable, what are the remedies? Of proposals which have already been made, which are good and which are bad? An attempt is made in the following pages to give answers in general outline to these questions. Of those who have dealt officially with the problem of unemployment the writer was the first to endeavour to analyse its causes, and this may give some value to the opinions given. No one, however, who is charged with the burden of unemployment administration can hope to make an adequate examination or one free from great risk of error. Concentrated investigation is badly needed.

The recent great increase in the figures of unemployment is a striking phenomenon. It would not be so remarkable or important but for the fact that it is superadded to the continuance of so high a level of unemployment during the last nine years. It is the difference between a sharp peak with a steep ascent and descent to sea level and one that rises from a high, bleak, broad tableland. The two phenomena possess different characteristics, and therefore should be considered separately. As regards the former, it is wrong to regard the figure of 1,200,000 as denoting a 'standing army' of that number of idle men and women. Of course, it denotes nothing of the sort. The vast majority of those who receive benefit in the course of a year only do so for a few weeks. Apart from workmen in the depressed trades, those who have been unemployed for a year or more form a very small proportion of the whole. Again, it is wrong in itself, and also a disservice to the country, to concentrate attention on the fact that 10 or 11 is a high percentage of unemployed and 1,200,000 a

formidable total, and not to remember that 80 or 90 per cent. of insured people are at work. The exposure of such misconceptions, however, does not justify any easy optimism. Employment is much worse than it has been for fifty years and more before the war. No such complete statistics exist for pre-war years as are provided by the unemployment insurance records to-day, but it is pretty clear that for the twenty years before the war the average amount of unemployment was about 4½ to 5½ per cent. in the occupations covered by the present unemployment insurance system The same percentage in the last few years would have meant an unemployment figure of only 550,000 to 600,000—over 600,000 less than the normal post-war figure up to the autumn of last year

The condition of the nation which is reflected in these figures is no ground for despair. There is no reason for pessimism or exaggeration. But there is no room for complacency It is an occasion for searchings of heart and still more for searchings for causes. The 'malaise' from which the country suffers is severe, whether judged from the human aspect, the business point of view, or the financial position Six hundred thousand more unemployed means that five or six times that number live in uncertainty. A man loses his job; he becomes unemployed, and his neighbour may well exclaim, 'So, but for the Grace of God, were I!' A longish spell of unemployment weakens self-reliance in men and women who, in normal conditions, are anxious to work From the business point of view 600,000 more unemployed means that those businesses which still give employment are working at a small margin of profit, or even at a loss, in order to keep going In other words, reserves are depleted just when they most need to be increased to provide for improvements and replacements during an era of peculiarly rapid development in method and machinery From the point of view of finance, whether of individuals or of the country, 600,000 more unemployed is equally serious It means a reduction of more than 5 per cent in the production of the country, since it is the productive industries which have borne the brunt of unemployment and the distributive trades which have escaped more lightly. The Exchequer loses to the extent of more than 5 per cent. and the taxpayer has to make good this loss

Comparisons between nations are always liable to be misleading because of the difference in natural conditions In considering the state of unemployment the risk is greater because of abnormal occurrences peculiar to one or more countries which are the aftermath of the war. The course of employment in France and in Belgium has been affected by the restoration of ravaged territories. Depreciation of currency has occurred in different

European countries at different times, and stabilisation has been effected at varying levels. The payment of indemnities has been, and will continue to be, a disturbing factor, affecting countries differently as regards employment. Even so, it is very significant that no industrialised country provides any parallel to our post-war unemployment. Here and there, now and then, there has been some lesser peak of unemployment, as in the United States in 1926, but nothing like the continuing severity of our own experience. It was this fact that led the writer to think that there might be one or more causes of trouble, the incidence of which was either confined to this country or affected it with peculiar force. This has proved to be the case. The falling off in the volume of our oversea trade had already attracted attention.[1] It was due to a number of different causes. They all had their origin in the war They were cumulative in their effect. They affected international trade generally But as they were all present and operative in the case of British oversea trade it suffered with a peculiar severity. In the first place, oversea trade, except in articles of necessity, had practically ceased during the war. The machinery had been dislocated and the scramble to execute orders at inflated prices in 1919 and 1920 had done little to restore normal connexions

Meanwhile, the cessation of our exports during the war had led a number of countries which were formerly important markets for British goods to manufacture for themselves The usual result followed in the shape of protection to local industries when once established, and this tendency to a rise in tariffs was intensified by the growth in nationalistic spirit, which was also a result of the war Other markets, again, which were among our most important have been greatly restricted through poverty caused by the war, or, as in the case of China, through internal disorder and civil strife To these causes which affected the willingness or the capacity of importing countries to take supplies has been added the intensified competition of our rivals among industrialised countries doing an export trade. The depreciation of the currency in France, Italy, and Belgium was tantamount, while it continued, to a reduction in wages which helped manufacturers to undersell our own exporters These currencies have now been stabilised, but under conditions which have resulted in wages starting at very low level. In Germany the fall in the value of the mark facilitated the re-equipment of factories at an exceedingly low capital cost. In this country the restoration of the gold standard, with the pound sterling at its old value, had a contrary effect. It is not necessary, or indeed possible, to repeat here the reasons for and against that much debated step It is sufficient

[1] See first Report of the Committee on Trade and Industry

to state an opinion that the advantages of taking the final steps outweighed the disadvantages. At the same time, the disadvantage to industry was serious, since it added something like 10 per cent. to the wages cost of British exports.[8] It has been necessary to draw attention to the difficulties which the British export trade has had to face, as the view taken of them affects the determination of future policy. In considering the question of employment in particular it will be remembered that external trade has for many years formed a much greater part of our national economy than has been the case with any other of the great nations. A decrease in the volume of that trade, therefore, even if our proportion of the world's international commerce remained the same, would affect us with peculiar severity. Expressed in terms of work, it might well account for the greater part, if not the whole, of the excess of unemployment in the last eight years. This has proved to be the case. The amount of unemployment due to this cause has been variously estimated at between 450,000 and 700,000 insured persons. Even at the lower figure it will be seen that the greater part of our high rate of unemployment is thus explained.

A factor which has also contributed to the increase in unemployment since 1921—although not to the extent caused by the decrease in our export trade—is the decrease in emigration. Our national economy had become accustomed to a very considerable annual efflux of emigrants. Rapid developments in the United States and Canada, combined with easy conditions of entry, had caused it to reach an average of 270,000 in the five years before the war. During the war the population actually increased more through the cessation of emigration than it lost through the deaths caused by the war. Since then increasingly stringent regulations have been imposed on immigrants both into the United States and into the British Dominions. The eye of a needle was not a more effective bar to the rich man than some of the immigration

[8] With the restoration of the gold standard the pound sterling regained its old value as measured in terms of gold. This means an appreciation in value of about 10 per cent. above what it had been a short time before. Obviously, therefore, if the same nominal rates of wages continued to be paid the exported British article would cost the same amount to manufacture in pounds, shillings and pence, but a higher price in foreign currencies would have to be asked for it. Of course the same rise in the value of the pound sterling meant a corresponding fall in wholesale prices of imported commodities, including the principal foods and raw materials. Had this fall been passed on rapidly to the consumer in the shape of proportionately lower retail prices and cost of living, it would have been reasonable to ask for a corresponding reduction in all wages. But it was not passed on rapidly to the full extent. The result, *inter alia*, has been that where reductions in rates of wages have taken place this has occurred principally in industries subject to the full force of foreign competition, and has resulted in a discrepancy between the conditions obtaining in sheltered and unsheltered trades.

regulations to an intending British emigrant. As an inevitable result British emigration has been greatly reduced. The effect of this reduction has been offset to some extent by a fall in the birth rate, but the net result is still considerable, and may be said to account for the British labour market to-day being asked to absorb between 200,000 and 300,000 more persons than would have been the case had emigration been as unhampered as before the war.

So much for the continuous high level of unemployment during the past few years The peak of this summer confronts us with a different problem A seasonal improvement generally takes place between January and June This year, however, the figure has increased steadily from 1,300,000 at Christmas last to 1,775,000 at the beginning of June—a considerably higher figure than at any time during the General Strike or the long coal stoppage[1] A primary cause of this great increase is undoubtedly the fall in wholesale prices, which became pronounced towards the end of 1929 and has continued throughout the spring of this year The fall has extended to nearly all commodities, and, while accentuated by the increase in the world's supply of some natural products, is largely due to deflationary influences which are natural after the high money rates of last autumn Unemployment naturally resulted Merchants are not going to show confidence in the buying, or manufacturers in the making, of cotton goods when the raw material may be substantially cheaper a month hence than it is to-day As with cotton, so with other materials which have fallen in price—foodstuffs like wheat, sugar, and tea or coffee, metals like copper, tin or zinc, textile materials like wool or silk, or other commodities in large use, such as rubber Everybody lives from hand to mouth in such times and stocks are reduced to the minimum Unemployment is inevitable until a halt is called in the downward process. The incidence of the increased unemployment has also, as is natural, been distributed throughout most of the productive industries, although it has fallen with special severity on the textile trades.

Moreover, it is not only this country which has suffered. In other great industrial nations unemployment has increased. Many attribute the whole of the present depression in England to this fact In this they are not justified Socialists who at the General Election freely and unreservedly promised a great and early improvement in employment are naturally anxious to point out that America and Germany have been affected as well as ourselves. Few, however, have the hardihood of Mr. MacDonald

[1] The miners affected by the dispute in 1926 were not included in the figures of the live register, but for industries other than mining the present figures are higher than at any time during the long coal stoppage.

to overstate the case so boldly as to lead his hearers to believe that a year ago there were no unemployed in the United States, whereas there are between 5,000,000 and 6,000,000 to-day. The fall in prices has been the most potent cause, but its effect has been powerfully reinforced by the ill-advised activities of the Government. When a pendulum has already begun to swing, a push will send it much further than it would otherwise go. So it has been recently with the economic policy of the Government. When trade is depressed and industrialists and business men have an anxious time, it is the duty of the Government of the day not to add to their burdens or their apprehensions. Yet this is the moment chosen for passing a Coal Bill which threatens the consumer with dearer coal; for passing an Unemployment Insurance Act which devotes millions annually to a relaxation in the conditions for benefit which Government spokesmen had previously declared unjustinable. An Education Bill looms before us which will involve enormous expenditure to pay for a step which, as is admitted by educationists, is at the least premature. Perhaps the most serious effect, however, was produced by the debates upon the Budget. More important than the new taxation, heavy as it is, was the manner of its imposition. As was remarked to the writer by a very shrewd and successful business man in the City, British citizens would not lose confidence if they were asked to pay taxation, although heavy, as a contribution to a national need. An entirely different psychological effect is created when the same taxation is imposed to an *obligato* of vindictive and malicious comments, and with the menace that it is the first of a series of 'doses' of like nature. The fall in prices will come to an end. Quite how soon this will occur it is impossible to say, but it is not likely to be very long delayed. Low Bank rates and cheap credit will begin to have their effect. Orders will be given more freely and stocks replenished. Once more a trade revival will start in America and Germany. But what of this country? We shall undoubtedly feel the beneficial effects of the turn of the tide, and unemployment figures will begin at last to fall. The degree, however, to which we shall take advantage of the turn and the extent of the improvement in employment will depend largely on the confidence of the business world in the future.

The fall in prices is also of significance for other reasons. It has been the occasion for the first time of the appearance of new features in international trade, in the shape of unified selling agencies of natural products. It may also cause some trouble for a year or two to come in our export trade. Apart from this, its principal importance lies in the danger that the temporary intensity of the employment situation may cause the Government to be stampeded into some foolish action at the instance of ex-

tremists. In other words, it is the first great test of democracy. The recent great increase in unemployment causes more intense hardship for the time being, but, if properly faced, it is not intrinsically so great a menace for the future as the high continuing level of worklessness that seems to have become endemic in the last few years. What are the prospects as regards this less dramatic but more indurated trouble? The excess of the normal amount of unemployment in recent years up to 1929 over that which existed before the war is not so great as the amount of worklessness which can reasonably be attributed to the loss of oversea trade and the decrease in emigration. In other words, we have already made up part of the leeway. In addition, we have absorbed the annual increase—albeit the rate is not rapid—in the adult population. Moreover, the results would have been better but for the lamentable history of coal and the folly of the long stoppage in 1926. Apparently, therefore, absorption is taking place, though slowly. The country is gradually adjusting its economy to allow for a smaller proportion of oversea trade just as formerly it expanded that proportion. In any case, however, the process is very slow. Meanwhile, the normal rate of unemployment is still twice as high as the pre-war rate, and the gravity of the problem is universally admitted.

The question now emerges of policies to be pursued and of remedies to be applied. Here, subject to the corrective influence of the business community, the country is at the mercy of its economists and its politicians. Of economists King Magnus in *The Apple Cart* says: 'Even political science, the science by which civilisation must live or die, is busy exploring the past while we have to grapple with the present. It leaves the ground before us full of black darkness while it lights up every corner of the landscape behind us.' Of politicians the dictum of another critic is that they are 'a genus divided into two species—the people who leap without looking and the people who look without leaping.' But, whoever may be the adviser who prescribes the physic, the view taken of the prospects of oversea trade constitutes an essential and perhaps decisive factor in determining the line of policy to be pursued. Those whose views were voiced by Sir Oswald Mosley in the House of Commons recently take one extreme view: 'This hope of recovering our position through an expansion of our export trade is an illusion, and a dangerous illusion. The sooner the fallacy is realised the quicker can we devote ourselves to a search for the real remedy.' That there should be a search was no doubt a polite *façon de parler* due to the dictates of modesty. The remedies had already been found—'rationalisation' as the ultimate and permanent remedy and so-called 'public works' to bridge the interval. No explana-

tion was given as to how rationalisation will fill the bill as the permanent remedy unless it increases our volume of export trade. Our immediate interest, however, is in the doctrine of public works, for there is no need to look beyond the interval if the bridge collapses by which it is to be spanned.

A policy of public works is superficially attractive. It has been so since the days of Queen Elizabeth, when statutes were passed under which the 'sturdy and valiant beggars' were to be set to work It is, indeed, rightly exasperating to know that mankind is short of many useful articles when at the same time there are men and women short of work The times are somehow out of joint. That is why the kind of proposals sponsored first by Mr. Lloyd George and now by some of the Socialists make a natural appeal to many people The danger is lest the pressure prove strong enough or the Government weak enough to give way to it against their better judgment. Disagreement with such proposals does not denote lack of sympathy with the unemployed. The objection to them is that, like other inviting short cuts across boggy country, the wayfarer who is tempted to take them will never reach his destination Such a policy possesses three drawbacks Only a small proportion of the schemes proposed can be justified on business grounds The greater part are not wholly economic They contain an element of usefulness varying in amount, but for the most part they are thinly disguised relief schemes which would never have been put forward but for the subsidy from the Government This subsidy is to be paid for out of loan. Loan money, however, does not come like manna from heaven, and it needs much faith to believe that the country will be rendered so prosperous that it can make light of the payments for interest and amortisation when they fall due This leads to the second objection If loans are raised on a grandiose scale to finance schemes of this nature, legitimate productive industry will go short of credit As a result of giving men work on unnecessary roads other men will be deprived of employment at their own trade in some factory or workshop

Considerable controversy has centred upon this question of the sufficiency of the supply of credit The most reasonable view seems to be (it being assumed that the gold standard must be maintained) that there is a certain elasticity in the amount of credit that can be made available without prejudicing the supply to industry; also that, if other conditions are favourable, its use upon public works may give a slight fillip to trade. On the other hand, that fillip would not be sufficient to counteract such lack of confidence as at present exists, and so large a use of credit as is suggested either by Mr Lloyd George or by Sir Oswald Mosley would in fact cramp industry so soon as either a revival

of trade in this country or a fresh bout of speculation in America caused a demand for credit and began to send the Bank rate up once more. The third objection to a grandiose policy of public works is perhaps the most cogent of all. It is, in fact, insuperable. It would be a physical impossibility to put to work upon the schemes the very persons for whom they are intended. By far the greater part of the employment which would be provided is heavy navvying labour. The 300,000 unemployed women are at once barred from consideration. So are all those men who have any physical weakness Not only so At the request of the writer a contractor in London ascertained through his foremen the proportion of applicants who were judged to be really suitable for heavy work It was found to be about one in six. If this is the proportion in the case of those who applied on their own initiative, what of the general body of unemployed ? In fact very few men over fifty years of age could stand the physical strain ; nor could men of a much younger age whose regular occupations had been in the lighter trades A return has been asked for by the writer showing the composition of the 115,000 persons claimed by Mr. Thomas to be set to work on his own much more modest list of public undertakings. If this is given, the results should be illuminating. It is almost certain that if employment exchanges delivered up their secrets it would be found that much of the supposed delay and 'red tape' in getting existing schemes started is due to the difficulty of obtaining labour. In other words, the whole policy of relief works, specious as it sounds, breaks down when brought to the test of fact. If it be adopted, the last state of the country will be worse than the first.

What then ? Is the only answer to be an admission of helplessness ? The answer is No A great scheme of public works would be something palpable and indeed ostentatious, like Naaman setting out to bathe in Abana or Pharpar, the rivers of Damascus, but an examination of the prospects of oversea trade opens up a line of progress that is sounder if less dramatic. Some of the causes that have injured our trade are likely to be permanent It needs a touching belief in the power of innocent persuasion to expect a general and early reduction of tariffs by foreign countries as a result of the recent speeches of the President of the Board of Trade at Geneva So far the direct result of the negotiations has been an increase in tariffs in two countries ! Other influences, however, that have handicapped our trade are temporary in character. Currencies in European countries have now been stabilised and the effect of our return to the gold standard has been gradually adjusted. The costs, therefore, of some of our chief competitors are likely to rise as compared with

our own. Moreover, as the world slowly recovers from the impoverishment of the war, new developments will in all probability cause a re-expansion in international trade of which we should obtain our share. How large that share may be will depend largely on the degree to which confidence is restored and the extent to which a reduction in costs is achieved in British industry by a resolute policy of rationalisation. Such a truth is now so well-worn a platitude that hesitation is felt in repeating it. But from the days of the Sermon on the Mount until now it may well be said that the greater the truth the greater the platitude and the more it needs emphasis. To-day the need for confidence, and for the reorganisation which cannot be wholeheartedly pursued without confidence, is a truth which it is vital that the country should take for its working creed.

There is one all-important distinction in our oversea trade—that between exports to foreign countries and to countries within the British Empire. Two observations alone are sufficient to indicate the fundamental importance of this difference. The shrinkage in our exports would have been much more serious had not the unfavourable course of our trade with foreign countries been offset by the much more favourable course of inter-Imperial trade due to the preferences awarded to British goods. The value of such preferences will be further advanced if the action recently followed by Canada is followed by other Dominions. Again, the possibility of development within the British Empire is immense, and with it the opportunities of benefit to our own industries in taking an important share in that development. The subject is too lengthy for discussion here, and a separate article will be devoted to its detailed consideration.

Is there no stimulus, however, which can afford immediate help to trade and employment, and which will also promote, and not prejudice, permanent recovery? The imposition of duties upon imported manufactures has been a subject of controversy for so long that it is seldom impartially considered. Post-war economic and industrial conditions, however, are in many ways wholly different from those of twenty years ago. It is not that general principles which were true twenty years ago have less validity to-day. *Οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε ζῇ ταῦτα* is as true of economics as of morals. But though principles remain the same, if the conditions in which they are applied are different the practical inferences may be different also. It is as true to-day as it was before the war that in a country which depends upon its export trade in manufactures it is of cardinal importance to avoid raising the cost of production, either directly, or indirectly through the enhancement of the cost of living. The question to-day, however, is whether the cost of

production would in fact be raised by such a system of duties. In this as in other respects any analysis is inadequate and misleading which runs along pre-war lines and does not take full account of the change in conditions as they exist to-day. There is no Free Trader of the old school who would not approve of our being able to make artificial silk synthetically in this country to replace silk previously imported from abroad, provided that it was not protected by an import duty He would not deny that its manufacture provided employment, and he would be thankful for it. If the same were true of fabric gloves he would also rejoice. But if the imposition of a low duty were necessary, but at the same time sufficient to cause the gloves to be manufactured in this country, would the imposition of the duty be harmful? Would it merely 'divert production from unprotected into protected channels'? Would it, in however microscopic a degree, raise the cost of living or production in this country? Let anyone analyse the possible increase in price and set it against the contribution to our high cost of government which is made directly or indirectly by any industry at work in this country The analysis will show that the gain to the country through increased revenue will be greater than the harm through increase in prices. Production will not be diverted from unprotected to protected channels. In the present state of the country it will be created in the protected industries and promoted in those which are unprotected There are, of course, fairly definite limits within which alone this result would follow If these are transgressed, the balance of advantage will be converted into a disadvantage.

Is this contention unsound? Then let it be put to the test. *Humanum est errare* But any examination into this and other aspects of the unemployment question should take into account new conditions and avoid the bias of old prejudices Contributions have been made to the subject, as, for instance, by Professor Clay in his book on *Post-War Unemployment* But what is needed is to obtain as wide a consensus of opinion as possible on the main points involved and to make it available for general information Otherwise a sound reform may be rejected through prejudice or the Government may be driven to take action which will only aggravate the evil The late Government was criticised. But they were better aware of the inherent difficulties of the problem than were the majority of their critics. It was more studied and better understood than had previously been the case. The restriction of road-making and other public works to those which were economically justifiable was based on a reasoned view of the use of credit. The causes of unemployment were taken into account in framing legislation. Doubtless there were lapses

from grace, but the troubles of the General Strike and the long coal stoppage were great, and their effect continued long after the stoppage ceased. The difficulty with the present Government is that the members of it, with few exceptions, came to office with an ignorance of the problem that was amazing in its *naïveté* and completeness. It is difficult to imagine any other explanation of the promises to improve employment which were made by them at the General Election. They really thought they had but to introduce their ready-made schemes and, hey presto! the long frosts of unemployment would dissolve and the spring of prosperity begin. It is to the great credit of Mr. Thomas (who before the General Election was as picturesque and as Boanergic as any in his misstatements) that he has appreciated the facts quickly and been outspoken and courageous in his new views. He is like a modern St. Paul suddenly smitten with light. The importance of our foreign trade and the need for rationalisation were his new vision to which he has been faithful under great difficulties.

But the rank and file of the Socialist Party have not had the advantage of such an apocalypse or of the advice of skilled civil servants and experienced City opinion to draw aside the curtains that veil the truth. So they are restive. They cling to the old beliefs and distrust the new 'mysteries.' The danger, therefore, is very real. The Government have already shown in the case of their Unemployment Insurance Act that they can capitulate to a demand that they have publicly stated to be wrong. They may do so again. Indeed, in the volume of public works already undertaken they have made some compromise with views which they know to be unsound. The great and urgent need is for public opinion to be guided on as wide a scale and in as authoritative a manner as possible in order to help the new democracy to pass its first great test successfully.

ARTHUR STEEL-MAITLAND.

THE REVOLUTION IN FLEET STREET

In the course of an address to the Imperial Press Conference, on June 2, the Prime Minister said:

> In my time the Press as an organisation has been completely revolutionised. I remember the old days when the Press was a personal possession, held by individuals competing with each other, each showing the stamp of a strong and special individuality.

In the march of progress, Mr. MacDonald added, we have had to recognise that we must make the best of the new conditions under which the Press has become a great centrally controlled machine. Undoubtedly: combinations and mass production, syndicated news, inflated advertising, huge circulations, the enormous costs of printing and distribution—these and kindred forces have swept away the old English daily paper. The Prime Minister implies that a period of about thirty years must be regarded as the era of mechanical revolution in journalism. That is so. But the London event which, in the present summer, has brought a shock to every journalist in the country comes as the culmination of a process that did not actually begin until the end of the war. 'In my day,' said Lord Morley, recalling the *Pall Mall Gazette* of the 'eighties to Kennedy Jones, 'a million readers were undreamed of.' 'You must remember,' was the reply of Lord Northcliffe's chief lieutenant, 'that you left journalism a profession. We have made it a branch of commerce.' The sudden killing of the *Daily Chronicle* was a resounding revelation to the world of the extent to which the daily newspaper has been sucked into the vortex of financial speculation.

The *Daily Chronicle* had been in existence since 1877 as a Liberal morning paper. Three remarkable editors—A. E. Fletcher, H. W. Massingham, and Sir Robert Donald—had given it a distinction which was maintained over a quarter of a century until 1918, when, a few weeks before the Armistice, Frank Lloyd, head of the great Kentish paper concern, relinquished the ownership. The circulation at that time was the second largest in England. The purchase was negotiated by Sir Henry (afterwards Lord) Dalziel, acting on behalf of Mr. Lloyd George, then, of

course, Prime Minister. The price for the *Chronicle* and *Lloyd's Sunday News* was something over 1,000,000*l.*, paid partly in cash and partly in debentures to be discharged in instalments. The new syndicate consisted of three sections: (1) the Lloyd George Political Fund; (2) a group represented by Lord Inverforth, holding just over half the shares, and so controlling all except the politics; and (3) a group headed by Lord Bute. The retiring owner stipulated that his family name should be dropped from the title of *Lloyd's*, which had been the first Sunday paper to claim 1,000,000 readers before the close of the nineteenth century. The property was required to pay 10 per cent on its very large capital, besides meeting the heavy charge of debenture instalments. It was able to do this. The circulation was over 1,000,000, the price of newsprint had fallen, and during the post-war boom advertisement revenues were high. The device of newspaper insurance brought further prosperity, and in 1923 the circulation rose to 1,300,000. Two years later there came a second reorganisation. The Bute interest was bought out, and most of the Inverforth interest; the Lloyd George Fund held five-sixths of the ordinary shares. But it is evident that, although after more than four years the proprietors could look with satisfaction upon their financial returns they had no intention of maintaining the paper as a permanent property. Plans were made for yet another change, which was effected in November 1926, when the paper was sold to Sir David Yule and Sir Thomas Catto, two wealthy representatives of the jute industry of Bengal. Their ownership was destined to be very short-lived. The first died, the second retired, and in the summer of 1928 the paper was acquired by Mr William Harrison, of the Inveresk Paper Company, who had begun his career in newspaper ownership with a spectacular deal in weekly illustrated journalism. By this time the end was near, although to all appearance the *Daily Chronicle* was not only flourishing, but was entering upon a stage of expansion. New machinery costing not less than 250,000*l.* was installed, the paper, which had been handicapped by a rather mean-looking sheet, underwent a change of form, and the staff was enlarged. These activities however, could have meant what they seemed to mean only if it had been possible for Mr. Harrison to make a successful new flotation. In 1927 the *Daily Chronicle* Investment Trust had taken over the United Newspapers, Limited, with a capital of more than 3,000,000*l.*, of which 800,000*l.* was in 7 per cent first cumulative preference shares. At the end of 1929, after the Hatry and New York disasters, Mr. Harrison was manifestly unable to attempt a fresh enterprise in the stock market. Newspaper advertising showed a heavy decline in the early months of 1930, and at the end of the winter

there came the striking success of the new *Daily Herald*, marking the arrival of a Labour daily into the field of the 1,000,000 circulations. The *Daily Chronicle* had fallen into the hands of Lloyds Bank, and the great banks, when holding property such as newspapers, cannot wait for long-distance results. An accountant was put in charge, and on June 2, without a preliminary announcement of any kind, the paper was submerged in the *Daily News*.

The incident is without parallel in the annals of British journalism, and the calamity is the greatest ever known in Fleet Street. No outsider can understand how it happens that a great daily paper, which had a circulation of some 960,000, and was able until last year to show a profit notwithstanding its swollen finance and repeated upheavals, can be closed down without warning or preparation. The secret of the merger, carried out under the direction of Sir Walter Layton, editor of the *Economist*, was astonishingly well kept. Until the fateful week-end the *Chronicle* reporters were doing their turns without misgiving, and hence the crash was all the more shattering. A modern daily paper is a very large and complicated organisation. The news and literary staffs are far larger than they were ten years ago, while the business and mechanical departments employ a total of men, women, and boys for which there was no equivalent in the first decade of the century, when the old *Standard* was destroyed by Sir Arthur Pearson and the *Tribune* was brought to an end in the manner described by Sir Philip Gibbs in his novel, *The Street of Adventure*. More than one writer, telling the story of the ruin of the *Daily Chronicle*, has been careful to point out that in the tragedy there are no villains and villainies. From the first sale in 1918 to the attempt at reorganisation by Mr Harrison ten years later, it is contended, nothing was done that in any way violated the accepted code. That, presumably, is the fact, but, as Sir Robert Donald has pointed out, immense sums were taken out of the *Daily Chronicle*, 'not in dividends, but in deals, sales, and resales, compensations and fees.' Modern newspaper management must, to be successful, make adequate provision for reserves, for reconstruction, and the meeting of new competition, to say nothing of allowances for employees displaced by reorganisation or due for retirement. But what provision of this kind is possible in the case of a daily paper, sold or reorganised four times within ten years, and on three occasions out of the four made the play of speculative forces such as, until well on in the twentieth century, were altogether unknown in the province of newspaper ownership? It is believed that more than 1000 employees, including sixty members of the National Union of Journalists, are affected by the stoppage of the *Daily Chronicle*. The understanding is that the merger was based upon an arrange-

ment involving a loss or change for two-thirds of the *Chronicle* people and one-third of the *Daily News*; and it is recognised that, however the adjustment may be worked out, a grave amount of distress may prove to be unavoidable. One can see no reason for contradicting the statement, made repeatedly since the first week of June, that the ending of the *Chronicle* is the worst disaster of the kind from which the world of London journalism has ever suffered. No little comment has been aroused in Fleet Street by the statement that the employees were urged by the management to purchase preference shares in United Newspapers, Limited, and that many of them did so. The investment in some cases would appear to have reached several hundreds of pounds, and it would not be an unwarranted inference that not a few members of the establishment had entrusted their life savings to a concern which they had good reason to believe was exceptionally secure.

I have remarked that the event occurs at the end of a decade which has been signalised by developments in newspaper ownership and management that were unknown during the earlier stage of the transition from the old journalism to the new. The first great fortune, as fortunes are now reckoned, made out of newspapers and periodicals was that of Lord Northcliffe, and he was no speculator. He was a journalist-proprietor. His great successes were achieved by a union of intuition and planning, a complete understanding of the mass mind combined with an exceptional power of creating and directing a great machine. His triumphs were his own. He built up dozens of journals and magazines and fitted them into the departments of his multiple organisation. He did not part with his properties. He would destroy at a word a weekly or monthly which had disappointed him, which did not pay or had no recognisable use. But I never heard of his selling a paper or a magazine. He would have been shocked beyond expression by the developments that began to take shape within a few months of his death. Lord Rothermere's dealings with the Hulton group in Manchester, for example, were certainly not Northcliffian. The transfer to the brothers Berry of the immense agglomeration of the Amalgamated Press, with its scores of periodicals, each one precisely adjusted to a definite section of the multitudinous public he had discovered and manipulated, would, I think, have appeared as a deep sort of treachery to the founder of the house of Harmsworth. Lord Rothermere has seemed to be aware of this, for a few years ago he explained to a company of New York journalists the main difference between his brother and himself. The one was a journalist-director-owner, the other was, by his own admission, what in America would be known as a newspaper broker.

This article is not much concerned with newspaper properties or finance, but before passing to matters of more immediate interest to the practising journalist we may note a few salient facts in relation to the movement towards great consolidations since the death of Northcliffe eight years ago. When towards the end of his life the master of them all published a brochure into which he condensed his expert criticism of the newer millionaire owners, a good many people who had no knowledge of what was happening in Fleet Street jumped to the conclusion that here was a ludicrous example of Satan rebuking sin. Certainly it was not. Northcliffe, of course, was himself a millionaire owner, but he was the polar opposite of an absentee. He knew, or wished to know, all his publications. His eye was upon everything. There was no editor in any corner of his immense concern who was allowed to forget that he was liable to be reprimanded by a chief who could tell every man how his job was to be done. But Northcliffe realised, during the short and harassed evening which was all that was left to him after the Peace, that the type of ownership for which he stood had, with startling suddenness, become almost as rare as the independent editor and editor-proprietor whom he and his kind had displaced twenty years before. The Hultons and Berrys, Beaverbrooks and Riddells, Starmers and Harrisons, were as different as could be from the little band of brothers and their admirers who, with supernatural luck, had caught the marvellous tide in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Northcliffe doubtless saw in some degree what was coming. He had ended one epoch of journalism. He had established the method of treating news as a marketable commodity—that, and nothing more. But the newspaper in his mind was still a family concern. He could not endure the prospect of the news-shop becoming a bucket-shop. The thought of a time when, as now, nearly a score of newspaper properties are listed daily on the Stock Exchange would have been intolerable to the man who, perhaps more than any contemporary, was responsible for the development he abhorred.

Northcliffe's partner and successor gave the first great impetus to the flotation of newspaper combines. The Associated Newspapers, Limited, is so far the supreme example of a newspaper group—kindred in character, strongly based, and so organised that from beginning to end, so far as an outsider can tell, the shareholders have been satisfied, while many beneficiaries have become rich or very wealthy. This group comprises the *Daily Mail*, *Evening News*, *Sunday Dispatch*, and *Overseas Mail*, with a capital of nearly 3,500,000*l*. Add to this the two picture papers, the *Daily Mirror* and *Sunday Pictorial* (which have been all along the special preserve of Lord Rothermere), with their

combined capital of 2,500,000*l.*, and we have the compact central structure of the Northcliffe-Rothermere Press. The past two years have witnessed a much advertised and bitterly opposed extension—Lord Rothermere's attempt to command, by means of Northcliffe Newspapers, Limited, closely linked with the *Daily Mirror* Company, a chain of provincial newspapers stretching from the south-west of England to the north of Scotland. Needless to say, it is in this field that the architects of consolidation encounter the most stubborn resistance—in the characteristic British trinity of regional patriotism, local independence, and family tradition. It is, I suppose, impossible at present to make a forecast as to the result of this movement, which involves the fiercest competition with the largest consolidation so far created, the Allied Newspapers, Limited, of the brothers Berry. Such competition may or may not be good for the rival concerns It is bad alike for the public and the profession, since it leads inevitably to regional treaties of abstention Up to the time of writing the two sides have agreed to respect one another's territory in at least four cities, and meanwhile the wider struggle continues. There will, undoubtedly, be some notable permanent successes to be recorded on the Northcliffe side, but the general issue between London and the provincial centres may well remain undecided for several years.

There is a widespread belief that Lord Rothermere controls the largest of the newspaper consolidations It is possible that he would do so if his ambitious designs upon the provincial Press were to succeed But at present he is excelled, both in respect of numbers and of capital value, by the organisation built up by Lord Camrose and his brother Sir Gomer Berry Their success is, after the initial triumph of Alfred Harmsworth, the most extraordinary phenomenon of its kind ever recorded After acquiring several important journals in South Wales they made their entrance into the metropolitan field by the purchase of the *Sunday Times*, and achieved a dramatic *succès d'estime* by acquiring, with Sir Edward Iliffe, the control of the *Daily Telegraph*. In the interval their conquests had included the greater part of the Hulton newspapers in Manchester, with the *Daily Sketch* and *Sunday Graphic*, the *Financial Times*, Kelly's Directories, Weldon's fashion papers, the old publishing house of Cassell, the Edward Lloyd Paper Company, and—perhaps most surprising of all—the immense congeries of weeklies, monthlies, and miscellaneous publications gathered under the wing of the Amalgamated Press, once looked upon as a concern not conceivable under any other direction than that of Northcliffe. In this massive financial structure, the Allied Newspapers, Limited, accounts for a capital of 8,250,000*l.* and the Amalgamated Press for

9,250,000*l.*, while their six main companies are represented by a total capital of about 32,000,000*l.* By the side of this stupendous consolidation the largest group of provincial journals—that organised by Sir Charles Starmer with the Rowntrees prominent in its ownership and control—seems of modest dimensions. But it comprises more than thirty daily and weekly papers, chiefly in the north of England, and may perhaps be counted the most clearly defined of the newspaper chains in the matter of political opinion and general influence. Lord Beaverbrook, with his three papers—the *Daily Express*, *Sunday Express*, and *Evening Standard*—is an owner and a portent by himself. Lord Rothermere may at times exert himself for a particular object in home affairs, or devote space in his papers year after year to the grievances of a European country. But such activities amount relatively to very little. His rival has a different attitude and method. He is capable of concentrating upon a political mission, and it is not impossible that in the near future Lord Beaverbrook may be the central figure in a combat to decide a momentous issue of British policy—the question, namely, whether one of the great political parties is to have its policy shaped and its leadership determined by a newspaper owner with no political experience, no understanding of party traditions, and no contact with the House of Commons.

And now, in order to complete this necessarily rough catalogue, let us take note of the amazing growth of the Sunday newspaper, with its peculiar characteristics and its flooding of the 8,000,000 households of England on the Sabbath Day with standardised printed matter. Lord Rothermere's *Pictorial* and the Berrys' *Graphic* have a combined sale of not much less than 5,000,000. Lord Riddell, proprietor of the unique and indescribable *News of the World*, has, I believe, completely failed in his efforts to prevent his sales from coming within sight of 4,000,000, and the remaining popular Sunday papers must together account for something like 4,000,000. That is to say, there is at the week-end a cataract of Sunday papers pouring from the presses of London and Manchester to the extent of many more than 12,000,000 copies. They are produced upon a plan which, until a short time ago, we associated with the American Press, and not with our own. That is, they fall into two or three plainly defined types, which reproduce one another's features with a staggering mutual servility; they treat of public affairs, as a rule, only in so far as they can be brought under the heads of personal gossip or entertaining incident; they collect bucketsful of what journalists call 'slop' from successful Churchmen and politicians, aviators and film stars, about marriage, the Americans, the younger generation, the right length for a skirt, Mr. George Lans-

bury's London Lido, or Where are the dead? Sport, crime, and the Young Girl make for the Sunday editors an inexhaustible provision; and the paper which commands the world's largest circulation has worked out a technique for dealing with police-court records which has long been a jest among the reporters who profit by it, and a wonder to that by no means inconsiderable public which knows little or nothing of a modern nation's hidden deeps. And I believe it is true that, among the papers dispatched everywhere to our people in the Dominions and all over the world, to keep fresh their memories of England, home, and beauty, not far from the largest portion belongs to the class of Sunday journal typified by the *News of the World* Truly, the resistant qualities of the British race are a marvellous heritage

In the speech from which I quoted at the beginning of this article the Prime Minister was recalling the days of his own early adventures in Fleet Street At the time of his entry into politics (which we may connect with his joining the Independent Labour Party in 1894), and for long afterwards, Mr MacDonald was a free-lance journalist, a good deal more inclined, if I am not mistaken, to literary than to political journalism Like many another member of the craft who later rose to eminence, he gained no small part of his experience by working for that eccentric representative of late-Victorian Radicalism and philanthropy, John Passmore Edwards, owner-editor of the *Echo*. When writing for him, or, as he told the Imperial Press Conference, failing to qualify as a leader-writer on the *Daily Telegraph*, Mr. MacDonald was playing a part in the last stage of the old journalism My own memories, as it happens, go back almost as far It was in 1897 that I made a start in Fleet Street, and the journalist who was young at the second Victorian Jubilee may claim to have witnessed virtually the whole of the revolution in the Press to which the Prime Minister referred In 1897 the *Daily Mail* was one year old, and although Alfred Harmsworth was not of the pioneer band which made the first breach in the old newspaper tradition, the founding of his morning paper was the definite beginning of a new epoch In 1894, after six years of breathless success as a producer of snippet papers, he had entered daily journalism in the purchase of the *Evening News*. He handed it over to Kennedy Jones, and for two years he looked on at an experiment which he was too ignorant to have undertaken for himself He developed an absorbing interest in the technique of editing and production He was, as Massingham said in an obituary article, a wonderful workman. There was nothing in the mechanics of journalism that escaped his eye. He started with a conviction that the people who bought the old sort of English newspaper did so because they had no choice.

It was impossible that they could like it. They wanted the news, and that they could not get. This was Alfred Harmsworth's first discovery. His second was that the old notion as to the newspaper value of political speeches was a ridiculous superstition. Very few men could speak as well as almost any reporter can write; and it might at least be taken for granted that not a single man or woman of the new literate multitude could be induced to read six columns of the Prime Minister in Edinburgh or the leader of the Opposition in the Free Trade Hall. Harmsworth in these things was entirely right. But it may be well to point out, for the benefit of those who are persuaded that journalism was completely reborn in 1896, that the creative pioneers were already in the field. The new journalism, like its name, was initiated by W. T. Stead, who succeeded John Morley at the *Pall Mall Gazette* in 1883. In 1888 T. P. O'Connor had founded the *Star*, and H. W. Massingham was his assistant editor; Bernard Shaw and A. B. Walkley were members of the most brilliant young staff in London, and its presentation of the news had a startling freshness. Moreover, the first Harmsworth invasion came after Fletcher and Massingham had transformed the *Daily Chronicle* by throwing over the established belief that the substance of a morning paper must be unequally distributed between finance, politics, and crime.

It would be difficult to think of any profession or branch of commerce that has changed its conditions and methods more completely within a working lifetime than journalism has done. It is to-day an occupation almost totally different from the calling that was known to those editors who in the 'nineties had to meet the challenge of the young and confident news merchants. I will venture the statement that nearly every journalist, with twenty years or more of experience, would find himself in cordial agreement with Mr. J. A. Spender's measured review of the transition in the concluding chapters of *Life, Journalism, and Politics*. In respect of many very important matters these thirty years make a dismal story; but it has, of course, to be recognised that in some departments the gains balance or outweigh the losses. The best newspaper of 1930 is an incalculable advance upon the best Victorian product. If it is news we have in mind, the morning paper as a mirror of the world's doings, then the reader of 1880, or even 1900, had nothing to compare, in merit and interest, with to-day's *Times* or *Observer*, *Manchester Guardian* or *Glasgow Herald*. And—notwithstanding the fact that the men who make them are violating almost every Northcliffian rule of the page as regards balance and display—our papers for the million fulfil a large part of their function remarkably well.

But what of the other side? Twenty years ago one could have

named a dozen English editors occupying positions of national importance, men of high distinction—publicists to whom the most powerful statesmen were and had to be respectful. It is the newspaper magnate, not the editor, before whom Prime Ministers tremble now, and upon whom as a matter of course they bestow titles. The ranking of the manager, and even the advertisement manager, above the editor is to be counted a major tragedy of journalism as governed by circulation. And when, on behalf of the millionaire owner, or the financial syndicate, it is argued that large-scale management has meant higher rates of pay for newspaper men and women of nearly all grades, the journalist must answer that the new system has brought into Fleet Street a terror of speculative change which means for him and his family a desolating sense of insecurity. And moreover, as the Prime Minister lately reminded us in another connexion, the principle of Gresham's Law, with its fixing of the relation between the good currency and the bad, applies to the newspaper no less inexorably than to other institutions of the public life.

S. K. RATCLIFFE

AFTER THE LONDON CONFERENCE—A FRENCH VIEW

He who has not dreamed on the quay of Cronstadt, at the foot of the old dwellings of Toulon which stand out above the Mediterranean, who has not seen within this famous bay the chaplet of islands which seem to form an escort to Provence, or the sea fighting against the land for possession beyond the moors of Brittany by the 'Pointe des Pois,' or the sweeping curves of the Basque country, where the Pyrenees overshadow the Gulf of Gascony, or the white cliffs of Normandy coming down into the Channel like a cascade—does not know France nor does he realise that half her frontiers are washed by the sea. Henceforward for the Frenchman of 1930 the sea is a new country. On the threshold of this era he sees in the horizons of oceans the hope of a wider, a more decisive and more modern existence. My compatriots love the sea. These are the observations of a Frenchman who studies international problems, not as a naval expert, but with the common sense of an economist. Lovers of the sea should study our history closely. The Normans went to conquer Sicily, Greece and the Holy Land. The Bretons and the youth of Honfleur emigrated to America. We find the Gascons settled all round the coast of Africa. The people of Provence sought adventure in Africa and in Asia. The Frenchman of to-day asks more of the sea than adventure, he takes more than a pleasure-loving interest in it—he appreciates it as one of the practical elements in life. French public opinion, moreover, is becoming increasingly conscious of the naval problem because the sea is a link between colonial countries.

France is a colonial Power: she has interests everywhere, on all continents. She needed the war, however, to make her appreciate further the services which this new inheritance could render her. She pays a tribute to the devotion of the coloured peoples of her colonies who came to fight in defence of her metropolis in the regions of the Somme, the Artois, and Lorraine. She recognises the active nature of the economic competition in manufactured goods, raw materials, plant and equipment, as well as foodstuffs, in which she has become involved. Since

the war Frenchmen have been drawn to their colonies both for interest and for pleasure. It is no longer true to say that the Frenchman is an individual who likes bread and does not know geography. If you grant him a taste for bread, you must now recognise his sense of geography My compatriots are now sensitive to the mystic lure of Fez, to the somewhat feudal majesty of Marrakech Only this year the centenary of Algeria has reminded everyone of great achievements All the newspapers, the magazines and the reviews have celebrated in their turn the activities of marshals, soldiers, administrators, and colonials The taking of Algiers has been shown in a romantic light Just as everyone wanted to know the stages of the physical conquest, so they wanted to know the stages of another conquest—the conquest of hearts There has arisen a whole literature of the sea, we have the captivating Morand, the enchanting Tharaud, and the delightful Pierre Mille These are not caprices of fashion but rather centres of thought In economic circles there are no longer any Frenchmen who do not know that colonial trade represents 32 milliards of the commerce of the metropolis, nor any who are not aware that our sea routes of communication are 58,000 kilometres long, a figure which must be compared with 32,000 for the United States, 10,000 for Japan, and 7800 for Italy France has 11,000,000 square kilometres of colonial possessions containing 52,000,000 inhabitants These are the bare facts that M Tardieu gave us with his customary clearness and frankness at the Naval Conference in London

These facts show the position of France Our country has rights, obligations, and duties concerning the populations entrusted to her They count on her for the defence of their interests and for their intellectual, moral, and spiritual development. This is a sacred duty a difficult but cherished mission, which cannot be neglected One cannot be indifferent to the great naval issue about which the world is divided at this very moment. Nobody has any illusions about it. It is not so much naval disarmament, but the division of spheres of influence, which raises anxiety in the minds of the public as it follows the rather technical debates which occurred during last winter in the capital of the British Empire The problems which came under discussion concern the people, not only in their national economy (because of the markets to be secured, maintained, gained or lost for their foreign trade), but also, more especially, because of the intellectual influence and the opportunity for propagating its culture, of which each nation is particularly jealous.

During the hundred years between the battle of Trafalgar and the battle of Tsoushima England has benefited by an undoubted

superiority. Everyone has paid homage to her rule of the waves during a period of unprecedented economic prosperity. Then the horizon was darkened by the development of Germany as a naval Power. We have only to consider the two main principles which dominated naval rivalries before the war—the two-Power standard by which the English fleet must be equal to the sum of the two next biggest fleets and the maxim 'two keels to one,' according to which England answered every German enterprise by repeating it twice over in her own Navy

After the war American imperialism appeared on the scene. In 1914 the American navy was hardly equal to the French, but in 1920 it had nearly exceeded the British. The Treaty of Washington of February 6, 1921, sanctioned the equality between England and the United States in the capital ship and reduced the status of Japan, France and Italy France attended this Conference under particularly unfavourable conditions owing to financial difficulties, due principally to the fall of her currency Her load of heavy debts, gloriously contracted during the war, had seriously affected her foreign exchanges. Competent observers feel that her influence and prestige were severely compromised. It is also noticeable that the two nations that made the greatest sacrifices for an America which, though certainly pacific, still appeared to claim to take advantage of the Washington Conference by making her superiority recognised, were France and England The percentage of the world's fighting ships owned by the United States, as compared with 1914, increased from 18·4 to 30·6, while that of England decreased from 45·5 to 30·6 and that of France from 15·8 to 10·2.

After the Washington Agreement the Powers continued their negotiations aiming at naval disarmament Consequently it seemed logical that Geneva, which is the centre of international affairs, should remain the point of contact between the different countries desirous of working for the peace of the seas Indeed, many sensible people think that Geneva should remain the centre of conversations on disarmament, and that it is within the framework of the Geneva agreements that these conversations should be continued. All those who read without bias the French Memorandum of December 20, 1929, were struck by the correctness of its views and the exactness of its conceptions. We ourselves are too much concerned with international economic life not to wish the problem of disarmament to be studied internationally. Conversations at little tables between two, four, or five Powers certainly have their advantages, but those who are not invited to these conversations have the feeling that some designs are being hatched against them. But when the members of the League meet together illusions and the appear-

ance of mystery are avoided. Hence the big green tablecloth is preferable. Moreover, we are all bound together by the Covenant of the League, which has imposed upon all of us member States the obligation to study problems in common. All those involved in the Covenant are under serious obligations; they must carry out a binding agreement which they have signed. The problems of disarmament can but gain by such a collective study, and their solutio will thus command an authority which will impose that consent without which even the best treaties fall to pieces.

Now exactly at the psychological moment an important new fact appears on the scene—the construction of a new German cruiser, the *Admiral Scheer* It is not the construction of a cruiser that has upset the world Neither the admiralties nor the Press would be disturbed by one cruiser more or less. It is first and foremost the circumstances of its construction which have given food for thought to all impartial observers. The *Admiral Scheer* can attain a higher speed than any existing battleship. All cruisers must flee before it This new invention should engage the attention of the Powers who signed the Treaty of Washington

The whole world was in sympathy with the generous spirit that prompted Mr MacDonald to go to Washington to visit President Hoover and thus by this friendly gesture to hasten a disarmament which all nations considered necessary. The burdens which weigh on the taxpayer on account of fresh naval construction are among those which everyone agrees should be lightened as soon as possible The Powers invited accordingly at once agreed to answer the call given to them. On January 21, 1930, at the Conference which was opened from the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords, the King of England and Mr. MacDonald made speeches in favour of peace—speeches which found a sincere echo in all our hearts

Two methods could have been adopted at the London Conference A limit could have been fixed to naval budgets. In this case every citizen would know that while the agreement lasted naval expenditure could not exceed a certain maximum. Some people, seeing certain advantages which it possesses, favour this method Its simplicity is at once apparent The other method consists in establishing limits and maximum tonnages either for the global tonnage of a fleet as a whole or for the different categories of vessels But one cannot help noticing that the system of limitation, as formulated by the Washington Conference, even if it has suppressed competition in quantity of ships, has nevertheless served as a pretext for competition in quality. A new art has been born called 'naval construction'

which has found a successful expression in types like the *Admiral Scheer*.

An observer cannot help recognising that the technical or military value of a unit is no longer expressed by gross figures of displacement, gun calibre, hull specification, thickness of armour plates, dead weight, engine power, or fuel capacity. In vain do we multiply indices and discover new methods of expressing the military value of a unit, when human ingenuity is continuously discovering methods of falsifying these symbols. Henceforward we must recognise the importance of ' unitary weight,' *i.e.*, weight per unit of energy or power. What we are witnessing to-day is a veritable competition in getting the maximum efficiency per unit of weight in fighting ships. Some go so far as to ask whether these conferences which employ the intellectual activity of a whole corps of expensive experts for months on end are not mere vanity, and even whether they are not moving in a direction contrary to the goal aimed at One might even say that the conferences merely stimulate the ingenuity of experts whose imagination busies itself with finding new formulas which permit the military value of naval units to be developed excessively. Whatever the limitations provided for, the fact remains that in the case of the *Admiral Scheer*, for example, the substitution of electric welding for riveting and the systematic use of light alloys both constitute an incontestible advance As a result of these inventions every kilogramme of the new German vessel costs three times as much as that of a normal cruiser, and as, in consequence, a kind of levelling-up is bound to occur, the French, English, or American unit will inevitably be brought to the same degree of perfection as the German One is inclined to wonder whether these limitations will not result in producing a real inflation of costs Whether we wish it or not, the effect of the limitations prescribed by the Treaties of Washington and London will mean an increase in naval budgets. Hitherto we have only spoken of hulls, but progress has also been made in engine construction by the continual increase in the thermal efficiency of liquid fuels. In other words, the economy in weight thus realised might be devoted either to giving increased armour protection or to increasing motive power—that is to say, speed and range of action.

Thus the prescribed limitation of tonnage would result in making the limited vessels much more destructive than those which existed before the Conference These conversations on disarmament might thus induce admiralties to construct ships which were much more dangerous than those which were launched before people started talking of peace. It is true that frequent international revision would allow of a more strict control, but

one cannot get away from the fact that to talk too often of disarmament stimulates intelligent people to get round the text of agreements with remarkable ingenuity. The difficulties of the system of limitation are numerous. With regard to battleships, for example, limitation should be accompanied by a reduction in the maximum calibre of torpedoes or of guns, but the naval gunnery expert will compensate this by an increase in muzzle velocity. Is it a question of fixing the number and the tonnage of cruisers? We must take into account the length of sea routes, the importance of maritime commerce, and the development of coastal facilities. Then we all find ourselves in a different position. The United States, having only few naval bases, needs cruisers with a greater radius of action, while England and France, possessing many naval bases, need very fast cruisers with a relatively small radius of action. In fact there are a thousand ways of getting round the text of an agreement. We have the case of liners. It is known at the present time that there is nothing easier than camouflaging a big liner, and that certain nations are suspected of preparing this camouflage. Certain fine high-speed merchant ships could be transformed into vessels of war having a very appreciable speed and a very wide radius of action.

The problem of trade routes introduces the question of submarines. We are all agreed in deploring the part played by the submarine during the war. The whole of humanity has been moved by the uncivilised acts perpetrated on the merchant ships sunk without warning. Moreover, all the nations have agreed to draw up rules about the conduct of submarines towards merchant vessels. But, after all, the submarine is only a ship that makes use of the same weapons as its fellow-ships. For example, nobody has dreamt of prohibiting a torpedo-boat from using torpedoes. The submarine can only be condemned on account of the way in which it is misused, but that holds good of all armaments. A French note presented by M. Leygues has submitted our theory on this subject, and has indicated in measured terms what is the essential *rôle* of the submarine. France, finding that she has a great length of sea routes to protect, on account of the distance and dispersion of her colonial possessions, considers it a very economical method of defence to make use of these extra light units, which are specially suited to keep watch over long trade routes. Particularly vast colonial possessions scattered all over the world compel the French to have units specially adapted for this service. It is quite certain that, given a multitude of outposts to watch over, France cannot use cruisers which would perform their service of defence in too heavy and too burdensome a fashion.

France, conscious of the part she plays overseas, learnt with

genuine surprise that by the allotment of the co-efficient of 1·75 the principle of equality with Italy was being evolved at Washington. Of course there can be no comparison between the French colonial empire and the overseas possessions of Italy. While Italy has the task of watching over the route to Tripoli, we have in the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, the Pacific, in Africa, Asia and Oceania a number of posts which count solely on us for their defence This principle of equality has been a great shock to us, not only to our national feeling—for France is essentially a pacific nation—but it has also touched our sense of justice. The average Frenchman believes in equality above everything; he has a clear sense of what is just and of what is logical. It is glaringly obvious to everyone that if Italy has a fleet in the Mediterranean we are in the presence of a dilemma. The first assumption is that we should concentrate all our forces in the Mediterranean to face Italy that would mean removing our defences from our Channel and Atlantic coasts, and we remember that during the last war these coasts were the objects of numerous attacks, and that to keep in contact with our glorious allies the English our navy had to work ceaselessly Moreover, it would mean that we left our colonial routes undefended—a course of action which no one would attempt to justify Civilised nations, members of the League, would be the first to demand that we should take every step to avoid an attack on our colonial possessions—this task of humanity being among the most important of all the preoccupations of the civilised world

The second assumption is that we divide our fleet between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, with half our forces opposite Italy, and this would prevent us holding our communications with Algeria But Algeria consists of three French departments which form part of the mother country to such an extent that they are actually within the jurisdiction of the Minister of the Interior. Algeria is not a colony, but an integral part of metropolitan France. We could not accept the idea of separating ourselves from compatriots who belong to us in the same sense as the people of the northern coast or those of Meurthe and Moselle North Africa comprises also Tunis and Morocco, which are inhabited by people who have asked for our protectorate, and are materially and morally our *protégés*, united to us by bonds of the greatest affection North Africa is the meeting-point of new lines which safeguard our communications with French West Africa and French equatorial Africa We feel that in the part of North Africa entrusted to us we have an important task sanctioned no less legally than that of England, who safeguards her communication between Cairo and the Cape, and we do not think that we have a right to refuse it.

We understand the position taken up by Italy so much the less now that our Roman friends since the war have been liberated by the common action of our soldiers from the Austro-Hungarian menace. We know that the problem of naval disarmament is no longer quite what it was, seeing that ratios were established for certain categories of ships at Washington. We must note, however, that then the question was, above all, one of offensive vessels, and that it was for these that ratios were established. But it is a far cry from the admission of equality in a particular category of ships to a general parity. One cannot go from the particular to the general. Anyhow, the French, who are essentially a pacific nation, know that Italy, whose first ambition is to be just, will consider these problems calmly.

Anglo-American parity cannot be compared with any other ratio. The solution of the long rivalry between the two great Anglo-Saxon nations was ripe. In order that a diplomatic agreement may be successful, a problem must have reached a certain degree of readiness politically and socially. Public opinion must be unanimous and must declare itself in favour of a formal agreement. Those who follow foreign affairs, and especially the relations between England and the United States, know how these have developed during the last few years. Mr MacDonald's visit to the United States was, so to speak, a finishing touch. The warm welcome that he received was thus in harmony with popular feeling.

The Franco-Italian problem must be expressed in quite different terms. A new situation has arisen among our neighbours. France on her side has always had the same friendly feeling for the large Latin heart of her neighbour. But, as a matter of fact, there are two conceptions of equality. Equality either proceeds from a common effort or else it implies the reduction of the units of one side and the increase of those of the other. But then the equality is, in fact, an inequality. And under the pretext of equality an act of international expansion is being sanctioned—which is contrary to any philosophic idea of equality. Hence the London agreements have led to very interesting results, which, when considered in all their manifold relations to human affairs, will have their consequences.

Here we must pay a tribute to the English Delegation. There has been, as far as we know, no disagreement in principle between our two theories. Discussions bearing on the greatness of sacrifices do not in any way concern fundamental principles and their validity. The Anglo-French problem, which had been the subject of previous agreements, has thus been adjusted by goodwill. Its further discussion will be pursued in a spirit of mutual understanding, not merely of irreducible needs expressed

figures which have not, in fact, officially been questioned, but also of moral necessities.

What nations are hoping for is a progressive disarmament and a reduction of naval expenditure. Nobody can maintain that under the guise of reduction nations ought to consent to certain principles which would endanger themselves and their colonial possessions. What we ask is that everybody should consider together, quite calmly, common questions with due regard to the consequences of new inventions This century is a subtle one and has a love for the unexpected. Floating islands, for instance, will no doubt be created which will serve as bases for aeroplanes and seaplanes This will be a new device with an entirely new purpose. Inventions such as we have named might modify naval economics from one year to another, and might run counter to the agreements of London and Washington We must therefore be imbued, above all things, with the spirit, and work in accordance objectively and realistically, for all nations are in some degree tired of conferences Public opinion has observed that certain conferences were called at the wrong moment. Conferences can only bear fruit in a wholly favourable political atmosphere It is true that they deal with technical questions, but it is above all things essential that certain political conditions should be fulfilled For if these conditions are not fulfilled the task of the conference becomes extraordinarily delicate

During the last ten years Europe has been submitted by her medical advisers to a particularly lowering *régime*; she has been given sedatives and restoratives in large doses by way of resolutions and speeches That is what happens after a war In the days which followed the war of the First Empire, and during the existence of the Holy Alliance, Europe saw many congresses, but the ease of transport and the frenzy of modern life multiply these meetings Public opinion gets tired, and wonders whether these intellectuals sitting at their tables are not heading for results contrary to their desires France, who since 1914 has reduced her naval construction by 40 per cent., has loyally and scrupulously applied the regulations laid down at Washington. She has avoided expensive building programmes for fear of burdening her taxpayers indefinitely She has constructed light vessels which do credit to the mathematical and scientific brains of her engineers. Certainly no nation is more tired of war, none less warlike, than my country, none has so great a fear of the horror of casualties France is thoroughly impregnated with the modern spirit. She is conscious that she has to fulfil a part before the world and before the territories which have been confided to her supervision. Moreover, in this age of economic

conflict the sea has become a commercial battlefield. Raw materials which provide mankind with the essentials of existence —light, heat, and food—follow upon the ocean the route determined by the laws of supply and demand.

To London came the men who spoke with the voice of France —Tardieu, fascinated from his youth by the international aspect of political problems, and Briand, born on the Atlantic coast, whom the tidal motion of the waves has filled with a mysterious and tender eloquence These men did not seek to realise the selfish ambition of their country. They had no naval imperialism in view. They have that same feeling with which a man like MacDonald went to America to raise enthusiasm by his pacific speeches. My fellow-countrymen are, for their part, convinced that it will be with navies as it was with armies before the war They weigh very heavily upon the future and are able to start wars.

What we are looking for is an agreement based on the principle of balance or equivalence Just as in the economic sphere French and German industry, having come to an agreement and having established a series of conventions about raw material, have stabilised production and stopped quarrels which were in danger of ruining nations and condemning the working classes to unemployment, so we think that in naval matters our representatives should be able to arrive at agreements based on the balance of forces

Disarmament is a collective effort All parties stand and fall together. They reduce their armament together and evaluate their parallel of reductions mutually. Disarmament is not directed against anybody It is not the object of an egoistic policy. In an atmosphere of peace all nations decide together to attain a result which is sanctioned by public opinion However an observer must notice that a conference like the London Conference has not exactly helped to tighten the bonds of friendship between France and Italy. A conference is in itself praiseworthy, but should it not consist first of a few quiet, hushed, diplomatic conversations without the display of these sessions to which the Press of all the continents is summoned? A dispute about a few technical details then becomes a political misunderstanding; in fact, there is no denying the result. Since the Conference things have been said on the other side of the Alps which were conceived in cold blood, but which were certainly due to the Press agitation which arose both before and after the naval discussions in London.

Nevertheless, the outstanding feature of this century is the progress in ideas and in the international spirit. This spirit reigns henceforward provided that we create a certain environ-

ment and international atmosphere in which our debates are ruled by a common understanding of problems. It is in this atmosphere and in this spirit that nations will arrive at a common policy of disarmament. This policy must be really collective and must be formed with everybody's consent. Each one must participate in it with perfect agreement. Altogether, each one collaborating with the other, we ought to arrive at a solution. Let us avoid all possibility of individualism, let us avoid everything that might shock nations and throw them against one another. Let us rather seek our solution in common Let us hope that, moved by the international spirit, nations will understand each other henceforward and will realise more clearly their respective positions, their commitments and their obligations. France will not fail in performing the duties towards the colonial peoples entrusted to her in order that they might gain the moral and material benefits of civilisation Nor will she fail in her duty towards the whole of humanity of being first in the field with the ideas of peace and progress

PIERRE LYAUTEY.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE AS AN ECONOMIC FAMILY

AT the General Election in Great Britain a year ago nothing was heard of Imperial economic co-operation. No doubt Mr. Amery tried to make people see his vision of the Empire as an economic unit, but neither his constituents nor the country were listening. The appointment at about the same date of a Professor of Imperial Economic Relations at the University of London passed unheralded. Mr. Bruce in Australia and at the Imperial Conferences in London in 1923 and 1926 had been hammering away on the need for practical action to promote economic co-operation in the Empire, but Australia and the rest of the Dominions were busy with their own internal problems.[1] To-day Imperial economic co-operation in one form or another is on everyone's lips. In the Dominions and in the Colonial Empire, and even in India, as well as in Great Britain, statesmen and politicians, thinking men and women, the man in the street, and the columns of the daily newspapers are full of the subject. In Great Britain it seems likely that it will be the most prominent topic at the next General Election. What is the explanation of this sudden emergence into the limelight of an ideal which a year ago conveyed almost no meaning to the majority of people, which was impatiently dismissed as belonging to an unpractical order of thought? At first sight the answer seems to jump to the eye. Lord Beaverbrook and Lord Rothermere have done it by their 'crusade' for Empire Free Trade and by the formation of the United Empire Party, which, if its fortunes as a party are less rosy than Lord Rothermere would like to hope, seems finally to have committed the Conservatives not only to the advocacy of Imperial economic co-operation, but also to the promotion of

[1] The remarkable but unobtrusive development of the Imperial War Graves Commission (set up by the Imperial Conferences of 1917 and 1918) requires further notice than can be given to it incidentally here. By its stubborn insistence on the principles of equality of status to which expression was finally given by the Conference in 1926 this Commission has established a real financial and administrative partnership in advance of anything which has so far been achieved in the field of Imperial co-operation.

[p]olitical measures to secure it, thereby giving a new meaning to [the] old name 'Unionist.'

The explanation is, however, not so simple. The Empire [M]arketing Board, with its posters, deserves much credit for [de]mocratising the subject. The two Press Lords have done a [ve]ry great service, in spite of some dangers inherent in their [c]rusade, its methods and provenance, by bringing this question [i]nto the arena of public discussion. But when daily journals of popular character set out to drive the great-hearted public in a particular direction, it is a safe assumption that the tide of public interest has already set strongly that way. The newspaper campaign indeed found the ground well prepared in advance. Not only had the Empire Marketing Board, whose origin traces back to Mr Bruce's initiative at the Imperial Conferences, been busy encouraging people to buy Imperially, but a remarkable number of people and groups and schools of thought were already actively engaged in the study of one or other of the divers aspects of a subject which has extraordinarily wide ramifications. It is well that this was so, and it is most important that the process of study from different, if converging, lines of approach should be energetically continued That the public has seized hold of a big and fruitful idea in the field of Imperial politics is a great gain, but it is accompanied by considerable dangers

> the thicket of the people wil take furtiv fire
> from irresponsible catchwords of live ideas

If unduly generalised the idea is not likely to be conducive to practical action If it is narrowed down to one particular and relatively minor part of its content, in this case the question of tariffs and preferential duties, or if what ought to be a national and Imperial question, beyond party, is prostituted to the selfish purposes of a particular faction, what might be a powerful integrating force will become a disintegrating influence

It is the intention of this article to review some of the underlying causes of the present popularity of the idea of Imperial economic co-operation, to study as many of its different facets as is possible within the limits of space, and to consider what practical measures can be immediately undertaken to promote true economic co-operation throughout the Empire An endeavour will be made to place tariff questions in their right perspective, and to indicate that, while they are a feature of importance in the picture as a whole, they are neither central nor dominating and do not—if a quantitative measure is permissible—occupy more than some 10 per cent. of the canvas

The famous and happy formula of 1926 laid finally to rest the

bugbear of inferiority of status as between the Dominions and the Motherland which has for so long distracted the minds of the members of one Imperial Conference after another from other urgent topics. With the unanimous acceptance of the formula by Governments and peoples alike the constituent parts of the Empire have been free to pay active attention to the means and methods of free association and equal co-operation within the Imperial family to which the Conference of 1926 pointed as the true line of advance The constitutional question being out of the way, men's minds all over the Empire turned naturally to thoughts of the promotion of the economic welfare, not only of their own particular country, but of the Empire as a whole. This tendency was powerfully reinforced by consciousness of the economic maladjustments around them. The centre of gravity was shifting from political and constitutional to economic questions. Membership of a single Empire helped to prevent economic problems from being envisaged solely from parochial standpoints. It was natural, especially in Great Britain, that possible solutions for local economic distress should be sought in plans embracing the British Empire as a whole

Very characteristic is the history of the Colonial Development Fund It had been dreamed of, or planned, by successive Secretaries of State for the Colonies anxious to promote the wise development of the portions of the Empire in Africa in the West Indies, in the Indian and Pacific Oceans—the whole of the British heritage outside India and the Dominions—whose welfare is the responsibility of the British peoples, and in particular of the Colonial Secretary This dream was suddenly translated into fact by the passing in July 1929 of the Colonial Development Act at the instigation of the newly formed Labour Government as part of its programme for relieving unemployment in Great Britain It involved the setting aside of a fund of 1,000,000*l* a year from the revenues of Great Britain, the effects will be realised increasingly in the economic advancement of all parts of the Empire The recent Report of the Colonial Development Advisory Committee makes it clear that the aims and scope of the fund are very extensive Grants and advances are made not only for such projects as the Zambesi Bridge or the development of Famagusta Harbour in Cyprus, which bring large immediate orders to British industry, but also for the promotion of public health, the improvement of housing conditions, aerial surveys, research into problems of human nutrition, and all manner of other purposes

The growth of the idea of the British Empire as an economic unit is a natural concomitant of the increasing tendency to think of Europe as an economic unit and to dream of a European

customs union. The word 'unit' is in both cases liable to mislead and to be misinterpreted. Certainly in the case of the British Empire it is better to think and speak of economic co-operation and an economic family than to adopt words which understress the harmonised diversity on which the unity of the Empire depends in its economic as in its political structure.

There is a long history behind the conception of economic co-operation in the British Empire. The names of Froude, Dilke, Disraeli, Joseph Chamberlain, Harcourt, Milner stand out among the pioneers who have worked towards this goal. Apart, however, from the question of tariffs and Imperial Preference, the machinery for reaching the goal and the machinery of co-operative effort have never been prominently presented for public discussion, and the Empire has not been envisaged as an economic group organised on a grand scale. The idea of the division of the world into a few large-scale economic units is a post-war development. It has been greatly stimulated by the tremendous advance in the economic power of the United States since the opening of the twentieth century. The thought of Europe as an economic unit has in particular been instigated by the example of the United States. Could not conditions equally favourable to material wealth and happiness be brought about in Europe by conscious economic organisation on a scale transcending national and political boundaries? Is not such a reorganisation necessary to enable Europe to stand up against the new economic imperialism of the United States? It is easier to apply the analogy of the United States to Europe than to the British Empire. In Europe the geographical area of the imagined unit is continental. History suggests that for the building up of a big economic unit there should be a customs union which, without destroying individuality or statehood in contiguous groups, could create a great free trade area within which all the groups would find increasing opportunity for economic life and activity. The United States of America themselves, Germany, Canada, Australia, South Africa, even India (in population by far the largest free-trade aggregation in the world), all suggest that the way to material advancement is from the smaller economic unit to the greater, and that a customs union is the essential gateway.

At first sight this line of reasoning precludes the possibility of making the British Empire into an economic group. It is not a continental *bloc* of contiguous States, and has not common land frontiers. It is this absence of common land frontiers and the fact that the British Empire is scattered over the seven seas which have for so long prevented men from seeing the vision of the Empire organised as an economic family. Its geography and its constitutional history were thought to put a

customs union out of court. Joseph Chamberlain, the greatest prophet of Imperial organisation of the last generation, did not indulge in wild talk about Empire Free Trade. Nevertheless he approached the question through the gateway of tariffs, and his campaign for Imperial Preference, becoming entangled in the partisan controversy between Protection and Free Trade in the United Kingdom, has left behind it a habit of mind which makes any audience in this country, when the subject of Imperial economic co-operation or organisation is mooted, think instinctively of tariffs and preferential duties to the exclusion of everything else. The most active propagandists for Imperial economic organisation to-day are trying to escape the issue either by shutting their eyes to the impossibility of Empire Free Trade within any reasonable period of time, or by pretending to themselves that free trade and freer trade have much the same meaning.

Is it a correct reading of history to regard a customs union as a *sine qua non* of large-scale economic groupings? Octroi duties are in fact widely prevalent even to-day in old-established customs unions such as France. They do not destroy her economic unity. That continental Europe will in due course form itself into a large-scale economic family is more than probable. A lowering of tariff walls will certainly accompany or follow economic co-operation between its constituent States. But a customs union and complete free trade are more difficult to forecast, and are surely not an essential prerequisite of economic co-operation in Europe. Already, in spite of tariffs that tend to grow rather than diminish, the political frontiers of Europe are criss-crossed and blurred by industrial and financial groupings which are rather unconscious or oblivious of nationalism than consciously international. The logical extension of the idea of rationalisation, the recognition of the unfruitfulness of economic nationalism, the indifference of applied science to historical survivals which it has outgrown have gone far in continental Europe to lay the foundations of economic unity. Still more is this true of the British Empire, where, in spite of the sturdy pride of nationhood in the Dominions and in portions of the Colonial Empire, cultural, racial and social traditions and ties. British common law, prevalent use of the English language, a common constitutional outlook, a widespread ideal of service, a common approach to a large proportion of the problems of daily life, and a considerable community of material interests reinforce political unity. They have sufficed not only to lay very strong and deep foundations, but even to erect a number of substantial edifices already in active occupation for the purposes of economic co-operation throughout the King's realms.

As the habit of economic co-operation spreads considerable modification of tariffs within the Empire will doubtless be effected, and as the Empire organises itself as an economic family practical considerations will correct existing anomalies in intra-Imperial tariffs and accustom industry to adopt an outlook wider than that which fosters local and parochial demands for prohibitive tariffs against all comers. But it is surely an error to treat tariffs as the starting-point for economic co-operation and to let them obliterate consideration of other more promising methods which are ready to hand or already in use It is the growth and extension of the habit which will make freer trade within the Empire possible; concentration on tariff questions may impede instead of stimulating the growth of the habit. Imperial unity must always be largely a matter of the spirit A tariff is at most an outer cover. Within that cover there must be a feeling of having something in common—a diffusion of goods and of individuals and of ideas. There is every reason to discourage the selfish aim of an Empire politically or economically exclusive To lay stress on tariffs is dangerous just because it panders to the motive of shutting others out

What, then, is being done at the present time to promote Imperial economic co-operation? How can what is being done be improved and extended? What more can be done? These questions have a special importance at this date, because at the moment of writing a Colonial Conference is sitting and in a few months an Imperial Economic Conference will be assembling in London, and their consideration ought to be their chief task. The word 'economic' must be taken in its widest sense if the maximum advantage is to be obtained from the discussions of the Conference, and the whole Empire must be included in its purview even though it is primarily a Conference of the Dominions and India. It is the more important to include the Colonial Empire in that the constitutional formula of 1926 is not entirely satisfactory in regard to relations between the Dominions and the Colonial Empire It would be fatal to the unity of the Empire if the Dominions were to act strictly on the juridical view that the Colonies and Protectorates are the concern of Great Britain only, and the British Empire can never become an economic family if they are ignored. Fortunately logic and constitutional purism are not being allowed to override the facts of the situation. The Irish Free State continues to provide Empire builders for Imperial service throughout the world as freely as in the days of the Union. Canada is taking an increasing interest in the fortunes of the British West Indies. Not only the Rhodes scholars and overseas students of British universities, but others, men and women educated in the Dominions, are taking a growing share in adminis-

trative work in the African Colonies and Protectorates as civil servants, educationalists, in forestry work, in medicine, as well as outside Government service in engineering work of all kinds. Australian mining engineers and oil drillers are prominent in the mines and oilfields of Burma. India's connexion with East Africa is not confined to labourers and small traders, but she also sends sub-assistant surgeons to provide for services which could not be maintained otherwise till education raises the indigenous population to a higher level of civilisation.

The extent to which Imperial economic co-operation has already advanced is obscured by the fact that it is so largely a spontaneous growth owing almost nothing to conscious organisation and that machinery for co-operation scarcely exists. As long ago as 1888 an initial attempt to create such machinery was made when the Imperial Institute came into being, but events in the last forty years have left it largely stranded. Again in 1918 the Dominions Royal Commission recommended the establishment of an Imperial Development Board, but the project fell flat. These two failures were due in part to the preoccupation of the Dominions with questions of constitutional status, but still more to the mistake of attempting to deal with the economics of the Empire through a centralised body sitting continuously in London. Such an organisation is insufficiently flexible, nor can the requisite number of persons of influence in their own countries overseas spare the time for protracted work in London.

A fresh start was made with the constitution of the two Imperial Committees—the Imperial Shipping Committee and the Imperial Economic Committee. Both Committees are composed of representatives of the Governments in agreed proportions, and on the Shipping Committee certain representatives of business and shipping interests also sit. The chairman of each Committee is not a representative of any particular Government. There is an interesting difference in the method of appointment of members to these Committees. All members of the Shipping Committee, which is the older of the two, are appointed by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, acting, so far as concerns the overseas Governments, on nominations of these Governments. On the Economic Committee the various Governments appoint their own representatives direct without any intervention of the Prime Minister of Great Britain, merely notifying changes to the Dominions Office. The cost of both Committees is, however, borne by the British taxpayer. The real financial partnership achieved by the Imperial War Graves Commission is still lacking.

The terms of reference of the Imperial Shipping Committee are:

To enquire into complaints from persons and bodies interested with regard to ocean freights, facilities and conditions in the inter-Imperial

…es or questions of a similar nature referred to them by any of the …minating authorities, and to report their conclusions to the Govern…nts concerned;

To survey the facilities for maritime transport on such routes as appear … them to be necessary for trade with the Empire and to make recom…endations about speed of ships, harbours, docks, etc

…hipping magnates have a natural predilection for freedom of …rade, and would strongly oppose attempts to force them to …evelop their shipping on particular lines for the benefit of the …mpire without regard to the economics of the round voyage. …he tramp owners have an uncanny skill in discovering where a …argo is likely to be picked up, and it is on their skill that British …rade, as well as British shipping, have long depended in competi…on with rivals The Imperial Shipping Committee was brought …nto being to provide machinery for preventing dangerous clashes …f interest between those who are developing raw material and …hose who own ships It was Mr Massey, of New Zealand, who …oresaw the danger and secured the formation of the Committee …hich has done valuable service in reconciling the functions of …ritish shipping as a world carrier and as the link which holds the …mpire together

The terms of reference of the Imperial Economic Committee …re:

To consider the possibility of improving the methods of preparing for …arket and marketing within the United Kingdom the food products of the …verseas parts of the Empire with a view to increasing the consumption …f such products within the United Kingdom in preference to imports …om foreign countries and to promote the interests both of producers and …onsumers.

…hese terms of reference were agreed to in 1925 At the Imperial …onference of 1923 it had been proposed to establish an Imperial …conomic Committee with less restricted terms of reference:

To consider and advise upon any matters of an economic or commercial …aracter, not being appropriate to the Shipping Committee, which are …eferred to it by any constituent Government, provided that no question …hich has reference to another part of the Empire may be referred without …he consent of that other part

…hese terms were accepted by a majority of the Conference, but …ad never been made operative It will be seen that under the …erms finally agreed the work of the Committee was subject to three …imitations. It could only inquire into subjects agreed to by all …overnments; those subjects had to relate to the marketing of …mpire produce; and the object of its inquiries had to be the …creased marketing of such produce in the United Kingdom.

The Imperial Conference of 1926 extended the terms so as to

enable it to conduct inquiries into the marketing of raw materials and to make suggestions for the conduct of trade surveys. Even so, however, the Committee deals only with a small section of Imperial economics. Nevertheless, it has done very valuable work. It has made a beginning of the all-important task of preparing the facts and bringing together some of the information needed for a survey of the economic needs and potentialities of the Empire as a family. Its reports on particular trades have been widely used all over the Empire, and it has recently presented to the public an exceptionally interesting document entitled *A Memorandum on the Trade of the British Empire*, written by Sir David Chadwick, the Secretary to the Committee. In this document the trade of the Empire as a whole is analysed into intra-Imperial trade, which is treated as the domestic trade of the Empire, and foreign trade The figures bring out the fact that the foreign trade of the Empire, taken as a whole, exceeds that of the United States of America, and would almost certainly exceed that of the continent of Europe if the latter were treated as a unit in such a way as to exclude trade between European States as coming under the category of domestic trade It is shown that the total value of trade conducted between the Empire and foreign countries in 1923 and 1927 is about three times the value of strictly intra-Imperial trade, but that, in spite of this, each considerable portion of the Empire finds a market for over 40 per cent of its exports among other members of the Empire. About 84 per cent of the total of intra-Imperial trade is focussed on the United Kingdom, either converging upon it or radiating from it The difficulties of the United Kingdom in finding markets for its exports since the war, and the line upon which they might be solved, are suggestively brought out in the fact that whereas the United Kingdom exports to foreign countries have fallen by 30 per cent in volume as compared to 1913, the fall in intra-Imperial exports from the United Kingdom is less than 9 per cent.

It should be an inspiration to statesmen of the Empire when they meet to discuss Imperial economic questions to know that they are dealing with the economics of a section of the world which does a larger international trade than any other one conceivable unit, and of a section in which the countries comprising it are dependent upon each other in each instance for well over 40 per cent. of their total export trade. They should further be heartened by the knowledge that, in spite of the lag caused by the United Kingdom's post-war difficulties, the external trade of the Empire as a whole has increased since 1913 more rapidly than the average of the world If one of the main objects of the League of Nations is to strive to promote peaceful relations and

economic goodwill amongst all the countries of the world, the statesmen of the Empire, quite apart from any sentimental or cultural associations, will, in considering intra-Imperial economic relations, be working towards the same objective for a section of the world which is perhaps economically the most important of all.

It would be an immense addition to the services which the Imperial Economic Committee has already rendered in promoting the habit of thinking of the Empire as an economic family if a similar survey could be made by it of the Empire's position in the matter of the provision of capital for new development, distinguishing carefully between intra-Imperial and extra-Imperial movements of capital It is not quite satisfactory that with unlimited demands for new capital for development all over the Empire the British Empire should on balance be an exporter of capital. London's liabilities for finding money for European reconstruction cannot of course be ignored, but the habit of investing imperially needs to be stimulated and the machinery of the London Money Market directed towards Imperial needs. The Colonial Development Fund, already mentioned, is a valuable step towards the canalisation of Imperial capital

The most important recommendation hitherto made by the Imperial Economic Committee is that which led to the formation of the Empire Marketing Board Political events in 1924 deprived the Dominions of the hope of certain preferences which had been held out to them at the Imperial Conference of 1923. The Empire Marketing Board was given a sum of 1,000,000*l* a year with a view to furthering the marketing in the United Kingdom of Empire products, including home agricultural products The theory is that this sum is given in compensation for the loss of the proposed preferences, and is not therefore to be regarded as a free gift from the pocket of the British taxpayer, but rather as a sum due to the producers of the Empire in place of the preferential duties which were to have served a similar purpose The chairman of the Empire Marketing Board is the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, and its members are appointed by the Governments of each of the Dominions, with a representative of the Colonial Empire appointed by the Colonial Secretary Expenditure from the grant is under the control of the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs No single body has done more to make people think imperially than the Empire Marketing Board, and its posters and films drawing attention to the possibility and desirability of shopping imperially are known throughout the length and breadth of Great Britain. Even more valuable than its publicity work has been the encouragement given to scientific research and economic investigation in every part of the Empire,

with a view to the practical application of the results for the good of the Empire as a whole.[8]

The existing official machinery for the organisation of economic co-operation includes also such bodies as the Overseas Settlement Board, the Standing Committee on Empire Forestry, the Imperial Agricultural Bureaux The Executive Council of the Agricultural Bureaux is specially interesting as a type of a new form of machinery for Imperial co-operation, in which the principle of devolution is fully recognised, and by means of which agricultural research and to some extent the problems of the marketing of agricultural produce throughout the Empire are linked up. The Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture in Trinidad, the Amani Institute in Tanganyika, the Veterinary Research Institute at Onderstipoort, the Waite Institute at Adelaide, and so on, are true embodiments of the ideal of an Imperial Economic Family It is perhaps correct to class under the heading of machinery also the intra-Imperial Conferences on Education, Forestry, Agricultural Research, Communications, Statistics, and all sorts of other subjects The habit of holding official conferences of this kind has developed spontaneously since the war, and offers striking evidence of the growth of the spirit of free association among the States of the Empire This habit is not confined to Governments and officials The Empire Parliamentary Association may be mentioned as an instance of an organisation which is half-way between the official and non-official categories, and by arranging visits to all parts of the Empire it has done much to stimulate family feeling It is not necessary here to give instances of non-official Imperial conferences Any reader of this article could at once call to mind many examples Such non-official conferences are outside the category of official machinery of Imperial co-operation Everyone will agree, however, that the annual meetings of the British Association in different parts of the Empire, in Canada and South Africa, for example, are powerful instruments in promoting the habit of scientific and intellectual co-operation So, too, is the fact that such a body as the British Medical Association is organised as an Imperial body The Empire Mining and Metallurgical Conference is another body which has followed the practice of meeting in different Dominions It was this Conference which at its meeting in Canada in 1928 put forward a plea for a mineral survey of the Empire, which is to be further discussed at the Congress to be held this year in South Africa. Mention must also be made of the work of the British Cotton Growing

[8] For a full account of the activities of the Empire Marketing Board the reader is referred to the last annual report for the period ending May 1930 (E.M.B.28, obtainable from the Stationery Office at the price of 1s net)

Association and of the British Engineering Standards Association and various Committees of the Baltic, each engaged in its own province in actively promoting the development of Empire production and encouraging uniformity in methods of grading and in trade practice. In particular the work of the British Engineering Standards Association, which aims at the introduction of common measures and standards throughout the Empire, suggests a most promising line of advance towards the rationalisation and standardisation of production and marketing on Imperial lines

On the marketing side of agriculture, recent years have seen the growth of producers' associations all over the Empire Their purpose is primarily to assist the producers of particular products in particular countries What can be done by such means is brilliantly exemplified in the results achieved by the New Zealand honey producers By imposing standards of quality for export and regulating supplies so that the honey did not all come on the market (mainly the London market) at once, and appointing an agent in London to receive shipments, blend the honey and place it among the wholesalers and retailers as New Zealand honey, with its identity insisted upon New Zealand has revolutionised her position in the world market for honey These producers' associations, however are doing more than secure Imperial markets; they are becoming important organs of Imperial economic co-operation and are pointing the way to a possible new method of approach through import boards and bulk purchasing organisations to the solution of some of the problems which have tended hitherto to be attacked almost entirely through the medium of tariffs

BASIL BLACKETT.

(To be continued)

EDUCATION AND REFORMS IN INDIA

A FUNDAMENTAL question which the Simon Commission had to consider is that of education. The Government of India Act of 1919 launched India upon a voyage directed towards democratic and responsible government—of government, that is, by authorities who will be answerable for their actions to elected Legislatures, and, ultimately, to the electorate which has chosen those bodies. At the last census, out of a population of 247,000,000 in British India, only some 18,500,000 were returned as literate. The electorate to-day is even smaller. It may be urged that the Indian peasant (and, since 71 per cent. of the population are engaged in agricultural pursuits, the peasantry are predominantly important) is by his very nature a reliable voter. The *ryot*, as anyone who is acquainted with him well knows, is a true gentleman—quiet, courteous, dignified, of simple and moral habits, thrifty (save for amiable outbursts of altruistic expenditure which are imposed upon him by tradition), industrious, patient in face of calamity, a lover of the open air, of the soil which he tills, of the rain which nurtures, and of the sun which ripens, his crops. But his outlook is limited to the village, to the fortunes and mishaps of his neighbours, to his fields and to the excitement of an occasional pilgrimage. Shrewd within his narrow sphere, contented with his lot (which is far happier than that of his forbears under bygone forms of rule), he is quite ignorant of the problems of administration and liable to be misled by specious promises, fabricated rumours, and empty blandishments. The Commission realise that education is not an indispensable requisite for the intelligent use of the vote, but that it assists in the formation of an electorate which will be potentially more capable of understanding issues submitted to its judgment; and it is reasonable to regard the extent of popular education 'as a not untrustworthy general guide to a people's fitness for the exercise of political privileges.'

Nor does the problem end with the tiller of the soil. The object in view is the production, not merely of an intelligent electorate, nor yet of a class (which India happily possesses) of useful public servants, but also of what the Commission describe

as 'a directing class, capable of sane and inspiring leadership in the political field.' It is largely to secondary and higher education that we must look for the formation of these qualities and of a wholesome political atmosphere.

Education is in fact 'a vital service' It is a potent factor in creating a capacity for self-government; the manner of its handling under the Reforms will serve as a criterion of the working of the Constitution initiated in 1919; and success in its handling will, the Commission think, perhaps afford a better assurance to the peoples of British India than success in any other field that their own Governments are capable of translating ideals into action and guiding enthusiasm into fruitful channels. The importance of the subject was recognised in the Act, which directs the attention of the Statutory Commission especially to education The Commission, mindful of this injunction and conscious of the complications and difficulties with which educational problems bristle, set up an Auxiliary Committee to investigate the subject

This Committee, composed of six persons of whom three are Indians, produced last year a unanimous report, subject to several notes by individual members and one minute of dissent which deals with religious and communal questions Part I of the Commission's Report contains an interesting chapter on education, in which the Commissioners generally endorse the picture presented by the Committee

The picture is not altogether encouraging The inquiry does indeed show that growth has been rapid In the ten years ending in 1927 the number of pupils in recognised institutions has increased by 46 per cent, the total expenditure on education by 118 per cent, and the amount of Government funds devotedto this object by 205 per cent But it is necessary to look beneath these figures The Committee had to lament the enormous wastage in elementary instruction, due to the brief duration of school-life, which involves the 'total loss of 60 per cent. of the expenditure on mass-education and the prevention of all but a few pupils from becoming literate' Bengal—a province which claims to be among the most enlightened—faithfully observes Mr. Robert Lowe's injunction that education, if it is inefficient, shall at least be cheap, and pays its primary teachers (75 per cent. of whom have had no training) an average salary of less than 13s. a month. (It is only fair to observe that in Bombay the salary is from five to six times this amount) The Commission stress the fact that adult education has hardly begun, save in the striking and valuable work done in the Army—that cockshy of Indian politicians, expenditure upon which they resent as absorbing resources which would be better employed on 'nation-building' activities.

The Committee went so far as to envisage a scheme of compulsory primary education calculated to bring under instruction 80 per cent. of the boys and girls at an additional annual cost of 15,000,000*l.*, against which certain minor savings might be effected. The estimate is based on a modest annual expenditure of 12*s.* for each boy and 16*s.* 6*d* for each girl—which is the cost to-day. Capital expenditure is excluded from the bill; and the training of a new army of teachers would be a long and costly operation Even the bare sum suggested would form a serious burden on provincial and local revenues, which are limited and inelastic. The imposition of the requisite taxes would present difficulty 'People may be willing to pay taxes for education,' says Mr Edwyn Bevan in his *Thoughts on Indian Discontents*, 'if they appreciate the value of education, but they have to be already educated up to a certain point before they appreciate the value of education.' Here there is a vicious circle. Though the principle of some sort of compulsion has been embodied in legislation in nine provinces, the practical adoption of compulsion has been slow in urban areas and, with the exception of the Punjab and the Central Provinces and Berar, has made no headway in rural areas The Commission, though they received evidence which would support an extension of compulsion, regard universal compulsion as 'for the present hardly a practicable policy, if only on grounds of finance' Nor is the difficulty merely one of finance. The Commission 'believe that the desire for education is widespread' But other statements which they make appear to qualify this belief 'The Indian villager may be willing for his child to go to school for a year or two, but, as soon as the child can give help in the fields or the home, economic pressure and long tradition are strong inducements to take the child away, especially as the cultivator does not, as a rule, value education for its own sake'

But, if the percentage of literacy among the masses is low and that of those undergoing any sort of instruction is only 4½ of the population, the facilities for what the Committee calls 'education for the directing classes' are fully ample Indeed, in several provinces 'the economic limit of the provision of new high schools has been reached' The Committee (with one weighty voice of dissent) was able to paint a brighter picture. But such brightness as it possesses is flecked with sinister tones. The ambition of the secondary pupil is to enter a university; and, said the Committee, 'there are unmistakable indications that the standards in some of the universities are not satisfactory.' Indian universities 'are burdening themselves, and are allowing their constituent and affiliated colleges to burden themselves, with a very large number of students who have little or no chance

of completing a university course successfully, and on whom expenditure of money intended for university education is wasted.' Hence many fall out by the way; and, as regards the successful, the Committee records that it is well known 'that the universities and colleges of India are at the present moment turning out large numbers of graduates who cannot find employment.' It is an old story Time and again has the Government striven to encourage technical and other vocational avenues. But the tide flows strong through the conventional channel, and India is swamped with 'failed B A 's,' with unemployed B.A.'s, with immature and ill-disciplined students who, devoid as they are of experience or any sound mental training, offer the most promising material for the irresponsible agitator 'We wish,' wrote the Committee, 'that there were more signs that the universities regarded the training of broad-minded, tolerant and self-reliant citizens as one of their primary functions '

Here again expansion has been impressive Ten new universities have sprung into being since 1916 But, when it is found that in one province the allocation of expenditure is 32 per cent upon secondary, 22 per cent upon university, and only 17 per cent. upon primary education, the suspicion arises that the pressure of middle-class opinion has won undue advantages for the type of instruction which that class so loudly demands The outlay has not been judicious The Commission find in the Committee's review and in the supplementary note (written by Sir Amherst Selby-Bigge) 'much evidence of the same waste and ineffectiveness which characterise mass education and the same defects of direction, control and administration to which they are attributable.'

The weaknesses are obvious The general upshot is that a great but misdirected effort has been made There has been much expansion, but the expansion, at least for the purpose of creating an instructed electorate, has so far failed Ministers have had at their disposal far larger sums than were previously available for education, yet there has been no advance, commensurate with this expenditure, towards the diffusion of a sense of citizenship Of the two main causes which have contributed to this failure (for it is no less than failure) one can be removed only by a radical change in the public attitude which at present renders the establishment of a satisfactory system of mass education 'one of the most tremendous problems which educationists have ever had to face,' and by the breaking down of prejudices which, among other things, militate against the instruction of women; and the Commission rightly describe the Indian woman as 'pivotal.' The other cause lies in these 'defects of direction, control and administration' which have already been

mentioned. Such matters are capable of a readier cure; and they may usefully be examined.

The Commission realise that their function was not to propound a scheme of educational reform, but to note the causes of weakness and ineffectiveness and the remedies which the Committee's investigation suggests, and to examine indications of the manner in which Ministers have exercised their responsibility for administration. They make it clear that Ministers have inherited a system—a faulty system, and they are careful to assure the reader that they would be very sorry if their observations 'were regarded as attributing reproach or blame either to Ministers or to their official predecessors.' The system under which education is conducted dates from the middle of the last century and from the initiation, in the latter half of that century, of the principle of local self-government. Education has always been, at least as regards its details, a provincial subject. But, prior to 1919, the Government of India exercised a large control over expenditure in the provinces, undertook university legislation, and, by the disbursal of grants ear-marked for particular objects, were able to direct the educational policy of local Governments. Moreover, there was a service called the Indian Educational Service, the members of which were recruited by the Secretary of State and performed important duties both in the colleges and some of the secondary schools and in the general work of direction and inspection. Even so, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report commented upon the number of agencies, public and private, which were at that time concerned with the guidance of educational development, and remarked that lack of co-ordination was the main defect of the existing system. Primary education was practically in the hands of local bodies. True, the influence of the district officer was then paramount on most of those bodies, but it did not necessarily follow that he and his colleagues always saw eye to eye with the educational inspector. Secondary education had been deliberately left almost entirely to private agency, with the result that it often expanded, not on any orderly and economic plan, but on indiscriminate lines dictated by communal or private interests. 'Bureaucratic' interference was resented; uneconomic growth led to depressed standards and unwholesome competition. The universities were largely non-official bodies vested with extensive powers, and the problem was complicated by what the Commission describe as 'the peculiar patronage' which they exercised over high schools in respect of recognition. There have been occasions when the disastrous results of this patronage have been tragically illustrated. In a word, neither the Government nor its corps of expert advisers was even then master in the sphere of education.

How have the changes of the past ten years modified this position? For better or for worse? In the first place, education was classed, under the diarchical scheme of the Reforms, as a provincial and transferred subject—that is to say, the Government of India were divested (with minor exceptions) of their directing power, and the portfolio of Education was handed over in each province to an Indian Minister responsible to the local Legislature. The central Government has now surrendered even its advisory functions. For, though the post of Educational Commissioner with the Government of India has been saved by a rather undignified device, the Central Advisory Board and the Bureau of Education (which the Commission rather curiously mention under the head of 'Directly Administered Areas,' though they were designed to exercise an all-India influence) have been abolished, apparently in the interests of economy.

It was only natural that, under the system envisaged in the Reforms, Indian Ministers should be placed in charge of a 'nation-building' branch of administration, in which they might be expected to manifest special interest. But their activities are subjected to a public opinion (so far as a public opinion can be said to exist) which shouts for quantity, ignores quality, and too often advocates lowering of standards and indiscipline. And, next, their efforts were hampered by two other administrative changes. First, the character and functions of local bodies were altered. In another chapter the Commission comment on the failure in India to realise the need for control by provincial Governments over local self-governing authorities, and contrast the increasing measure of Government's power of interference which in England has accompanied the delegation of wider and more complicated duties with the free devolution of responsibility upon local bodies in India—a matter in which (they remark) 'it is now evident that the action of some provincial Governments was both precipitate and excessive.' 'In England, where the principle of decentralisation is honoured and local self-government is strong and highly developed, much more power is reserved to and exercised by the Department, acting through its permanent educational advisers, than in India.' In the case of India the restraints were inopportunely removed; the provincial Government lost the district officer as its agent on the local body; the Minister lost his powers of control; for he could no longer use the gentler forms of pressure and would naturally be reluctant to proceed to the extreme measures of dissolution or suspension—the pole-axe instead of the spur or the rein. The Commission say that the resultant mistakes are more correctly described as 'breaches of trust.' Government is the trustee, and 'trusteeship

involves the reservation and the exercise of the powers necessary for securing its due discharge.'

Second, the staff upon which the Minister has to depend for professional advice and the realisation of many schemes has been depleted and weakened. The Commission peak of the vital importance of Government inspection—'Government's administrative key to advance' Yet there has been a partial transfer of the services of inspectors to local bodies, the number of inspectors, notwithstanding the increase of schools, has been diminished, and the character of the educational service has been changed in important respects A Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India (set up in 1923) recommended the abolition of all-India services the members of which were engaged upon transferred subjects, on the ground that, although Ministers had been given full power to prescribe policy, they might be hampered in carrying out their policies by the limitation to their control over such services, inasmuch as the members were appointed by the Secretary of State and their salaries were not subject to the vote of the Legislatures This argument is open to obvious criticism, and it may be noted that the Montagu-Chelmsford Report had emphasised the necessity of retaining in India 'the willing help and guidance of many men like those who have led her thus far on her way Nevertheless, in accordance with this Commission's recommendation, recruitment to the Indian Educational Service has been stopped, those who composed it (and who have not resigned in view of the growing difficulties of the situation) are dying out, and with them the European element is rapidly disappearing Not only say the Commission, does the provincialisation of the educational service and the closing down of recruitment for the Indian Educational Service make the problems of recruitment and training even more difficult than they were, but also, 'for better or worse, European standards and methods of education have been adopted in British India, and to say that for some time to come the experience of Europeans will be necessary for their effective application implies no reflection on the capacity of Indians to assimilate and profit by that experience and eventually to dispense with it'

The gloom of the picture is relieved by the signs of new movements—the growth of a missionary spirit, a welcome activity among women, an awakening of conscience to the condition of the depressed classes, the generosity of the wealthy and the zeal of Ministers. These are forces which make for progress. But they require guidance, otherwise funds and efforts will be dissipated. The Commission note the unwitting intensification of difficulties by the very enthusiasm which has impelled Ministers to insufficiently considered advance on the old lines. A combina-

tion of administrative changes—changes which were almost simultaneous and have reacted one upon the other—has resulted in partial dislocation. Devolution of powers has taken place in the Executive, in the Legislatures, in local affairs A perusal of this part of the Commission's survey suggests the question whether a due balance has been maintained between attempts to educate the people in self-government on the one hand, and, on the other, the progress already made towards general literacy and a higher average of intelligence without which such lessons will be nugatory. Have the safeguards been removed prematurely? Is the general mental calibre strong enough to bear the strain of this advanced course of instruction in responsibility? The Commission sum up the situation in a pregnant example of meiosis 'The prospect of an educated India is remote, while the dangers which might arise from an uneducated India are not diminishing'

H SHARP.

THE GOVERNMENT AND OUR SUGAR COLONIES

Two months ago, in this Review, Mr Ormsby Gore discussed 'The Sugar Crisis,' and its effects in our West Indian Colonies and Mauritius

The declared present attitude of His Majesty's Government in regard to that crisis is that, so far as assistance by tariff adjustment or regulation of price are concerned, they will not interfere with the normal courses of trade and markets, nor will they give any assurance that even the existing tariff preference will be maintained after this financial year If, however, the Colonial sugar industry 'can be put by research or improvements in a position to withstand world competition,' assistance will be given from the Development Fund for improving cane, for combating diseases and pests of the cane, for improving means of transportation and cultivation, and possibly, though this is not clear, for assisting in factory improvements Obviously no help of this kind can take early effect, even if the delays of the Development Board are not serious Obviously, also, so far as it may demand expenditure or the increase of debt by planters and factories, these cannot be faced with sugar at its present price and prospects, and with the uncertainty as to the preference hanging over the industry And if or when the worse comes to the worst, 'if any portion of the industry is temporarily or permanently suspended' (which is already occurring), 'then we shall have to take measures for finding some sort of alternative living for the workers displaced, and at any rate maintaining them if there is any appearance of distress'

An 'appearance of distress'! The expression reminds me of nothing so much as of the philosophical comment made to me by a Jamaican in a period of local dearth in that island, caused by recurrent drought. 'Dem Pedro people, dem bred to hungry and starving from time!' 'The people,' said the Treasurer of Barbados to my Commission, 'will be starving; and will have to be fed.' That situation is already arising.

The concluding paragraph of Lord Passfield's despatch is, perhaps, of the whole, the most provokingly empty, and will

probably, to those conversant with the situation, appear, in view of their experience during the last thirty or forty years, the most astonishing. It runs as follows:

It must, unfortunately, be recognised that, notwithstanding all the assistance that may be available, it may not be found possible that the whole of the areas in which sugar is now produced should continue in the cultivation of that crop, and that in some cases the substitution of other crops may be necessary. I am confident that the help of the Colonial Development Fund will be liberally extended to support such measures to facilitate the substitution of other crops as may commend themselves to you and to my agricultural advisers

What 'all the assistance that may be available' amounts to has already been pointed out Unless a higher level of price than the present can be ensured, and the continuance of the preference—or its equivalent, at least—be guaranteed, the industry must slowly or quickly perish. Let it be recognised—I myself see no help for it now, though help might with some effect have been given six months ago—that some of the weaker estates must in any case go out but let it also be recognised and frankly admitted, without further dissimulation that under the conditions now indicated the whole industry will go out. And let it also be recognised and declared that that must not be allowed to happen Not even a Socialist Government, committed by its Chancellor of the Exchequer to the most ultra-individualistic principles of competitive capitalism, can afford that discredit For many years—ever since the Report of the West India Royal Commission of 1897 and earlier, but especially since the establishment of the West Indian Department of Agriculture—the best agricultural talent available, scientific and practical, and the best energies of numbers of very intelligent planters have been devoted to the problem of finding some alternative crop to sugar that could be cultivated at a profit Lord Passfield has, in the 1897 and the 1930 Reports, in the archives of the West Indian Agricultural Department and in the reports being now sent forward from that Department in view of the present crisis complete demonstration of the practical futility of the suggestion that any alternative paying crop can be substituted for sugar in those districts into which it has been driven by economic necessity and has survived by its natural suitability The most important practicable alternative means of even providing subsistence for the labouring populations—and that is not a money-yielding alternative—is that recommended by both the Sugar Commissions, that they should be provided with land to enable them at least to grow their own food.

It is now common knowledge [writes Lord Passfield] that the existing duties upon sugar imported into this country will not be altered during the

present financial year, and that the undertaking given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the House of Commons on July 9 last holds good . . . that, as long as those duties, upon which preferences were given, are in operation, those preferences would be maintained. I trust that any persons who hesitated to continue planting operations owing to uncertainty regarding the continuance of the preference during the current financial year will now be reassured, and that they will be able to avail themselves of the help which his Majesty's Government have offered to provide as regards advances for the purposes of cultivation.

The 'trust' expressed in this sentence has conveyed to the persons concerned no reassurance whatever. If 'the continuance of the preference' *after* the current financial year (ending March 1931) has been assured, the passage might have the significance which it would appear to be meant to convey. 'Planting' means, on sugar estates, the ploughing, manuring and cultivation of land and the setting of new 'seed'—*i.e.*, cane-joints with buds, which, if done now, would grow into a 'crop' to be reaped about eighteen months later. Cane 'planted' this summer and autumn will be reaped not earlier than the winter and spring of 1931–32. Much, but not all, of it could be made into sugar and sold within that financial year, and if the preference were then still in existence the price would be so much the better. But as there is no assurance that the preference will be maintained after March 1931, whilst, on the other hand, Mr. Snowden declares that he will sweep it away as soon as he can possibly dispense with the sugar duties, the existing 'continuance of the preference' gives no 'reassurance' whatever in regard to the risks of 'planting.' The most this year's preference can do is to enable rather more to be spent (in view of the better prospects of price) on cultivating and attending to the cane already planted in 1929 or early in this year, and to encourage some continuance and maintenance of expenditure and employment of labour in attending to canes planted in or before 1928, and recently reaped, so that they may yield 'ratoon' crops, which would have been sacrificed had the preference not been maintained. This sacrifice is already, on some estates, being made. When, however, 'planting' stops it means that the estate is being wound up. It cannot live on ratoons.

The most serious immediate factor in the position is, in fact, the uncertainty whether the preference will be maintained after next March, or some guarantee given of at least equivalent help after that date. It is essential that the prime importance of this point should be recognised if it is hoped to enable any substantial part of the industry to be maintained, even at the present rate of its losses, in the hope of better future conditions. It is additionally important because the uncertainty which the Chancellor of the Exchequer resolutely maintained up to the date of his Budget statement this year, combined with his repeatedly announced

desire to abolish the preference, depreciated and in great measure destroyed the market for the 1929–30 crop of sugar up to the date of his statement. The existing situation, combined with similar reticence, will have the same effect on the market for the crop of 1930–31, until the next Budget statement is made. These considerations have repeatedly been pointed out to Lord Passfield. In his speeches and in his published despatches he has not, indeed, denied, but has discreetly ignored them.

The Government's attitude, as expressed by Lord Passfield, appears to those for whose interests he is responsible (and it may, without any element of unwarrantable assumption, be said—to his Governors and their local councillors also) to be comparable to that of a man who is shown a valuable ship and has had it explained to him that she has a large hole in her plates, is filling with water, is already beginning to sink, and in a short time, if the leak is not stopped, will founder This is the immediate position of the British Colonial sugar industry Already cane-planting estates, on which some of the most efficient factories depend, are being thrown out. Already new planting for any future crop is being suspended or drastically reduced Already field labourers are being deprived of employment, whilst the wages of those retained (which Governors have attested could not tolerably be reduced) are being cut down The like with factory staff Large groups of estates with good factories, owned by strong companies, are being maintained at a loss and without improvement or proper upkeep of their machinery They are prepared to hold on up to a certain limit of loss but not beyond Then if the leak in the ship has not been effectually dealt with, the foundering will accelerate rapidly At the same time there is a man in the ship's course lying up for her with a torpedo the promised abolition of preference That will inevitably make very short work indeed of anything that may still remain above water

Of course the man on the bank may not yet see that the ship is sinking The beginnings of the process are not conspicuous. Jamaica and Trinidad, which get income and revenue from other resources than sugar, are keeping submergence at bay within their own bulkheads by local subsidies No other Colonies are in a position to do so But the effects on Colonial revenue and the increasing demands arising from the needs of the labouring population will assuredly in a few months' time begin to make themselves sensible even within the Colonial Office I am informed that they are being reported already. And the man with the torpedo is still in the fairway

Lord Passfield offers the ship scientific assistance to make better fuel, loans to improve her engines. If there is any difficulty about advances on freight he will promise to pay a quarter

of the loss which any lender on that security may incur, provided that the Colonial Governments (rapidly approaching insolvency) will bear another quarter and the lender incur the risk of the other half. The banks concerned very quickly made it clear (the Royal Bank of Canada publicly so) that the principles of banking security upon which they are accustomed to make advances to planters would be prudently adhered to, and that they would not be tempted to risk greater probable losses by the prospect of getting one half, up to a limit, of such losses recouped to them.

Lord Passfield's despatch refers to the statement of Government policy in regard to the West Indian and Mauritius Sugar Reports (Cmd 3523), which, he says, 'gives briefly the reasons which make it impossible to accept the recommendations made by the West India Commission' 'An Import Board . with a guaranteed price . . would in effect require the community in the United Kingdom to contribute some millions of pounds a year to the sugar industry in the Colonies concerned' Just how much net sacrifice it would impose upon consumers I need not here examine substantially less than the 5,500,000*l* appropriated this year for the British beet sugar industry in addition to the cost of preference which it enjoys equally with Colonial sugar production But undoubtedly Mr MacDonald's Government has to choose between the practical ruin of some of our most ancient Colonies, accompanied with severe damage to others, and the sacrifice of some part of our continually increasing cheapness of sugar Briefly, my Commission argued that with sugar prices pooled through an Import Board, giving Colonial producers a living price and buying outside at the present bankrupt-stock prices, white sugar could be retailed here (without duty) at 1¾*d* per lb.—which, I submit, is quite cheap enough With uncontrolled importation it could be retailed at 1¼*d* per lb , the cost of maintaining our Colonial sugar industry and preserving a whole province of our Empire and the Colony of Mauritius from pauperisation and ruin being represented by the sacrifice of ½*d*. per lb. of the increased cheapness We shared the view expressed by Sir Henry Norman, Sir David Barbour, and the present Lord Grey of Fallodon in their 1897 Report .

> The benefit which the British Empire as a whole derives from any lowering of the price of sugar due to the operation of the bounty system is too dearly purchased by the injury which that system imposes on a limited class, namely, Your Majesty's West Indian and other subjects dependent on the sugar industry '

Lord Passfield has also argued that 'other industries are in the same unfortunate position of finding price below the average cost of production, and that it would be impossible to stand the

drain of meeting the position of all these industries.' The comparison is inapplicable. The West Indies are an outlying province of our own State, which governs them, though they have no voice in its government. It happens that they are largely—in some cases entirely, and with no immediate possible substitute—dependent upon one important staple which we buy, but which is not, or is only quite artificially, and through State aid, a British home industry. Our State, as a State policy, created those Colonies and peopled them with transplanted Africans and Indians for the purpose of growing sugar If our home industries are in difficulties, as they are, they provide mutual support, and we recognise as a State an imperative obligation to avert the worst results from our workers. The basis of our social institutions is not destroyed Both the principal parties in the State advocate positive methods, overriding the principles of free individualism, for dealing with these difficulties These Colonies have no such Imperial safeguards We, as consumers only, get all the advantages of cheaper sugar , they bear all the loss—the destruction of their whole power of earning, without unemployment relief, and of the public revenue, which depends almost entirely upon the industry

Unless the price of sugar is stabilised at a living rate the whole British colonial and home sugar industry will shortly be destroyed. The simplest way of avoiding this would be by means of an Import Board , and of all trades Colonial sugar is that to which it would be easiest to apply that method, for there is already practically only one British buyer, the associated refineries. The next best alternative is to guarantee maintenance of the preference. This is not, under present conditions, adequate to carry the industry through the present crisis with any hope of general recovery when smoother water is reached In order to do this, the simplest mode would be to raise the British preference to the equivalent of the Canadian—4s 8d per cwt A statesmanlike move would be to reduce the existing duty on sugar from its present rate of 8s 2d a cwt to that lower figure, leaving Colonial sugar free Unless such measures as these or their equivalent are quickly decided upon, the progressive ruin which is threatening these communities will soon overtake them.

I do not think that that is quite so negligible a prospect as the official attitude of His Majesty's Government would appear to imply that they are content to suppose Independently of the cruelty to the Colonies involved in such callous meanness it will certainly provoke the contempt of all our Dominions and the malicious amusement of our national trade-competitors.

OLIVIER.

THE AFRICAN LABOURER IN 1929

The lists of African policy have been generally left free for errant Quixotes breaking lances with religious fervour before the spasmodic applause of spectators whose attention is distracted by the duty of prodding their neighbours sleeping till more political issues come up for decision. The past year, however, has seen something like a tattoo, with even archbishops putting an edge to their croziers in their zeal to take a knock.

This awakening of interest is all the more remarkable for the fact that the lists have not run red with blood. A few lives lost in Durban, a few cattle lifted in Kenya, some stones flying in Gambia make about the sum of what usually alone can arouse popular interest in African affairs. Instead of intoxicating blood there have been a Commission, an International Conference, an Act of Parliament, and, surely least of all likely to awaken the sleepers, a couple of lectures at a university.

It is, however, by no means too early for some such stimulation of attention. Professor Buell, writing in December 1927, said that 'Africa is the one continent of the world where by the application of intelligence, knowledge and good-will, it is not too late to adopt policies which will prevent the development of the acute racial difficulties which have elsewhere arisen, and the evils of which have been recognised only after they have come into existence.' Yet what development there has been in the short period since he wrote throws doubt on his optimistic vision of a continent parching for lack of enlightenment. On the contrary, Africa, both white and black, is lapping up economic and social change so greedily as to justify the apprehension that before the statesmen have agreed on a formula, brewed and bottled it, their panacea will have become as undrinkable as the mead of the Anglo-Saxons.

THE EAST AFRICAN PROPOSALS

This would be a pity, for, even if realities are still coursing ahead of measures for the shaping of policy, nevertheless in the past year progress has been achieved in investigating the condi-

tions requisite for healthy development. In particular the Hilton Young Report is generally admitted to be the most important analysis of East African tendencies yet drafted by an authoritative body. Its main arguments can be traced to the realisation of the basic fact that the future of Africa depends upon the African labourer, whether working in European employment or on his own account on his own tribal lands.

Indeed, the Commission came to the conclusion that when non-native enterprise is introduced among primitive peoples—the main factor of the situation throughout East Africa except Uganda—the problems centring upon the supply of labour dominate the whole situation, both economic and political. An acute shortage of labour may have serious political repercussions and make the task of government in relation to the immigrant communities much more difficult. On the other hand, excessive demands on the native communities for labour must be most damaging to native society and to the proper development of native political institutions.

The Commission therefore held that, in dealing with native labour, the Government has two main duties to perform. The first is to ensure that the African sells his labour on fair terms. The second is to see that the labour demands of immigrant enterprises do not operate in such a manner as to prevent the proper development of native society. As regards the first point, a generous land policy is held to be the best measure of protection; in Africa adequate native reserves can take the place of trade unions. As regards the second point, the necessity is proclaimed of regulating the number of natives who go out to temporary employment, so that the number of adult males absent at any time is not so great as to endanger the proper development of native life, and at the same time of providing that natives who settle down to permanent employment outside the reserves are properly cared for with a view to their future development and their place in the social and political organisation outside the reserves.

The Hilton Young Report was followed by Sir Samuel Wilson's mission to East Africa. With the publication of the Under-Secretary's memorandum the chorus of approval set up by the supporters of the first gathered confidence and volume, while those who had been clearing their throats in helpless expostulation found themselves provided with a score agreeable to their ear. Yet those who are not musicians may well wonder what the pother is about. The majority of the Hilton Young Commission proposed a re-sorting of the Kenya Legislative Council; Sir Hilton Young himself proposed two alternatives; Sir Samuel Wilson has come along with three other solutions. To decide whether the elected Europeans shall be eleven thirty-eighths,

eleven thirty-fifths, thirteen thirty-ninths, thirteen thirty-eighths, or fifteen forty-seconds of the whole seems capable of arousing the enthusiasm of mathematicians only. Again, the Hilton Young Report concludes in favour of the appointment of a High Commissioner to control certain common services, and to inaugurate inquiries with a view to the ultimate creation of the post of Governor-General of East Africa. Sir Samuel Wilson also recommends the appointment of a High Commissioner with primary control over the common services, and points out that such an officer would in fact 'be in a position to do much of the work recommended by the Hilton Young Commission.' Though in the first instance the powers of Sir Samuel Wilson's officer would not be so extensive, and though his promotion to Governor-General is not so certain, nevertheless there is no such difference between the two reports as would prevent a conscientious Minister of the Crown from drawing up a scheme which he could maintain was a compromise, since it would embody the points of agreement in both reports

Yet the Archbishop of York can say that Sir Samuel Wilson's suggestion, judged on broad principles, 'no longer appears as a proposal to adopt for action a part of the proposals of the Hilton Young Commission, it appears as something directly antagonistic to those proposals'

There is no longer any mystery as to the point where the alleged antagonism arises The Hilton Young Report was a difficult document to read Now, however, that Sir Samuel Wilson's Report is before us for comparison its meaning is the clearer The Hilton Young proposals are based on a belief in the urgent need for planning a safe path towards African native prosperity across the difficult country which leads from primitive traditional production for sustenance to Western production for sale, by labour either on European estates or on native lands. The Wilson Report ignores all questions of native policy. 'You are to proceed to East Africa,' Sir Samuel Wilson was instructed, 'in order to discuss the recommendations of the Hilton Young Commission.' Sir Samuel Wilson appears to have interpreted these recommendations to the exclusion of the one that is fundamental.

Mr. A. J. Siggins, writing in the *Empire Review*, says little more than the Hilton Young Report. But what he says emphasises the impossibility of 'conciliating' two reports the details of which alone are capable of conciliation.

Until a definite and single native policy is laid down to cover at least all those parts of Africa under the British flag, any immediate steps towards a form of co-ordination of control would place Central and East Africa in the position of having to readjust parts of their policy to meet

either the rapidly increasing demands of the natives themselves or of the industrialists, who are attempting to develop the immense resources of the country with a totally inadequate labour supply. We are only at the commencement of our labour troubles, which will be greatly complicated by divergences in the native policies of those colonies most advanced in development.

The Colonial Development Act

Across the babel of controversy on the Hilton Young proposals the Colonial Development Act cut with the clearness of a toastmaster compelling assent and almost silence. The Act was welcomed by all parties. The debates upon it seemed mainly to turn on claims for the merit of its introduction, at the most they served to clarify details of application. It would indeed be difficult to quarrel with the purposes of the Act In the past Colonial development has had to depend largely on private effort The future will bring no change, except the all-important one that the creation of the pre-conditions of private effort may be stimulated by grants or loans made after consideration by a committee the composition of which is a guarantee of its financial ability The progress of under-developed areas and the promotion of employment at home are two results which can be expected from the Act with a mild degree of confidence.

Yet, as regards Africa, the Colonial Development Act raises the same fundamental issue as the Hilton Young Report The lines of African progress have not yet been determined There are divergences, not only between the East African and the West African policies, but also between the various territories within the two main geographical divisions, between Uganda, Tanganyika and Kenya, between Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, even between Nigeria and the Gold Coast If development is stimulated in each territory before the divergences have been adjusted or justified, the future will complicate the labour problems of the present. Mr. Siggins' remarks could be taken word by word, 'stimulation of development' substituted for 'co-ordination of control,' and his conclusions would remain equally true.

No doubt Parliament was by no means indifferent to the necessity of attaching certain social safeguards to grants under the Act. Provision is made for the payment of standard wages, for the prohibition of forced labour and of the employment of children on works financed out of the Colonial Development Fund. These are details of value, but as details may prove insufficient In addition, they give rise to questions of principle, to which they provide no answer. As regards the first, will, for example, the prohibition of 'forced labour' mean the prohibition, once the

works have been constructed, of enforced maintenance, which in some territories is distinguished from forced labour under the name of 'compulsory labour'? As regards the second, what labour and social guarantees will be required of public works and private industries, which, though they do not directly profit by the advances, expand with the improved economic facilities resulting from the advances?

To take a concrete case. Tanganyika is justly proud of the progress made by its native cultivators. With more money for experiments, for demonstrations, for the improvement of communications, this progress may be accelerated. Was a European member of the Legislative Council right in suggesting in 192[illegible] that four-fifths of the work of planting, cultivating, and harvesting of native produce is done by women and children under conditions involving some degree of constraint? In the same year, to turn to European estates, was an officer of the Tanganyika Survey Department correct in estimating that for each coffee or tea unit of 200 acres a labour force of 200 men, 200 women and 200 children is required? The present scale of employing African women and children on agricultural labour can be readily justified. There seems, however, to be a real need to estimate to what the expansion of that scale will lead before stimulated development has squared the pitch of healthy policy.

More serious, as involving a revolution in methods of labour, are the immense potentialities of Northern Rhodesia. It has been estimated by Mr W. A. Wills that a labour force of 40,00[illegible] will be required to meet the capacities of copper production, with which Sir Edmund Davis has credited the Roan, Bwana and Rhodesian Selection Trust.

> One might imagine [writes Mr Wills, considering the purely financial possibilities] the supply would be easily obtainable out of a gross population in Northern Rhodesia of 1,000,000 natives, until one remembers that the Transvaal, recruiting from the great native reserves of Zululand, Basutoland and Mozambique (where alone there are 3,500,000 natives), etc., finds the greatest difficulty in keeping together a force of 200,000.

If the supply is not readily available, and if British money, both public and private, has been sunk in Northern Rhodesia in the belief that there will be no such obstacle to the exploitation of the wealth, will not there be a danger that the prohibition of forced labour on works financed by the Development Fund will have little effect on the ruling labour policy of the country?

The Rhodes Memorial Lectures

General Smuts' lectures, which must take their place in the events of the year as the most imposing justification of wh[illegible]

settlement yet pronounced by a statesman, provide in their turn the same warning of the vital necessity of considering all the implications of African development before allowing events to drift out of the control of reasoned policy. General Smuts aims at cultural segregation of the races combined with economic co-operation.

It may be thought (he says) that there is a clash between these two aims, and that civilisation by white contact must inevitably lead to the undermining and ultimate destruction of the native culture and social system. This is, however, not so. So long as there is territorial segregation, so long as the native family home is not with the white man but in his own area, so long the native organisation will not be materially affected. . . . It is not white employment of the native males that works the mischief, but the abandonment of the native tribal home by the women and children.

General Smuts' programme may be argued to exist in fact in certain of the East African territories. With more confidence it can be said to be already the adopted policy of Southern Rhodesia. But its implications have not yet been worked out generally, or in relation to the particular conditions of each territory. For example, has any single Administration come to any conclusion as to the ideal length of time for any male native to be in alien employment beyond his locality, account being taken of the needs of the employer and of the native community? In 1928 the Governor of Northern Rhodesia in the Legislative Council quoted a statement by a district commissioner to the effect that 'if every native carried out his obligations at his village, it is doubtful if he could spare more than six months of his time per annum to work for an employer.' Is this true of Northern Rhodesia? If so, is it not true of Kenya? A second vital question raised by General Smuts' arguments is the proportion of adult males that can be absent at any one time without injury to the community. The Belgian Congo Labour Commission recommended that a maximum of 5 per cent. of the fit adult males should be at any one time engaged in distant employment, that an additional 5 per cent. could without injury be employed about two days' march from the village, and that a further 15 per cent. could be engaged in European enterprise in the village. In Kenya, where there has been no similar inquiry, over 30 per cent. of the able-bodied men were in employment in 1928.

SOUTH AFRICA

Such problems of policy for the British Commonwealth and of detail for the particular territories all appear to require investi-

gation and decision before the developments, advocated with wisdom by General Smuts and planned with financial prudence by the Colonial Development Act, have created in Africa a machinery of production for which the provision of a native labour supply will tend to be considered as a necessity exceeding any requirements of social policy. Recent events serve to show how the natural economic hunger of the world is already accelerating these developments.

In South Africa it is admitted by every political party that the economic organisation of the country has been allowed to progress without sufficient attention to the fundamental problem of the part to be played in it by the white and black races respectively. The results have compelled the attention of the whole country, for, apart from political difficulties, recent years have seen a threat of fissure in the very economic structure. In particular the two primary industries of agriculture and mining are suffering from a shortage of native labour, while grave problems of adjustment in certain urban localities are arising from the influx of native labour for commerce and the secondary industries. As for agriculture, in October 1929 the situation led the Congress of the South African Agricultural Union to pass a resolution declaring that 'the welfare and prosperity of the white and native races of South Africa depends, in a large measure, on the complete segregation of natives from the towns, and the gradual repatriation of all male natives to the country, except such as are housed under the compound system while serving periods of employment.' This sounds very much like General Smuts' policy. But from the native workers the retort it meets is the old cry of 'too late.' In November Mr Ballinger said that 'actual physical force would not drive the majority of Reef native people to work on the farms. They prefer unemployment, with all its attendant miseries, in the towns to serfdom on the farms.'

On the mines all kinds of solutions are being explored—the recruiting of tropical natives, the running of the diamond fields on an all-white basis, the increase in the proportion of native labour to white supervision. But the chief source of supply, Mozambique, already limited by the Convention between the Union and Portugal, is further threatened by a campaign in Mozambique itself.

> No one denies [says Commandant Jose Cardozo] that the conditions of life in the mines have improved considerably, but this improvement has not yet come to benefit the native of Mozambique, who must not continue to be sacrificed on the land until the progress of medical science makes it possible to substitute them by Union natives, without the latter carrying to the kraals the scourges which our natives bring back.

The mines, with statistics in hand, can deny the implications in such a statement, and explain that, since the Portuguese Government has abandoned the policy of direct labour compulsion,

> the local estate owners are apparently endeavouring to substitute another form of compulsion on the natives in Mozambique, and, by preventing them from following their customary occupation on the Transvaal mines, creating such a large surplus of labour in the province that the natives will have no option but to work on the local estates, no matter what the conditions of employment are there

To judge between the contending parties is not necessary. What is clear is that the mines in the Union and the agricultural interests in Mozambique cannot now find that cheap and plentiful labour supply, which in other parts is still held up as one of the chief inducements for the investment of capital in Africa

Yet from the municipalities of the Union are arising complaints of the unwanted invasion of natives. Into Johannesburg there is an annual influx of between 400 and 600 families, the municipality is required to supply suitable accommodation, involving a burden on the municipality of 100*l* for each family. Not unreasonably, therefore, the municipalities are seeking new powers to regulate and limit the entry of natives to their locations. On the other hand, the native leaders claim that the land situation inevitably forces natives into the towns, and that to grant extended powers to the municipalities will be to tighten the bonds of agricultural serfdom, and to enable the urban employers to discipline their own workers by the threat of expulsion of the unemployed.

NORTHERN RHODESIA

South Africa's native labour problems are a very part and parcel of the economic machinery which exists and which at all costs must be kept in working order If, however, the machinery could be constructed afresh it would be incredible if adjustments were not made in it to lessen the friction it causes Where, therefore, there seems a possibility of a repetition of South Africa's economic growth advantage may well be taken of South Africa's experience Such a possibility undoubtedly already exists in Northern Rhodesia. 'It is not impossible,' said General Smuts, 'that within the next ten years Northern Rhodesia will have a mining field second only to that of the Witwatersrand.'

In expectation, it would seem, of the immense labour demands thus to be made upon its native peoples Northern Rhodesia during the last twelve months has largely remoulded its native legislation.

In March 1929 a Native Authority Ordinance was passed,

which, while containing many apparently admirable provision on the Tanganyika model of native administration, also permit the enforcement of labour for sixty days in the year. Amon the persons exempted from this obligation are those who ar fully employed in any other work, or who have been for a perio of three months during the year The adoption of this syster was all the more surprising as in 1926 at the Conference c Governors of the British East Africa Dependencies the the Governor of Northern Rhodesia stated that he had no intentio of taking any powers of this nature

In the same month a Vagrancy Ordinance was adopte similar in many respects to the laws in force in Kenya and Sout West Africa A magistrate may order a convicted vagrant t find work within a definite time or to return to his home villag or to be detained in a house of detention Every person s detained may be put to labour, and the superintendents of t houses are instructed to use their best endeavours to obta suitable employment for the vagrants in their charge 'Whe any such employment is obtained any vagrant who refuses neglects to avail himself thereof without reasonable excuse, sh be liable on conviction to imprisonment with or without ha labour for a term not exceeding three months'

Towards the end of the year Bills were drafted providing f the registration of all male natives of employable age, and co fying and amending the previous native labour legislation T Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Registration B explains that the carrying of an identity certificate 'will be help in checking desertion from employment' and 'in ma other respects will be of advantage to a native himself' As f the Bill on the Employment of Natives, in many respects it is advance on previous legislation Provisions for the welfare workers are more stringent, and a system of workmen's co pensation for accidents is introduced On the other ha whereas in the old legislation labour offences such as deserti were generally punishable by fines and only in default of pa ment by imprisonment, by the Bill the maximum fine is £ and imprisonment for six months may be imposed, in default payment or without the option of payment

Another measure of some significance prepared during t year was the abolition of the tax on plural wives and its substi tion by an increase of 2s 6d in the tax on all male nativ The effect would appear to be to lessen the amount paid in taxati by the older men, and to increase that to be earned by the m of the most suitable employment age

An adequate justification is no doubt forthcoming of peculiar features in these changes It is surprising, however

at a time when at Geneva the British Government is among the foremost in working towards an international decision against forced labour, and at a time when by the Colonial Development Act it has limited the possibilities of employing forced labour on public works, legislation should be adopted in any British territory which may be interpreted as a subtle combination of indirect pressure on the natives to seek private employment. That this is an economic as well as a social problem is shown by the fact that the progress of copper development is recognised by such financial authorities as Mr Wills as depending in part on the native labour available, which in its turn is conditioned by the numbers of the population. In the neighbouring territory of Nyasaland the Report on the Census of 1926 assigns as one of the causes of under-population the absence of thousands of adult males seeking mine employment in the south. Experienced opinion, official and unofficial, medical and lay, the Superintendent of Census stated, is unanimous in putting this emigration among the forefront of the causes tending to reduce the native birth rate below its normal figure.

TANGANYIKA

Coming north again into Tanganyika, recent signs seem to indicate that in this territory it is European production which is threatened by the difficult native labour situation. General Smuts has appealed for an intensification of the white colonisation of the highlands of East Africa, which, if present methods are followed, will mean the carving out of new agricultural estates managed by Europeans, but worked by a native labour force, the chief advantage of which is its low cost. The comment on such hopes can be found in the situation at Kilosa, as summarised in the Land Development Survey Report. A few years ago all the able-bodied native population then went out to work on white estates. Now, however, 7000 of these natives have in eight months drawn

in cash from the local ginneries an average of 25l. each for home grown cotton. In other words each man had stayed at home, grown and eaten his own food, acquired the tax due for himself and his two wives and earned in eight months 40s. a month for the whole year, giving him a period of rest so dear to the native.

(In passing it may be noted that the cash wages of the high-paying sisal plantations of Arusha are 18s. a month, that in Nyasaland of the 83,000 males in European employment 19,000 receive less than 6s. a month and 60,000 between 6s. and 20s.)

It is certain that few of the 7000 men will ever work for a European again. It would seem that, as the demand for labour incr[e]ases, so will

the supply decrease, unless the profits of European agriculture are larg enough to enable employers to make employment very tempting. Thi may be possible in the production of high-priced tea and coffee; but doubt if it can be done by the grain farmer or the pastoralist.

Native production, such as exists in West Africa, has not stoo the test of an economic crisis such as may come with Easter competition. Equally, it can be argued that European productio on the basis of native labour has not stood the test of the com petition of purely native-grown crops Before settlement i encouraged on a large scale, at least for the production of othe crops than sisal and high-class coffee and tea, a searching investi gation of European and native agriculture respectively would b in the interests both of the Europeans and the natives.

THE SUDAN

Purely native production, it has been often said, is in dange from its inefficiency or its inability to meet the sudden change world economics require European-managed estates, on th other hand, have already reason to complain of the native labou shortage Though Africa will certainly not progress along on single road, perhaps in some areas development will tend to follo a system which seems to combine the efficiency and monetar strength of European management with the absence of labou difficulties on native lands In the Sudan, for example, th Plantations Syndicate is still pursuing its prosperous career I the Gezira the tenant and the Government each receive 40 pe cent. of the profits, and the syndicate 20 per cent The technic services—supply of seeds, survey, advice, ginning, marketing- are undertaken by the syndicate The tenants are free to wor in their own manner In 1928 the Government report 'E1,316,600*l* in profits and advances was paid out . . t 10,000 tenants, of which E909,500*l* represented clear profit The scheme is as popular and prosperous as ever, and there a three new applicants for any tenancy available' Labour (60,00 to 70,000 people are required annually for the picking) 'continu to be readily attracted,' and the wages paid 'add to the pu chasing capacity of many people besides the tenant and h family.' In the same year the syndicate could pay a dividen of 25 per cent, so all parties appear to have reason f satisfaction.

It is possible that a closer examination of the Gezira conditio would lead to the discovery of some defects. Is, for instance, t health of the migrant labourers adequately protected? But, c the facts at present available, it would seem that such an examin tion would be of benefit to certain of the other areas of Briti

Africa, when native labour and European capital and skill at present appear to be in opposition one to the other.

Indeed, wherever we turn in Africa, an urgent need is evident for a closer consideration of all the factors in the economic and social situation, and this both in the interests of each separate territory and for the information of the rest of Africa. Armchair critics are notoriously irritating, and pioneers notoriously irritable. It is not surprising, therefore, that among the pioneers the cry is gaining strength that there have been enough inquiries, commissions and reports, and that the man on the spot should be allowed to get on with his work in peace. But when the man on the spot is so busy that he has not time to profit by the experiences by the man on the next spot, and when the man at home is assuming ever greater financial, moral and international responsibilities, a policy of somnolent trust is no longer fair to anyone.

What is required is not a new *ad hoc* inquiry or a temporary commission, but a permanent watchfulness, organised and linked up with the permanent machinery for the general administration of the Empire Whether this can best be effected by such officers as the proposed new High Commissioner for East Africa or by the Colonial Office or by a new organ in connexion with the Colonial development schemes is a question which may be considered as the definition of future functions is more carefully detailed Before, however, the lists of African policy are again deserted by the public, advantage must be taken of the temporary interest to plan the mechanism by which the permanent watchfulness can function

W. Benson.

RELIGION AND THE MODERN WORLD

The seventh Conference of the Bishops of the Anglican Communion is to be held at Lambeth from July 7 to August 9 of this year. It is to be attended by more than 300 out of the total number of, roughly, 400 bishops now in communion with the See of Canterbury The Conference, so far as its actual constitution goes, is a purely private gathering, and possesses no authority whatever to reach decisions in any way binding upon the Churches of the Anglican Communion Nor is its main value necessarily to be measured by the immediate effect which any of its public pronouncements may produce. In recent years it has become a habit among many persons both inside and outside the Anglican Church to call for some clear lead from the bishops upon various controversial issues of the day But these demands convey no guarantee that those who utter them have any intention of following such an episcopal lead, if it were given, or even of taking the trouble to discover whether in fact a lead has been given or not. No one knows better than the bishops themselves that their Church is not to be governed by pronouncements in the Press And probably the chief results of the Conference of 1930, as of its predecessors, will be found in the fresh help and encouragement given to each bishop's work by the common discussion of the great problems which all alike, in their very diverse and often isolated situations, have to face Such results are none the less important because they provide no subject for head-lines

Nevertheless, it is fitting and inevitable both that the bishops should give some public expression of their mind upon the interpretation and application of Christian principles in the circumstances of the time, and that this expression should attract considerable attention in the religious world The general subject of the Conference is 'The Faith and Witness of the Church in this Day and Generation,' and the particular topics dealt with by particular sections include the Christian doctrine of God (considered in relation to modern secularism), certain central problems of Christian morality (*e g.*, sex questions and war and peace), the unity of the Church in special relation to the South India proposals for reunion, Anglican ideals and principles of

Church government, the supply of clergy, and the special contribution of youth to the Church's life. Certainly the bishops cannot be accused of ignoring the burning problems of the day. All the main questions which are being asked in regard to the Church's rules of faith, conduct, and ecclesiastical order find some place on their agenda The main fear is lest the pronouncements of the Conference should be criticised for not achieving what manifestly they cannot attempt, namely, the clear settlement, to everyone's satisfaction, of the most acutely debated problems which are now perplexing the intellect and conscience of the Christian world

The most that can be aimed at in this article is to indicate how deep some of these problems really go, and how inextricably their roots are intertwined Probably the question of reunion in South India is that which is exciting most anxiety within the Church itself, but really the most fundamental and critical subject to be considered is the doctrine of God, and it is with that that I mainly propose to deal

Some very striking facts were brought out by the quite lamentable controversy about Prayer Book revision, which for a year or two recently made religion once more a subject of public and popular discussion in this country It was then clearly revealed that, while a very large and probably increasing majority of our people do not go to church and make hardly any use of the forms of institutional religion, nevertheless the bulk of the laity of the Church of England see, on the whole, little need for change in those forms, while a keen minority of clergy and laity is chiefly zealous for the restoration of certain forms which are claimed as 'Catholic' and are at any rate mediæval. There is no widespread demand whatever for a devotional expression which will embody fresh thoughts about God corresponding to the new knowledge about the physical universe which has completely revolutionised the whole character of human culture and civilisation On the one hand, modern secularism occupies itself with the things of space and time with the means of man's livelihood and his control of his material environment, it recks little of an eternal world, acknowledges no obedience to any spiritual authority, and regards the notion of divine government as an exploded myth. On the other hand, the religious public is but little concerned with the reinterpretation of its faith to meet the changing conditions of modern life. It is not greatly interested in any theological reconstruction. It seeks chiefly to defend traditional habits of thought and action against the menace of the secularist attack It wants not to be disturbed. Such is a situation which may well draw from the bishops a summons to the reconsideration of the fundamental ideas about God involved in the Christian revelation.

Let us analyse the situation rather more deeply. Broadly speaking, it is true to say that mediæval orthodoxy regarded God as the great Sovereign of the Universe, enthroned above the skies, while to the more philosophic minds of the age He was also and chiefly the *ens realissimum*, the one ultimate and absolute reality, and ground of all being. By all the divine authority was believed to be embodied upon earth in a definitely religious and ecclesiastical organisation, the claim of which to exercise a controlling authority over every field of human activity and thought, secular and sacred, was generally admitted. Religion was the almost undisputed mistress of secular activities, and religion itself was under the control of an ecclesiastical hierarchy representing the Sovereign God. Secular departments of human thought and action were thought to be definitely further removed from God than the religious; but through the authority of the divinely appointed Church God exercised a sovereign sway over all, even though the secular arm of the State was allowed in its own sphere a certain independence. Not everyone was called to be 'a religious'—that was the higher vocation of some—but everyone was called to obey what the religious authority prescribed, and in that obedience lay salvation.

But now in the view of the world at large religion holds a quite different position. It is no longer assumed to be the supreme activity of the human soul, exercising an authoritative control from without over every secular occupation. Rather it is just one autonomous department of life among many, each of which puts in its legitimate claim, not indeed to dominate or control the rest, but to pursue its own distinct end in its own way, to set up its own independent standards, to be free from external interference. The typically modern mind—at least, as manifested in Western Europe and America—does not desire to forbid or to destroy religion, nor even rigidly to curtail its activities. Religious freedom and toleration are recognised as great achievements of the modern age, which many even of our advanced secularists would be eager to defend against the attacks of the new Bolshevist culture. But the very principles of such freedom and toleration imply that religion, not less than physical science, art, economics, politics and the rest, must recognise its own departmental character. And on the whole this departmentalising of human activity in the name of freedom has been very successfully carried out. To the intellectual of to-day religion presents one exceedingly interesting and clearly marked field of experience and study, which may very probably be assumed to make some contribution along with others to the understanding of the world we live in. To the man in the street it appears as a perfectly legitimate pursuit for those peculiarly constituted but doubtless

admirable individuals whose natural gifts or training have given them a particular bent in that direction. Not long ago a magistrate uttered words, which may be given a deeper significance than he intended, when he cautioned a woman whose religious activities had created some disturbance in a London street. 'You may,' he said, 'be as religious as you like—you may try to make other people religious also—but *you must not make yourself a nuisance.*'

The question, then, which has to be faced is this: How has the changed attitude to religion affected our thought of God? It is difficult to avoid the assumption that human knowledge of God is mediated by religion, that it is through religion that man comes into communion with God. This assumption was no doubt made, even if it was not explicitly declared, in mediæval thought. But then, since it was at the same time assumed that religion was the queen of life, belief in the sovereignty of God was not affected by the belief that the religious sphere was the only one in which God could really be approached. To-day the case is altered. A strictly departmental conception of religion tends to produce, consciously or unconsciously, an impression that the God of religion is a being somehow distinct from the author and ruler of the universe, or from any absolute ultimate and omnipresent reality. Many philosophers, of course, accept this distinction quite frankly. They distinguish sharply between the Absolute or Universal Spirit and the God of religion. Secularists would, of course, accept the same distinction, though they would go much further than idealist philosophers in disparaging the claim of religion to provide any valid knowledge about the nature of the world. But religious people themselves are in a great difficulty, greater than they generally recognise. Some, of course, would still maintain, at least dialectically, the sovereign sway of religious and ecclesiastical authority over the whole of life, and silence the too curious questioner with the thunder of infallibility. But most of us at least cannot escape the consequences of the plain fact that the main great departments of the world's life, departments in which Christians themselves have continually to move, have thrown off religious control altogether, and are conducted according to distinct laws and standards of their own. It is often said that people are perplexed as to the application of religion to their life in the world, their business or profession, or even to the life of the family. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that they do not understand how the God whom they learn about and approach in a religious department can be served also in departments which have become definitely non-religious.

From this point of view the somewhat plaintive and futile appeals for clear guidance from bishops or clergy are easily

intelligible. They represent a pathetically vain attempt to return to the good old days when the specifically religious authority could still exercise an effective sway over the whole of life. But in our close-knit yet infinitely complicated system of society the considerations which have to be weighed in determining conduct have become so multitudinous, and demand such varieties of special knowledge, that it is impossible for any ecclesiastical casuist to supply definite rules which at once convince the conscience and are plainly applicable to each particular case The bishop or cleric has his own highly specialised task in administering the ecclesiastical organisation of which he is an officer ; and the best he can do is to take expert advice and give wise and godly counsel in general terms. He is himself, when all is said and done, the expert of but one department.

Religion is but part of life God is the God of the universe In that antithesis lies the fundamental problem which faces the religious world of to-day It is not, of course, a new problem ; but the modern world feels it with a quite new force, because religion is more definitely and distinctly a part of life than it has ever been before That is why in face of modern secularism the Church must reflect once more on its doctrine of God

That is exactly what so few religious people are doing And that, again, is the reason why those who are responsible for the agenda of the Lambeth Conference are so supremely right in putting down as the first subject for its consideration the doctrine of God in relation to modern secularism It is so tempting to encourage revivals of religion which really leave out of sight altogether the fundamental need for a clearer thought about the relation of God to the world and human life as a whole We are familiar with modern attempts to construct a religion without any real theology at all, to wax enthusiastic about religious experience without seriously considering the ultimate nature of that reality with which the experience is supposed to give us contact. Such attempts are commonly made by those but loosely attached to membership of any Church But even within the Church itself there are not wanting teachers of unquestioned zeal and sincerity who seem to be seeking to intensify a religious experience among religious people by training them in certain methods of worship and devotion, and who seem to suppose that, if the specifically religious experience can thus be made sufficiently vivid and impressive, the problem of the relation of the omnipresent God to the non-religious aspects of life will solve itself. In this way it may be possible to do with religion what many modern experts are doing with art, *i.e.*, to make it an absorbing pursuit for the highly trained or naturally gifted few, at the cost

of rendering it almost unintelligible to the many. There are some people in every class—many of them belong to the poorest—who have an innately strong 'religious sense.' May not the Church concern itself with cultivating the religiousness of those whose mystical faculties readily respond, and make their devotion a substitute for a more catholic theology?

To answer this question in the affirmative would be to commit oneself to modernism indeed. For it would be to acquiesce in the departmentalising of life, which is the most prominent characteristic of our modern age But within the Church of England at least the essential modernism of such a religious policy is effectively disguised by the fact that many of those who are most keenly pursuing it employ for the purpose methods of worship and devotion which present in externals simply a return to the Catholic tradition of the West. The lines of division between Catholic, Evangelical, and Modernist are not nearly so clear as most people suppose Again and again we need to remind ourselves that it by no means follows that, because some local Church is extremely Catholic in its forms of worship and rules of observance, therefore the inner spirit of its thought is in any way approximating to the main tradition of Catholic theology According to this tradition the main value of every religious act lies in *the thing done* in obedience to the declared will of the all-sovereign God; the thing done matters infinitely more than the feelings or experiences which men may or may not find in the doing of it, and which are so greatly affected by the outward manner and circumstances of the doing It is this emphasis on the value of the thing done in obedience to God which leads to the celebrated doctrine of the *opus operatum* in connexion with sacramental theory But in the minds of some of our most zealous and intellectual Anglo-Catholics this line of thought has in fact been quite abandoned The outward rules and forms of traditional Catholicism are by them carefully taught and observed chiefly as a means of quickening a certain devotional experience in the human soul. They are much less interested in theology, that is, the doctrine of God, than in the training of a religious experience, of which all theologies are in their view but imperfect and temporary 'rationalisations.' In many ways this change has led to an enormous gain in devotional sincerity, of which it would be both wicked and foolish to underrate the value. But the fact remains that in their philosophic outlook such Anglo-Catholic thinkers are much more closely akin to Otto in Germany, Alexander in England, and to modernists of the psychological school than to theologians in the great tradition of Aquinas. For the modern philosophers mentioned agree in holding that God is really to be found and known mainly or only in a specifically

religious experience; they have but scant respect for the grand old Catholic rationalism which has always taught in different ways that God is to be known by the reason and conscience of all men as the living ground of a universal order of goodness in the world.

The strength of Anglo-Catholicism, as of certain less powerful movements in Evangelicalism, lies in the fact that they are indeed keen and active revivals of *religion* in our modern world. But they do not clearly face or recognise the fundamental problem arising from the fact that whereas the God of whom they speak must be the supreme reality of the universe, the experience which they revive remains one section only of man's knowledge and activity, and has but little power to relate its own object to all that lies beyond. We cannot allow a specifically religious experience wholly to determine our doctrine of God without becoming in the end either ecclesiastically minded Churchmen or else vague pseudo-mystics, disqualified in either case from taking up the challenge of a secular civilisation. If our views are to be really *whole* views, it is rather the doctrine of God which must determine our treatment of religion.

If the foregoing analysis of the situation be at all a sound one, it is clear that the subject placed first on the agenda of the Lambeth Conference ought to exercise a decisive influence upon the others. Whether the bishops are considering the vexed problems of social and sexual morality, ecclesiastical order, the reunion of the Churches, or other questions no less far removed from one another in appearance, one fundamental question to be asked is always this. How far are those rules, on the observance of which religious people eagerly insist, really based upon a fundamentally rational and inclusive doctrine of God, or upon merely religious sentiments possibly derived from an ancestry both older and more primitive than either Christianity or Judaism? The weakness of our religious modernisms, which build on the foundation of religious experience, no less than of a religious traditionalism, which is content to appeal to ancient rules of the Church, is that all alike are in danger of working with a doctrine of God unrelated to the whole of life, just because it is the product simply of the *religious* consciousness of mankind. The besetting temptation of our age is to fashion a religion for naturally religious people, and to let the secular departments of life look after themselves. But such a religion can be in its essence neither truly Catholic nor fully Christian.

For Christianity stands in the end by its claim to be the bearer of a revelation of God which transcends every religion; and it is that claim which above all needs re-emphasis and re-interpretation in the peculiarly complicated conditions of modern life. The Bible from cover to cover is concerned with God, while the word

'religion' hardly occurs in it at all. Yet no book is more drastic and more searching in its criticism of human religions. The great message of the Old Testament prophets is that Jehovah demands to be served in other than specifically religious activities. And this message leads up to the final climax in which God's eternal Word is revealed as incarnate in the manhood of the Nazarene prophet, crucified with the consent of the religious authorities of God's chosen people. It is that, at first sight quite incredible, limitation of the Godhead which really gives to the Christian doctrine of God its peculiarly inclusive breadth. For the revelation of God in the one whole man is in principle wider and deeper, at once more infinite and more definite, than the revelation of God in one section of the experience of all mankind. From henceforth God is to be found, not merely in any specifically religious department of knowledge or action, but in everything in the world which expresses, adumbrates, or reflects the ministry and the Cross of Jesus Christ.

Perhaps that revelation is wider in its scope than most of us have yet perceived. Consider especially the symbolic significance given to Jerusalem and Nazareth by the Fourth Gospel. Jerusalem is the home of strict orthodox Judaism where the Messiah is expected to appear. Nazareth is the centre of a debased, easy-going, worldly Judaism, adulterated by Gentile influences. But the true Israelite, Nathanael, recognises Jesus as the Messiah, coming from Nazareth. The story of Nathanael's conversion may well serve as an allegory for our times. Jerusalem typifies a narrow religious traditionalism; Nazareth a lax, compromising worldliness. Both reject the Messiah; but it is from Nazareth that he appears. Certainly, on the whole, the faults of our modern secular civilisation are those of Nazareth rather than of Jerusalem. Can, then, any good thing come out of Nazareth? Perhaps to-day it is still from Nazareth that God is revealed; and it may be that on our capacity to see it depends our own conversion and our power to convert others. Christians must see the hand of God in secular civilisation before they can convert secular civilisation to God. They must learn once more how much greater is God than religion before they can bring men back to a true religiousness. No longer can religion by the exercise of its authority from without control the manifold activities of the world's secular life. But a right emphasis on the God-ward value of those activities themselves, when seen in the light of the meaning of Christ's life truly presented, may enable those who are themselves occupied in each secular activity to serve God and work out their own salvation therein.

If such be the real hope, it must not be expected that the ecclesiastical authorities of a world-wide Communion should

beating a thunderous tattoo on the arched iron roof of the building.

Seldom have I seen such rain. Hour after hour it poured down in torrents. When you looked at the outer stage (which is built of stone and open to the sky) and watched the great drops splashing into the puddles, it seemed impossible that the sky could continue to empty itself at such a rate for long; but when you looked at the sky, there was to be seen no promise that it would ever stop. Nor did it, that day. Throughout the eight hours of the performance and the two hours of the midday interval, and afterwards right on into the night, it was always raining except when it was snowing. But even such conditions could not damp the ardour of the players. For them, the rain might not have existed. The chorus, in particular, was heroic.

This chorus, forty-eight in number, has a very important though unspectacular part in the Passion Play. It is modelled pretty obviously on the chorus of Greek tragedy, and performs much the same function, of commenting lyrically upon the action of the play. But it differs from the Greek chorus in the important respect that it performs no movements except a stately and ceremonious entry and departure. For the choric dances of the Greeks the unknown writer of the Oberammergau play (who was probably one of the monks at the great Benedictine monastery at Ettal, four miles away) has substituted a series of tableaux from the Old Testament, which form a running commentary upon the action of the play itself.

For example, Act III of the play deals with the parting of Christ and Mary at Bethany. At the beginning of the act the chorus enters in single file from either side of the stage, and forms up across the stage in a great curve with the choregus in the centre. The choregus explains the general purport of the act, after which the chorus sings a stanza which expresses sympathy with Mary in her coming loss. This done, the song goes straight on to describe the grief of the mother of Tobias when her son left her to go to a foreign land. At a given moment during this part of the song the chorus divides in the middle and its two halves swing back like the two halves of a double door. Simultaneously the curtains of the inner stage roll apart, and the tableau of the departure of Tobias from his home is displayed. Then the curtain closes, the chorus swings back again into line, and the song changes to the lament of the forsaken bride in the Song of Solomon, who is the subject of the next tableau. This is now displayed with the same ritual. After the song is finished the chorus divides again and paces out, each half forming double rank as it goes.

Since the choruses are often extremely long and are invariably

written in slow tempo, and since the play consists of seventeen acts in all, before each of which either one or two tableaux are exhibited without variation of method, you will understand that the task of the singers is a heavy one in any circumstances, but becomes something like martyrdom in bad weather. Their dress, for men and girls alike, is Greek in design though distinctly Teutonic in execution, and consists of a flowing white garment under a long grey-blue cloak. They are bareheaded except for metal circlets, and the girls all have long hair flowing loose over their shoulders. In this garb they stand stock-still on the exposed outer stage for what must be very nearly three of the eight hours during which the play is in action

None of the other actors are at the mercy of the elements in this way. Apart from the fact that no other actor, with the possible exception of the Christus, is on the stage so constantly, there is the very pertinent fact that no other actor has to confine his activities to the outer stage. Not only the tableaux, but nearly all the big set scenes take place on the inner stage, under cover On the day of which I am writing most of the actors came through their ordeal without much outward sign to show for it, but the unfortunate chorus was plainly soaked to the skin during the first hour, and never again had a chance to get dry. Even so, not one of them faltered or showed discomfort; indeed, not until the afternoon, when a little chill wind that cut like a knife got up, and one or two of the girls had to brush the wet hair from their eyes—not until then did anybody deign to notice the weather at all Anton Lang, the choregus, who is now an elderly man and had been suffering from a chill and loss of voice two days before, carried through his heavy task as imperturbably as the rest

That convinced me, as perhaps nothing else could, that the spirit of devotion in which the play was first conceived still persists in Oberammergau A cynic might say that a special occasion will always call forth a special effort—that, since this was the Press performance upon which the quality of the actors was to be judged, the actors had an incentive to do their best which would later be lacking. The cynic would, however, be wrong; for my landlady told me that bad weather is common at Oberammergau in May, and that every Passion Play year two or three of the chorus die as a direct result of the conditions in which they have to play their parts After hearing this, I felt that I needed no further proof that the talk of commercialisation is mere nonsense.

Such talk probably had its origin in the minds of a certain class of well-meaning but sheep-brained tourists which arrived in the place with its collective mind made up as to what it was

receive immediate inspiration to lay down exact rules for Christian conduct which can be everywhere applied. Even when it comes to questions of ecclesiastical order and Church reunion, it is more important that what counsel they give should be clearly based on a Christian understanding of divine operations in Church and world than that particular points of controversy should at once be settled in favour of this party or that. Certainly the Anglican bishops cannot in a month's deliberation at Lambeth finally dispose of the vast questions raised by their agenda. Yet, even without epoch-making decisions, they may give a fresh bent and direction to Christian thinking, for which the few—if few they be—who follow it, and in the end others also, will be lastingly grateful. Notoriously, the destiny of the Church of England has been to occupy a middle position Somewhere between Jerusalem and Nazareth, perhaps, she stands to-day And, if she succeeds in keeping up some communication between a religious tradition on the one hand and a new world of secular civilisation on the other, she may be content even to bear the reproaches that of old fell upon Samaria.

OLIVER C QUICK

OBERAMMERGAU

If I begin the account of a visit to this year's Passion Play at Oberammergau by talking of the weather, that is not because I am so firmly wedded to the Englishman's pet topic of conversation that I cannot shake free of it even on paper, but because it seems to me that the weather has an important bearing on the subject

There is a widespread notion that the Passion Play and its players have both been 'spoilt' The play is no longer produced, as it used to be, by a small community of poor wood-carvers at its own proper cost No longer does the village council put by its pennies so that every tenth year there may be enough money in the box to keep the vow made by its ancestors in the plague year of 1632 So far from being a drain on the resources of the inhabitants, Passion Play year now brings wealth to their doors. A ceaseless stream of tourists flows through the village, buying tickets for its play, accommodation in the houses of its people, specimens of its wood-carving, postcards, souvenirs of every kind, all at strictly commercial prices Obviously, the players also are—must be—commercialised Obviously, the play is staged nowadays, not to the glory of God, but for greed of gain.

All this I had heard, and though it did not in any way agree with my own memories of the place as I last saw it in the lean year of 1922, or with the tales I had subsequently heard of the distress which fell upon it in the still leaner years which followed, I arrived in the village determined to satisfy my mind upon this point first of all, if I could It is not easy to form an opinion of any value on such a point in three days, especially if you are the representative of a daily newspaper and must spend much of your time recording instead of receiving impressions It is quite possible that I might have been able to come to no really definite conclusion on this point, if it had not been for the violent break in the fine weather on the night before the general rehearsal of the play, at which the audience consists chiefly of journalists from all countries and of dignitaries from Munich and the country round. All night it rained, and when we assembled in the Passionstheater at 8 o'clock next morning the drops were

beating a thunderous tattoo on the arched iron roof of the building.

Seldom have I seen such rain. Hour after hour it poured down in torrents. When you looked at the outer stage (which is built of stone and open to the sky) and watched the great drops splashing into the puddles, it seemed impossible that the sky could continue to empty itself at such a rate for long; but when you looked at the sky, there was to be seen no promise that it would ever stop. Nor did it, that day. Throughout the eight hours of the performance and the two hours of the midday interval, and afterwards right on into the night, it was always raining except when it was snowing. But even such conditions could not damp the ardour of the players. For them, the rain might not have existed. The chorus, in particular, was heroic.

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That convinced me, as perhaps nothing else could, that the spirit of devotion in which the play was first conceived still persists in Oberammergau A cynic might say that a special occasion will always call forth a special effort—that, since this was the Press performance upon which the quality of the actors was to be judged, the actors had an incentive to do their best which would later be lacking. The cynic would, however, be wrong; for my landlady told me that bad weather is common at Oberammergau in May, and that every Passion Play year two or three of the chorus die as a direct result of the conditions in which they have to play their parts. After hearing this, I felt that I needed no further proof that the talk of commercialisation is mere nonsense.

Such talk probably had its origin in the minds of a certain class of well-meaning but sheep-brained tourists which arrived in the place with its collective mind made up as to what it was

going to find, and then, finding something different, felt itself aggrieved. The public has a vague general notion that the Passion Play is performed by 'peasants.' Since I returned from Germany a good many friends and acquaintances have asked me to describe the play and the people to them, and have all been astonished when I told them that simply to say 'Wonderful—and all just peasants!' would be to give them an entirely wrong impression. Oberammergau is not essentially a peasant community, and, what is more important, it never was. For centuries past it has been a community of artists, whose wood-carvings have been known far beyond their own borders. Their work was deservedly famous in the eighteenth century. In the nineteenth it lost much of its original inspiration and became mechanical and stereotyped—the work of journeymen rather than of artists—but to-day, plainly enough, the divine impulse is at work amongst them again, for they have men who turn out carvings and figures full of feeling, life, and beauty.

Naturally, such a community is not content, merely for the delectation of tourists, to live in the primitive fashion demanded of 'peasants.' According to its pastor (to whose excellent handbook I am indebted for my facts concerning its past history) the standard of education in the village is a good deal above the average even for Germany. 'It would be difficult,' he says, 'to find another village of the size of Oberammergau in which so many foreign languages are spoken, in which music is so much a part of daily life, and in which literature and art are more understood and appreciated.'

Even if we make generous allowance for local patriotism on the good man's part, we can see clearly that he has a cure of highly civilised souls, likely to know what is going on in the world and to shape their lives accordingly. Their streets are paved and asphalted and watered by an up-to-date motor-driven cart. Their houses are well-built and electrically lit, and the one in which I stayed had parquet flooring throughout, and an automatic telephone. If you like to put it so, sophistication has set in.

But the sophistication is only skin-deep—a mere matter of mechanical progress. Beneath that thin veneer the people still remain the same—a simple, straightforward, kindly race, with beautiful, easy manners. My own feeling concerning them is not that they have been spoilt by the fame of their play, but that they have been able to withstand most admirably the spoiling process. The reason is that to them the Passion Play is primarily a religious ceremony, and only in the second place a dramatic spectacle. The fact that travellers from all over the world come to see their play is a source of gratification and justifiable pride to them, but is not of essential importance. If

there were suddenly no more tourists, the play would be performed less often in the course of the summer—but it would be performed with the same devotion

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that it is the spirit of devotion shared by a vast company of actors, rather than any great virtuosity on the part of individual players, that makes the Passion Play a profound experience. Since the play was first discovered for the English-speaking world reams of turgid nonsense have been written by sentimental journalists whose enthusiasms had run away with what little judgment they possessed, and the result is that many people have gone to Oberammergau with high expectation of this or that kind and have been bitterly disappointed

When I went to the 1922 play I had as companion a musician, who was convinced that he was about to see and hear a tremendous work of art His disappointment was pitiful to witness He experienced a revulsion of feeling so strong that it drove him to fierce vituperation. He complained that the crucifixion scene was disgusting, the chief players—with one or two exceptions—could not act, the production was old-fashioned, the music was 'Haydn-and-water' I had no preconceived notions to trouble me, for the reason that until I was told by my editor to go and see it I had never given the Passion Play any particular thought. I found the performance impressive in ways which my companion was in no condition of mind to appreciate

Nowadays the flow of panegyric has ceased and the tide seems to be setting the other way An impression has been spread abroad that the Passion Play is nothing very wonderful after all, and that whatever glory there once was in it has now departed It is my belief that the play, like the people, has changed only in certain external and inessential respects, and that it is to-day exactly as well worth seeing as it always has been

To my mind, it is a mistake to attempt to judge this play by artistic standards. That in certain ways it is an artistic success is true, and is much more true in 1930 than it was in 1922, for reasons which will appear later But its inspiration, its manner of working out, its form, are all religious rather than artistic. If I were told to criticise this play by the same standards as I should use in the secular theatre, I should have to begin by saying that there is almost no crime in the dramatist's decalogue which the good monk who wrote this play has not committed. He has, in fact, no theatrical guile whatever. He must be allowed the one virtue that he does tell his story, but he completely ignores the even greater virtue of compression, and takes an unconscionable time over the task. He labours his effects

unforgivably. He dissipates his best dramatic moments by allowing minor characters to talk at interminable length upon affairs of minor importance. And so on, and so forth.

Turning to the acting, I should have to say that most of the individual players attain no higher standard than our own amateurs who compete for prizes in the National Festival of Community Drama. Guido Mayr, who plays Judas, is a natural actor of considerable gifts; Johanna Preisinger, the Magdalene, has beauty, grace, and force of personality; Hugo Rutz, the blacksmith, makes a fine powerful figure as Caiaphas; but I imagine that many a village could match these three, who are the best of the Oberammergau company. Alois Lang, the Christus, does not strike me as having any particular talent for acting. His performance has a compelling power, not because of what he makes believe to be, but because of what he evidently is—a man of fine character, of simplicity and strength. And having dealt thus faithfully with the acting, I should have to go on to speak in disparaging terms of the music, for which my disgruntled friend of 1922 seems to have found the just phrase. It *is* 'Haydn-and-water.'

But I should be wrong to say all this. The play is not to be judged by such standards. The Ettal monk wrote his play, not for dramatic critics, but for worshippers of Christ. His aim when writing his dialogue was rather to make sure that he had got everything in than to leave anything out. He had none of the usual aims of the playwright before him. He had neither to invent incident nor to create character. Even the words of his dialogue were to a great extent predetermined. His play was written, not according to the needs of the ordinary theatre, but in a special form for a special purpose; its appeal to us therefore lies, not in its purely dramatic quality, but in its suitability to its special purpose. It was written as a vehicle, not for art, but for religion. If you insist on regarding it as a work of art, its quality is not fine enough to move you. But if you regard it in its true light as a great declaration of faith, then, whether you yourself happen to be religious or not, it can hardly fail to move you profoundly.

The effect upon you of the much-debated crucifixion scene depends entirely upon your own attitude towards the play. Dramatically speaking, this scene fails. Twice I have sat through it, and both times, in spite of (or possibly because of) the strongly realistic manner of its presentation, I have found that it makes no appeal to my emotions at all. To religious-minded people, on the other hand, the scene stands—as it should—as a tremendous climax to the whole tragedy. Delving into my mind to discover a reason for this violent cleavage of opinion, I have formed a

theory which, though I put it forward with diffidence, seems to me to be credible enough. The scene fails with me because throughout its length my mind is subconsciously occupied, not with the mimic action on the stage, but with the very real discomfort which is being endured by the chief actor during his fifteen trying minutes on the cross. The religious mind, I imagine, is troubled by no such consideration—not because it lacks pity or sympathy, but because it accepts the player's voluntary ordeal as an act of worship, and is rather edified than revolted by it.

I am strengthened in my belief in this theory by the fact that as soon as the crucifixion is over I find myself powerfully moved by the scene which follows—the Descent from the Cross. Two men set ladders against the cross and climb up to where the Body of Christ is hanging. Carefully and reverently, but with a businesslike expertness, they pass a band of white cloth across His breast and over the cross-beam, so that the long ends droop to the ground. Two other men hold these ends, and then, when the nails have been taken out that have fastened His feet and hands to the cross, they lower His body slowly to the ground, and lay it with the head in Mary's lap. The scene has no great significance in itself, but it has an effect as though Rembrandt's picture in the gallery at Munich (from which it has evidently been copied) had come to life; and when I saw it something in its simple realism caught me suddenly by the throat. I am sure that part of the emotion I felt was due (once again, subconsciously) to relief that the actor was now no longer in pain.

The pain that he must undergo during the crucifixion scene is very severe. The cross is so built that he gets little support for his feet, and the weight of his frame is held by some kind of strong hook at his back, so that his outstretched arms do not have to bear any part of the strain. But even so, only a very strong and courageous man could bear to remain for fifteen minutes (which seems to us in the audience to be more like thirty, and to the actor must feel an age) with his arms held aloft at full stretch and with no possibility of movement. I am told that by the end of the scene his arms are quite 'dead,' and that the task of getting him down from the cross is one that must be performed by experts and with the minutest care.

Although I have attempted to show that a visit to Oberammergau in search of æsthetic experience is foredoomed to disappointment, there are two respects in which the Passion Play is worth seeing purely as a dramatic spectacle. First, the settings, the groupings, the handling of colour effects, both in the play itself and in the interspersed tableaux, are marvellously well done, and are in direct contrast to the 1922 production. I

remember wishing eight years ago that the tableaux could be left out of the performance altogether, so tawdry and uninspired did they seem. This year a new mind, enriched by knowledge of modern theatrical practice, has been at work, and the tableaux are now a rich decoration whose removal would be a great loss to the play. The picture of the Lamenting Bride (already mentioned), seated all in white at her window, with eight Daughters of Jerusalem in saffron yellow disposed about her chamber, remains in my memory as an exquisitely lovely thing

And second, and more important, are the big crowd scenes. These have a quality not to be matched on any other stage; and if you consider local conditions for a moment you will see why. For centuries now the Passion Play has been the central point upon which the life of Oberammergau has turned. With it are bound up all the family traditions, all the personal ambitions, the hopes of triumph and the fears of disappointment, which in other municipalities concern themselves with local politics The Ammergauer makes up his mind in early youth that when he grows up he will act this or that part in his play, and on the day when he achieves that desire his life is crowned with success. Each play in which he appears brings him ten years nearer his goal, or ten years nearer the time when he must admit failure. Each play gives him a new chance of proving his mettle in a subordinate part Add to this his devotion to his religion and his pride in his birthplace, and you have the factors of an amazing communal enthusiasm which no mere æsthetic impulse could inspire The finest theatrical producer in the world could never put upon the stage a crowd of 500 people of both sexes and of all ages, every member of which is utterly and completely wrapped up in his part. It is not in mortals to command success of that kind

The first big crowd scene of the Passion Play, Christ's Entry into Jerusalem, is an unsurpassable and unforgettable stage picture. Some people think that the later full-stage scene, in which Pilate hands over Christ to the Jews, is even finer It is certainly more dramatic, but that very fact impels me to prefer the earlier scene. There is a touch of artificiality in the Pilate scene, inherent in the manner of its writing In it large numbers of people have to speak together, and are given long and complicated sentences to say It is obvious that if a band of men have to shout such a mouth-filling sentence as 'We belong to Moses! We are and will remain followers of Moses and his teaching,' the only way in which they can make the audience hear the words is to speak strictly in unison

Throughout this particular act, consequently, the various sections of the crowd give an exhibition of disorder so extremely

well-drilled that the figure of the producer is never absent from the mind's eye. But the great quality of the Entry into Jerusalem is its apparent spontaneity. In this scene there is no dialogue at all. Through the various entries pours a throng of people, singing hosannas and waving palm branches. They flood the huge stage with sound and colour, and in their midst Christ is seen riding by into the city That is all But for the moment you forget the theatre, and only know that you are taking part in a magnificent service of adoration.

W A DARLINGTON.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH CRICKET?

As in politics, so in sport, a diversity of opinion is universally held by the leading authorities no less than by the numberless participants and followers engaged in its pursuit.

Cricket has long since ceased to be of merely national importance; apart from actual cricketers, it numbers to-day countless enthusiastic followers, not only wherever the British flag flies, but in every quarter of the civilised world. The fascination of the cricket-field never loses its hold on those who have once been enthralled by its spell. Although, by reason of age or circumstance, they may be debarred from the active delights of the game, the votaries of cricket will ever thrill responsively to the memories of joys once experienced in playing or watching the play of the great heroes of the past whose names to them are household words.

Since the County Championship was introduced by the Press, some forty years ago, the game as regards first-class cricket has undergone considerable changes. The question arises: Have these changes been for the benefit of the game and for those who play it?

I have no hesitation in answering the question in the negative. Like our main products and industries, first-class cricket is suffering from over-production. That is to say, there is a surfeit of professionals employed by most of our counties, which is not only detrimental to those amateurs who can afford to play, but also to those who for the sake of example might quite conceivably be able to play for six weeks or so at various periods during the season. The result is that the amateur is gradually being pushed out of the game, chiefly on account of the surfeit of matches. Unless a player can devote four months and a half to the game—this applies especially to the northern first-class counties—he probably does not get an invitation to play. We have seen what the effect has been of over-professionalising football. Where every player is a paid servant whose existence and livelihood is dependent on success, and with competition as keen as it is to-day and steadily on the increase, a tendency is created to study one's self rather than one's side. At present this applies more particu-

larly to Association football, but there are distinct signs that the same result is being brought about in first-class cricket.

The evil in cricket has been slow; nevertheless, the state of things to-day gives food for thought as to whether it is too late for the counties to put their houses in order. The present unsatisfactory condition of things is largely due to the vast county programmes which started when the last half-dozen counties were admitted into the Championship. This, in itself, could not very well have been avoided These sides had proved that they were thoroughly deserving of recognition both from a financial and cricket point of view Under the old *régime*, some forty years ago, professionals were paid 5*l*. per match and no winter pay. Yorkshire was the first county to institute winter pay, which, I believe, is to-day 2*l* per week The other counties have been practically forced to fall into line in this respect, although half of them are really unable to do so Last season was an exceptionally fine and dry one, yet the balance-sheets, except in very few instances, made sorry reading.

In former days the professionals, who were far fewer in number, all had some sort of winter jobs either as groundsmen or in business, and were capable of earning a living outside their cricket To-day, except to those who get to the top of the tree and find a regular place in their county eleven, the game is hardly worth the candle The young player is up against a far keener competition than obtained in former years, and this, combined with the comparatively lazy and luxurious life he leads during the summer months, minimises his chance of getting work A further obstacle is the increasing difficulty for a batsman only to get into a county eleven, and unless the player has an outstanding chance of obtaining this distinction he is almost sure to strike a bad patch during his first seasons, which results in his being left out His nerve may be shattered, and he will probably be relegated to club-ground matches and be out of the eleven for a season or two During that period he is earning a bare existence, and, not being a bowler, his chance of obtaining a permanent place in the eleven is very slight

The selection of young players is undoubtedly made in too haphazard and ignorant a manner by many counties. Except in very rare instances, no young cricketer should be engaged by a county as a batsman only There is an old saying that in both codes of football the wise judge looks to the half-backs when he gauges the strength of a side The same remark applies to cricket if you substitute the bowlers for the half-backs. It is in reality the bowler rather than the batsman who will win the match. A bowler is born, not made, and, though he may learn much from logical and capable coaching, not above 10 per cent. of young

players can hope to become great at bowling, whereas 80 per cent. can be made into skilful batsmen, especially in these days when so much is done by the super-excellence of our county grounds to favour the batsman.

The restarting of county cricket after the war presented a favourable moment in which to review the unsatisfactory state of affairs. The whole question should then have been tackled and a remedy might have been effected :

(1) By limiting the number of county matches to twenty.

(2) By making it a *sine qua non* that at least half the side should be composed of amateurs.

By limiting the number of county matches there would be certain periods during the summer when the professionals would be free. During those times they might very well be employed in their own counties in bowling or coaching the various clubs and schools They should be paid for the season's engagement. At present the professional is paid by the match, and in some cases leading players get a field fee Half our counties are being ruined, from a financial point of view, by a plethora of county matches. The problem might be solved by the counties agreeing to play two-day matches of one innings apiece and eliminating three-day county matches of two innings The third day of a county match is almost certain to be a dead loss financially No matter how interesting the state of the game may be, the public can seldom afford either the time or the money to attend matches every day in the week A further argument is that in many games on the third day stumps are drawn about 5 o'clock to enable the visiting team to travel to their destination, which may be several hundred miles away Counties which indulge in county cricket weeks find that their supporters attend either on the first or second day's play of each match, but seldom on the last day, which in most cases results in a short day's play, a draw, or a foregone conclusion The regrettable incident which occurred at Southampton early this season will serve to point a moral Hampshire, with one run to win and half their wickets to fall, were compelled by Nottinghamshire to go in to bat on the third day. Nottinghamshire's idea was that had it rained all day they might have saved the loss of five points—a potent example of how cricket should not be played!

There are few outstanding personalities among the cricketers of to-day compared with those of thirty or forty years ago This is due in no small measure to the introduction of googly bowling, which was invented by B J T Bosanquet in the late 'nineties. It is googly bowling that is primarily responsible for the altered position assumed by our batsmen at the wicket, and known as the two-eyed stance. This, by the way, is a misnomer ; it should

be termed the two-shouldered stance, as it deals with the position of the shoulders. As the batsman stands at the wicket to-day his left shoulder is away on the on side and his body less sideways than formerly, while the stance at the wicket is far more open. The modern batsman has reacted to this innovation in a deplorable manner. The driving, especially straight driving, of other days has given place to a dull, stereotyped batting in many of our county sides; and a further result is the lamentable weakness that is apparent to-day in a large percentage of our so-called first-class batsmen.

All present-day cricketers would do well to make a careful study of *The Personalities at the Wicket*, which includes the well-known portrait of the late W. G. Grace, by the late Archibald Stuart-Wortley, and model lessons may be learnt from the wonderful instantaneous photographs by G. W. Beldam of F. S. Jackson (now Sir Stanley Jackson), the Jamsahib of Nawanagar, and the late V. Trumper, all taken in the act of driving, with the left shoulder in line with the ball they are driving. This attitude shows a striking contrast to that of the present-day players, many of whom step back while the ball is in the air, irrespective of its length, and with the full breadth of their chest facing the bowler, so that they are always in an impossible position to drive an over-pitched ball. The perfect exponent of the correct position at the wicket before making any strokes was A. C. MacLaren. To the initiated as well as the ignorant onlookers he gave an impression of supreme command and ability which has never been surpassed by any other batsman. In a minor degree the same may apply to F. E. Woolley to-day, but he, being a left-hand player, is not in quite the same category as the normal batsman, although the correctness, ease, and perfection of his graceful play would be very difficult to improve upon. Another dominating personality at the wicket is Hobbs. He can truthfully be dubbed the most evergreen batsman of to-day, or indeed of all time. He has the rare gift of knowing his own limitations, and what he can or cannot do in regard to his increasing age, though in spite of his forty-seven years his marvellous artistry as a batsman on all types of wickets shows no signs of diminishing.

There are fewer bowlers of real class to-day than there were formerly, and it is this obsession for trying something new without having the least command of what really counts in bowling that is in a great measure responsible for the low ebb of our present-day bowling. Apart from a natural ability, there is no short cut to success in bowling, and no bowler can hope to make good without real hard work. I have often been asked what really goes to make a fine bowler. I unhesitatingly answer: 'Guts and brains.' It is a lack of the former that causes the dearth

of fast bowlers to-day; and there is a strong need of the latter, if the bowler is to avoid the common pitfall of trying to accomplish too much, and consequently sacrificing length for the sake of employing a googly, without any command of pitch or direction. We look in vain to-day for any bowlers who can carry on the traditions of the late F. R. Spofforth, G R. Lohmann, C. J. Kortright, Peel, Blythe, or Sidney Barnes, who were inimitable in their methods of delivery or variety of concealed pace, whilst the real fast bowler, always excepting Larwood, has practically vanished from our fields

In these post-war days our bowlers cannot compare in physical fitness with their predecessors, nor are they capable of such long spells of bowling as were those giants of yore. Where to-day could we hope to witness such a feat as that achieved by W. Brearley some years ago in the Canterbury Week? None who were present will ever forget how he bowled right through the day, which was a broiling one in August, and bowled his last over just as fast as his opening one. It is true that Brearley was, and still is, a man of exceptional physique, but, even if we eliminate the obvious exceptions, our cricketers to-day are not nearly so strong nor so fit as were their pre-war prototypes It is a pretty safe prophecy that when we send abroad a team of fifteen players more often than not at least three or four of the men will be *hors de combat* with minor ailments and unfit to play. Whether or not this lack of stamina is due to the softer conditions of life which have prevailed since the invention of the motor car and the introduction of other luxuries I do not pretend to judge The fact, however, remains that the fieldsmen of to-day are not nearly so much on their toes, and the bowlers have not that vigour, perseverance, and accuracy, which are only to be obtained by frugal feeding and drinking, and the use of common sense as regards short sprints and physical exercises.

As regards batting, it is undeniable that, with the exception of our leading batsmen who are actually representing England, and a very few others, the style of batting as practised by our young professionals to-day is not only radically wrong, but almost painful to watch. The main principles in attack are quickness of footwork and the correct position of the body, which should be sideways at the moment of impact, with the shoulders loose, especially the left shoulder. To-day these principles are generally ignored, particularly as regards the play of the shoulders, and it may be said of at least half of our prominent batsmen that their shoulders, for all practical purposes, are non-existent. Correct methods of batting have suffered terribly of late years by the substitution of a poor defence, which is boring to watch and

results in many drawn-out games and depleted gates in nearly every county ground throughout the country. A terrible exhibition of batting took place only last month on the first day of the Kent week at Tunbridge Wells, when Kent met Worcestershire. The visitors batted for just under five hours and succeeded in making 141 runs on a very slow and comparatively easy-paced wicket. They were so obsessed with this two-shouldered stance that they were utterly incapable of trying to force the game. One of the Kent bowlers bowled eight half volleys in two overs, and not one of them was scored off or attempted to be hit, but they were simply played in front of the batsmen, whose whole body faced the bowler. Can we wonder that county cricket has lost the hold which it had on the public in former years, and that the balance-sheets suffer accordingly?

A great drawback in cricket to-day is that very few first-class teams are captained by men who have real inside knowledge of the game. So many captains are at fault over the question of a sticky wicket. They seem to be incapable of differentiating between a wet wicket which plays quite easily and a sticky one, which to-day is a *rara avis*. The following instance will illustrate my meaning. Towards the end of May, when Lancashire were playing Middlesex at Lord's, Lancashire had made a large first-innings score, and might easily have disposed of their opponents for under 100 runs in both innings on the third day. With a hot sun out after a wet night, a real sticky wicket would probably have resulted, and bowlers like R. Tyldesley and Hopwood might have been unplayable. But the ground was perfectly fit for play and was pronounced to be so by White, the head groundsman, yet there was no play on the third day. In the same way many a match has been abandoned in recent times through ignorance as to what effect weather conditions might have upon the ground, which expert knowledge would have pronounced to have been perfectly fit for play. It is such cases as these that upset the spectators, who leave the ground sorely disgruntled and disappointed.

Many inaccurate statements are being noised abroad concerning the inability of obtaining amateurs for the game. There should be no reason for fear on this score. The standard of cricket at the universities does not vary. Year by year the elevens are drawn from the best products of our great public schools, with the occasional addition of a first-rate Colonial recruit. Yet fewer Blues get invitations to play for their counties. In my day, and a good deal later, the Kent county amateur cricketers were, with the exception of our great leader and all-rounder J. R. Mason, K. L. Hutchings, and W. M. Bradley, all university players. I count it a privilege and a joy to have played under

such a leader and with such a side. The style of batsmanship which F. E. Woolley so ably portrays is due in no small measure to his first captain, who inculcated a correct method in his team, and played cricket himself in a match-winning style according to the conditions of the moment.

The alteration in the size of the stumps last year was made with the idea of helping the bowler, but, up to date, it has hardly proved to be the success that those who were responsible for its innovation anticipated The root of the trouble is the doping of the wickets by so many of our groundsmen To-day, even when a hot sun following heavy rain seems to warrant it, we very seldom get a real sticky wicket; moreover, the custom of covering it up on every occasion nullifies the assistance that it was hoped the bowlers would get from the use of larger wickets When the question arises as to whether a match should continue or not owing to the condition of the wicket it is always the greater sportsman who is the sufferer This was exemplified in the first Test Match at Nottingham this year, the captains of the opposing teams being A P F Chapman and W M Woodfull On the first day fairly heavy rain fell for two hours about luncheon time, producing conditions all in England's favour—*i e*, a rather greasy wet ball on a fast wicket with rain on top of it, a combination of circumstances than which nothing could be more favourable to batting, and especially to a forcing batsman But Woodfull, in a most sporting manner, agreed to start play at 5 30 On the second day a similar question as to whether the ground was fit to start play, was decided by the umpires, owing to the captains holding opposite views on the subject In any match of importance it should always be left to the decision of umpires as to whether the wicket and ground are fit for play Where rain has intervened after a match has started, the conditions will in most cases favour one side at the expense of the other

Test Matches, which form such an important part of every cricket season in this country, are rapidly widening their scope. The admission of the West Indies and New Zealand (which will probably be followed shortly by that of India) and the recent extension to four days which is now allotted to each Test Match make them progressively exigent, so that greater demands are made upon our players and reserves, who for more than half the season are now unavailable for county cricket It is to be hoped that four days will be the limit of extensions for games in this country. One day for each completed innings, however good the wickets may be, should provide sufficient time in which to win a match, if the game is played in the correct manner and spirit. Games such as those that were played the last time England's side visited Australia cause a strain and weariness to the players

which become a real burden; and it ought not to be possible to prolong any match to the extent to which the last Test Match in the West Indies was dragged out, when, after seven days' play, the game was abandoned because the visiting team had to catch the boat home. The altered state of things, as it affects county cricket, presents a problem to which the cricket authorities should give serious attention. The extra time allotted to Test Matches is a distinct menace to county cricket, and it is surely the moment when the counties and the Advisory Committee and the M.C.C. should take counsel together to decide what steps to take.

My considered opinion is that the remedy lies in having two-day county matches of one innings each. The results would be:

(1) To reduce automatically the number of days' play without reducing the number of matches (say twenty-eight a county), which would give a much-needed rest to many of our leading bowlers.

(2) To help the counties very much from a gate point of view, seeing that nowadays, however interesting a state the game may be in, the third day of a county match is almost invariably a dead financial loss.

There is bound to be opposition, as there always is whenever delegates and representatives act on behalf of committees and large areas. For instance, there might conceivably be objections from counties that thrive on their cricket weeks, like Kent and Sussex, or from others in the north, who might resent the idea of giving up playing during even part of Whitsun Week, which is, I believe, a holiday with them. But if only counties would sink the individual standpoint and regard the interests of cricket as a whole, we might yet arrive at some happy solution of present difficulties.

G. J. V. WEIGALL.

STATE-BARGES

A STATE-BARGE, though undeniably a boat, is even more a stage property for use in shows and pageants. Seldom has it any peculiarities of a nautical kind, and when they occur they are apt to be extremely small. The state-barge in the Victoria and Albert Museum, designed in 1732 for the Prince of Wales by William Kent—portrait painter, architect, and landscape gardener—has, for instance, an extra rowlock on its starboard side. The state-barge of the Clothworkers' Company—who have a seventeenth-century model of it at Mincing Lane—had a tiller curiously twisted upwards; but that was only in order that the steersman could see over the pavilion and the three golden rams (the crest of the Company) that stood upon its roof. Such boats have more interest for the student of decorative art with a taste for the rococo, though even he might be inclined to pass them by on the ground that their embellishment was but that of their period, already displayed abundantly enough on many a carven balustrade and console and organ-loft. And although there is room for ingenuity in the application of their insistent decorative motives—their dolphins and tritons and shells—it is probably what the state-barge recalls of bygone aquatic ceremonial that constitutes its chief claim to notice.

The water pageant in which the state-barge often played a leading part is as extinct as the Court Masque, and in England its heyday was more or less contemporary with that joyous ebullition of the Renaissance. Let us take as an early example the entertainment provided for Henry VII.'s queen when she came by water from Greenwich to the Tower. Her escort on that occasion was formed by the barges of the Lord Mayor and the City Companies, 'freshly furnished with banners and streamers of silk, and in especiall a barge called the batchelors' barge, garnished and apparelled passing all other, wherein was ordeigned a great redd dragon spouting flames of fyer into the Thames, and many other gentlemanlie pagiaunts curiously devised to do her Highness sporte and pleasure withal.' The City barges were in frivolous company that day; but it must not be forgotten that the barge of ceremony had more austere and formal uses. We

need not go as far afield as the solemn annual assertion through many centuries of the claim of Venice to dominion over the Adriatic, which was made from the upper deck of that most sumptuous of state-barges, the *Bucentaur*. In England, time out of mind, it was the custom at Newcastle-on-Tyne for the mayor and the Brethren of the local Trinity House in their barges, 'gorgeous in paint and gilding,' to beat the bounds of the former's jurisdiction over the river, due proclamation thereof being made at its territorial limits both upstream and seawards. This practice of going on the river to settle boundaries can be traced by the corporation's disbursements to early in the seventeenth century, but is probably as old as the town's acquisition of a local 'admiralty.' Newcastle had a 'town barge' in 1676 fine enough for the mayor to take Sir Francis North, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, for a trip to Tynemouth in it. So upon occasion had the Doge of Venice—the parallel sounds ridiculous—employed the *Bucintoro* to show the beauties of the lagoon to distinguished guests of the Republic.

The Newcastle 'Barge Day,' as it was called, presented a scene that local marine artists such as J. W. Carmichael liked to paint, perhaps because not only had the *Bucentaur* attracted Canaletto's pencil, but also, whilst he sojourned in England, the state-barges of the eighteenth-century Thames. Incidentally we may note the odd coincidence that the Mayor of Newcastle should have gone afloat for this semi-legal function, as the Doge did for his, upon Ascension Day. At Hull, too, the mayor embarked upon the river to assert his rights as Admiral of the Humber. It is recorded that in 1727 the corporation of that town resolved that his worship 'do exercise his Admirall's jurisdiction,' and for that purpose they voted him a new flag with his arms in it to make 'a parade down Humber with a jury.'[1] These municipal excursions by water had a more or less serious purpose, though, since the local historian says that at Newcastle 'the whole town turned out to see the show,' they served as well the purpose of entertainment. 'The barges,' we are told, 'rowed by men in gay costumes, and accompanied by a flotilla of boats with streamers flying, moved down the river amidst the firing of cannon, the ringing of bells and the cheers of the crowds on shore and on board the bunting-decked ships alongside the quay.'[2]

So that, although dignified personages like port admirals and archbishops—his Grace of Canterbury had a barge which was wont to lie off Lambeth Stairs[3]—might have state-barges for

[1] Frost, *Early History of Hull* (1827), Appendix.
[2] Charlton, *Newcastle Town* (1885).
[3] Possibly the small barge with a comparatively plain pavilion shown in Samuel Scott's painting of Lambeth Palace (London Museum) is meant for this.

their own dignified uses, we never get far away from the state-barge as an ingredient in holiday junketings upon the water. It is, of course, a mere coincidence—though a happy one—that the king's barge-house in Tudor times was situate in the then theatrical neighbourhood of Bankside; but we shall find the royal barge participating in aquatic shows of whose counterparts on land Ben Jonson was in his day the most distinguished deviser. It was in Ben Jonson's lifetime, too, that decorative art, impelled by the influence of the Renaissance percolating into England through France and Holland, made an unparalleled invasion even into the shipyards of the Navy About the year 1614 Gerard Christmas is appointed 'carver' to the Royal Navy and the Lords of the Admiralty. he plies his art for twenty years, and then his two sons, John and Mathias, succeeding him, take in hand the elaborate carven allegories of the *Sovereign of the Seas*. It is symptomatic of the period that the praises of the work they put into this man-of-war should be sung by a playwright and designer of lord mayors' pageants, Thomas Heywood, and his book on the subject reminds one of nothing so much as that later volume in which Signor Luchini, citizen of Venice, catalogued the artistic wonders of the last of the Doge's state-barges But in the *Bucentaur* and her like baroque decoration had a legitimate field. of the *Sovereign*, John Evelyn notes sadly that she was 'especially for this remarkable, that her building cost his Majestie the affections of his subjects' From these facts may be gathered why it was that at this period the state-barge attained to the zenith of its flamboyance

Though Evelyn calls the *Sovereign* 'monstrous,' he had a pretty taste for the ornate legitimately applied He had hurried from Rome to Venice expressly in order to be present there on Ascension Day and to see the *Bucentaur* in all her glory Nearly twenty years later he enjoyed the show upon the Thames when King Charles brought his Portuguese bride by water from Hampton Court to Whitehall, and thought it 'far exceeded' the Venetian festival This Restoration water pageant, which Pepys as well as Evelyn witnessed (the former with difficulty, though he was consoled by the sight of the Lady Castlemaine perched upon some part of Whitehall), included groups of allegorical figures borne upon barges — the aquatic counterparts of the land 'pageant' on its car; and in it figured also the two gondolas which had been presented to Charles by the Doge Domenico Contarini.[4] But, so far as appears from the old print by Stoop of this 'triumph,' the show fell far short of what the Venetians were able to do (as we shall see) just a century later. Yet Evelyn thought it 'the most magnificent triumph that ever

[4] See Pepys' *Diary*, September 12, 1661, note in Wheatley's edition.

floated on the Thames.' He describes the royal barge used on this occasion as 'an antique-shaped open vessel, covered with a state or canopy of cloth of gold, made in the form of a cupola supported with high Corinthian pillars wreathed with flowers, festoons and garlands' This description comprises nearly everything that need be said about the appearance of seventeenth-century English state-barges; nautically their form always tended to be archaic, and the 'state' or canopy, which is implicit in their name, was the chief care of their designers. The description Humpherus [5] quotes of the barge of King James is very similar—'built in the fashion of a tower or little castle, enclosed with glass windows and casements faire carved and gilt, being wrought with much art, the roof being made with battlements, pinnacles, pyramids and fine imagery.' He adds that on the occasion of the state visit of Christian of Denmark to James it was towed by another barge with thirty oars It had been the custom at Venice to tow [6] the earlier *Bucentaurs* to the Porto di Lido when the Doge went there to marry the Adriatic From the spectacular point of view probably towage by rowing boats would be less impressive than the advance of a great galley propelled by the rhythmic sweep of her own forty or fifty oars. But it is clear that without some use of that ancient implement the impressiveness of the water pageant vanishes, and as regards the Thames, we may surely surmise that all sense of it must have been lost when in 1839 an offer by the London and Westminster Iron Steamboat Company of the use of one of their steamers to tow the Lord Mayor's barge from the City to Westminster Hall was 'gratefully accepted by the Corporation

There is no doubt that Venice was the immediate *fons et origo* (we must leave Cleopatra and Caligula alone) of the water pageants of Europe Her *Bucintoro* was imitated by the d'Estes on the Po and the Gonzagas on the Mincio the Electors of Saxony had another on the Rhine, and the barge in which Ferdinand Maria of Bavaria disported himself on the waters of the Starnberger See early in the seventeenth century was built for him by Venetian craftsmen and given the same name as its original There still exists a model of this craft in the Deutsche Museum at Munich: it had sails as well as oars, and displays a tendency to classicalism in the twenty-six caryatids supporting the roof of its pavilion and the double beak in the fashion of a Roman galley that projects from its stem.

The Republic of Venice seldom failed to provide a *regata* for the delectation of Pope or Emperor or other notability visiting the city. In Italian there is a small library on the subject; and in

[5] *Origin and Progress of the Company of Watermen* (1887), vol i., p. 167.

[6] Correr, *Venezia e le sue lagune* (1847), vol i, pt. 2, p. 201.

English there is a contemporary account of the aquatic entertainment given to His Royal Highness Edward Augustus, Duke of York, in 1764—a show, as the reporter says, 'possible to be executed only in Venice.' In view of the kinship between such spectacles and the shows of the theatre, one fact, which we learn from another source, may be noted. Of the allegorical groups representing the four elements of Water, Earth, Air, and Fire which were borne by the four principal *peotas* in the procession two are stated to have been the invention of '*celebri pittori teatricali*.' This is how the English spectator describes the scene:

> The four first peotas represented the four elements, the first of them entirely silvered over, and symbolizing the element of Water, representing the triumph of Neptune adorned with figures of tritons, swordfish, dolphins, etc. The second expressed the Earth symbolized in the goddess Cybele, crowned with towers and adorned with various products, plants, flowers and animals, the whole being gilt and silvered over The third was sky-colour and silver, denoting the element of Air, expressed by the rape of Orithya by Boreas, with Zephyrs and Cupids playing around in the air. The fourth was of flame-colour with ornaments of silver, indicating the element of Fire, admirably expressed by the forge of Vulcan, sweating at the anvil with his naked Cyclops in gigantic figures, with Venus opposite in her car drawn by doves, and with other allusions agreeable to the fable. These four peotas bore the arms quartered of the four Venetian nobles deputed to entertain the Duke The other five peotas were fitted out by their nearest relations The first represented Great Britain led in triumph by Europe the second shewed the whale-fishing, very well executed the third exhibited the triumph of Venus in her car drawn by four doves: the fourth the chariot of the sun, drawn by four horses preceded by Aurora in the act of dispersing night the fifth and last, the triumph of Pallas, with trophies and allusions to that deity All rivalling each other in pomp, and glittering with silver and gold, particularly the various elegant dresses of the rowers, musicians and other figures in each peota richly adorned with laces besides the long fringes and tassels of silver playing upon the water

To return, however, from their occasions to state-barges themselves, there was specially built for the convenience of the Duke, moving about Venice during a rather lengthy stay, an ornate *felucca* remarkable for its carved work . a pleasure vessel, which, having been laid up in the Arsenal 'for remembrance' after his departure, had the distinction of being destroyed long afterwards by Napoleon's soldiers on the same day that they hacked to pieces the world-famous *Bucintoro* itself. The rather dissipated scion of the House of Hanover who was thus honoured was the grandson of that Frederick, Prince of Wales, for whom William Kent—the fashionable Jack-of-all-trades of his period, as Austin Dobson calls him—had designed the state-barge now at South Kensington. It does not appear that amongst his many avocations Kent was ever either scene painter or property master, but

probably Edward Augustus saw nothing even at Venice that much excelled the invention of the English artist who provided his own family's state-barge—in the way, that is, of applied sea-lions and somewhat contorted mermaids endeavouring to 'support' shields of arms

WILLIAM SENIOR.

CLEMENCEAU[1]

When a man has lived for nearly fifty years in the forefront of public affairs, his compatriots have little more to learn about him. When he has talked as brilliantly, written as profusely, and acted as energetically as Georges Clemenceau, when he has been at once the leading parliamentary gladiator and the most talented publicist of his time, when he has been twice Prime Minister and has brought his country victoriously out of a great war, proceeding always through every vicissitude upon certain clear-cut intellectual principles, continually and confidently proclaimed, there can be very little ambiguity as to what manner of man he is. To the French public few figures were so familiar as 'the Tiger.' They knew the force of his spring, the sharp edge of his claw. They had watched him pull down Ministry after Ministry by his gift of devastating invective and biting wit. They did not need the assurance of the elaborate volumes written 'in the evening of his thought' to realise that he was an unrepentant anticlerical with a wide interest in modern science and a stoical courage in face of the ultimate mysteries of fate. The admirable work of M. Martel was not required to remind them that there was no talker in France more vivacious or amusing, so wide has been the currency for his flashing sayings. Finally, though no statesman of modern times has been more ready to provoke or salute fierce forms of controversy, there was nothing in Clemenceau to surprise the Frenchman. In mind and character he was thoroughly Latin. For this last reason the five volumes of English prose which are the subject of this article are specially to be welcomed. They recall the incidents, too little remembered in England, of a singular career, and bring us close to a man of strong emotions

[1] (1) *In the Evening of my Thought*, by Georges Clemenceau. Translated by Charles Miner Thompson and John Head, jun. (two vols.). London: Constable & Co. (first, 1929).

(2) *Grandeur and Misery of Victory*, by Georges Clemenceau. George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd. London, Bombay, Sydney.

(3) *Clemenceau, the Events of his Life as told by himself to his former Secretary, Jean Martel*. Longmans, Green & Co. London, New York, and Toronto.

(4) *The Tiger, Georges Clemenceau*, by George Adam. Jonathan Cape: Bedford Square, London.

and powerful understanding, who for a short but very critical period of history exercised an important influence on the destiny of our own country. Though there is more to be learned about Clemenceau than will be found in these 1600 pages, what is here given is sufficient to exhibit the man in the strength and limitations of his rich Latin nature, at once fierce and logical, savage and tender, proud, artistic, witty, combative, to a people long inured to those habits of intellectual compromise which were least tolerable to his scornful and impatient intellect

Georges Clemenceau, the son of Dr Benjamin Clemenceau, atheist and republican, was born at St Vincent-sur-Jard, in the Vendée, on September 21, 1841 There was something 'obstinate, limited, and savage' in the Vendéan peasantry which attracted the boy. The people and landscape of his native province were always close to his heart 'Martel, I love the Vendée. Why? Because I passed my youth there. I know every field, every farm, every village I have ridden on horseback through all its sunken roads' So in his summer vacations riding and shooting, fishing and flirting, he passed the best days of his youth When he went to the academy at Nantes his father's influence began to assert itself The old freethinker, who was known for his gift of pointed and bitter epigram took pleasure in demolishing the religious theories which were put into the boy's head by his official instructor in philosophy 'Once, pointing my finger at my instructor, I said, "But you are losing the thread of your argument" His answer was "Leave the room"' Sometimes he would be taken to the public reading-room at Nantes, where his father would stride backwards and forwards declaiming against the empire and the priests not however, always with impunity, for one day in 1858, the imperial police being stimulated to increased activity after Orsini's plot Dr Clemenceau was arrested and sentenced to penal servitude in Algeria 'I remember going with my mother to see him in prison In front of the spies I went up to him and said, "I will avenge you," to which the old stoic replied, "If you want to avenge me, work."'

Medicine having already been for three generations the craft of the Clemenceau family, the boy was sent, at the age of nineteen, to Paris to qualify as a doctor He was not, however, of the stuff of which medical specialists are made, and, though he obtained his degree and for some years practised as a physician among the poor in Montmartre, medicine was always the least of his serious interests.

At that time the student quarter in Paris was in a state of feverish excitement, and Clemenceau threw himself heart and soul into the agitation against the empire. In 1862 he launched a newspaper entitled *Le Travail*, in which friends of the Court were

so unsparingly attacked as to bring down on the fiery young journalist seventy-three days of imprisonment in Mazas Gaol. Having thus graduated as a martyr of liberty, he determined to visit the lands in which liberty was best understood. In England he made friends with John Stuart Mill and his circle, and then, crossing the Atlantic, settled for some years in Connecticut, where he taught French literature in a girls' school and married an American wife

The year in which Clemenceau first emerged on to the stage of politics is one of the darkest and most terrible in the annals of modern France The Prussian invasion, the capitulation of Sedan, and the siege of Paris portended the further disasters of a calamitous peace and an even more humiliating civil war During this tumultuous and tragic period Clemenceau, as Mayor of Montmartre and as deputy to the Parliament of Bordeaux, played an energetic and honourable part He voted against the cession of any part of French territory to the enemy, and endeavoured, at great personal risk, to mediate between the Communards of Paris and the Government of Versailles. For a time he suffered the fate which attaches to the man who tries to intervene between two furious antagonists The air of Paris became suddenly unwholesome, but after a brief rustication he returned to the capital, and, being elected to the Paris Municipal Council, threw himself into the many urgent problems of reconstruction which the civil war had bequeathed to that important body. In 1876, after the most valuable kind of apprenticeship which a young politician can serve, he entered the Palais Bourbon as a determined champion of the still uncertain fortunes of the French republic

The history of French parliamentary life during the early decades of the republican *régime* is marked by the intrigues, hatreds, and jealousies to be expected in a concourse of excitable men unschooled in the discipline of party loyalty In this unquiet atmosphere Clemenceau achieved a peculiar kind of reputation, not altogether enviable, of being a man who deliberately avoided the responsibilities of office in order that he might be free to exercise his passion for political mischief He was unpopular with the Chamber, which he never sought to conciliate, and fiercely suspected by his followers, who were never certain into what strange places he might lead them. 'A parliament,' he observes, 'is always irritated with a man whose politics are national in scope', but if there be some truth in the statement that Clemenceau talked to the country rather than to the Chamber it is not a full explanation of his unpopularity. A cruel tongue was a more important factor in creating a general feeling of unfriendliness around him. Moreover, his notable powers as a

parliamentary gladiator were reinforced by a skill in the use of the revolver and the rapier, which made him a redoubtable champion in the duels which he was prompt, even in old age, to provoke or accept. A fierce hater must expect to excite passionate animosities, and to the legion of his personal enemies Clemenceau appeared to be no better than a bravo who found in the arena of politics the most diverting occasion for the indulgence of a quarrelsome and savage temper.

To these allegations were added other and graver charges, that he had murdered two generals in the Commune, that he was in the pay of the Jews, that he was the hireling of the British Government All these charges were false, but each was capable of being supported by a tissue of plausible though fallacious evidence The insinuation that, as the young Mayor of Montmartre, he had been a consenting party to the murder of General Clément Thomas and General Lecomte during the Communard insurrection clung like a malignant cloud round his reputation In revolutions the sequence of events is difficult to establish, and for unthinking people it was a sufficient proof of Clemenceau s guilt that he was mayor of the district in which the murders were committed, that he was known to be opposed to the measures which the generals were ordered to carry out and that he was on the scene of the crime soon after its occurrence That these suspicions were pertinaciously entertained is proved by the fact that Clemenceau thought it worth while in extreme old age, to supply M Martel with a minute narration of his movements in Montmartre on the critical day

To Clemenceau's friends the charge so widely believed during the Panama crisis that he was in the pay of the Jews and the English was always incredible Clemenceau had many faults, but a willingness to sell his opinions was not among them It was, however, unfortunate that Cornelius Herz, a Jewish financier deeply involved in the Panama scandal, had put money into Clemenceau's paper *La Justice* The fact was not denied ; but the inferences drawn from it were completely shattered by the modesty of Clemenceau's fortune

The trade of a statesman in opposition is one of the most difficult to reconcile with self-respect Governments are more often right than wrong, and oppositions more often wrong than right, for two obvious reasons The Government has, and the opposition has not, the curb of responsibility and the support of departmental knowledge Yet it is the familiar and besetting weakness of statesmen in opposition to behave as if the balance were reversed and the Government of the day altogether unworthy of confidence. From this common failing Clemenceau was not exempt. Having great powers of invective and a keen

enjoyment of a quarrel, he hit hard and gave no quarter. Yet it would be the greatest mistake to represent him as the unscrupulous *condottiere* of the Palais Bourbon. No figure in French politics was more consistent Starting as a radical republican and a convinced secularist, he remained a radical, a republican, and a secularist to the end of his days. These terms, however, have each a connotation in France slightly different from that which they now bear in this country Clemenceau's radicalism was of the old-fashioned *laissez-faire* type He believed that once the nation was secured in its civil and political liberties, without the tyrannical interference of the monarch and the priest, the essential task of statesmanship was accomplished In education he saw not so much a system of social insurance as an instrument of spiritual liberation For him, as for Gambetta, clericalism was the enemy

His republicanism, which was not the less fervent because it was hereditary, was of the same spiritual type Having entered political life as an opponent of the Second Empire, he regarded all forms of monarchical or imperial government as inherently vicious and unsuited to the needs and temperament of France Accordingly, in the early years of the Third Republic, when it was still uncertain whether royalism might not again prevail, he stood out as the indefatigable protagonist of republican principles For him the republic stood for national strength no less than for social reform Imperialism had been twice tried, and on each occasion had led to disaster Only the republic could restore to France her proper place of pride among the nations In this forecast Clemenceau has been justified by the event

In view of the repeated disasters in which France had been involved by a policy of imperial adventure, it is not surprising that Clemenceau should have counselled sober thoughts on external affairs For him France was enough He wanted no conquests, he wanted no colonies Let France be prosperous, strong, well defended against her secular foe—these were the terms which he asked of the republic. As his friend John Morley was a 'little Englander,' so he was a 'little Frenchman' To anything in the nature of imperial democracy he was unalterably opposed. For him Tunis and Tonquin were costly follies calculated to weaken and disperse the forces of the nation in face of a vigilant and powerful foe. He had not forgotten that, in the summer of Sadowa, the flower of the French army was away in Mexico. So in an age of competitive colonial expansion Clemenceau would have nothing of the current fashion. It is curious to reflect that the man who was afterwards to stand out as the greatest War Minister of France was persistently opposed to the formation of that colonial empire from which France, at the supreme crisis of her history, drew no small part of her military strength.

His anticlericalism, again, was of a type which does not easily flourish in the temperate atmosphere of Whitehall or Westminster, for it was more than a sceptical habit of mind, more even than a settled body of agnostic convictions—it was a theory of life to be proclaimed from the housetops and a militant programme for the improvement of the public hygiene In Britain no politician concerned with his parliamentary future could afford to outrage the sensibilities of all the Churches , but the Tiger, to whom popularity was never an important consideration, found acute pleasure in assailing theology, with all its consequences for the mind of man and the life of the country. When France was divided into two opposing camps by the Dreyfus case, Clemenceau, convinced, against his earlier preconceptions, of the Jew's innocence, entered the lists against the generals and the Jesuits with vizor down There could be no mistake where he stood in the battle of the creeds, nor did advancing age temper his aversion from the consolations of the Church His final apologia, written with the hand of extreme old age, burns with the fervour of a prose Lucretius

When power at last came to him in 1906 he exhibited, to the surprise of his critics and the dismay of his friends, a genius for resolute action A number of grave industrial disturbances were handled with a rare mixture of courage and tact He was not afraid to go down among the formidable miners of Courrières, unprotected and unarmed, and when Albert, the leader of the Vignerons, then combined in a menacing strike, came to negotiate with the Government he insisted, by a genial stroke of wisdom, in charging his hotel bills to the State 'We all he said, 'must learn liberty Education is achieved, not by words, but by deeds' In his conduct of foreign affairs he was equally resolute, and even risked a war with Germany to avoid a diplomatic affront. In a Ministry which lasted less than three years he showed, despite some grave indiscretions, the decision, the energy, and the human insight which go to the ruling of men

Nine years later (November 16, 1917) the crisis of the Great War brought him the supreme opportunity of his life. He was seventy-six and afflicted with diabetes but he brought to the conduct of affairs a will to victory which no reverse could shake, and which he succeeded in communicating to the army and the nation. Widely suspect as he was to the officer class for his anticlerical opinions and his conduct in the Dreyfus case, he won their confidence. Everyone knew that Clemenceau was out for a fight to a finish, that he had a short way with defeatists, and that the armies could count on his unwavering support. His quality was proved when in face of the disaster in the Chemin des Dames he moved a resolution of confidence in the army chiefs. '*Qui dit chef, dit*

animateur.' Wherever he passed this veteran of seventy-six inspired a new breath of confidence and hope.

When the Peace of Versailles had been concluded, and the old man had been cast from power by the resurgence of democratic animosities, he was able to give himself to the joys of travel and books, and to the delights of his little fisherman's hut in the Vendée, where he could watch the moods of the sea and listen to the rustle of the breeze among the pines Occasionally he would pay a visit to Paris, and there I chanced to meet him some time after his return from the East. He was still the best company in the world, sparkling with wit and amusement, yet there were spaces of sadness, as when contrasting the sacrifice of war with the selfishness of peace, and, speaking as one who had left the age of heroes behind him, he said, with his accustomed frankness, '*J'aime mieux la guerre*' For the League of Nations he exhibited infinite contempt, and reserved his eulogies for Frederick II. of Prussia, speaking of him as a model ruler, and as the master of a style so excellent as to deserve illustration in any anthology of French prose

Though he had all the resources which a cultivated curiosity can supply, he could not disinterest himself in the destiny of France, or in concern for the protection of his political record.

While he was travelling in India Foch published an attack on the Treaty of Versailles. The old Marshal described it as 'a bad, a very bad, Treaty,' since it failed to drive the Germans from the control of the bridgeheads on the Rhine Now, the Treaty was the work of Clemenceau, and that it should be attacked by Foch, to whom he had given the marshal's staff, roused in him bitter indignation In a strongly polemical volume, *Grandeurs et misères de la Victoire*, Clemenceau elaborated a rejoinder which had better not have been written The Marshal was already in his grave, and posterity will form its own opinion of the Treaty of Versailles It is true that on the main point at issue between them Clemenceau was right and Foch was wrong, but the Tiger would have been wise to refrain from his final spring Had not France deserved something better from him than the ugly spectacle of a public conflict between the two outstanding heroes of her war epic ?

Though Clemenceau contended against Foch that the new Europe was founded on right and justice, his outlook on the future was none the less thoroughly depressing. In Germany, despite the downfall of the empire, he discerned a perpetual source of danger to France only to be met by strong military defences and by the preservation in some form or other of a union between the Entente Powers At the bottom of his heart he wanted Germany to be kept perpetually disarmed and everlastingly

helpless. So, when England refused to go into the Ruhr, Clemenceau failed to assign her abstention to the right cause, which was the belief that the economic convalescence of Germany was to the interest of Europe, but detected a reversion to that mischievous policy of stirring up trouble on the Continent which it is the well-known delight of perfidious Albion to pursue. Had John Morley been alive the Tiger would hardly have fallen into the error of thinking that a cordial understanding with England was compatible with a more drastic treatment of Germany. The very steps which Clemenceau blamed his successors for not taking would have led France further away from that goal of a solid English understanding which he advised his compatriots to pursue. Clemenceau knew and admired Lord Balfour. He tells us how, when he asked for Landau, the English statesman merely placed a hand upon his shoulder, sweetly murmuring, 'Ah, my poor friend!' Now the fact that Lord Balfour had led the Conservative Party into the League of Nations was a sign that if France were to persist in a policy of keeping Germany under she could not expect the concurrence of her recent ally. All this Clemenceau failed to appreciate, attributing to the cowardice of France concessions which were wrung by the hard lesson of facts, and to the lassitude of England an attitude which was grounded on a well-reasoned aversion from war. Two quotations will illustrate his views:

> As for the Peace Treaty, never lose sight of the fact that there were two things to consider: what I got out of it and what my successors got out of it. When I left office Alsace and Lorraine had been given back to us; French troops occupied the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads. Poland and Bohemia had been put on their feet. Roumania and Serbia enlarged; we had reconquered Morocco, put our hand on the Cameroons and so forth. After which came M. Millerand and others, and the Treaty fell to bits. All there was still to do, all the work to be partitioned out over the months and years to come, was given up. I had not been out of office a fortnight before they announced that they were not going to extradite William II and all those people who had burned, pillaged and so forth. Germany should have been made to disarm. . . . At Spa and elsewhere she was granted delay after delay; we removed all our commissions of control; and now the Boche army is built up again, Boche factories are once more turning out cannon, machine-guns, and everybody thinks that's perfectly all right.

And again:

> She has been a very great lady, England, aloof, ruthless, but with an engaging quality about her. England alone is perhaps of all peoples the one whose will held on the longest. Unfortunately she has begun to show a kind of weakening, of lassitude. The conquest no longer serves to quicken the conqueror. What can you expect? Their history goes back such a long way.

The English have three kinds of enemies to take into account: first, their natural enemies . . . and these are not the most formidable, next, their Dominions, their offshoots in Asia, Africa and Australia, who are beginning to get restive; and, lastly, the English themselves, the English of to-day are less enterprising than those of a hundred years ago. Some virtue is going out of them.

'Clemenceau,' wrote John Morley in 1885, 'is able, bright and honest, but he is a lightweight.' If there was any deficiency of substance in the man of forty, it was made good in later life, though there was always a strain of gay and reckless insouciance in Clemenceau's talk, which might well have led a serious English friend to undervalue his equipment for great undertakings. Certainly the author of *Au Soir de la Pensée* can hardly be described as 'a lightweight,' unless all who renounce metaphysical and theological speculations are to be so branded Had Clemenceau in reality been a lightweight, he might have solaced his declining years very agreeably by composing a piquant dish of political and personal memories, or a treatise on French impressionist art, or a series of *causeries* on his Eastern travels, on the habits of birds and monkeys, on the Greek drama (which he loved so well), on the art of Pheidias, or on the classics of French rationalism On all such topics he could have poured out his thoughts pleasantly, easily, and, we suspect, to the entertainment of a large public What he elected to do was very different, and the index of a big mind occupied with the biggest things Just as Robert Bridges between the ages of eighty-three and eighty-six summed up his philosophy of life in a long sacred poem, so Clemenceau, also an octogenarian, turned the sunset lights of his strong intellect on to a philosophy of the universe To the professional students of metaphysics and science, the meditations of the Anglican poet and the French freethinker may seem equally unimportant We do not imagine that Bridges has given a new theory to the metaphysicians, or Clemenceau a new fact to the professors of physical science What is interesting in these two most sharply contrasted declarations of faith is the picture of human character which they present In the case of Clemenceau it is the picture of a man of high cultivation and wide scientific knowledge, with the artist's eye and the poet's sensibility, but also with more than the ordinary allowance of rough common sense, in whom all the ideas and sentiments connected with and nourished by religious conviction are regarded with abhorrence as obstacles to the honest life. However people may dislike such opinions, they must admit that in Clemenceau they were compatible with a high degree of moral idealism, and with a genuine enthusiasm for disinterested knowledge. Nor was his rationalism of the vulgar type Most critics of orthodox theology

are content to pit their negations against the affirmations of the Churches. They counter faith by reason, imagination by facts, the heat of enthusiasm by the chill of measured inquiry. Clemenceau was a different kind of sceptic. His faith in the 'poetry of the active universe' was as glowing as the rapture of the divine in contemplation of the mysteries. Here is a passage on the sunrise:

> Colour! At last, here is colour breaking through the last screen of ashen gray, infusing the tumult of the scene with dazzling fire. The pale field-poppy of the dunes and the soft sea-green of the marine purslane send forth their fragrant invitation. The insignificant everlasting offers its deceitful gold. The spider has woven its lacy trap over the stiff heads of the broom. The little white snail hoists himself slowly along the twigs to complete the bouquet with an even whiter flower. The lark flutters singing in the heavens. From the mass of molten iron volcanic lightnings flash upon the reddening sea. And all that transformation of night into day, of death into life, has taken place without my having been able to detect at any moment the transition between the phenomena that together form a pageant which always invites me and always eludes me.

The cosmos is like the sunrise, a series of delicate gradations and perpetual changes, of energies crossing, joining, interpenetrating one another, not an atom indifferent to its surroundings, but each exhibiting the same spectacle of delicate sensibility. The iron rod which reacts electrically when it is touched, the tiny blossom which turns to the sun, exhibiting forethought and even maternal love, attest the essential unity of created things. It is for man to obtain an emotional understanding of the rushing creative forces around him. The means of scientific verification are increasing. Knowledge extends its boundaries. It seems that humanity will progress towards perfection until a cosmic catastrophe rings down the curtain on the human drama, which for a brief space of years is enacted on a tiny corner of the universe of things.

> What is is, and of that which is I am. I am somewhere an atom of a transient something. Over other incidents of the cosmos I have the advantage of feeling and of knowing what happens to me and of reasoning on positive data so as to attenuate my sufferings and those of my fellow beings by obtaining for them, if they show themselves worthy to learn, brief flashes of happiness. The true 'civilized' man of all periods and of all countries is he who knows how to conquer himself and so to order himself as to devote always more and more of himself to the task which exceeds his strength, yet who expects nothing either of gods or of men.

Such, amid much that is variously interesting in this remarkable book, is Clemenceau's final deliverance on fate, man, and duty.

H. A. L. FISHER.

SOME LITERATURE OF THE GREAT WAR

The literature of the Great War has assumed of late the character of a flood, and those who engage in the arduous task of the criticism of literature may be excused if at times they admit to a sense of bewilderment. The variety of the soldier's testimony is as great as the volume, and the critic's task is not made more easy by the circumstance that indubitable excellence of writing has given on occasion an air of verity to doubtful testimony.

I have no claim to be regarded as an authority on literature. I have some small claim as a student of the literature of war. I have read a considerable number of war books. I hope and believe that I have read the best of them. I was an infantry soldier in France and Flanders and in Italy. I have been the friend of many infantry soldiers. If my criticism has any value, it is not on account of my knowledge of literature, but on account of my knowledge of war.

I would have you, moreover, observe the title. It is '*Some* Literature of the Great War.' Few people are aware how great the literature of the war already is. A professor of a university of the United States, M. Norton Cru, has made this a special study. M. Cru has read 300 war books by 246 authors. I understand that these 300 books are either by French authors or have been translated into French. The Imperial War Museum at South Kensington has a library of 50,000 books. You will appreciate how few people have any right to describe themselves as authorities on the literature of the war, and before making a few general observations on the subject I wish at once to draw attention to the work of a much more competent authority, M. Norton Cru, and to that of M. Charles Delvert,[1] who recently wrote in *La Revue des Deux Mondes* an appreciation of M. Cru's[2] book.

M. Cru, himself a soldier in the war (I believe as a corporal of infantry), considers that the literature of the war should be treated in a scientific spirit. To that end he has made a marvel-

[1] 'L'histoire de la guerre par les témoins,' by Charles Delvert (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, December 1929. Paris).

[2] *Témoins, Essai d'analyse et de critique des souvenirs de combattants édités en français de* 1915 *à* 1928 (M. J. N. Cru. Éd. les Étincelles).

lous collection, not only of books and documents, but of maps—indeed, even of trench maps. With the aid of these maps he has undertaken the useful task of dissipating, in so far as he is able, the fictitious element in the literature of war. When he reads reminiscences of those who fought he takes the trouble to verify whether the action took place on the day they mention, and if the regiment to which they belonged was, in fact, present. This, no doubt, is a very annoying practice; it is also a very useful one. He has, I think rightly, come to the conclusion that those who fought in the war should give their experiences from their memory, and not from their imagination. 'Quand on est combattant,' he writes, 'il ne faut pas écrire de roman de guerre, il faut toujours donner des souvenirs réels.' He makes the further observation, to which every soldier would, I am sure, subscribe: 'On ne peut pas raconter la guerre sans l'avoir faite, et tout le talent du monde ne pourra remplacer l'expérience.'

Having accepted M. Cru as a guide, I have rejected those books which have been written by men who did not serve in the war, and, moreover, books by those who did not actually serve as soldiers in the line. It is probable that no more false view of war exists than that which has been put on paper by those who observed the troops, but were not themselves soldiers. I do not wish to labour this point. I would only observe that those who saw the troops coming out of battle were, in general, sorry for them; the troops were not sorry for themselves. Self-pity is, perhaps, the most ignoble of all passions, and of self-pity the soldier was not, in my experience, guilty.

In regard to fiction I have given myself a somewhat wider scope than M. Cru, partly because there are one or two books of fiction which seem to me fiction only in name, and partly because I cannot dismiss from consideration that very remarkable work of fiction—or perhaps I should say that work of very remarkable fiction—*All Quiet on the Western Front*.

I have limited myself yet further to the fighting in France and Flanders. I served only on the Western Front, and had no experience of Mesopotamia, Palestine, or Gallipoli. This has meant the exclusion of such notable works as *These Men Thy Friends* by Edward Thompson[3] and *Revolt in the Desert*.[4] Both these books I have read and greatly admired, but the latter, at any rate, cannot be placed in the literature of the war. The experiences of Colonel Lawrence were unique. Of war in general his book is not evidence.

I have also omitted, though with some measure of regret, the books on fighting in the air. I have had no experience of

[3] *These Men Thy Friends* (Edward Thompson: Alfred A. Knopf).

[4] *Revolt in the Desert* (T. E. Lawrence: Jonathan Cape).

that form of war. But I must, in passing, say how greatly I admired two books which came out during the war by Alan Bott—who at that time used a pseudonym—*An Airman's Outings*[5] and *Eastern Nights and Flights*[6]—and a more recent book, *War Birds, The Diary of an Unknown Aviator*.[7]

In considering the literature of infantry fighting on the Western Front I have in the first instance passed in brief review the books which to my mind are the most important, in the order in which they appeared This has enabled me to indicate the general trend, as it seems to me, of that literature. I have further attempted to give the epitome of each book, where possible in the author's own words, in that passage or passages in which his point of view finds most eloquent expression. I have then offered a few conclusions, drawn from the evidence thus adduced.

The splendid and exalted mood in which the youth of England—and, indeed, I believe the youth of every country—went to war is illustrated in the poetry of the time, poetry now, in part at any rate, submerged in a welter of poetry written from another point of view. This mood found passionate expression in the five sonnets of Rupert Brooke,[8] which were published in the early days of 1915, a little while before Rupert Brooke found a soldier's grave in an Ægean island The spirit of those sonnets is admirably expressed in the first line of one of them, *Now God be thanked Who has matched us with His hour* At almost the same time Julian Grenfell, captain of Dragoons, a few days before he died of wounds sustained at the Second Battle of Ypres, wrote the poem which of all other war poems will surely have immortality—*The naked earth is warm with spring* The last lines of that great poem I can hardly forbear to quote

> The thundering line of battle stands,
>   And in the air Death moans and sings .
> But Day shall clasp him with strong hands,
>   And Night shall fold him in soft wings

Night folded Julian Grenfell in soft wings in April 1915 A chorus from the *Hippolytus* was on his lips The soldier and the poet were one after, I suppose, 300 years of divorce.

There is another poem by a citizen of the United States serving with the French Army, now, I am sorry to say, forgotten wholly in this country. It is not well that we should forget. I refer to Alan Seeger.[9] His greatest poem was the *Lafayette*

[5] *An Airman's Outings*, ' Contact ' (Blackwood)
[6] *Eastern Nights and Flights*, ' Contact ' (Blackwood)
[7] *War Birds, The Diary of an Unknown Aviator* (Hamilton)
[8] *Collected Poems* (Rupert Brooke · Sidgwick and Jackson)
[9] *Poems* (Alan Seeger Constable)

Ode, a poem of pure exaltation, written a few days before he died in the Battle of the Somme. Another poem, to my mind a great poem (*The Aisne*, 1914–15), is of earlier date. Alan Seeger had no illusions as to the price of courage.

> I have a rendezvous with Death
> At some disputed barricade,
> When Spring comes back with rustling shade
> And apple blossoms fill the air—
> I have a rendezvous with Death
> When Spring brings back blue days and fair
>
> It may be he shall take my hand
> And lead me into his dark land
> And close my eyes and quench my breath—
> It may be I shall pass him still
> I have a rendezvous with Death
> On some scarred slope of battered hill,
> When Spring comes round again this year
> And the first meadow-flowers appear

Alan Seeger kept his rendezvous unflinching and undismayed. He had had more than eighteen months of infantry fighting. It is well to bear this in mind, because it is destructive of the theory that an exalted mood does not survive a soldier's first battle

At this time Robert Nichols [10] attained fame in *Ardours and Endurances* A marvellous picture of a front-line trench in summer is given in his poem *Noon* There are other poems of Robert Nichols which reflect a mood perhaps shared by but a few soldiers, but certainly a mood worthy of the dignity of poetry. I have in mind *Courage born of Fire and Steel*, *Farewell to Place of Comfort*, and *At the Wars* His greatest poem to my mind was *Fulfilment*, but to this I shall return later

Another mood, not of exaltation exactly, but of acquiescence and that sturdy valour which is among the proudest traditions of our race, found expression in certain books which came out in serial form in *Blackwood's Magazine* I have in mind especially *The First Hundred Thousand* and *Carrying On* [11] These are true pictures of the war as I experienced it in the early days. For my part I find the men of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders whom Major Wagstaff and Captain Blaikie led at Loos, and their successors, Angus M'Clachlan, Sergeant Mucklewame, and Private Bogle, at Longueval on the Somme, much more true to my experience than those who are now presented to us as types of the soldier. There is plenty of horror in the

[10] *Invocation* (Robert Nichols Elkin Mathews), *Ardours and Endurances* (Robert Nichols Chatto and Windus).

[11] *The First Hundred Thousand* (Ian Hay Blackwood), *Carrying On* (Ian Hay Blackwood).

war books of that time, but the mind of man was still dominant over the horror. To this time also belong *The Adventures of an Ensign* by the anonymous 'Vedette,' [12] a marvellous description of the two great battles of Ginchy and Lesbœufs, in which the Guards Division took part on the Somme. The splendid morale of the Guards in the battle is there depicted in equal measure as the horror of the fighting, but the morale is the dominant theme.

> Over the top! Has any man's life ever offered such a thrill, such a sensation of freedom, such a bursting from incarceration into liberty, from darkness into light, as that inspiriting leap into the open? Gone the uneasiness, the doubtings of the eve—only the great moral uplifting, which the din of battle brings, remains.

These words were written during convalescence from wounds, when all the horror of battle must have been present in the mind, and time had had no power to exert its healing influence. They carry the mark of truth

I have spoken at some length of the happy warrior I must turn now to the unhappy warrior, who about this time found his way into prose in M Barbusse's book *Le Feu* and in the poems of Siegfried Sassoon [13] I am very ill-acquainted with *Le Feu*,[14] although it has been in my possession for some ten years, but I understand that the epitome of the book is very adequately given in a quotation from it which appears in a volume of poems of Siegfried Sassoon

> Dans la trêve désolée de cette matinée, ces hommes qui avaient été tenaillés par la fatigue, fouettés par la pluie, bouleversés par toute une nuit de tonnerre, ces rescapés des volcans et de l'inondation entrevoyaient à quel point la guerre, aussi hideuse au moral qu'au physique, non seulement viole le bon sens avilit les grandes idées, commande tous les crimes—mais ils se rappelaient combien elle avait développé en eux et autour d'eux tous les mauvais instincts sans en excepter un seul, la méchanceté jusqu'au sadisme, l'égoïsme jusqu'à la férocité, le besoin de jouir jusqu'à la folie

M. Barbusse and 'Vedette' appear to have seen the war with very different eyes

Of Siegfried Sassoon I could speak much He seems to have alternated between the very happy and the very unhappy warrior, but it is more than clear that his unhappiness was not on account of any wrong done to himself, but of the wrong done to his men. It is the nature of the generous mind to resent the wrongs of others more bitterly than one's own. The generosity of his mind will have been apparent to all who have read that beautiful book, *Memories of a Fox-hunting Man*.[15]

[12] *The Adventures of an Ensign* (Vedette Blackwood)
[13] *War Poems* (Siegfried Sassoon Heinemann)
[14] *Le Feu* (Henri Barbusse Ernest Flammarion, Paris)
[15] *Memories of a Fox-hunting Man* (Siegfried Sassoon Faber and Faber)

It was well for the British Army that the horror of modern war was not able so greatly to dominate the minds of her soldiers as to render them incapable of completing the task which they had taken in hand. Of the horror of that war her poet sons were more than conscious. They felt the war and its sorrows perhaps more keenly than the ordinary man, but poets have their morale as well as soldiers, and perhaps the highest morale of all is that of the soldier-poet I remember a poem which appeared in *The Times*, and, so far as I know, has not been reproduced since. It was, I think, by Robert Nichols, and I remember it well because it came out shortly before the Battle of Passchendaele. It appeared to me to be peculiarly apposite in those terrible days

> By all borne and left unsaid
> By the soldier, by the mire
> Closing o'er the comrade's head,
> By the faces stripped by fire,
> By sunlight's dumb and crowded wire
> By moonlight's lonely loathsome dead,
> By the slow, the final dread!
> Slaying very life desire
> Englishman whoe'er thou art
> That is theirs and this thy part
> Steadfast hold the English heart

Immediately after the war ended war books became a drug on the market, and perhaps it was well A period of reflection has enabled many of us to see things more steadily and to see them whole But there is one book which came out shortly after the war, *The Way of Revelation*, by Wilfred Ewart,[16] which cannot be overlooked He died shortly afterwards in Mexico, killed by a stray bullet at a *festa* Wilfred Ewart was a captain in the Scots Guards There is a wonderful passage late in the book. He is lying wounded in a wood during the last advance, and he sees his Lewis gunners, the men whom he had trained, advancing through the wood as he had taught them to advance. One by one they fall, and he is left alone in the wood

> A phase of mental drowsiness succeeded, he pondered quietly over many things Dreams and fancies dreams and fancies stole upon his mind—those merciful dreams which clothe reality in happiness and peace Why and whence and whither—who should say? And where was the place of beauty in this self-destructive creation? The wood—it must have been fair enough in spring-time, and summer Even now it held the pleasant contours, the russet and mahogany colouring, the warm red-and-black tints of the falling year But its little community of birds and beasts its immemorial silence, its dim and secret places, its wind-rocked solitude that had remained unbroken for generations when

[16] *The Way of Revelation* (Wilfred Ewart Putnam)

this horror was over-past and themselves forgotten, would those calm and beautiful things return again ?

I suppose that for few of us can these calm and beautiful things return again ; but we have something else, and that something is expressed in his tribute to his men.

Those Lewis gunners, those sleepers yonder who knew nought of God, who never thought of themselves, who never approached in imagination their own sublimity—out of the humble simplicity of their lives had been achieved the greatest of all things

So he knew—though it were his last conscious thought—that there moved in the world something greater than fear or grief or mental agony or earthly pain—some human force, undeniable, that triumphed over these and surpassed civilisation and vanquished the powers of the Prince of Darkness himself

Owing to the disfavour into which war books had fallen a war book and a war play, both of them of high distinction, did not receive the attention which they deserved Austin Hopkinson's *Religio Militis* [17] was a remarkable attempt to evaluate the experiences of war in terms of philosophy. The exaltation of Austin Hopkinson, an officer of Dragoons, at the First Battle of Ypres, and afterwards a trooper of Dragoons (when disabled he re-enlisted at the time of the March retreat in 1918), is as great to-day as it was in those far-off days of Rupert Brooke and Julian Grenfell. I shall have much to say of him at a later stage

Le Tombeau sous l'Arc de Triomphe [18] is a play of great merit, and to my mind one of the outstanding presentations of the point of view of the soldier I would that I could give not a few lines only, but the whole of the dialogue in which the father and the son, who has come on leave in the full knowledge that his life is forfeit, discuss the war The attitude of the soldier of intellect and imagination face to face with the harsh verities of war is here stated in lines of majestic power and eloquence. He has made his choice , it was of his own free will that he went to war and of his own choice that he will set out on a hazardous enterprise which can have no end but death. He denies that his life as a soldier has in it any element of servitude He is obedient not to others, but to himself alone : 'Tout ce qui est, ne l'ai je pas voulu, ou consenti ? Je connaissais très bien quels engagements je prenais en jouissant de la mienne. Je tiens avec probité ce que j'ai promis.' For war and its supposed majesty he has nothing but contempt : 'Et voilà cette fameuse guerre, beaucoup plus embêtante encore que terrible. Je ne la crains pas, et je l'abhorre. Je la fais, et je la méprise.' For military glory he

[17] *Religio Militis* (Austin Hopkinson Martin Hopkinson)

[18] *Le Tombeau sous l'Arc de Triomphe* (Paul Raynal Librairie Stock, Delamain et Boutelleau, Éditeurs, Paris)

has the fighting soldier's derision ; he knows that the courage of the soldier is moral in its origin, that, indeed, any other form of courage could not support a man in the conditions of modern war. 'Ne crains tu pas,' says the father, 'que cette froide détermination, puisqu'elle remplace en eux le vieil enthousiasme, finisse par s'user, si par impossible la guerre dure ? Que les courages s'amollissent ?' The soldier replies in scorn: 'Au contraire. L'enthousiasme passe Cette volonté sans illusions ne bronchera pas.' Despairing, but undefeated, he goes back to the trenches and that chance before which his head remains unbowed

The change in the outlook of the public on war books took place late in 1928 ; it was marked by the success of *Journey's End* as a play and of *Undertones of War* and *All Quiet on the Western Front* in literature

In *Undertones of War* [19] Edmund Blunden gives a wonderful picture of the late New Armies, from which the professional soldier was almost wholly excluded We get, if I may say so, a wonderful picture of Sussex at war Those who have read the book will not forget that remarkable passage in which he pays tribute to the infantry soldier in that dreadful winter of 1916–17

> Man, ruddy-cheeked under your squat chin-strapped iron helmet, sturdy under your leather jerkin clapping your hands together as you dropped your burden of burning cold steel grinning and flinging old-home repartee at your pal passing by you endured that winter of winters, as it seems to me in the best way of manliness I forget your name I remember your superscriptions O A S and 'B E F, your perpetual copying ink pencils in the pink as it leaves me', you played House, read Mr Bottomley sang If I was a tulip and your rifle was as clean as new from an armoury It is time to hint to a new age what your value, what your love was your Ypres is gone, and you are gone we were lucky to see you 'in the pink against white-ribbed and socket-eyed despair

There has been much criticism of *Journey's End* [20] by men who did not serve in the war and profess to regard it as a libel on the soldier, and by some men who, serving in the line only in the early days of the war, remember the early mood of exaltation, but not the later mood of stubborn resolution wholly free from illusion which eventually won the war. For my part I find the play at once painful in its fidelity and of the very stuff of tragedy It is the darkest hour of the war The great German attack of March 1918 is imminent Captain Stanhope's company is doomed, and every man knows it If they spoke the language of rhetoric, if they were men inspired by consciousness of heroism,

[19] *Undertones of War* (Edmund Blunden Cobden-Sanderson)
[20] *Journey's End* (R C Sherriff Victor Gollancz).

their fate could not stir our hearts in such measure. But they are true to type; they are the men whom we knew; their common humanity gives them a claim to our intimate regard and heightens the sense of tragedy. To me the two officers of the company who in this regard are unforgettable are Trotter and Stanhope: Trotter, the middle-aged ranker, a man of infinite good nature, without imagination, stolid, invincible; Stanhope, the young captain, his nerves in rags after three years of infantry fighting, supporting his courage and resolution by whisky in preference to quitting his post.

Perhaps Stanhope has the greater tragic stature. When the cup of bitterness overflows he turns to the young subaltern straight from England, who, knowing nothing of what he has endured, appears to be rebuking him for attempting to drown his sorrow and despair in drink. 'To forget, you little fool, to forget, do you understand, to forget. Do you think there is no limit to what a man can bear?'

There cannot but be a certain sense of the triumph of the spirit when on that dark morning of defeat the shelling rises to a fury and Stanhope goes up the steps to play, for the last time, his captain's part, to lead the men to whom he has been faithful, for whom he has sacrificed much more than life.

The success of *Journey's End* as a play was matched, and perhaps surpassed, early in 1929, by the success of *All Quiet on the Western Front* [11] in the field of literature. M. Norton Cru has pointed out mistakes in fact and mistakes in psychology in this remarkable work of imaginative fiction. Any infantry soldier can do the same. M. Remarque, in easing his mind of an intolerable burden, has exaggerated and given a false picture, not so much of the things seen, but of the reaction of the soldier to them.

Still, I am glad that M. Remarque wrote his book, inasmuch as it may have brought home to many people who are still ignorant of it the physical infamy and unceasing horror which the spirit of man overcame. We soldiers are, in a sense, a lost generation. Few of us can read without emotion those lines in which M. Remarque speaks of the soldier's attitude towards the past.

> These memories of former times do not awaken desire so much as sorrow—a vast, inapprehensible melancholy. Once we had such desires—but they return not. They are past, they belong to another world that is gone from us. In the barracks they called forth a rebellious, wild craving for their return; for then they were still bound to us, we belonged to them and they to us, even though we were already absent from them. They appeared in the soldiers' songs which we sang as we marched between the glow of the dawn and the black silhouettes of the forests to drill on the moor, they were a powerful remembrance that was in us and came from us.

[11] *All Quiet on the Western Front* (E. M. Remarque: Putnam).

But here in the trenches they are completely lost to us. They arise no more; we are dead and they stand remote on the horizon, they are a mysterious reflection, an apparition, that haunts us, that we fear and love without hope They are strong and our desire is strong—but they are unattainable, and we know it . . . We are burnt up by hard facts; like tradesmen, we understand distinctions, and like butchers, necessities We are no longer untroubled—we are indifferent. We might exist there; but should we really live there?

We are forlorn like children, and experienced like old men, we are crude and sorrowful and superficial—I believe we are lost

M Remarque's book has been succeeded by a flood of literature from Mittel Europa, some of which was apparently expected to attain success on account of entering into detail, not only of the horrors of war, but of certain routine discomforts of life, which also occur in peace Some of these books are merely ignoble, they illustrate a point made by M Norton Cru ' Jadis le public voulait une guerre romancée avec drapeaux déployés et flamberge au vent, aujourd'hui, il aime une guerre non moins romancée, avec boyaux dallés de morts aux grimaces infernales et baisers aux cadavres '

But I must except *Zero Hour*,[22] though I thought it rather a dull book, and an exceptionally fine book, *The Storm of Steel*,[23] by Ernst Junger This splendid captain of infantry, fourteen times wounded in the war, remains unbeaten and undismayed at the close, notwithstanding the defeat of all for which he stood. Those who have judged the morale of the German Army from reading certain German war books should turn to Captain Junger's description of the Battle of Guillemont, when the British barrage broke on the German line

While this hurricane was raging I went along my platoon front. The men were standing rifle in hand as though carved in stone their eyes fixed on the ground in front of them Now and then by the light of a rocket I saw the gleam of helmet after helmet, bayonet after bayonet, and I was filled with pride at commanding this handful of men that might very likely be pounded into the earth but could not be conquered It is in such moments that the human spirit triumphs over the mightiest demonstrations of material force

In the final defeat of his cause he can yet say

We stood with our feet in mud and blood, yet our faces were turned to things of exalted worth And not one of that countless number who fell in our attacks fell for nothing Each one fulfilled his own resolve To-day we cannot understand the martyrs who threw themselves into the arena in a transport that lifted them even before their deaths beyond humanity, beyond every phase of pain and fear Their faith no longer exercises a compelling force When once it is no longer possible to

[22] *Zero Hour* (Georg Grabenhorst Brentanos)
[23] *The Storm of Steel* (Ernst Jünger Chatto and Windus)

understand how a man gives his life for his country—and the time will come—then all is over with that faith also, and the idea of the Fatherland is dead; and then, perhaps, we shall be envied, as we envy the saints their inward and irresistible strength.

I am sure that we soldiers recognise in *The Storm of Steel* the men whom we fought. If the German soldier was accurately described in the other German war books, the war would have been over by December 1914.

Later in 1928 we had a book written with the fine insight and sensibility of the poet, *The Wet Flanders Plain*,[24] by Henry Williamson.

Mr. Williamson's book is full of splendid writing, the theme of which is a lament for wrongs done by man to his fellow-men. There is a terrible description of an unsuccessful attack on the Somme. This is followed by a picture of the infamy of Passchendaele.

> A year drifts by, and I am standing on a duck board by a flooded and foul beke in the Salient, listening in the flare-pallid rainy darkness to the cries of tens of thousands of wounded men lost in morasses of Third Ypres To seek them is to drown with them the living are still toiling on, homeless and without horizons doing dreadful things under heaven that none want to do, through the long wet days and the longer nights, the weeks, the months, of a bare, sodden winter out of doors

Defeat and victory are words without significance to him. He sees only the waste and horror, the desolation of the human spirit From Passchendaele he turns, unimpressed, to the great attack on the Hindenburg Line, which finally broke the martial power of Germany He remembers in that victory but one thing, and it is well that he should remember in all that thunder the still small voice of humanity

> And in the stupendous roar and light-blast of the final barrage that broke the Hindenburg Line I see only one thing which grows radiant before my eyes until it fills all my world the sight of a Saxon boy half crushed under a shattered tank, moaning 'Mutter, Mutter, Mutter, out of ghastly grey lips A British soldier, wounded in the leg and sitting near by, hears the words and dragging himself to the dying boy, takes his cold hand and says 'All right, son it's all right Mother's here with you'

I do not think that Mr Williamson would admit that war had any credit side to set against its terrible debits.

Very different is the point of view of Lieut-Colonel Rowland Feilding in *War Letters to a Wife*,[25] published in the autumn. This most gallant officer, whose courage was almost legendary, was a company commander in the Coldstream Guards in 1915.

[24] *The Wet Flanders Plain* (Henry Williamson Faber and Faber)
[25] *War Letters to a Wife* (Rowland Feilding Medici Society)

He commanded the Connaught Rangers on the Somme, at Messines Ridge, and in the March retreat of 1918. In the last battles of the war he commanded the Civil Service Rifles. All the horror of war is here, but man is still master of it. After all these years of infantry fighting he can yet say in a letter, written just after the Armistice, that there was a good deal to be said in favour of the old trench life owing to the atmosphere of selflessness and the spirit of *camaraderie*—that, in sort, there was no humbug in the trenches, and on that account the better kind of men who had lived in them would look back upon them with something like affection

His letter of December 14 in the terrible winter of 1916–17, paying a tribute to his men, matches in truth and eloquence the passage, already quoted, from *Undertones of War* He describes the life of the men in the trenches in the winter, wet through most of the time, freezing when they try to sleep, under constant shell fire, in a perpetual state of unrest and strain

> Think of these things and compare them with what are considered serious hardships in normal life ! Yet these men play their part uncomplainingly That is to say they never complain seriously Freezing, or snowing or drenching rain always smothered with mud , you may ask any one of them any moment of the day or night Are you cold ' or Are you wet ' and you will get but one answer The Irishman will reply —always with a smile — Not too cold sir or Not too wet, sir ' The curious thing is that all seem so much more contented here than the people at home Everybody laughs at everything here It is the only way

I must mention also *Good-bye to All That*, by Mr Robert Graves [24] The book appealed to me particularly, because I also was a temporary officer serving with a Regular battalion My admiration for my regiment was not less than that of Mr Graves for the Royal Welch Fusiliers

The book appealed to me also because of its extraordinary candour and, as it seemed to me sincerity. I think that the war, as it was represented in my experience, is more nearly described in the pages of *Good-bye to All That* than in any other book I know that Mr Graves has laid himself open to hostility at the hands of those who have resented his candour and his frank criticism ; but after all there was much in the conduct of the war to criticise, and some of his criticisms, though they may give offence, may also have the effect of destroying a good deal of cant, and may even have a salutary influence on the complacency of some who are too prone to think that the soldier of the line, because he did not complain, had nothing to complain about.

There is a splendid picture of the Royal Welch Fusiliers

[24] *Good-bye to All That* (Robert Graves Jonathan Cape).

going into action on the Somme, given by an officer of another regiment.

> I saw your High Wood show through field glasses. The way your battalion shook out into artillery formation, company by company—with each section of four or five men in file at fifty yards interval and distance—going down into the hollow and up the slope through the barrage, was the most beautiful bit of parade-ground drill I've ever seen. Your company officers must have been superb

'I have read,' said the colonel, 'of bravery, but I have never seen such magnificent and wonderful disregard for death as I saw that day It was almost uncanny—it was so great' A man so candid as Robert Graves would not have quoted these remarks if he had not believed in them Criticism comes somewhat naturally to him, and praise from the hypercritical is more worth while than the easy commendation of the ignorant On Armistice Day Mr. Graves, like many of us, did not take part in the contemporary merrymaking The news of the Armistice sent him out walking alone along the dyke above the marshes of Rhuddlan (an ancient battlefield, the Flodden of Wales), cursing and sobbing and thinking of the dead

The latest, and to my mind the best, of personal records of the war is *Her Privates We*,[27] by the anonymous Private 19022. This book challenges comparison with *Le Tombeau sous l'Arc de Triomphe*, in its depth of psychological insight, in its interpretation of the mind of the soldier, in its understanding of the significance of war In both books the soldier is a man of intelligence and imagination serving in the ranks of an infantry regiment, in both books the attitude towards war is the same Here is no self-pity, no repudiation of responsibility, no attempt to blame others for the disaster which has been the lot of an ill-starred generation Private 19022 and his comrades are masters of their fate Each could say, as the soldier of *Le Tombeau* said · 'Tout ce qui est, ne l'ai je pas voulu, ou consenti ?' Each knows that, though enthusiasm may pass 'cette volonté sans illusions ne bronchera pas' They are soldiers of their own free will, they will not break, they have faith in themselves and in their comrades.

Her Privates We opens with a marvellous description of the relief of a battalion on the Somme At once the hand of a master is revealed ; we see the drawn, pitiless faces of men despairing but undefeated. We follow their fortunes in a quiet sector to which they are withdrawn, and in their rest billets. We return with them to their battle on Serre Ridge in the late autumn of 1916.

The descriptions of the trenches are remarkable in their

[27] *Her Privates We* (Private 19022. Peter Davies).

fidelity. Of many I choose one, a relief of the line north of the Ancre:

> They passed men on the firestep, men as fixed as statues when that ghastly light fell tremblingly on them from the sky, and one or two sprawled on the step, their backs propped against the side of the bay, snatching a little fitful sleep, their tin-hats tilted over their faces, and boots, puttees, and trousers plastered with mud that caked like mortar Sometimes their eyes met a face, blank from the weariness that is indifference; and perhaps, because at this point they only moved forward a few yards at a time, they would exchange a few whispers
>
> 'What's it like?'
>
> 'Oh, 'e strafed a bit this afternoon, but it's cushy enough'
>
> Bourne had never heard any other reply to that question in all the hundreds of times he had heard it asked A face of expressionless immobility, with hard inscrutable eyes, and that even, monotonous whisper
>
> 'Oh, it's cushy enough'

Colonel Rowland Feilding and Private 19022, from widely differing standpoints, bear the same testimony to the soldier of the line

Good as is the description of the fighting, the trenches, the rest billets, it cannot be compared with the superb picture of the Englishman at war Here is the common soldier in all his essential sanity and good humour, the common people in whom the real strength and wisdom of this great nation have always rested Proud, self-reliant strong and simple, they know well what they are doing Sergeant Tozer, Weeper Smart, Little Martlow, Shem, Madeley, Pacey—you were our comrades, the men we knew and loved

We see them as they prepare for battle, we know that they will not break

> These apparently rude and brutal natures comforted, encouraged, and reconciled each other to fate with a tenderness and tact which was more moving than anything in life They had nothing not even their own bodies, which had become mere implements of warfare They turned from the wreckage and misery of life to an empty heaven and from an empty heaven to the silence of their own hearts They had been brought to the last extremity of hope and yet they put their hands on each other's shoulders and said with a passionate conviction that it would be all right, though they had faith in nothing, but in themselves and in each other

We may bid this sturdy battalion farewell undaunted and undismayed.

> They marched out of the village, past the stone calvary at the end of it and men who had known all the sins of the world lifted to the agony of the figure on the cross eyes that had probed and understood the mystery of suffering

One last book I would mention—a text-book, strangely enough—entitled *An Outline History of the Great War*,[22] by Major Carey and Captain Scott. It is intended for use in schools, and perhaps I may say that I can think of no text-book more suitable for them. We are enabled to see a battle in terms of fighting men, proud, passionate, humorous, sturdy, men who, by virtue of their humanity, can claim our affection as well as our admiration. A due balance is maintained in the presentation of the soldier He is not depicted as moving in a rarefied atmosphere of conscious heroism and self-sacrifice The happy warrior of the war correspondents and romantic novelists and the unhappy warrior of contemporary fiction alike find no place We have here the real soldier, grim and steady, faithfully discharging his duty in circumstances without parallel in their infamy It is most fitting that the frontispiece should be *The Desolation of the Salient*, a Royal Air Force photograph of the remains of Zonnebeke village in 1917 There the advocates of war may find something to ponder in the illimitable waste of shell-holes strewn with the carnage of the most terrible of battles, to which, as the authors observe, the agony of a nation has given the pregnant name of 'Passchendaele' The last chapter is the complement of the frontispiece; no one after reading it can be ignorant of the burden that was borne by the infantry soldier, or think again in terms of 'pride, pomp and circumstance of glorious war.' The authors have placed in their debt the men of their own generation, for whom this book will recall much that they would not willingly forget, memories proud and tragic, of victory and defeat, of hope and despair, of high fellowship, that sure weapon in the battle of life and in the face of death, made true and keen on the anvil of hardship and danger. To a later generation, to the men of to-morrow, they have told a story which cannot but be of interest and may confer something of pride and inspiration and resolve.

I have given as briefly as I can a survey of the literature which seems to me the most important of the infantry fighting on the Western Front. I may perhaps be permitted to offer a few conclusions arising out of the evidence which I have adduced

First I suggest that no man has a right to speak for all soldiers. In a review of *All Quiet on the Western Front* I find these words 'Universal in its appeal and application. It supersedes all previous histories and renders all later histories superfluous. The common soldier has found a supreme voice, which tells the tale of the trenches in accents of almost unbearable poignancy and beauty.' This is the ecstasy of criticism. The soldier was

[22] *An Outline History of the Great War* (G V Carey and H S. Scott Cambridge University Press)

infinitely diverse in type, and the type which is depicted in *All Quiet on the Western Front* was not, I believe, a very common type. It would be as wise to say that an artist such as Goya had rendered all later artists superfluous, and had made it necessary to forgive and forget the ineptitudes of Botticelli and Fra Angelico.

My next point is that the literature of war illustrates the dominance of the mind over things material. There is no limit to what a man can bear 'What matter where, if I be still the same,' said the fallen Lucifer in *Paradise Lost* Never did these profound words receive such majestic testimony to their truth as in the Great War.

The problem of the affirmation of the will in the face of death which confronted the soldier in the war was no other than the problem which confronts man at all times, face to face with the darkness of the universe and the mystery of his being War, as Private 19022 observed, is only the ultimate problem of all human life stated barely, and pressing for an immediate solution

My third point is that the fiction of disenchantment may safely be laid aside There is no evidence in the literature of war written by soldiers that they went to war in a state of enchantment, and that the subsequent danger and discomfort and distress disenchanted them We knew well what we were doing, we anticipated the horrors of war They were not more horrible than we expected Moreover, we had no foreknowledge of the splendid comradeship which enabled us sometimes to ignore, and nearly always to endure, the horrible things which we saw and the horrible things which we had to do I have never been able to trace the origin of the legend that men enter on war in ignorance of its horror The literature of the past gives no support to the idea In early Greek and in Norse literature, which are concerned almost exclusively with fighting men, war appears to be regarded as neither righteous nor joyous, but as inevitable and decreed The weariness and sorrow of war are in the foreground, and courage in defeat is the major theme

We who have been soldiers know that the reward of courage is sometimes honour, but more often wounds and death This theme finds constant expression in the literature of war The brave man in adversity is surely the greatest of the world's stories. 'He saved others, himself he could not save'

This is the real enchantment of war, and to many it is overwhelming. In the realm of the spirit that which counts is not what a man gets, but what he gives. In my experience of men in battle I found that the greater the demand, the more sure was the answer

> In life the Great Call comes only once, and when it comes there is every reason why you should not answer it—every reason but one If you do answer it, whatever the cost may be, you will kindle a glow of

content in your heart that nothing can put out. If you do not answer, it does not matter who else forgives you, you will never forgive yourself.

Those words of a dead officer are quoted by Lieut.-Colonel Hotblack in *Fighting Tanks.*[29] That officer was killed one week later in a forlorn attempt to recover a wounded man from the German wire. There was every reason why he should not have made the attempt ; every reason but one.

Those who think of life in terms of comfort and security may ignore the enchantment which the necessity of courage has for the minds of men, but its existence cannot be denied The privilege of the soldier in time of war—that splendid life of courage, fidelity and unswerving loyalty to friends—is the privilege of the seaman and the mountaineer at all times Year by year the sea and the mountains take their toll ; yet their lovers are faithful to them. The sea is ever hungry, the mountains ever treacherous. They have neither faith nor honour Why, then, are there seamen and mountaineers and soldiers ? Surely because there, and there only, can certain men find their manhood, can feel that heightening of the faculties, that exaltation of the spirit, when fear and fatigue have alike ceased to have any power or influence, and when life and death are for one brief hour seen in their true perspective.

Extravagant pleasures entail extravagant penalties, but there are those who are willing to pay the price And it must be paid, not once nor twice, but at all times Man requires to know for his own satisfaction that he is as good a man as he was last year or ten years ago In the last resort he must pay the penalty It was a penalty which he foresaw and which he willingly accepts He accepts it partly because of the privilege which it confers on him of the society of Men Death and wounds have no significance to a man who has learned that life offers nothing more worth while than the approbation of his peers

The soldier asks no other reward than the knowledge that he has been faithful to his trust This is expressed consummately in the epitaph on the Spartans at Thermopylæ

ὦ ξεῖν᾽ ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε
κείμεθα τοῖς πατρίοις ῥήματι πειθόμενοι

Go tell to Sparta, thou that passest by
That here, obedient to her laws, we lie

That translation is not mine ; it is far better than I could give, but I think there is rather more in the word *πειθόμενοι* than 'obedience.' It expresses, it seems to me, implicit trust and faith. Life and death, victory and defeat, are immaterial, so

[29] *Fighting Tanks* (edited by C Murray Wilson Seeley Service).

long as the spirit remains undefeated, and the high fellowship of the soldier's creed is unsullied by any failure of courage or will.

In the literature of war, and more especially in the poetry of war, victory and its reputed glittering prizes find no place. Conspicuous among the poems which illustrate this point is that of E. A. Mackintosh,[20] lieutenant in the Seaforth Highlanders, who was killed at Cambrai

Not for the day of victory
I mourn I was not there,
The hard fierce rush of slaying men
The hands up in the air,
But for the torn ranks struggling on
The old brave hopeless way,
The broken charge the slow retreat
And I so far away

It was when things were going badly that the soldier could not rest unless he was with his battalion At the time of our great defeat in March 1918 the corridors of the War Office were filled with discharged and disabled men demanding to be sent back to their regiments The poem of Siegfried Sassoon[21] which, of all his poems, I most admire is that called *Sick Leave*.

When I'm asleep dreaming and lulled and warm –
They come, the homeless ones the noiseless dead
While the dim charging breakers of the storm
Bellow and drone and rumble overhead,
Out of the gloom they gather about my bed
They whisper to my heart their thoughts are mine
'Why are you here with all your watches ended?
From Ypres to Frise we sought you in the Line'

This is the greatest of all themes in the literature of war, the theme of comradeship Hardly a book has been published on the war in which the reader does not find full, and, indeed, almost passionate, expression of it In *All Quiet on the Western Front*[22] there is a wonderful passage when the soldier finds himself lost in 'No-man's Land' and then hears the voices of his comrades in the trench

At once a new warmth flows through me These voices, these quiet words, these footsteps in the trench behind me, recall me at a bound from the terrible loneliness and fear of death by which I had been almost destroyed. They are more to me than life, these voices they are more than motherliness and more than fear, they are the strongest most comforting thing there is anywhere they are the voices of my comrades

I am no longer a shuddering speck of existence, alone in the darkness

[20] *War the Liberator* (E A Mackintosh John Lane)
[21] *War Poems* (Siegfried Sassoon Heinemann)
[22] *All Quiet on the Western Front* (E M Remarque Putnam)

I belong to them and they to me; we all share the same fear and the same life, we are nearer than lovers, in a simpler, a harder way; I could bury my face in them, in these voices, these words that have saved me and will stand by me.

As eloquent is the passage in *Le Tombeau sous l'Arc de Triomphe*,[33] in which the soldier, on whom the dark night of death is already descending, calls his dead friends to be present at his marriage. They only are invited: 'François Rexens, mort à Morhange; Philippe Sahuc, mort à Charleroi; Richard de Dambosc, mort sur la Marne; Jean Joseph Trébose, mort sur l'Yser. . . . Et voilà ceux que j'avais choisis pour m'accompagner dans l'existence. J'avais choisi trop bien . . . Mes amis! Mes bons compagnons! Mes camarades! Mes copains!'

In *Undertones of War*[34] Edmund Blunden calls again to his men: 'Daniels, Davey, Ashford, Roberts, Worley, Clifford, Seall, Unstead, do you remember me yet? I should know you among ten thousand. Your voices are heard, and each man longed for, beyond the maze of mutability.'

If you talk to any soldier about the war he will always return to the same absorbing subject, the men with whom he served. He has forgotten much, but he remembers the splendid good-fellowship.

> Faces cheerful, full of whimsical mirth,
>   Lined by the wind, burned by the sun;
> Bodies enraptured by the abounding earth,
>   As whose children we are brethren: One.
>
> Was there love once? I have forgotten her.
>   Was there grief once? Grief yet is mine.
> O loved, living, dying, heroic soldier,
>   All, all, my joy, my grief, my love, are thine!

These lines of Robert Nichols[35] are, to my mind, the finest which he has written.

This comradeship has had a marked, but little understood, effect on the minds of the generation which fought the war. In a review in the *Spectator* of a number of war books recently published there was a sentence which expressed most clearly the point which I have in mind: 'Of political idealism, however, the belief in the virtues of systems, there is as little as there is much of what may be called personal idealism, a belief in and admiration for the virtues of human beings.'

These few words illumined much which had been dark to me in the last few years, and those who are concerned to know the mind of my generation and of such of the new generation as have

[33] *Le Tombeau sous l'Arc de Triomphe* (Paul Raynal. Librarie Stock, Paris).
[34] *Undertones of War* (Edmund Blunden. Cobden-Sanderson).
[35] *Ardours and Endurances* (Robert Nichols. Chatto and Windus).

been influenced in our point of view would do well to bear it in mind. We believe in men ; we do not believe in ideas.

From comradeship I turn to leadership, which is, after all, a very slight distinction. It is the knowledge that we were leaders of men that is the final recompense for those who once had that privilege It is leadership which we most need in the world to-day.

In Mr Austin Hopkinson's book *Religio Militis* [16] he is concerned to bring home that the only solution of our industrial troubles is that the meaning of leadership in industry should have the same high meaning which it had during the years of war, that the officer who was granted the privilege of leadership should live with his men, should accept their hardships, should be to the forefront in times of difficulty and danger—in times of distress should be the first to make the sacrifice

If only there were more men who had that philosophy of leadership and would practise it as Mr Austin Hopkinson has practised it in Lancashire !

It has exercised many minds why the great qualities of comradeship and leadership, which were the gift of the war to us, have disappeared in so large a measure from our lives A ready answer is that the general aim of the world to-day is to create more comfort and more security Comradeship has little significance in a state of comfort, or at any rate it loses its keen edge Leadership is of little importance in a state of security But to this Mr Hopkinson answers that 'we survivors of the war, wondering what fault of ours rendered us unworthy of a soldier's grave, may find satisfaction in the knowledge that peace no less than war can give us difficult and dangerous tasks to do ' So I am afraid that this answer will not suffice , I must seek another Assuming that we are the men we were, why are we no longer leaders ? Why are we not even comrades ? The answer is partly, I think, that we are so scattered and partly that we are not conscious of being wanted Modesty and diffidence are among the virtues of the soldier, but those qualities prevent a soldier from pulling his full weight in time of peace Mr Hopkinson asks us to put aside our diffidence and to set our hand again to the great task which once absorbed our energy and directed our endeavour. And it is with words of his that I conclude this exposition of the meaning which, to me at any rate, is inherent in the literature of the Great War

> And what is left for us before we die, now when the new generation strikes its tents and rides out from the bivouac of youth clad in its shining armour ? Some say our task is done our usefulness exhausted, and our advancing years a bar to fresh adventure Yet for my part I will not

[16] *Religio Militis* (Austin Hopkinson Martin Hopkinson)

think that comrades who toiled and fought with me through all those years on sea and land will ever be content to rust in idleness. Our labours and our wounds give us at least a claim to yet another fight before the end Our experience has shown us glimpses of another world of strange experience, and that untravelled universe we will explore till one by one we drop beside the trail Come, my friends, 'tis not too late to seek that newer world Put on the battered armour once again, close up our sadly thinning ranks, and once again forward to meet whatever toil or gay adventure fate may bring!

CHARLES DOUIE.

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THE

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EDDIES IN THE FLOWING TIDE

In the closing sentence of an article on the 'Crisis in the Unionist Party' which appeared in the April number of *The Nineteenth Century* I made bold to say 'The new ideas are on the march and will not be stayed.' My present task is to recount how swiftly and in what increasing volume the tide has flowed since then and, incidentally, what eddies it has generated by the reaction to it of different personalities and temperaments—eddies, as far as the Unionist Party is concerned, violently agitating the surface of politics and affording no little opportunity for open controversy; deeper eddies, not much discussed yet, but perhaps destined to have an even more profound effect on the whole future of politics, beneath the surface of the Labour and trade union movement.

Writing within a few days of Mr Baldwin's speech at the Hotel Cecil on March 4, and commenting on the unanimous enthusiasm with which his pronouncement on the referendum had there been received, I expressed the view that the referendum

could only achieve the double purpose of keeping the Unionist Party together and of winning the next election on one condition. That was that it was used as the starting-point for the whole-hearted advocacy, on its merits, of the broad case for Imperial Preference and for its necessary corollary, duties on foreign foodstuffs, while still reserving to the electorate a final decision on the details of an inter-Imperial agreement. If, on the other hand, it was used as a mere excuse for avoiding discussion of the implications of Imperial Preference in the way of duties on foreign agricultural produce, in fact, for an ostrich-like shirking of the issue, then, I concluded, there was bound to be a disagreeable awakening at the election.

The disagreeable awakening was provided much earlier—for the ultimate good of the party—by the restless and impatient activity of Lord Beaverbrook. While a large, and growing, section of the party undoubtedly went ahead confidently, preaching the whole policy, and expounding the referendum as part of the machinery for putting it into action within a few months of the return to office of a Unionist Government, there were, to put it mildly, indications of a very different attitude in authoritative quarters. On March 25 a letter appeared in *The Times* from Lord Salisbury in which the whole policy of Empire economic unity was dismissed as a 'fascinating ultimate aspiration,' and even safeguarding was minimised as something whose 'results must in any case be years ahead,' neither of them having an immediate bearing on the urgency of the situation. Such a letter, coming from the leader of the party in the House of Lords, was naturally calculated to make Unionists rub their eyes and wonder whether they had not slipped back from 1930 to 1903. Shortly afterwards the Unionist Central Office put out a leaflet in which the negative aspect of the policy was emphasised as 'Baldwin's pledge' that there would be 'no food taxes at the General Election and no food taxes ever without a direct vote of the people,' while the positive aspect was relegated to the region of the remotely hypothetical:

> If as a result of the negotiations with the Dominions there should emerge any *form* of agreement that gives substantial benefits to our industries and our workers and demands in return corresponding benefits for our Dominions in the *form* of foreign foodstuffs with which they can amply provide us—then that agreement will be put clearly before our people by means of a referendum.

Such a leaflet, treating 'food taxes' as something obviously undesirable in themselves which, in certain contingencies, might be, not recommended, but only 'put clearly' before the people, was certainly not in keeping with the spirit, even if it was within the letter of the compact between Mr. Baldwin and Lord Beaver-

brook. Little harm might have been done by aberrations like the two quoted if the leader of the party had taken an early opportunity to correct them by laying strong emphasis on his own conviction that Unionist policy, as regards Empire trade, was a policy of immediate action, and not of 'fascinating ultimate aspiration,' and that the winning of the referendum on an agreement which included food duties was no less important than the preliminary step of winning the election. Unfortunately, Mr. Baldwin's speeches, during the next few weeks, were confined, on this subject, to the briefest possible reiteration of the relevant passage in his Hotel Cecil speech They did little to allay the uneasiness in the advanced wing of the party or the impatience of Lord Beaverbrook, who, impressed with the belief that public opinion was moving with ever-increasing acceleration in his direction, was already regretting the referendum, which he himself had suggested, as a dilatory expedient calculated to prevent politicians from making up their minds and, indeed, imperilling the whole of the policy on which his heart was set

The West Fulham by-election afforded him an excellent opportunity for testing the movement of the public mind. Sir Cyril Cobb was a candidate who was prepared to go out wholeheartedly on the 'Empire Free Trade' platform, and the fact that the constituency was essentially a 'dormitory' constituency which might be supposed to fear the 'dear food' cry, and that the head of the Liberal Party organisation came down in person to mobilise the Liberal vote against the 'dear food' candidate, added zest to the passionate fervour with which he threw himself into the campaign An increase of the Conservative vote by 2244 and a victory by the sufficient margin of 240 votes, as against a defeat by 2211 the year before, rewarded his indefatigable exertions and confirmed his judgment of the situation. The 'Glory Hallelujah' with which he hailed the result applied no less to the announcement, only a day or two before, of the new Canadian Budget, in which Mr Dunning had embodied a wholesale revision of items in the Canadian tariff in the direction of Empire free trade or of more effective preference, and which he declared to be only an earnest of the spirit in which Canada wished to enter the Imperial Conference Here was both a confutation of the assertion that the Empire was opposed to a policy of economic co-operation and a reminder of the awkwardness of the referendum as a method of clinching business with a willing negotiator. Accordingly, on May 19, Lord Beaverbrook announced that he had done with the referendum, which had been used as a mere excuse for not facing the issue, instead of as a spearhead to advance the policy Once more the political situation in the Unionist Party became strained. There was

little enthusiasm for the referendum, in which the public had shown no interest, and a widespread feeling that Lord Beaverbrook had had some cause for complaint. But the general verdict was that he was unnecessarily impatient, and that it was hardly fair to ask Mr. Baldwin to drop the referendum barely ten weeks after its formal adoption as the basis of party unity.

On Whit Monday Mr. Baldwin delivered his long-promised statement on agricultural policy. His declaration in favour of a guaranteed price for home wheat, of a duty on imported malting barley, and of effective measures to check the importation of dumped oats met with general approval from the farming community. But the speech made no attempt to correlate the proposals for British agriculture with any policy for Empire agriculture, and in one passage, indeed, used arguments ruling out protection for British agriculture which, while, no doubt, primarily intended by the speaker to refer to wheat, did on the face of them refer to agriculture in general, and lent themselves to quotation by opponents against any policy of food duties for Empire purposes. A speech in Aberdeen a few days later contained much the same argument, and suggested that asking for protection for British agriculture was crying for the moon Lord Beaverbrook resolved to treat these utterances as a deliberate attempt to queer the pitch, and decided that the time had come for the renewal of the aggressive and coercive tactics which he had used in February Once again, too, he thought that the 'rogue elephant,' Lord Rothermere, might be usefully employed to give weight and noise to the attack.

Accordingly, on June 17, the *Daily Mail* published a letter from Lord Beaverbrook complaining that Mr Baldwin had failed to support the policy of the Empire Crusade and appealing to Conservatives to send their party subscriptions to him to be used in running candidates against any Conservative candidates who failed to toe the Empire free trade line An appeal for funds, even for the object indicated, might not have created much commotion. But the suggestion that normal party subscriptions should be diverted was quite another matter This was open war against the party as an organisation Another letter two days later announcing that Lord Beaverbrook proposed to secure the summoning of a special meeting of the National Union to decide future policy was a no less direct challenge to Mr. Baldwin's leadership Lord Beaverbrook's attack, if menacing in substance, was not intemperate in language It was accompanied both in the *Daily Mail* and in the *Daily Express* by much stentorian trumpeting from Lord Rothermere in praise of Lord Beaverbrook as the only leader to save the nation, and of his policy of taxes on foreign foodstuffs as now ' not only economically

desirable but electorally possible,' and by even more than his usual borborygmic abuse of Mr. Baldwin and the 'discredited old gang' of the party leaders.

Mr. Baldwin countered promptly by summoning a meeting of all Unionist members of Parliament and candidates on June 24 In opening the discussion he brushed aside the issue of the referendum in a few sentences by pointing out that it was a piece of machinery adopted to secure the unity of the party, and that if it were given up at that moment it could only be for one of two alternatives, the old unqualified pledge against food taxes or the immediate free hand, on neither of which platforms he believed unity could be secured 'Therefore, *in the light of present circumstances*, I stand where I did' He then turned to what he regarded as the 'gravity of the national situation' involved in the attempt of Lord Rothermere and Lord Beaverbrook to dictate the policy of the Unionist Party. Comparing their activities to those of Mr Hearst in America, he charged them with endeavouring 'outside the province of journalism, to dictate, to domineer, to blackmail,' with an irresponsibility and inconsequence which he proceeded to illustrate The issue was one going to the very roots of constitutional government

> The desire to dictate the policy of a big party, the desire to choose the leader, the desire to impose Ministers on the Crown the only parallel to that was the action of the T U C in 1926 when they tried extra-constitutional means to impose their will on the democracy of the country That is what you are up against If you do not realise it the sooner you do the better We are told that, unless we can make peace with these noblemen, candidates are to be run all over the country The Lloyd George candidates at the last election smelt these will stink The challenge has been issued to us We are told that the gloves are off If they are we shall see who has got the dirty hands

As an example of the kind of dictation which the 'Press Lords' wished to exercise he quoted a letter from Lord Rothermere to Mr Hannon in which the former announced

> I cannot make it too abundantly clear that under no circumstances whatsoever will I support Mr Baldwin unless I know exactly what his policy is going to be, unless I have complete guarantees that such policy will be carried out if his party achieves office and unless I am acquainted with the names of at least eight, or ten, of his most prominent colleagues in the next Ministry

Pointing out that for 'Baldwin' might have been substituted the name of any other leader of the party, he concluded by repudiating with contempt so 'preposterous and insolent a demand' and declaring that he would 'fight that attempt at domination to the end.'

The speech, revealing Mr. Baldwin as a hard hitter, unafraid of using strong language where his moral indignation was roused, and appealing both to the natural sympathy of the party for a leader who had been for years the target of unfair and vindictive criticism and to its sentiment of independence against outside dictation, was completely successful in disposing of the attack, in so far as it was a challenge to Mr Baldwin's leadership. It would be outside the scope of this article to discuss in detail the issue on which, with a shrewd tactical judgment, he chose to concentrate The power of the Press is no new thing in this country, and John Delane in his time had quite as much to say to the fate of Governments as any Press potentate of our days The difference lies in the fact that the growth of democracy in the electoral sphere has also been accompanied by the growth of a mass production democratic Press The control of such a Press, built up by business methods with which political judgment or consistency are not necessarily concerned, has created a new factor of political power In the hands of men with little sense of public responsibility and swayed by personal motives, it can become a purely disorganising and unsettling force, unless it ends in ceasing to influence public opinion at all In the hands of men with strong and sustained political convictions and ambitions it may become something much more formidable, for good or ill At present we are still some distance from the possibility of the supersession of parliamentary government by a new Press Cæsarism, and broadcasting, television, and the film may before long restore the balance in favour of older ideals of government. As far as the meeting was concerned, all the indignation centred on Lord Rothermere, who thus once again served Lord Beaverbrook's purpose both as a bludgeon and as a foil Towards Lord Beaverbrook himself feeling was more indulgent, partly because there was a widespread sympathy with his views, but also because, in their advocacy, he had faced the ordinary rough and tumble of public debate and heckling, and not confined himself to self-glorification in his own or allied newspaper columns

With the issue of 'Press dictation' disposed of, the meeting settled down to the question of policy, Sir Gervais Rentoul leading off with an official resolution welcoming Mr Baldwin's statement on the referendum and approving the declaration that 'in the present circumstances it should be retained in the party programme as the surest and shortest method of achieving success' The counter-resolution, or amendment, to the effect that the reasons for a referendum no longer obtained, and that 'the British Government should enter upon the forthcoming or any future Empire Conference with a free hand to discuss and agree upon the measures necessary to develop Empire economic

unity,' was moved by Colonel Gretton. For the referendum, on merits, hardly anyone had a word to say during the hours of debate that followed. The general sense of the meeting was well expressed and effectively focussed by Sir R. Horne, who wound up with an earnest appeal for unity, expressing his own view that the referendum was certain, within a few days or weeks or months at most, to be superseded by the flow of events, but that, in face of the challenge to the party organisation, and to its leadership, he intended to vote for the main resolution That, in spite of his appeal, about a third of those present voted for the amendment was significant of the strength of feeling in favour of the free hand, but even more of the extent to which that sentiment had grown in the previous three months The resolution was then carried, against one dissentient, and the meeting dispersed, satisfied with having vindicated the party's control over its own affairs, and content to leave the referendum to fade out at the earliest convenient opportunity

Meanwhile, facts were speaking more powerfully and convincingly than all political speeches or newspaper articles. The unemployment figures went on rising, and by July 14 reached 1,939,900 The trade returns grew steadily worse, and the first six months of 1930 showed a decline in imports of over 63,000,000*l*. and of nearly 54,000,000*l* in exports Even more disquieting than the gross figures was the fact that, while our export of manufactured goods had gone down by over 45,000,000*l*, our import of manufactures had decreased by under 3,000,000*l*., and that in certain important lines such as iron and steel, electrical goods, machinery and apparel, the heavy fall in our exports was actually accompanied by a serious increase in competitive imports In other words, the world depression closed other markets to us without in any appreciable degree affecting the hold of our foreign competitors over our own home market For the first time, too, these six months saw the United Kingdom fall from the second to the third place as an exporting country, Germany advancing to the second place with a total of 310,000,000*l* against our 304,851,000*l*

For the first time in its history the 'City' was seriously alarmed, not only at the immediate prospect, but at the whole national situation, and forced to reconsider the fundamentals of the position which it had taken up for over a century, ever since the historic declaration of the London merchants in favour of free trade in 1820 As recently as 1926 the City, as a whole, still clung to the ideal of international free trade, and a number of its leading bankers and business men had signed in that year the international appeal for the 'establishment of economic freedom as the best hope of restoring the commerce and credit of the

world.' But in the growing industrial difficulties of the last few years the banks, as creditors, have been forced to look at the position from the manufacturers' point of view, and to realise that no efficiency and no rationalisation can avail against the tremendous handicap imposed by free imports in a protected world. On them, too, as on the rest of the country, the conception of an Imperial economic system had begun to exercise its compelling influence. On July 2 a number of the leading bankers and business men met at Hambro's Bank, under the chairmanship of Sir Eric Hambro, and passed the following resolution:

> It is resolved that urgent measures for the promotion of inter Imperial trade are needed to secure and extend the market for British products both at home and through the export trade. Bitter experience has taught Great Britain that the hopes expressed four years ago in a plea for the removal of the restrictions upon European trade have failed to be realised. The restrictions have been materially increased and the sales of surplus foreign products in the British market have steadily grown. While we retain the hope of an ultimate extension of the area of free trade throughout the world we believe that the immediate step for securing and extending the market for British goods lies in reciprocal trade agreements between the nations constituting the British Empire. As a condition of securing these agreements Great Britain must retain her open market for all Empire products while being prepared to impose duties on all imports from all other countries.

Among those who passed the resolution, or announced their adherence to it a few days later, were the chairmen of the five big joint stock banks—Mr F. C. Goodenough (of Barclays), Sir Harry Goschen (of the National Provincial), Mr Beaumont Pease (of Lloyds Bank), Mr McKenna (of the Midland Bank), Mr Tennant (of the Westminster Bank), two directors of the Bank of England (Sir Alan Anderson and Mr Whigham)—and a number of other leading men, such as Lord Ashfield, Sir G. May (of the Prudential), Sir Herbert Lawrence (of Glyn Mills, and chairman of Vickers), Sir Guy Granet, and Mr Vivian Hugh Smith. The impression created was profound. What impressed was not only the eminence of the names, but the fact that so many of them had, up to the last, avowed their faith in free trade, and their resolute opposition to all suggestions for a change in our national policy. And now they had gone the 'whole hog' with Lord Beaverbrook! There were no qualifications, no suggestions that any category of imports must on principle be exempt from discussion. For the sake of Empire agreements 'Great Britain must retain her open market for all Empire products while being prepared to impose duties on all imports from all other countries.'

Who killed Free Trade?
I said the banker,
I was its sheet anchor,
I've killed Free Trade.

Little less significant as a sign of the intellectual trend of the country, and perhaps even more important politically, has been the development of opinion in the ranks of the trade unions and of the Socialist Party. In practically every instance in the last few years applications for safeguarding had been supported by the trade unions immediately concerned, and their action, however much minimised and frowned upon in political trade union circles, had inevitably set others thinking. An even sharper stimulus to thought was supplied by Mr Snowden's vindictive attitude towards the safeguarded industries There was every reason, both in the industrial and in the revenue situation, for allowing the lace and other safeguarding duties that were due to expire this year to run on. There was no reason, except sheer pedantry, why the inevitable decision to retain the McKenna, silk, and sugar duties should not have been announced six months beforehand The feeling rapidly spread in the Labour ranks that a theory which insisted on such senseless and mischievous action must be a senseless and mischievous theory If ever a man has deliberately made free trade both odious and ridiculous, it has been Mr Snowden He well deserves the description Sheridan once gave of Grenville 'I have known many men knock their heads against a wall, but I never before heard of a man collecting bricks and building a wall for the express purpose of knocking out his brains against it'

Whatever the cause, the rank and file of the Labour Party have been discussing the question among themselves with a freedom undreamt of before It is no secret that Mr Thomas has never shared Mr Snowden's objections either to safeguarding or to Imperial Preference, and such an intellectual leader of Socialism as Mr G D H Cole has now declared himself definitely converted to Protection by the facts of the new situation But the most significant evidence of the change of outlook is furnished by the report of the Economic Committee of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress prepared in May and formally adopted by the Council at the end of June This document, contemplating the possibility of the emergence of larger economic groups in the world, concludes that our present policy of isolation is no longer tenable; that world economic unity is not practicable at the present time; and that of the various possible groups, the British Commonwealth group is the one which sentiment and language, existing arrangements and tendencies, its admirable balance between raw materials and manufacturing industry and its facilities for internal migration, all make it our obvious interest to consolidate. The report, therefore, considers that advantage should be taken of the Imperial Conference 'to press for as full a development as possible of the economic relations between the

constituent parts of the British Commonwealth.' As machine to further the desired end it advocates regular Economic Conferences and a permanent Economic Secretariat to help in the evolution of a common economic policy—its recommendations in this respect being practically identical with those of the Joint Preparatory Committee for the Imperial Conference set up by the Association of British Chambers of Commerce, the Federation of British Industries, and the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom. In an appendix, no less interesting and important than the main report itself, free trade is dismissed as something non-existent in the world to-day, and not worth considering as a working aim, even if it were compatible with trade union and Labour principles to regard it as an ultimate ideal. Commerce must be regulated, and the imposition of tariffs is simply one among many devices, to be considered not 'with preconceptions based on the belief that certain fundamental principles or traditions must at all costs be adhered to,' but simply as a matter of expediency. The report is to come before the Trades Union Congress at the beginning of September.

Free trade as an intellectual conviction is dead. This is not the occasion to discuss the reasons why a very superficial economic generalisation, deriving some justification and plausibility from the facts of the time, should have hardened into a rigid creed, regarded by a whole nation as intellectually and morally self-evident and above criticism, and should have retained its power for eighty years in the face of all experience at home and abroad. Nor need we pause to consider in how many directions this creed has paralysed the thought of this country in the past, or what a stimulus, in other fields besides the purely economic, will be given by the liberation of our intellects from the old catchwords and shallow sophistries on which it was based. It is enough for our present purpose to discuss the bearing of the landslide towards Protection, whether on the national or the Imperial basis, on the immediate political situation.

For the Unionist Party the problem is essentially simplified, if it will only have the courage of its own convictions and lead the nation where it wants to be led. After the bankers' manifesto the leading Conservative newspapers, *The Times*, the *Telegraph*, and the *Morning Post*, hastened to assume that no more would be heard of the referendum, which now only awaits the appropriate occasion for its obituary notice. Whatever the arguments in its favour at one time, it is essentially a dilatory device, and the nation is in no mood for anything except decisive action. There can be only one policy for the Unionist Party to-day, and that is to demand an absolutely free hand to impose such duties as it may believe to be in the public interest. There is no reason

why it should impose a duty on any foodstuff, unless a clear balance of advantage, whether from the point of view of Empire negotiation or of domestic agriculture, lies in its imposition, or unless it is satisfied that the cost of living of the people is not prejudicially affected. But it should insist on the right to judge these points on merits, and to act upon its judgment, and not tie its hands in advance by pledges which are, in fact, an admission of untrustworthiness or incapacity.

How, in this case, is the party to meet the cry of 'dear food'—a cry far less effective, indeed, than it was, but still a serious factor to reckon with in an electorate such as ours is to-day? It cannot be done by putting our heads in the sand. Avoiding the subject on the platform is not going to mitigate what enemy canvassers will say in the back streets. There is only one way of dealing with bogeys, and that is to drag them into the light and expose them. The experience of safeguarding has already educated the public to understand that a duty will not send up the price if the untaxed supply is sufficient. But more than a merely defensive argument is required. What is needed is an offensive campaign to bring out the fact that the present system of ever-increasing taxes must mean, and does mean, dear houses, dear clothes, dear food, and ever-shrinking employment. No more effective platform argument could be used to illustrate this than the fact that the loaf to-day costs *3d* more than it did some twenty years ago when wheat was the same price as it is at present. We must rub it into the public that there is only one way to secure cheap food and to reduce the cost of living, and that is to reduce taxation, and that the only effective way to reduce taxation is to increase production, and that every measure, whether of safeguarding or of Empire reciprocity, which enlarges our market and increases our output must therefore be a measure making for cheapness. Our answer to a false charge should be not merely to deny it, or even explain it away, least of all to run away from it, but to fasten upon our opponents the true charge of being 'food taxers,' which we are fully justified in bringing against them.

In dealing with this question of 'taxing food' it is, however, worth keeping in mind that, electorally speaking, 'food' means, in the main, bread. The dear loaf complex is a very real psychological factor, and if that were removed, the fear about the effect of our policy on other foodstuffs would be a much less serious obstacle. Now, as far as home agriculture is concerned, we are already committed to help wheat production, not by the method of duty, but by the method of guarantee, probably supplemented, to judge by Mr. Baldwin's most recent utterance on the subject, by some quota scheme worked by the millers. If so, it is at least worth considering whether the same method might not be

applicable to Dominion wheat. If the method is that of quota, the same machinery that would administer the Unit Kingdom quota could administer the Empire quota. If it guarantee, an appropriate price could no doubt be fixed f Canadian or Australian wheat, and jointly guaranteed by t British Government and the Government of the Dominion co cerned. Generally speaking, the method of a customs duty by far the simplest, fairest and most flexible It involves n bureaucratic interference with individual transactions It exe cises a steady pressure, gentle or firm according to the rate of th duty, upon the course of trade, but leaves time to those whom i hits to adjust themselves to the new situation by paying the duty while looking for other markets or contracting their output. It is thus far less likely to lead to friction, international, inter-Imperial or domestic, than any scheme of bulk purchase, or even of quota, worked under Government auspices Lastly, unlike bulk purchase or guarantee, it brings in money instead of costing money, which means that the Treasury will not devote all its ingenuity to defeating or obstructing its operation But there are a few cases of articles falling into a limited number of easily classified grades, and handled by a very small body of importers, where the method of quota or guarantee might be applicable Wheat is one of these Beef, mutton, sugar are other possible examples. There is no reason why Unionist policy should in appropriate cases not give careful consideration to this method of encouraging both home or Empire production, so long as it is clearly realised that over the greater part of the field the natural and most effective form of assistance is that given by duties

It is on these lines, indeed, and still more on those of state-controlled bulk purchase, that many of the supporters of the present Government would have them approach the problems of the Imperial Conference This appeared very clearly in the debate on the Unionist vote of censure on July 16, when Sir O. Mosley and Mr E F. Wise delivered two remarkably interesting speeches based on the complete acceptance of the ideas of protection and Empire economic unity, but advocating bulk purchase as the most economical and effective method of achieving the desired result These speeches, listened to with obvious approval by a large proportion of the Socialist members, were directly opposed in argument and spirit to the official Government declarations made by Mr Snowden and the Prime Minister.

The motion itself was in essence a 'fishing' one Its object was to discover whether Mr. Thomas's statement on the Dominion Office vote that the Government would enter the Conference absolutely free to discuss every proposal on its merits had really

superseded Mr. Snowden's earlier declaration that all existing food taxes and their accompanying preferences would be wiped out as soon as possible. The debate certainly left no doubt as to the attitude of the dominant section in the Cabinet. While Mr. Snowden and Mr. MacDonald both made perfunctory references to bulk purchase which gave little indication of any real intention to give effective application to such a policy, the whole gist of their speeches was completely negative The Dominions might, if they wished, discuss proposals involving duties But the British Government were firmly resolved to have nothing to do with any such proposals Both speeches, too, concentrated on proving that the Dominions would in no circumstances do anything for British trade, whatever advantages we might give them, and Mr. Snowden even poured contempt on the idea that any substantial expansion of Dominion trade was possible

Whatever hopes Mr Thomas may have entertained of making a great success of the economic side of the Imperial Conference have been pretty effectively scotched No one who heard Mr. Snowden, or who knows the intrinsic difficulties, cost, and risk attending bulk purchase schemes, will expect anything much to materialise on that line Nor need anyone fear the prospect of the Government going to the country after a successful Conference and 'dishing the Tories' with a programme of Empire unity achieved and protection offered The Government will hang on, committed to a policy of negation on the Imperial as on the domestic issue, until such time as internal dissensions or Liberal dissatisfaction bring about a parliamentary defeat

This throws the initiative in policy back upon the Unionists. Mr Baldwin, in opening the debate on July 16, confined himself, as he was fully entitled to do, to stating what he would do if he were in office and in charge of the Imperial Conference. That situation, however convenient as enabling him to present to the country the actual details of an agreed scheme of Empire reciprocity, is not likely to arise The prospect we have to envisage is that of an election, which may come at any time after the Conference, and for which it is essential to prepare the mind of our party and of the electorate from now onward I have already stated what I believe to be the only policy which we can pursue—the policy of the free hand, free from all paralysing negative pledges or dilatory expedients, free for immediate and decisive action But such a policy can only succeed if the ground is prepared for it by intensive preaching of a definite and coherent creed. To drift into it is only to court disaster Recent by-elections in Shettleston and North Norfolk have shown significant and hopeful reductions in Labour majorities But they have also shown that even the amazing vigour and impassioned elo-

quence of Lord Beaverbrook, and all the power of his P concentrated on a single seat, cannot in a fortnight's camp sufficiently shift the slow-moving and suspicious mind of a l section of the electorate.

What is needed to-day is not manœuvring for some formul satisfy the timid section of our party, nor yet frightening tl into courage by the threat of rival candidates, but an Em crusade in the true sense of the word, a crusade of educat carried on with conviction and enthusiasm by a large band workers from one end of the kingdom to the other Whet that crusade is to be conducted by Lord Beaverbrook, or by Unionist Central Office under Mr Neville Chamberlain's capa direction, or, as I should like to see it, by both working in co-ope tion, is a minor matter What is essential is that it should begun as soon as possible, with the knowledge that the wh fate of this country and of the Empire depends upon its succe

L. S. AMERY.

THE INDIAN SCENE

I The Simon Report

THE task remitted to the Simon Commission when it set out on its ungrateful exploration was not merely to propose a scheme for the better government of India. It was—what is so often forgotten in Britain—to direct its inquiry in a particular direction indicated in advance. It may seem strange to those not in vivid contact with the extraordinary views of the Indian problem widely held in this land that in the first volume of the Report the Commission should have laid such stress on the objective definitely given to British policy—in the Declaration of 1917, which Lord Curzon had a considerable hand in framing, in the preamble to the Act of 1919, and in the Instrument of Instructions issued to those in authority in India—' the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in British India as an integral part of the empire ' Last autumn that policy was further clarified by the authoritative statement that by responsible government was meant Dominion status It is one of the many ironies of the Indian political situation that, whilst so much sound and fury were raised by the use of the term ' Dominion status,' so little attention was paid to the definition of our goal as responsible government It passes the wit of man to conceive that there is any difference between the two The real test applied to the recommendations of the Commission, by the men who will have to work them in India, is whether they lead directly to this end—responsible government, meaning, by that term, Dominion status.

But there is another condition which the recommendations of the Commission have to satisfy, on which the same emphasis is not laid. It is an axiom in constitutional history that almost any constitution will function if there exists the will to work it, whilst the most ingenious scheme ever devised may fail if it lack this vitalising ichor What is the stage of public feeling which any new constitution must at any rate attempt to satisfy? Here it is best to use the actual words of the Report. Alluding to the increasing sense of unity, the Commission invite attention

to 'the growth of a passionate determination among minded classes of all Indian races and religions to assert the claim of India as a whole to its due place in the wo overmastering sentiment is developed in the closing p the first volume, where it is set forth that

> While the experienced Indian member of the Services will adı benefits of the British Raj and realise the difficulties in the way of plete self government, while the member of a minority commu putting the safety of his community first, will stipulate for safegu and while the moderate may look askance at extremist methods w he will not openly denounce all alike are in sympathy with the den for equal status with the European and proclaim their belief in determination for India.

No one who knows India will question the absolute ac racy and justice of these definitions The two volumes of Report cover nearly 800 pages, close-packed with knowled fact and argument If we attempt to follow it through the forests we shall never see the wood for the trees I shall ther fore indicate only two or three broad questions of policy, exami them in the light of the dual conditions of the problem indicat above, and try and show how far they satisfy the essential fac which govern the Indian situation

A Federal Constitution Unity in Diversity

The Commission lays down two broad principles whicl have governed its recommendations—that the new Constitutior should, as far as possible, contain within itself provision for it own development; and that any constitutional changes now recommended for British India must have regard to a future development when India as a whole, not merely British India, will take her place among the constituent States of the Commonwealth of Nations united under the Crown Both these are important, the latter is immeasurably the more important. If the Commission had done nothing else, it would have justified its work by directing our gaze steadfastly towards the one possible end—the evolution of a federation which will embrace the whole of that vast and varied land Many Indian publicists cherish the idea of a unitary State for the whole country, with a sovereign Legislature sitting at Delhi, responsible for Indian polity in small things as well as large The inexorable facts of geography, as well as race, religion and history, are against them; an all-embracing Legislature which must be predominantly Hindu would never be accepted by the great minorities, and would lead direct to fission and confusion. It would necessarily be divorced

[...]ick contact with popular feeling. The rural constitu[...] returning a single member to the Legislative Assembly [...]owhere less than 6000 miles in area, and a constituency, [...]en at random from Madras, contains over 25,000 voters [...]ttered amongst a population of 6,000,000, spread over an area [...] over 31,000 square miles. But, apart from the inexorable facts [...]f geography, there is the infinite variety of India Lest the Simon Commission be suspected of bias, let me quote one of the most experienced and suggestive publicists, Sir Ibrahim Rahimtulla, who in a scheme he propounded last year used these words:

> Looking to the size of the country and the variety of peoples inhabiting India, it appears futile to concentrate attention on conditions which are successfully worked in different countries in Europe under very different conditions A constitution really suited to Indian conditions can only be found on the principles of unity in diversity There should be an All-India Government with specified duties and obligations and Free States with residuary powers forming a Commonwealth of India

Moreover, it is only on federal principles that we can ever think of India as a whole—of the Indian States as well as British India The basic weakness in all earlier constitutional proposals is that they have drawn a rigid line of demarcation between those areas for which the Crown is directly responsible and that third of India and fifth of her population which is under the princes of varying degree True, Lord Chelmsford gave the Indian States a corporate existence through the Chamber of Princes; that Chamber sits in the tripartite legislative building which brings the princes, the elders in the Council of State, and the Legislative Assembly under one roof But there is no contact between the Indian States and British India save through the personality of the Viceroy, no liaison between the Indian States and the Government of India in relation to the Legislature That can be effected only through federation and the application of federal principles in the framing of the Constitution, this is the one path to unity, and it must be resolutely trodden

The Constituent States

The foundations of this federation will be laid in the constituent States, which we now call provinces, with the ultimate association of the Indian States each under its own ruler The Commission has nowhere been fortunate in its nomenclature, and we shall never think clearly until we abandon the term 'province' and substitute 'State.' It may be argued that this is merely a name; it is more, for it expresses an idea So long as we use the term province, we shall always think of some area entirely

subordinate to the centre; as soon as we adopt the design State, we shall realise that these are distinct entities, each wo out its own destinies according to its conditions and needs, w the vigorous ideas of the new India will find their fullest ex sion.

In regard to these States the proposals of the Commission at once bold and wise. It proposes the abolition of dyarch the division of the administration into two parts, one respons to the legislature and the other directly to the Governor— the establishment of unitary autonomous Governments, un Chief Ministers, responsible to elected legislatures in everyth which is not the function of the Federal Government, with spec powers reserved to the Governors to ensure that the Kin government shall be carried on in all circumstances Out of tl there arise four issues of importance—the special powers of t Governors, single or bi-cameral legislatures, the transfer of la and order to the Ministry, and the nature of the electorate

In the present state of Indian politics it is essential that tl State Governors shall be armed with special powers Nowher in India have definite parties emerged which could provid alternative administrations Often this is ascribed to th existence of dyarchy and official *blocs* in the provincial legislativ councils, and the assumption is made that they will immediately spring up the moment these obstacles are removed That is not a possibility on which an autonomous and responsible government can be immediately based These special powers are strictly limited; they are confined to the preservation of order and the protection of minorities, with the fulfilment of statutory obligations towards the Federal Government, essential liabilities, and service questions There is nothing anti-democratic in them; with our eyes too closely fixed on Parliament, we overlook the powers vested in the President and governors in the United States of America As responsibility develops and parties emerge they should fall into desuetude

On the question of single chambers, or bi-cameral legislatures, opinion is divided within and without the Commission Broadly, it may be said that there is no strong feeling in support of second chambers in India, and their establishment is often actively disliked. We already make heavy drafts on the political experience available, and with the powers vested in Governors there is no place for a revising chamber

Round the proposal to transfer law and order to the Ministry a battle royal will be joined, especially in view of the intensity of communal feeling in India. But the arguments employed by the Commission are conclusive. There can be no real responsibility without the charge of law and order, and we do not seek to

perpetuate the confusion of divided authority. But in this connexion there is much to be said for the suggestion of Mr. Kikabhai Premchand, in the Minority Report which he appended to the recommendations of the Central Committee which co-operated with the Simon Commission, that the head of the police should be an All-India officer, above all local or communal influences, and that the control of the judiciary should be vested in the High Courts.

It is a misfortune that these liberal and far-reaching proposals, which should command general acceptance here and in India, are linked with others of the most controversial and dangerous character. What, after all, is the difference between government and no government? It is the power of the Administration to make its will respected. We are aiming at basing these responsible State Governments on the popular will expressed through the ballot-box; the character of the electorate is all-important. That at present is small, but, disproportionate as it may be to the population, it is still largely inexperienced. The Commission itself says: 'It is nevertheless apparent that ignorance and superstition put some classes of the electorate at the mercy of ingenious and unscrupulous canvassers. Undesirable forms of pressure are probably fairly common.' Yet, having used this and even stronger language, it recommends that the electorate be arbitrarily expanded to embrace about 10 per cent. of the population. It is difficult to discern any principle whatsoever behind this proposal. Why this particular figure of 10 per cent.? It would be reasonable to suggest that the qualifications for the franchise should be widened and leave the electorate to expand naturally in response to it; but to lay down a rigid figure, regardless of educational and social qualifications, is to court the perils of which Mr. J. H. Thomas has often warned the British people—the vesting of immense powers in an inexperienced democracy.

The Commission has further tied up its conclusions with a proposal for inquiry into the readjustment of the present boundaries of the provinces which are to grow into States. This is a favourite exercise of those who do not realise the immensity of the difficulties involved. There is an overwhelming case for the separation of Burma from India, a less convincing one for the separate existence of Sind and Orissa. But the present provinces are something more than fortuitous collections of areas; they are definite units of government, with strong provincial feeling behind them, and a costly system of administration built up on their integrity. Surely the history of the partition of Bengal carries its own lesson? It is impossible to divide even a district without raising very strong local objections. There is also the

question of cost. In the financial memorandum by Sir W Layton annexed to the Report it is shown that the ratio of t tion to national income in India is small—6 to 8 per cent., acc ing to the method of computation, as compared with 20 per c in Britain and Japan; but an unusually small proportion of revenue raised is used in services which are of direct benefit raising the status of the masses of the people. With the p vinces requiring some forty to fifty crores of new money a year order to discharge their obligations, it would be folly to add to t present excessively top-heavy expenditure by carving out n administrative areas which in no circumstances could be cheap.

A very important provision in the Report must not be ove looked The provincial councils as at present constituted a legislative, and not constituent, they have no power to va their own constitution It is proposed to give them this pow in certain directions and under certain safeguards, thus enablin them to grow without dependence on Acts of an overburdene Parliament This satisfies the principle that the new Constitu tion shall, so far as possible, contain the germ of its own growth

The Federal Government

Special attention is devoted to the constituent States—and rightly, because they will form the foundations of the Federal Government—and the areas where the new spirit in the land will find the freest play When we approach the constitution of the Federal Government it is to tackle a question of the greatest difficulty Everyone is agreed that the Federal Government must be strong, that the Executive must be quick to act and free from the control of the Legislature in its day-to-day activities There is another consideration not so often emphasised, many Indian publicists have declared that they will accept no Constitution which does not embody some measure of responsibility to the Legislature But beyond these points of general agreement no two persons are at one as to how they are to be expressed. The proposals of the Commission are that the Federal Legislature shall be elected entirely by the provincial or State legislatures That is wise. From the geographical conditions outlined earlier, it is clear that by direct election no real contact between the member and his constituency can be established One of the greatest defects in the Act of 1919 was the abandonment of the secondary electorates; that excluded from the Councils many men of experience in local government and destroyed the valuable liaison between the provinces and the Central Legislature. The federal body is to inherit all the powers of the present Legislative Assembly, the Council of State, or Second Chamber, to be retained,

with the present special powers vested in the Viceroy. But the Executive is to be chosen entirely by the Governor-General, and to be neither removable by, nor responsible to, the Federal Legislature.

Is that a system which promises smooth working, or contains any element of permanence? Let us cast our memories back. Since the passing of the Act of 1919 the Government of India has been faced by an elected majority in the Legislative Assembly. That majority has been powerful for criticism, often very influential, directly and indirectly, but incapable of removing the Executive, consequently free from having to bear responsibility for its barbed shafts On the one side there has been criticism without responsibility, on the other administration tempered by cajolery, certification and veto—conditions which assuredly have not tended to strength in the Executive No doubt the Commission looks to the responsibility which members of the new Federal Assembly will owe to the State councils which elect them. Possibly it visualises the Federal Assembly as chiefly interested in providing funds for the provincial States whence they come through the Provincial Fund which Sir Walter Layton proposes These are large assumptions in the present temper of Indian politics The more one examines the problem, the greater are the complexities which it presents But, recognising that a slavish imitation of British parliamentarianism is totally unsuited to Indian conditions, and that we have to create a federal system out of a unitary Government which has arrogated and exercised excessive powers, it seems to me that the constitution of the Federal Government must be further considered, with the determination to invest it, if possible, with the element of responsibility if it is not to founder on the rocks of irreconcilable opposition.

Defence

Not less complicated is the position of the Army under the new Constitution We must be honest with ourselves Our present difficulties are largely of our own making We have built up a splendid military instrument in the Indian Army but until the first Indian cadets were admitted to Sandhurst after the war it was one in which Indians could serve only in a subordinate capacity. We are now confronted with this insistent demand for rapid progress towards responsible government, and a military machine which cannot, as it stands, be passed over to an Indian Government. The Frontier, with hordes of brave well-armed tribesmen hovering over it and a great State not a member of the League of Nations beyond, demands that the Indian Army must be maintained at the highest pitch of efficiency. The

maintenance of internal order amid the communal feuds wh distract the land demands that it shall be an absolutely relia instrument. For these reasons the Commission, whilst reject emphatically the idea that the needs of defence can be allowed constitute an irremovable obstacle to the attainment of responsi government, and urging that steady progress should be ma with the policy which contemplates the building up of an entir Indian force, proposes that defence shall be treated as an Imper concern, India contributing a fixed sum annually which shall n be votable Here, again, we must ask ourselves how long will Federal Legislature be content with the diversion of a large pa of the revenues to military expenditure over which it has neith voice nor influence

THE INDIAN STATES

No scheme for the development of the Constitution of Indi can be worth the paper it is written upon unless it embraces th Indian States as part of the constituent whole And as a persona view, it is imperative that the Indian States shall be brough within the fabric of the federation through their one organi body, the Chamber of Princes and no ear lent to narrow particu larism The units of the federation the Commission visualises would be the provincial States with their Ministries responsible to their legislatures, and the Indian States autonomously governed so far as their internal affairs are concerned, and over all the representative of the Crown as Viceroy in relation to the Indian States and Governor-General in relation to British India —an admirable ideal As a first step it proposes the creation of the Council for Greater India, to contain representatives of British India and the Indian States, to treat of matters of common concern It is probably impossible to go farther now But what is Greater India? We know only one India though it contains two parts, British India and the Indian States This ridiculous title may jeopardise the Council from the first, it would be far happier to take a name which has prestige behind it—for instance, His Majesty's Privy Council for India

CONCLUSION

The Report of the Commission has been approached from two angles—that it is sacrosanct, and in no respect must it be departed from; and that it is worthless and must be discarded. Both are equally absurd. I know of no report of any Commission in our history which was treated as the last word; certainly the recommendations of Mr Montagu and Lord Chelmsford were sub-

tantially altered by Parliament. Nor can any body charged with the framing of a progressive Constitution for India fail to take the conclusions of this Commission as the groundwork. The first volume, which surveyed the field, is one of the most masterly Blue-books in our official literature The recommendations in regard to the provinces, which we must treat as States, are far-reaching and on the whole wise If the Commission falters when it comes to deal with the Federal Legislature and defence, that springs from the immense difficulties inherent in the situation; its proposals must be re-examined with the determination to seek a form of government which will be at once strong, and at the same time contain the seeds of growth from within and mobilise behind it the driving force of public opinion.

STANLEY REED.

THE INDIAN SCENE

II The Report and After

Seven good men and true were despatched by Parliament on mission to square, if they could, the Indian political circle. They have circled the square miles of India, and have submitted the results of their inquiry, and the recommendations which they have to place before Parliament and the British nation, no less than before those limited numbers in India who are capable of playing an intelligent part in politics. Such men, outside the Indians in the higher services, are few in numbers, for I doubt whether there are more than a few thousand who could stand an examination on the Simon Report, no matter how many times they have read it; or who could give any reasoned idea of the real meaning of 'Responsible Government,' and the manner in which it should or would work over the sub-continent as a whole. Shouting for Swaraj is one thing; working it is another. Yet almost the whole of political India is writing and talking as if these two things were identical. Even those men who were able to draw up in polished English a Nehru Constitution as a thesis appear unable to perceive that when they say that they have not read the Report, and do not intend to read it, but that in their opinion it is a despicable document, they are destroying any reputation that they might wish to claim for commonsense, fairmindedness, and goodwill. One of the so-called 'Moderates,'—or 'Liberals,' as they like to term themselves—who has presumably read the Report, is said to have described it as 'a piece of unparalleled political humbug and chicanery,' and to have gone on to compare this document with Miss Katherine Mayo's book, *Mother India*. This is not the outpouring of some irresponsible fanatic, but the language used by a man who under this 'repressive British Government' held the high position of Law Member of the Governor-General's Executive Council.

And now to the Report itself.

Volume 1 lays before the British public a wonderful panorama of the vast sub-continent which we call India, and the diversified nature of the races and creeds which go to make up its huge

population. The whole situation is depicted with great skill and lucidity, and is entirely free from exaggeration; indeed, the Commission is careful to be a little blind to the political defects, and exceedingly kind to the political virtues, which the actual working of the existing Reforms has disclosed. No body of men could have more greatly striven than have Sir John Simon and his colleagues to be fair both to British achievements and to Indian aspirations; to understand both, and to make allowances for all points of view.

In volume ii. the Commission has courageously laid bare the grounds for the numerous doubts and difficulties which have assailed it at every step, and has tersely and lucidly explained the reasons which have led it, on the balance of arguments, to prefer one conclusion to another. It has left no doubt in the mind of any impartial reader that it has based its recommendations on a strict adherence to the ultimate goal which Mr Montagu announced and Parliament ratified by passing the Government of India Act of 1919 It has nowhere criticised the wisdom of that announcement, although it makes it clear that the ultimate realisation of the goal, when and if it is realised, is more likely to shape itself on some other model than that of Westminster The Report stands, and will always stand, as a clearing of sound argument and lucid exposition in a vast wilderness of specious phrases, conflicting claims and turbulent demands, whereby the basic facts that must govern the situation are entirely obscured

All will agree in principle that, no matter what shape the new Indian Constitution takes, it can succeed in the present and progress in the future only by peaceful co-operation between the divergent elements that go to make up the whole; and it is on this account that the Commissioners, while commending a bold advance towards self-government in the provinces, find it necessary to ensure security, both from foes without and foes within, in order that their scheme of constitutional advance may enjoy the degree of stability essential to all progress

Since 1858, for the last seventy-two years, that stability has been secured, for reasons upon which it is unnecessary to dilate, by the maintenance of the *Pax Britannica;* and the Commissioners believe that for many years to come the continuance of this *Pax Britannica* must be secured, or the new constitutional fabric will be wrecked on the threshold. They therefore provide that the new Central Government shall be strong, that the Army in India must be kept entirely away from politics and political contest, that reserve powers shall continue to reside in the Governor-General and the Governors of provinces, to be used in certain emergencies of a specified nature, and that the security services must be retained on an All-India basis, and

under the control of the Secretary of State. With these bulw against the complete wreck of young self-governing institutior foreign invasions or internal disorder, the Commissioners t to envisage the future progress towards a federation of In States and British Indian provinces under a federal Governm in which both shall exercise a voice in controlling those funct of government which are generally recognised the world ove pertaining to a central authority rather than to the compon States which make up the combined territory.

The Commissioners have refrained from referring to the te 'Dominion Status' which has figured in the announcements the Viceroy with the approval of His Majesty's present Gove ment, and has just been repeated since the publication of t Report. Their silence is obviously deliberate. These announ ments have been made without their consent in a way that w bound to prejudice the acceptance of their conclusions. Th could not criticise the term without both criticising the Vicer and the Government that had used or sanctioned its use. C the other hand, they were unable to commend it.

Every territory, small or great, developed or backward, one of the dominions of the King Every such dominion, fro the great self-governing Colonial States down to the smalle island under the Union Jack, has a *status* of its own. Th United Kingdom and India are exceptional only because one i called a kingdom and the other an empire, though they ar equally dominions under the sovereignty of the Crown The term 'Dominion' (with a capital 'D') is a term of comparatively recent coinage, and the status attached to it is one which has not yet been defined by statute. India might at some date take her place as a component part of the collection of self-governing States that owe allegiance to the Crown, but, if so, she would not fall into the same category as Canada or New Zealand, if only for the reason that greater India contains both the territories of Indian princes, which are not democracies, and of British provinces which would be self-governing in the modern sense The constitutions of these dominion States inside the British Empire are not exactly similar to one another, and it is not even certain that they have reached a final stage, but Indian politicians concentrate upon the description of the group of Dominions which was put into popular rather than legal language at the Imperial Conference of 1926. From this description they derive the conclusion that these Dominions possess the right to secede, and that if similar conditions were applied to India, secession—that is to say, complete independence—could be no longer constitutionally and legally resisted. No one who reads the Montagu announcement of 1917, or the preamble to the Government of India Act, can

appose that the responsible government to which he refers was itended to include a right of secession. To declare, therefore, that words used in 1926 in respect of British Colonies were implicit in an announcement made nine years before is to add to, and ot merely to interpret, the significance of Mr. Montagu's announcement. Those who know Indian politicians, and who they really are, know that they do not care a straw about distant goals; what they want is immediate power, and they were certain to take the Viceroy's announcement as an attempt to mollify the ultimatum delivered by Congress in December 1928. The Government fell into this trap; the Simon Commission refused to do so, and the Government now find themselves in the awkward position either of admitting their error or of throwing over the Simon Report as, forsooth, a reactionary document In the former case, they will be certainly accused of deceiving the Indian public; in the latter, they will certainly have deceived the British nation

In the meantime the Commission has pointed out the only direction in which it is even possible to discern, however dimly, an India settling down as a federal State among the families of nations that compose the British Empire as it exists to-day. The road they sketch is long, and its length cannot yet be measured, but the course is set to a definite scheme of development instead of to a terminus of confused issues and disputable phrases

The Commissioners would be themselves the last to deny that there is room for criticism of some among the multifarious proposals that they put forward. For example, their scheme depends upon the bulwarks standing against the pressure to which they will be subjected They desire a franchise which will at least treble the present electorates in the hope that these enlarged electorates will exercise greater restraint upon an oligarchy (p 94 of volume ii) of Ministers and legislative bodies than the present smaller electorates have been able to do They may, or they may not Certainly the example of Burma, where elementary literacy is much more widely developed than in India, and the electorates are even now larger than the Commissioners project for Indian provinces, cannot be called encouraging. Indeed, it is the reverse The Commissioners also advocate that the provincial legislative councils should be much enlarged, and they propose further the abolition of what is called the official *bloc*. The enlargement of the councils is intended to follow naturally from the extension of the franchise, but the abolition of the official *bloc* is recommended for other reasons.

The case for this drastic elimination of official influence from the councils is based on the argument that the presence of the small band of officials militates against the growth of the sense

of responsibility in these legislative bodies. This is the pos taken by all those who desire to defend provincial councils an indictment of irresponsibility. When the opinion is expr that provincial legislative councils have on the whole not too unreasonable, and the fact that certain Bills have been pa and supplies voted is adduced in their favour, it would cert be worth investigation of the division lists in order to disc how many of the measures passed would have been rejected had not been for the voting power and the influence of the off members. Indeed, it would be necessary to go even further examine what motions before these councils would have l respectively passed or rejected if the decision had been tha Hindu elected members only, for in the majority of council there had been no official *bloc*, the Hindu vote would have l greater than the aggregate vote of the various minorities wl find a place on these bodies It is to be observed that in provinces the system of government broke down, it is also to observed that the National Congress, which at all events has displayed much sense of responsibility for a great many ve past, has throughout been entirely free from all Governm influence within that body To my judgment at least, this s proposed by the Commissioners is a leap in the dark For i at least equally possible that those reasonable Indians who h supported reasonable measures were inspired to hold out agai the opposition by the example and support of the Governm members and of their European non-official colleagues I Commissioners have partially recognised this danger by th proposal to permit of the influence of a limited number of offic who can be heard on the merits of those subjects of which th possess special administrative or expert knowledge but with any right to vote This half-way house is absolutely essential if t abolition of official members on the legislatures should be accept

The Commission further proposes that a Governor m appoint one or two official Ministers (or even non-official Indian or British, who would not be drawn from the legislati council Such a Minister would be in charge of a portfolio a would have equal rights with other Ministers as a member the Governor's Cabinet This is a very valuable safegua which is sure to be resisted by the politicians Lord Burnhan view that these official Ministers should be made compulsory l statute has much to commend it, for there would be a risk that Governor might be tempted to dispense with such Ministers their appointment was purely optional and was bitterly oppos by the intelligentsia. It is absolutely essential that the Governor Cabinet should contain one or two Ministers whose tenure is n at the mercy of an irresponsible Press.

The Commissioners argue at length the propriety of transferring law and order (with the departments which that term covers) to the responsibility of the councils. They do not minimise the risks attaching to the course which they commend. They hope that the conferral of this power will so increase the sense of responsibility among Ministers and legislators that the evils which many predict from such a step will not occur. In this they are sanguine There is real danger that the cause of justice may be tampered with for political, communal, and, I am afraid, sometimes mercenary reasons. It is well known that the onset of these tendencies is in its nature insidious, and may go a long way before it is clearly manifested Disintegration in the loyalty and honesty of a police force or a magistracy may proceed very stealthily before the breaking point is reached The individual occurrences which induce to it may not be susceptible of proof, and may singly not be very important, but their cumulative effect may be great, and even devastating The check of an enlightened public opinion, so powerful in our own country to resist any such tendencies, is wholly lacking in India. The progress in restraining corruption has come, not from the pressure of public opinion in India, but from the application to Indian conditions of the standards which the Government and its higher services have brought with them from England This is one of the reasons which must have influenced the Commission in the insistence that they place upon the preservation of a British element in the services But, even with all the safeguards for the services which are recommended, there is no certainty that British recruits will be forthcoming, while, on the other hand, under the proposed Constitution, the influence that the services can bring to bear on the conduct of public affairs must obviously be much weaker in comparison with the past. The public servant had the assurance of support from the Government if he did his duty manfully That assurance is even now much reduced, and in the future there may be no such assurance at all. A right of retiring on proportionate pension is not complete compensation for the loss of a secure career, and it at best offers only a very negative attraction to induce high-class recruits to enter the services Nevertheless, the Commission deserves the gratitude of the services both for the generous tribute that it pays to their labours in the cause of India and for the recommendations that it makes in the hope of preserving them. This recommendation is in marked contrast to the defeatist proposal of at least one provincial Government that the security services must be provincialised for the gratification of provincial Ministers.

The Commissioners attach supreme importance to the extraordinary powers proposed for the provincial Governors and the

Governor-General. The necessity for such powers is admitted, even by politicians, in the abstract, but their u the concrete is a very different matter. The strain upon Governor and the Governor-General to decide when the tim come to use these powers is bound to be very great. Eve the last few years there have been instances when they sh have, but have not, been used No instruments of instruct can be drawn up which do not somewhere conflict with another, and wherever the observance of one instruction seem involve the neglect of another the Governor, being a hu being, will be tempted to follow the line of least resistance. decision one way may raise a storm of clamour, a decision other may sacrifice an interest which is unable to make its pro heard. It is obvious, therefore, that the selection of men Governorships will be more difficult in the future than it been in the past Will the right men be forthcoming, and they be selected ?

The Commission's scheme for a 'Federal Assembly' replace the present Legislative Assembly gives effect to a v important principle—namely, that the members of the n Assembly should be delegates to represent the provinces, and the representatives of constituencies too large and too ignor to establish any real connexion between the member and constituency Thus Bengal and Madras may have an inher right to governing Bengalis and Madrasis, but such right cann possibly extend to other parts of India Only British rule ma it possible to combine these countries and races under one Gover ment, and only British rule can keep them combined T fact that British authority has been exercised over sever different peoples does not give these peoples any inherent rig whatsoever to exercise authority over each other All the rig that they do possess is to see that in matters which pertain the Central Power the interests of their own particular race a not subordinated to the interests of others This necessity met by the system of delegation which the Commission propose

The Simon Commission's scheme of progress represents series of hopes based upon a true statement of facts, many which tend to make the realisation of these hopes *primâ facie* ver remote It is a bold and brave attempt to keep India united an secure without repudiating the rash announcement made by M Montagu That announcement was made without any pre liminary survey of the conditions If the Simon Commission ha made their survey in 1917, and Mr Montagu had deferred an announcement until the results of such a survey were in hi hands, then the history of Indian reforms would have bee written differently.

And what comes after?

Each day the situation becomes more fraught with peril. For the last three years the policy followed in India has been to placate, if it were possible, a Hindu Congress which is set upon bringing British rule to an end, and each attempt to conciliate and placate has merely served to increase both the demands themselves and the insolent vehemence with which they are pressed. The great error has been to mistake a conspiracy led by Brahmins for a true national demand, and this mistake is being repeated every day. How is it possible to secure by conciliation the surrender of enemies who are flushed with success, and who believe that victory is within their grasp? The Constitution proposed by the Commission, or any other form of Constitution which can be devised to meet the facts, can only be workable if legislative bodies include a substantial majority—to use Mr. Baldwin's favourite expression—of 'men of goodwill.' If this had been secured in the past, then even dyarchy would have proved a success. But if, under the new Constitution, the 'men of goodwill' cannot find seats upon the Legislature, neither this nor any other Constitution can succeed. The 'Round Table Conference' has now taken the place of the Simon Report in Indian political eyes. Sir John Simon's letter to the Prime Minister was intended to provide for a consultation between representatives of Great Britain, British India, and the Indian princes as to the best method by which the Indian States could be fitted into a Constitution for Greater India, and it was suggested because the Commission's original terms of reference had not directly extended to the problem of the Indian princes. This plain objective, contemplated by Sir John Simon, has become so broadened that it has developed into a conference at which Indian politicians of all shades expect to make their demands, and expect the British Parliament to accept and give effect to them. If the Congress condescends to attend the Round Table Conference at all, the demand it must make will be for immediate full self-government similar to that existing in Canada or Australia, with a short period of grace by the end of which the British troops will be withdrawn. This is indeed the demand, if slightly disguised, which is put forward by the so-called Liberals, whose only claim to the title of 'moderate' is that, while they give lip disapproval of the civil disobedience campaign, they protest vigorously against any steps taken by the Government to defeat it.

The Government of India would appear to be bracing itself to treat the Simon Report as an interesting exhibit in the case, which shows the inability even of the men who composed the Commission to understand the situation. Yet it is these men alone who have had the unique opportunity of an intensive

examination of the problem without the influence of long y of Indian administration. Such action, if persisted in by Government of India, is bound to lead to a crisis. Under atmosphere which has been produced by the continuous polic surrender before the ambitions of a tiny minority, supportec a venomous Press, defeatism is spreading among million: Indians otherwise prepared to be loyal, among European b ness men, who are so shortsighted as to prefer temporary r from boycott pressure, even at the cost of surrender, and at risk of future extinction, and, finally, among many stout-hear Government servants who fear that the slide down the slope gone so far, and has become so rapid, that no Government wh they can find in sight will be strong enough to stay it

The goodwill necessary for the working of the Simon sche or any other scheme with the same objective, can only be secu if the men of evil will are defeated and discredited It is imp sible to rally loyal friends unless they can feel absolutely su that they will not be abandoned to the tender mercy of t extremists

The world is watching with intense interest the course of t crisis, and the whole of the British Empire is deeply concerned the decision that will have to be made There is imminent dang lest the British Government should be tempted to buy by su render a temporary relief which can only put off the ultima crisis by a very short period The interests at stake are not tl grandeur of the British Empire alone but the peace and happine of many millions of men

REGINALD CRADDOCK

THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE

No special exertion is needed to discover the origin of the idea which led to the United States of Europe It stares us in the face. The very name under which it is discussed shows that it springs from the contemplation of the United States of America. In a sense, no doubt, the trend towards a European federation is but natural as a further stage in the evolution which gradually formed European nations by grouping together smaller units. Yet it is ' but natural ' only in the somewhat sophisticated atmosphere of historically trained minds The United States of Europe as a new, wider, and higher unity completing the historical evolution of England, France, Spain, Germany, and Italy does not appeal to us as possessing the same historically vital quality which these national evolutions themselves seem to have

There is no doubt, at all events, that the determining factor which attracted the attention of publicists and statesmen to the idea of an United States of Europe was the existence of the United States of America It may be argued that the United States of America had existed for nearly a century and a half. Yes. They existed But Europe paid no attention to them. The war here, as in everything else, made all the difference, for it was the war that brought out the dramatic contrast between the disunited States of Europe and the United States of America. In a sense, it may be said that the war was lost by Europe and won by America In a sense only The phrase is but one of those hasty journalistic sentences which are like neat travelling cases requiring much compression in the packing and much kit left out. But somehow or other the very simplicity of the contrast struck the imagination, particularly when, as a result of the insane economic and financial consequences of the war, the United States of America rapidly became the wealthiest country in the world.

It was then that people looked up their political economy manuals and discovered the classic counter-argument of the English free traders against the protectionists, who gave the United States of America as a brilliant example of prosperity through protection. According to free trade adepts the United States of America owe their prosperity to the fact that they consti-

tute the widest free trade area in the world. The lesson Europe was obvious. The Continent, it was said, is held economic thraldom by a network of customs barriers which m trade and industry as precarious as they used to be in medie nations and for the same reasons And the conclusion was less obvious. let us abolish all these frontiers, and by setting a European federation let us create a Continental unit on a j with that of the United States of America

Such are the origins of what became known as Pan-Euro The movement found a leader of unusual charm and intellect distinction in Count Coudenhove-Kalergi It was, and still one of the most potent factors for peace and intelligent mana ment of international affairs in the field, and by providing a wi yet definite background for Franco-German conversations rendered, and is still rendering, invaluable service to the cause peace.

The next step was frankly official M Briand as the Forei Secretary of the French Republic, and not merely in his priva capacity, brought together all the European first delegates at tl League Assembly in 1929 and put before them the general lin of a scheme for a European federation Since then, at the reque of the delegates concerned M Briand has drafted a memorandu which he has submitted to all the European Governments Th memorandum may briefly be summed up as follows:

> The principle of European solidarity to be recognised b all European nations,
>
> A federation of European nations to be set up,
>
> The federation to respect the national sovereignty of ever confederate State,
>
> The federation to be organised within the juridical an institutional framework of the League of Nations,
>
> The federation to leave untouched all European affairs a present under the jurisdiction of the League, but to concer itself with those which are left out.
>
> The federation to have an organisation composed of a conference (analogous to the League Assembly), a committe (corresponding to the League Council), and a secretariat.

Now, the first criticism that comes to the mind is that a paralle between the United States of America and the United States o Europe is but one of those false similarities which Pascal compare to painted windows for the sake of symmetry. Much as Cali fornia may differ from Maine, and Florida from Nebraska, the idea that the States of America and the nations of Europe are comparable entities is a most serious error. The States of America are a cross between natural environments as determined by

geography and climate on the one hand and artificial divisions cut in the map of a new country filled with uprooted immigrants. A few centuries hence California and Maine may differ in spirit as much as Portugal and Finland, but nowadays they do not. For Europe, in the relatively small territory which she occupies, is perhaps the richest creator of different cultures and ways of living that the earth has known. And it is this extraordinary wealth of human spirit and its manifestation in twenty centuries of history which is the specific quality of European life.

Just as the consciousness of our separate personality is at the root of our instinct of preservation and of our ambition, so the consciousness of a national culture and spirit is the cause of the nationalism of European nations. Security (preservation) and conquest (ambition) are national forms of life with the individual varieties of which we are fully familiar The turbulent history of Europe may be explained in this way as the outcome of the exceptional wealth of national spirits in our continent. It is in vain that economic considerations are put forward in the belief that they will ultimately deal a death-blow to national separatism Such an idea could only have sprung up in an epoch saturated with economics such as ours. But the fact is that, just as with individuals, nations put a certain number of things above economics, and in particular the things which guarantee their separate existence as nations

Hence that nationalism, despite our economists, dictates economic life and not economic life nationalism, hence the uses and the abuses of protection Viewed in this light, the comparison of economic conditions between Europe and the United States of America becomes illuminating True, the vast free trade area of the United States is an economic asset. But how is it possible? Because what is lost by one State is gained by another State within the same national allegiance When, as in recent years, cotton-spinning began to emigrate southward, New England suffered economic hardships, yet no ill feeling ensued because it all happened within the same family What if the loss of Germany had been the gain of France or Poland? The economic aspect of things must wait on the political, and no unity of European economics is possible until Europe feels herself one.

With his usual penetration M Briand has seen this point in all its importance. In his memorandum the need of solving political matters first is clearly emphasised. But what are these political matters? To enunciate them would be a hopeless task Everything is political. I have seen political battles rage in Geneva over such matters as 'white slave' traffic or Esperanto. Everything is political, because directly or indirectly everything touches that feeling of separate personality which is glorified under the

proud and vain name of sovereignty. Now the important pc is that this feeling of separate personality is as strong betw European nations as it is between European and non-Europ nations, or, in other words, there is no political basis for a Eu pean federation which does not *ipso facto* provide a basis fo world federation

This is an obvious fact The idea that a continent provide basis for union is fallacious It is, in fact, an American ic born of a hasty generalisation of the American experience It true enough for the United States of America—though, again, do not know how absurd it may appear to the Californians a New Yorkers of 2100 A D —but it breaks down even in the Nor American continent, as anyone who has spoken with Canadia and Mexicans will have realised It has but little value in Sou America, a continent of dispersion It means but little in As where the connexion between Siberia and Syria is *nil*, ev though the chain Japan-China India-Indo-China may prese a semblance of continuity to far-off eyes It means nothing Europe. We could imagine political evolutions which migl bring about a federation of Spain with some South America countries, or of England with the United States of America, or Italy with Egypt, or of Greece with Asia Minor, with less difficult than a federation uniting Sweden with Serbia and Portugal wit Norway The links that unite European nations between them selves are at most as strong as, and often less strong than, thos which unite any of them with non-European nations such as th United States, the Argentine Republic or Japan

Furthermore, the best machinery for furthering European an world union is already in existence The League with its Cour and Labour Office, has many advantages over the Europea federation which M Briand advocates The first advantage that the League exists and has behind it ten years of experienc and considerable success The second advantage is that th League brings to bear on European matters the co-operation o non-European nations This is a most invaluable asset both o the theoretical or moral and on the practical or political plane It is right that the principle of world unity should be emphasise by handing over European affairs to bodies in which all the worl is represented, and the League thus remains above the reproach o provincialism which a strictly European body might call fort and would probably deserve Then experience has shown tha non-European co-operation brings in a soothing element b providing a certain number of judicial detached members for th committees concerned On the ground of procedure, therefore there seems to be no advantage in the new plan.

It is doubtful, moreover, whether more machinery should b

created while full use is not made of the available institutions. It is obvious that the Council, the Assembly, and the Secretariat are not working at full efficiency. This is truer still of the Court. Either these institutions are held up by difficulties or they are not. For instance, the Balkans, the Italo-Serbian difficulties, the Franco-Italian difficulties, are allowed to drift. Numerous conflicts of a judicial nature are held up on their way to the Court Does anyone believe that a strictly European organisation would do more? The number of Assembly resolutions shelved without results, of conventions unratified, is already large. Is it wise to add to the list of international organisations while those already in existence are not used to the best advantage owing to passive resistance, remissness, suspicion, and even active opposition, on the part of most if not of all nations?

There is another danger We are asked to contemplate a simultaneous working of the world League and of the European federation. Some meetings would be world meetings, others would be meetings of Europeans only This would presumably apply to the Assembly (which would shed some of its members to become the European Conference), to the Council (which, shorn of its Asiatics and South Americans, would become a European Committee), to the Commissions (which would be equally operated upon to become Europeanised), possibly to the Secretariat. No one with any experience of Geneva should doubt of the disastrous effects of such a scheme on the feeling of world solidarity which it is so important to foster in our day The loss in world solidarity would be infinitely greater than the gain in European solidarity by such a procedure Every method tending to set up a barrier where no barrier was in existence before should be considered as in direct opposition to the best interests of the world.

But it may be argued that there are a number of European problems unsolved, and that until we solve them even our present world League must mark time We have therefore to examine whether it is a fact that there are such things as European problems. Bearing in mind that such things as minorities and other after-effects of the peace treaties, such as the administration of the Saar territory and of Dantzig, are explicitly League affairs, it would seem quite safe to say that there are no European problems whatsoever—none, at any rate, that really matter. For Europe comprises four world Powers, and there are no important European questions which do not affect at least one of them. Every time a world Power is involved in a problem the problem becomes *ipso facto* a world problem. This is particularly clear in the case of England. Every important European question touches English interests and thereby becomes a world

question. That is why, by the way, the plans for a United St of Europe without England may be described as what is know Spain as 'a hare pie without hare.' But the moment Engl is involved in a problem the United States and Japan are boun be concerned in it. It is difficult to see, therefore, how a Europ federation could tackle any serious question with any degree efficiency in the absence of the United States of America, of Jap and presumably of England.

There remains the problem of security. In a review o world subject from a world point of view—such as the pres lines should be—candour and plain speaking have a first claim the author. I may perhaps be forgiven for dissenting, as I about to do, from the views often aired in this country on t problem of security and sanctions. M Briand's scheme has be coldly received in many quarters as yet another attempt organise sanctions and to surround the European *status quo* wi a fortified line of treaties and covenants The argument of Briand's English critics rests on the assumption that such a schem would be effective, for neither the European *status quo* nor t idea of sanctions enjoys much favour in British public opinio But the matter must be discussed a little more closely

Let us first examine the vexed question of the *status qu* Can the race which invented the marvellous notion of fair pl forget that the European *status quo* was the outcome of a treat in which the *status quos* of the other four parts of the world we defined ? Surely not. Then why all these attacks on the Frenc and Polish gains in Europe while Great Britain digests in pea her gains in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific ? But let that pass fo the present, and let us grant for a while that the Europea *status quo* alone must go How is it to go ? By war ? Obviousl a suicidal policy for Great Britain as well as for Europe The why object to a system which aims at guaranteeing that peacefu methods only are to be used in political changes ? The charg that the French insistence on sanctions seeks to perpetuate th *status quo* may be true, but the fact that the system of sanction itself would perpetuate the *status quo* is not substantiated A determined Great Britain could do much, and in co-operatior with a determined America she could do all, to ensure that the application of the system of sanctions would

(*a*) Remove all war from the sphere of practical politics ;

(*b*) Permit a revision of the *status quo* on statesmanlike lines with the co-operation of that great statesman, Time.

But the universal nature of the problem must be recognised first. There is no European *status quo*. There is only a world *status quo* which can only be dealt with in a world way, and so this problem, which is one of the aspects of the problem of

security, cannot be solved on a strictly European basis—certainly not without England, almost certainly not without America.

As for the problem of sanctions itself, it will never be properly understood unless it be treated on its own merits and irrespectively of the aims and intentions of the nations that argue it. It is often discussed by the French on its military side. Will sanctions be effective? Let us have a general staff, plans of campaign, machinery. This attitude is merely provincial. It is the result of that Rhine obsession which the French suffer, not unnaturally perhaps, but which seriously impairs their fine universal quality of mind. In England, on the other hand, the problem is often argued politically 'This country will never fight for . . . this, or against . . that' That empirical argument is often used in a way which might lead significant observers to doubt of the sincerity wherewith this country signed and ratified the Covenant. The problem of sanctions should never be discussed in either of these short-sighted ways It is predominantly a moral and a psychological problem

From the psychological point of view the key to the problem lies in this fact—that while institutions may be effective in preventing war, they are almost certain to fail in stopping it once it has begun Therefore the English who argue 'this country will never fight for this, or against that' place themselves on the same wrong plane on which the French stand with their military obsession The true problem of sanctions arises in the pre-war stage. It is only by a very clear and determined decision to fight if necessary in certain precise and determined circumstances that the world can hope never to see those precise and determined circumstances arise The problem for England is that, whatever she may wish, she will not be able to stand out of any first-rate war in Europe, and therefore better for her to take the risk of promising war on her terms to ensure peace than of running into war by refusing to ensure the peace on her terms There is no life without risks, and the anti-sanction school in this country seem to the neutral eye to have taken the riskier risk of the two.

But the problem is also moral The Covenant rests on the idea of world solidarity, and the condemnation of the world aggressor is the natural outcome of such recognition There is no choice between the recognition of a world law to apply to all and the claim of the national law to remain supreme arbiter. The proud and uncompromising attitude of the United States on the plane of unrestricted national sovereignty—a proud and uncompromising attitude which even the Kellogg Pact has not abated in the least—followed by the less clear but not very much more satisfactory attitude of Great Britain in her shrinking away

from the system of sanctions towards the system of unrestrict British sovereignty, has had deplorable moral effects in t public opinion of the world during the last ten years. Thus, f instance, though it would be grossly unfair to attribute to eith Washington or London any political responsibility in the Franc Italian difficulties, there is not the shadow of a doubt that Washington had remained faithful to the Wilson ideal and Lond faithful to the Cecil ideal not even Signor Mussolini himself wou have dared speak as he did in Florence and Milan, with, by t way, the mildest possible objection on the part of the Briti Press

In the circumstances it seems difficult to object to M Brianc efforts—assuming that they are inspired in the security-compl of France, which is the truth, but not the whole truth—partic larly at the moment when Great Britain turns down the Chann Tunnel for reasons which ultimately and in the absence of ar better arguments must be assumed to rest on an equal securit complex This clears the ground from the objection against th scheme usually put forward in England It is as well that should be so for the idea of a European federation can then b discussed on its own merits Its shortcomings and the misguide analogies which stand at its basis have already been discussed i the preceding pages It remains to be said however, that, from the moral point of view the fact that a great nation should pu forward such a bold departure in international politics from a official platform is in itself an impressive sign of the times, and on which is bound to react favourably on that general evolutio towards the political manifestation of world unity in adequat institutions which has been progressing before our eyes, thoug with differing fortunes since the Peace Conference

SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA

THE BRITISH EMPIRE AS AN ECONOMIC FAMILY

II

THE question of industrial co-operation in the Empire has received much greater consideration owing to its closer relation to the tariff problem, and it will be enough to refer very briefly here to this part of the subject Apart from tariffs, something is already being done, and much more might well be done, by the interchange of ideas between manufacturers in different parts of the Empire There would seem to be scope for far-reaching agreements regarding the specialisation of particular forms of industrial production as well as for the standardisation of measures and methods, already mentioned as one of the purposes of the British Engineering Standards Association The old habit of British manufacturers of regarding the Empire as merely the natural market for their industrial products, to be paid for by the Dominions and Colonies by the export of raw materials and foodstuffs, is one which dies hard But it is an idea which has now been really given up by all the enlightened leaders of British industry, and once it is recognised in the Dominions that Great Britain is anxious as a member of the Imperial Economic Family to see industrial production flourish in the territories of its fellow-members, the opportunities for fruitful co-operation are immense In matters of agricultural production progress has already been made in studying the special aptitudes of particular parts of the Empire for the production of specialised crops The avoidance of over-production and cut-throat competition, particularly in tropical products, is essentially a matter for Imperial economic co-operation The industrialist might learn much from what is being attempted in the province of agriculture

Space will not permit of more than a short reference to other forms of economic co-operation, in the field of transport, aviation, migration, social services, medical services, education The British Empire would seem to offer an ideal vantage ground for the use of the film for visual education and for spreading among the backward races of the Empire, more intelligently than has

yet been done by the efforts to impart literary education, as [illegible] *as more effectively, the teachings of twentieth-century biolo*[illegible] *psychology, hygiene and medicine. Soviet Russia has made* [illegible] *use for her own propagandist purposes of the possibilities of film.* If the British Empire is to have as the basis of its free associatio[n] something of that common background of ideas and ideals fo[r] which, in relation to the Dominions, reliance has been place[d] mainly on the racial and cultural affiliations of the white English speaking peoples, it must pay special attention to the use of th[e] film and broadcasting

The creation a year ago of Imperial and International Com munications, Limited, represented a first attempt to establish [a] great Imperial public utility company whose purpose should b[e] to provide the Empire with the greatest possible facilities fo[r] communication by cables and wireless at the least possible cos[t] consistent with the maintenance of strategic cables. Th[e] company owed its being to the recommendation of a specia[l] Imperial Conference which sat during 1928 The instigation t[o] study the subject from an Imperial standpoint came in particula[r] from Canada and Australia, who were not content to see th[e] Pacific cable, in which considerable sums belonging to th[e] taxpayers of Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealan[d] were invested put out of business by the competition of wireles[s] services run by the British Post Office Imperial and Inter national Communications, Limited, is subject to a considerabl[e] measure of Governmental control Its dividend is limited, an[d] it has undertaken serious obligations of a strategic character It is supervised as regards its policy and rates generally by an Imperial committee, the Communications Advisory Committee, consisting of representatives appointed by the Governments of Great Britain and each of the Dominions, together with one representative of the Colonial Empire This great Imperial public utility company now controls practically all the external telegraphic services of the Empire The company is only at the beginning of its difficult and complicated task, and has many obstacles to surmount Still, given wholehearted co-operation with the Governments of the Empire, the company should be in a position to render signal services to the commerce and trade of the Empire and to the knitting together of friendly intra-Imperial relations It is a corporation of a rather special type, combining private capital and initiative and commercial management with a large measure of Governmental control, exercised, be it noted, not by one Government of the Empire on behalf of all the others, but by all the Governments of the Empire, and some features of its set-up may well prove a model for the organisation of other Imperial services.

A word must be said on the subject of Imperial financial co-operation. As already pointed out, the Empire is on balance still an exporter of capital, in spite of the fact that the development of its Imperial heritage calls for new capital investment far in excess of the available supply. Throughout their history, and in particular since the passing of the Colonial Stock Act in 1900, the Dominions and the Colonies have been able to obtain funds in London on specially favourable terms, a form of preference to which full value is not always given either in the Dominions or in this country by the more exuberant advocates of preferential tariffs. But there would seem to be room for greater financial co-operation than at present exists Finance, like shipping, is far more prone to take an international than an Imperial view of its functions and opportunities, and there is little, if any, conscious effort or organised machinery for directing the available capital of the Empire into those channels of Imperial investment which are most likely to contribute the maximum benefit to the Empire as a whole Recent events in Australia have emphasised the foresight of Mr Bruce in setting up an inter-State body to advise on projects for capital development put forward by the various States of the Commonwealth, and likely, if not wisely supervised, to lead not only to the overstraining of the borrowing powers of Australia, but also to preference being given to projects less attractive and less immediately urgent than others which were being squeezed out Is it out of the question to establish some Imperial machinery of an advisory character capable of doing for the Empire services similar to those which the Australian body is doing for the Commonwealth ?

An attempt has been made thus far to paint with a broad brush a picture of what is being done to promote Imperial economic co-operation, and of the machinery which is in existence for the purpose. Before considering what more could be done, and in particular what the next Imperial Economic Conference should aim at doing, it is necessary to examine shortly the questions. Why is it being done ? Why is Imperial economic co-operation thought desirable ? What is, or should be, the relation of the British Imperial Economic Family to other great economic groups in the world ? These questions call for clear thinking and an honest answer. There are honest doubts and hesitations in the minds of some of those whose willing assent and active help is needed in the cause of Imperial economic co-operation. Friends of the League of Nations sometimes fear that work for Imperial unity may prove incompatible with work for international peace. These fears are fostered by the glib application of militaristic terms and metaphors to economics,

and by that sixteenth-century political mentality which, defiance of twentieth-century science, persists in regarding and aggression as the natural aim and object of a nation or organised group of nations. Propaganda for Empire free tr too often suggests that what is desired is a self-sufficing Imper economic unit, aggressively exclusive, enclosed within prohibiti tariff walls. Exuberant publicists in all languages picture future with the United States of Europe, the British Imper Economic Unit, the United States of America, Russia, and t Far Eastern group confronting each other in a merciless econom struggle leading inevitably to new wars. Typical is a rece book by an American entitled *America Conquers Britain*. I conclusion, at the end of 400 pages, is summed up in the followi sentences:

> No one knowing the facts can say honestly that the British a American economic empires are not belligerent rivals. . . . No o knowing the facts can say that hands across the sea speeches on nav disarmament truces have removed the danger of armed war whi historically has resulted from such economic war. . . . Either t supremacy of America will be recognised by Britain in peace, or th supremacy will be asserted in battles of blood. . . . British policy to-d —whether commercial, naval, or political—is conditioned by one inexorat fact. She is an overpopulated dependent, exposed island. . . . As a maj world power her days are numbered . . . . What chance has Brita against America? Or what chance has the world?

It would be a great mistake to pay serious attention to suc apocalyptic outpourings, or to be misled into accepting for moment such a challenge to a fight to the finish. It is equall idle to pretend that desire for economic defence is not an importar factor in promoting the ideal of Imperial economic co-operatio Modern science and modern machinery demand a wider spher of action than can any longer be provided within the narro limits of the British Isles. The time has indeed gone by whe Great Britain by herself can maintain, not merely her pr ponderating commercial and industrial position in the world, bu any reasonable economic life for her people. In the period c industrial depression through which we have been passing it is great tonic to be reminded of our remarkable achievement i maintaining against heavy odds a standard of life for our worker far in excess of that offered to their fellows in any part of Europ That this has been done on the basis of high labour costs i evidence of an extraordinary level of general efficiency whic belies the lugubrious jeremiads to which we have been made t listen both at home and abroad. But we cannot maintain th position indefinitely unless we organise our economic life as member of some much larger economic group. If it is right t

stigmatise as aggressive the belief that there are British standards, British traditions, and a British way of life which have made, and are capable still of making, a big contribution to the welfare and happiness of humanity and are worth preserving and defending, then the conception of a British Empire Economic Family is open to objection. But there is nothing aggressive in such a belief. The internationalist should never forget that the better is the enemy of the good The approach to a rational organisation of the world is through the diversity in unity of a number of economic families, each contributing a certain individuality of culture. The time for a single world economic unit has not yet arrived, if it ever can arrive The world needs an organised British Empire Economic Family and an organised European Economic Family to take their place alongside of the great economic unit of the United States A single economic group as strong and as young and as vital as the United States cannot but threaten danger to the world and to itself if it has no counterparts and makeweights to preserve some sort of economic equilibrium However just and idealistic, the United States cannot concentrate in themselves and preserve for future generations all that the spirit of man has inherited from the past. The right way to meet such utterances as those just quoted is to prove that the British Empire is more than a dependent European island, and that by organising itself as an economic family it is ready to take its place alongside the United States of America and the United States of Europe and other large-scale economic groupings as a potent instrument in developing a rationally ordered world of peacefully associated harmoniously collaborating States Only so can modern science, with its ever-increasing control over the secrets of Nature, fully serve mankind and open up to the whole of humanity opportunities of material well-being and higher standards of attainment and aspiration compared with which the material achievements of the United States of to-day will seem but faint harbingers of the dawn.

There is little need to counter the objection that Britain, being geographically a part of Europe, ought to throw in her lot with the European Economic Family Some good Europeans have for centuries deplored the equivocal position of England in relation to Europe But her aloofness is a geographic and historical fact. Nor would her admission to a European Economic Family help Europe Britain is Europe's most important market, and her adhesion would make the European group impossibly lopsided. Even without Britain Europe has an undue proportion of industrial capacity and an insufficient supply of raw materials and foodstuffs. Britain's membership of the British Empire Economic Family will not prevent her from

continuing to render the services she has rendered to Europe as the financial centre of the world and the exchange market between Europe and the United States.

A further source of hesitation as to the desirability of an organised Imperial Economic Family is to be found within the family circle. The 'little Englander' is not quite extinct in this country. Voices may still be heard stigmatising the 'All Red Route' as the 'All Red Rot' and complaining that the taxpayer of this country is to be bled white for the benefit of the Dominions and the Colonies. In India, which has more to gain from and more to contribute to an organised economic Empire group than any other single member, the politically minded are too much occupied with questions of constitutional status to be able to regard the idea of economic co-operation with the rest of the Empire in reasonable perspective In some at least of the Dominions there are uneasy suspicions that the enthusiasm in Great Britain for economic co-operation with the rest of the Empire may conceal or connote an attempt to put economic limitations on their political autonomy The reply to this class of objection is that the approach to the economic organisation of the Empire can only be along the line of free association and willing co-operation, that any attempt at domination in the economic sphere is as fatal to the Empire as an attempt to reintroduce political dictation For many years to come Great Britain can and should remain the intellectual centre of the Empire, and in that capacity as well as in others she is entitled, and indeed is called upon, to give the lead to the rest of the Empire, above all in the spirit of service which has grown with and justified the growth of the British Empire But Britain cannot and dare not approach the problem of Imperial economic co-operation in a selfish mood which asks continually what she is going to get out of it If she gives the right lead, the Empire will respond in the same spirit, seeing the vision of the greatest good of the whole in the active co-operation of each part For the rest, the discovery of the right machinery for economic co-operation and how best to bring it into being is perhaps the crucial problem on which more than any other depends the readiness of the Empire to accept the ideal of an Imperial Economic Family and work for its early translation into fact. It remains then to consider this question—how to improve and extend the machinery and technique of economic co-operation, together with the question what more can be done than is being done, and what the next Imperial Economic Conference should aim at doing.

Perhaps the most important contribution that the coming Imperial Conference could make to the promotion of Imperial

economic co-operation would come from a study of the constitutional machinery of such co-operation. As already pointed out, this question of machinery has been much neglected, and the terms of reference of such bodies as the Imperial Economic Committee and the Imperial Shipping Committee are restricted. The Imperial War Graves Commission, on the other hand, has proved the possibility of going much further, and its development indicates that it is not out of the question to aim at the establishment of an Imperial Economic Council, appointed and in some degree financially supported on a free and equal basis by all the Empire Governments. To this Council would be affiliated all existing intra-Imperial bodies, such as the Executive Council of the Imperial Agricultural Bureaux and the various Imperial committees, and it would be the focus for new bodies hereafter created. Its function would be to deliberate and advise upon all economic questions which do not raise major political issues. The creation of such a Council would imply a permanent staff under the control of an authoritative body meeting at not too infrequent intervals. There seems to be no alternative to London for the headquarters of the permanent staff, but it should be possible to arrange for the Council to choose some other venue than London for occasional meetings. The permanent staff should include officers from overseas, and travel throughout the Empire by members of the staff in the prosecution of its investigations should be an important feature of their duties. The Council and its staff should take care not to get an unduly administrative bias. Whitehall's preoccupation with administrative problems tends to affect the atmosphere of Imperial Conference meetings in London. Administrative problems loom still larger when Ministers return to their own capitals. Minor common problems of administration are followed up with considerable energy by the various Governments concerned, but the larger questions of Imperial economic co-operation are apt to be withdrawn into obscurity, only to be dragged out again when the next Conference comes round. The Empire might well take a lesson from the experience and methods of Geneva. The opportunity offered by the annual meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva suggests, moreover, a means whereby at least one meeting a year of the proposed Imperial Economic Council could be secured without undue demands upon the Governments of the more distant parts of the Empire. Every autumn Ministers and other influential representatives of the Dominion Governments, among whom a considerable number are well versed in practical problems of commerce, industry and finance, meet at Geneva. Practically all of them visit London on their way to or from Geneva. There should be little difficulty

in arranging for an annual meeting of the Imperial Economic Council in London about the same time of each year.

Whether the coming Conference succeeds in achieving the establishment of such a Council or not, nothing should be done to hinder its ultimate realisation, and all possible steps should be taken to advance its coming. It is in any case of the first importance that the Home Government should invite special attention at that Conference to the whole question of the machinery of Imperial economic co-operation. With this end in view the remarkable growth of scientific co-operation within the Empire should be emphasised at the Conference, and the need for a corresponding development in other fields made clear. Existing achievements in true economic co-operation should be stressed and particular openings for extending that co-operation carefully fostered. Nothing but good can come of the exploration by the Conference both of the machinery and of the practical possibilities of economic co-operation

A full survey of the immense field outside all tariff questions which is waiting to be cultivated by the free co-operation of the Empire countries cannot be made here To a certain extent the ground has already been opened up in the first part of this article.[1] Some of the main heads may, however, be mentioned as examples.

(*a*) Rationalisation of Industry.

Rationalisation in Great Britain is the first essential need If this is being actively attempted, and given a desire to co-operate and some common machinery for the scientific investigation of economic problems, there appears to be every prospect of gradually securing a more rational distribution of manufacturing industry within the Empire Some tariffs, owing to difficulties of classification or to their general application, cause dislocation and expense out of all proportion to their value for revenue or protective purposes Representative bodies of manufacturers in the industries concerned, meeting in different parts of the Empire, would surely produce results of mutual benefit Their success would be certain if the Governments of the Empire were simultaneously studying the same problems in a spirit of co-operation.

(*b*) Standardisation

Progress must necessarily be slow in taking full advantage of the opportunities within the Empire for standardisation in engineering and industry Intense study and detailed documentation are needed.

(*c*) Statistics.

Imperial Conferences in the past have drawn attention to the

[1] *Nineteenth Century and After*, July 1930.

need for greater uniformity in Empire statistics. Improvements have been effected, but fundamental differences still exist, and statistical information for the Empire as a whole is not readily obtainable, and where available is rarely analysed. Economic development and rationalisation, whether in agriculture or industry, depend largely on the supply of correct and comparable data. At present Imperial statistics are designed mainly to serve the varying needs of the local administrations. The emphasis laid on problems of administration in the atmosphere of Whitehall has very markedly influenced the treatment of the question of Imperial statistics, and the contrast with Geneva is here particularly noticeable. Rearrangement of the existing data necessarily collected would assist comparability and compilation of statistics on an Empire basis The development of Imperial statistics should do much to promote knowledge of Empire production, possibilities, conditions and progress.

(*d*) Agricultural Intelligence

Co-operation between Empire countries in scientific agricultural research is, as has been shown, developing rapidly. The machinery for co-operation invented for the Imperial Agricultural Research Bureaux suggests methods of improving the machinery of other forms of economic co-operation. Organisations have been formed to facilitate the interchange on an Empire basis of information on agricultural research and so lead to joint attack on common problems The Empire Marketing Board is directly stimulating co-operative agricultural research. But, apart from research, there is scope for further common effort in the collection and supply of information on problems connected with marketing—both general intelligence regarding sowings or crops coming to market in Empire and competing countries and information regarding grading, standardisation, and statutory regulations affecting imports and exports, etc.

(*e*) Communications

The formation of the Imperial Shipping Committee and of Imperial and International Communications, Limited, offers evidence of the recognition by the Empire of the need for associating its various parts in matters affecting communications. The working of these bodies and their potentialities should be fully studied by the Conference, since the need for co-operation is increasing rather than decreasing Problems connected with the development of air communications and of broadcasting within the Empire also require study.

(*f*) Social Services.

The successful results of co-operation in agricultural research suggest that great advantages would flow from closer contact between the public health services and medical research workers

of the Empire, including the tropical Governments. Only partial effect has been given to a number of resolutions put forward by the recent Imperial Educational Conference. The use of films for educational and health propaganda offers great possibilities. The human factor should never be omitted from economic study, and the Empire affords special opportunities for co-operation on subjects such as social anthropology, ethnology, human dietetics, etc., not merely or mainly from the historical or antiquarian aspect, but from the standpoint of practical application to current problems

(g) Financial Co-operation

The Conference might with advantage turn its attention to measures for economising the use of gold and developing co-operation between the central banks of the Empire Such co-operation would be of definite assistance in dealing with international monetary problems For the economic development of the Empire more knowledge about movements of capital than is at present available would be of extreme value The data for such study are very incomplete The examination should aim not merely at establishing a balance of payments, but also at estimating new savings and the extent of their application within and without the Empire

(h) Economic Relations between the Dominions and the Colonial Empire

The Conference might well turn its attention to one further aspect of Imperial economic co-operation The world is becoming increasingly dependent upon tropical products, and Dominion Governments are beginning to recognise the importance to themselves of the economic development of the Colonial Empire Some of the Dominions are already directly responsible for the administration of dependent territories, presenting human and economic problems parallel to those of the Colonial Empire of Great Britain In the island of Nauru a first tentative step has already been taken in associating Britain and two of the Dominions in the administration of a tropical dependency. If the British Empire is to become in any true sense an economic family the Dominions and India must be brought into closer relationship than at present with the Colonial Empire. The constitutional aspects of the subject are delicate and require careful exploration It would probably be found, however, that Dominion Governments would appreciate an invitation to co-operate with the United Kingdom in the economic development of the Colonial Empire and to combine in studying both the constitutional and the practical problems which such co-operation involves.

At a public dinner in celebration of Australia Day last

January Lord Passfield declared that 'the soul of the British Empire requires more social tissue, and the opportunity would come to secure at the next Imperial Conference the means of expressing that sense of full Imperial co-operation' The opportunity is indeed a great one, and if the coming Conference succeeds in interpreting and giving practical shape to the vision of an Imperial Economic Family which is already envisaged, however dimly, by popular opinion, and, refusing to let itself be bogged in controversial questions of tariffs, insists on taking a broad survey of the needs and possibilities of the economic life of the Empire, the record of its achievements will bear comparison even with the famous Conference of 1926

BASIL BLACKETT

RATIONALISATION AND THE STEEL INDUSTRY

The iron and steel industry is like the ash-tree Yggdrasil, whose roots embrace the world. Both technically and economically it is one of the most important, most far-reaching, and most complicated of all industries No one save a trained metallurgist versed in the whole range of applied physical, chemical, and engineering knowledge is capable of charting the industry's technical domain; its economic importance, scope and complexity, on the other hand, are more easily surveyed and measured. The magnitude of the industry is shown by the volume and value of its output Last year the world production of steel aggregated nearly 120,000,000 tons, that of pig iron amounted to nearly 100,000,000 tons, and the value of this colossal mass of metal cannot easily have been less than 750,000,000*l*, and may well have been 1,000,000,000*l* —the latter figure being equivalent to nearly one-quarter of Britain's national income.

Four-fifths of the world's iron and steel is produced in five countries, the remainder being accounted for by the comparatively small output of a dozen other nations The British industry ranks fourth in size amongst the giants of this family Producing itself roughly one-twelfth of the world total, it is outstripped by the industries of the United States, Germany and France (including Lorraine and the Saar), which respectively account for one-half, one-seventh, and one-tenth of the whole Nevertheless, in Britain's economy the iron and steel industry plays an important part. The net value of its output (excluding the cost of raw material) totalled roughly 60,000,000*l*. in 1924; the gross value of its output (including the cost of raw materials) cannot have been less than 100,000,000*l* in 1929 It employs directly 250,000 persons, and a further 1,500,000 are engaged in industries, such as engineering and shipbuilding, whose products are mainly composed of fabricated iron and steel. It contributes some 70,000,000*l*. to our exports, or more than any other industry except cotton. No single home in the country but depends directly on the iron and steel industry for dozens of necessities

and scores of amenities. No single industry throughout the land but finds iron and steel in some form indispensable to its activity and prosperity. Because, indeed, of the very diversity of the uses to which its products are put, the iron and steel industry is not so much a single united trade as a congeries of trades, subdivided, interlocking, mutually dependent. Because of the weight and bulk of its raw materials, the immense size of its producing units, the large capital value of its blast furnaces, melting furnaces and rolling mills, the industry is specially exposed to the adverse effects of high transport charges and heavy local rates. Indeed, the industry's very complexity and size, which expose a large surface and innumerable sensitive parts to attack from every economic quarter, while lending it strength in good times, are responsible in bad times for a large part of its difficulties As bitter experience has taught, this is notably true to-day.

That the iron and steel industry in Great Britain has suffered for a decade from almost continuous depression is by now a commonplace In the years immediately after the war the depression was world-wide, and in none of the great producing countries did the industry enjoy any degree of prosperity The destruction and disorganisation caused by the war had paralysed trade, undermined saving and the will to save, and sapped the demand for capital goods For the time being, therefore, the demand for iron and steel (which largely arises from saving and capital development) was also inadequate, whereas the industry's productive capacity and potential supply were greatly in excess of current needs Abroad the depression varied in duration. In the United States revival was accomplished and the pre-war output exceeded by 1923 In France and Belgium the war-time destruction of plant, equipment, and organisation took rather longer to repair, but by 1924 or 1925 both these countries had practically regained the level of pre-war output within their existing territories. In Germany the industry was severely hit by the territorial changes effected under the Treaty of Versailles; great, though only temporary, damage was also done by the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923; and consequently recovery was delayed until a year or two after stabilisation During the last four or five years, however, the iron and steel industry has forged rapidly ahead in the great Continental producing countries, while in the United States it has risen to heights previously undreamed of.

In Britain, on the other hand, there has been no such recovery. A state of depression, the gravity of which increases with its duration, is still manifest throughout most branches of the industry. Although the output of steel has been larger in most

years since the war, and notably since 1927, than it was in 1913, the output of pig iron has fallen much below the pre-war level. In both sections production is far less than the physical capacity of existing British plant; exports are about 15 per cent. smaller than in 1913, while imports are about 25 per cent. larger; unemployment has stood in the neighbourhood of 20 per cent. or more for seven years; prices have been most unsatisfactory; and profits and dividends have been exiguous and in many cases non-existent. It is true that not all the industry, nor all of its constituent firms, present so black a record. The student of detail can refer, for example, to the relative prosperity of 1923, when Britain harvested domestic benefits from the troubles of the Ruhr invasion. He can exhibit the tin-plate industry, which, on the whole, has done moderately well. He can show that, though eleven great concerns have paid no dividends on their ordinary capital since 1921, half a dozen companies (mainly manufacturers of specialities) have maintained their dividends with notable regularity. And, on the workers' side, overlooking the wholly exceptional events of 1926, he can point with pride to a freedom from industrial disputes which sets an example to many other industries whether prosperous or depressed. But though these and other bright spots exist, they do not succeed in lightening the picture as a whole or in materially relieving its general and oppressive gloom.

What has to be explained is this divergence in the fortunes of the industry abroad and the industry at home. The contrast is clearly seen in current production. To-day the world output of steel is 57 per cent. higher than before the war, but British production is only 26 per cent. higher. The world output of pig iron is 23 per cent. greater than in 1913, but the output of British pig iron is actually 27 per cent. less. Because of these changes Britain's share of the world total fell between 1913 and 1929 from 10.2 per cent. to 8.2 per cent. in the case of steel and from 13.2 per cent. to 7.9 per cent. in the case of pig iron. Moreover, whereas foreign producers have been able on the whole to produce at a reasonable profit—and often at a substantial one—even with prices at their current low level, British firms have succeeded in making only the smallest and most precarious of profits where, indeed, they have managed to make both ends meet at all.

The post-war depression of the British steel industry and its long-drawn-out continuance result from the combined operation of many forces. In the years immediately after the Armistice great stress was rightly laid on the world-wide impoverishment which robbed Britain of many markets. For a time also the fluctuations of the exchanges, and particularly the depreciation

of the German mark and the French and Belgian francs, aggravated Britain's difficulties by giving a form of artificial subsidy to the iron and steel industries of those countries. But these influences, adverse though they undoubtedly were, had spent their main force by 1926. Since then the causes of the troubles have lain principally in other directions

Some of these causes spring from international differences or from general economic policy. Unquestionably wages and social charges are higher in Great Britain than in most, if not all, of the other great producing countries Unquestionably also the burden of national and local taxation has checked production and swallowed up profits which would otherwise have been available for reserves or modernisation Unquestionably, again, the British iron and steel industry has suffered from a monetary policy which, whatever benefits its Spartan rigour may have brought in other fields, has greatly intensified the difficulties of British manufacturers, while where new plant was installed abroad after the war during a period of inflation, the resulting capital charges (unless largely offset by other burdens, as in Germany) compare most favourably with capital charges and debenture debt in Britain steadily and automatically increased in weight because of constantly falling prices

Many people consider that these factors suffice to account for the post-war decline of the iron and steel industry in Great Britain, and for its relative advance abroad Many also argue that these advantages make foreign competition unfair and amply warrant the complete or partial exclusion of foreign steel by means of an import duty But when the situation is coolly considered it is plain that other influences have also operated, and that the solution of the troubles of the British steel industry are not likely to be quickly and simply achieved by the facile expedient of a tariff

The truth is that the picture drawn by those content with proclaiming the comparative advantages of foreign producers is seriously defective Both at home and abroad it omits essential elements and forgets decisive causes In all the main producing countries abroad the iron and steel industry has made prodigious advances since the war For the moment the United States may be disregarded, since less than one-twentieth of its output is consumed outside its own frontiers But on the Continent—in France, in Germany, and in Belgium—the industry has been practically reconstituted from its foundations upwards. Paradoxically enough, the cause lies in the war and its aftermath; the very influences which might have been expected to harm the industry have proved in practice to be its greatest help. The destruction of the Belgian steelworks and of the French

steelworks in the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais enabled the French and Belgian ironmasters after the war to reconstruct their entire works along the most modern lines. The transfer of Alsace-Lorraine to France gave the French industry some of the finest and most up-to-date iron and steel works in Europe. The inflation, both in France and Belgium and also in Germany, enabled the ironmasters to equip their works with the latest devices at the lowest possible cost. The loss of the Lorraine works and the severance of the ties which had previously bound Luxemburg to the Ruhr gave the German industrialists of Westphalia both the motive and the occasion for enlarging and improving their own plant; and the necessities of situation after the mark had been stabilised in 1924 caused the pace of rationalisation to be maintained and even quickened

Meanwhile at home the British industry was suffering first from excessive productive capacity, and secondly from the disadvantages of the pioneer and the pauper Before the war the pig iron capacity was 11,000,000 tons and the steel capacity 8,000,000 tons To-day the pig iron capacity is estimated at 12,000,000 tons and the steel capacity at about 12,500,000 tons. But whereas in 1913 the production of pig iron was 10,250,000 tons, or 93 per cent of capacity, and the production of steel was over 7,500,000 tons, or 95 per cent of capacity, in 1929 the production of pig iron was only 7,500,000 tons, or 63 per cent. of capacity, and the production of steel only 9,650,000 tons, or 77 per cent of capacity Whether these figures may reasonably be regarded as normal to the present situation is discussed below; suffice it to note here that during most of the past decade not even this level of activity was attained Throughout all the post-war years the industry has been burdened with physical plant largely in excess of market needs, incapable of producing profitably at ruling prices, adding to costs through large overhead charges, and depressing prices through excessive competition.

At the same time that difficulties were being born of surplus capacity, other troubles arose from the existence of old-fashioned plant and practice and from the lack of funds with which to carry out the necessary modernisation. Even before the war British steelworks were often small by comparison with the great German and American plants, and there was a tendency for improvements to be made by remodelling and extending existing works rather than by scrapping them and laying down large units planned *ab initio* for mass production. Such a state of affairs was the natural consequence of pioneering; for the British industry, which was the first in the field, suffered when its rivals, taking advantage at a later date of the experience dearly bought by Britain, planned and built their works on a great scale and in

the most modern fashion. Since the war, it is true, there have been many improvements in Great Britain. Plant has been greatly expanded and the new installations are naturally of the most modern and efficient character. A number of new blast furnaces of comparatively large capacity have been built—though even these are far outstripped by the vast American furnaces, some of which are capable of producing 1000 tons of pig iron or more a day. Mechanical changing gear has now been introduced at about a quarter of the number of existing furnaces—the mechanically charged furnaces forming a higher proportion of those regularly in blast. Machine casting of pig iron is a little more common, though still very far from universal. Steel making furnaces have increased both in number and size. Coking plant is somewhat more modern. The percentage of steel made direct from molten pig iron (instead of from pig iron which has been allowed to cool and has then been reheated) is greater to-day than before the war.

All these are favourable factors; but nevertheless the British iron and steel industry is still not thoroughly modernised *on the average*. Its coking plant and organisation lag behind current practice abroad, and in this field Britain stands to-day roughly where the Continent stood before the war. Many blast furnaces are smaller than the best standard for most efficient furnaces, and although a number of new furnaces of large capacity have been built—many of them in consequence of arrangements made by the Government during the war—for the most part the efforts of the blast furnace industry have been directed towards improving the auxiliary machinery rather than towards reconstructing the furnaces themselves. In steel making practice and rolling mill practice the position is better, chiefly because of the large amount of new plant laid down during and immediately after the war; but even so, though the best British practice is probably equal to the best Continental practice, 'it is probable,' according to the Balfour Committee, 'that the average practice in this country is behind the average practice on the Continent.'[1] Again, Britain has much to learn from the Continent in the application of methods of fuel economy. And, in addition to such detailed and individual shortcomings, there is the more important fact that, taking the organisation of works as a whole, Britain lags behind. In the opinion of the Balfour Committee (and a gentler or more friendly critic than this Committee cannot be conceived), 'few British works, if any, are modern throughout in equipment and practice, with coking ovens, blast furnaces, steel furnaces, and rolling mills adjacent to one another, and making full use of waste gases. Moreover, there is not infrequently a lack of

[1] Committee on Industry and Trade. *Survey of Metal Industries*, pp. 27–8.

balance between the productive capacity at the different stages.'[8] In the face of these faults, and even allowing for the fact that local circumstances and markets may well make the best plant and the best practice in one country unsuited to another, it is not hard to see that, with the Continental industry forging rapidly ahead, the British industry, even though advancing from its pre-war position, would be bound to fall relatively behind.

It is extremely difficult to give a fair and balanced picture of any industry or to keep thoroughly abreast of all current developments. Nevertheless, there is no considerable body of evidence which contradicts the facts just stated or throws doubt on their substantial accuracy This description of the existing situation is intended to state *facts* Even were it possible to do so, it would be useless to-day to saddle individuals with responsibility. For the truth is that the situation in which the British iron and steel industry has lived for some years past and is now living results, at least *very largely, from the operation of impersonal forces.* It has taken a long time for the fact of surplus capacity to become clearly manifest At first, indeed, the trouble seemed to be, not a glut of plant, but a shortage of markets, and when the true position was disclosed by time the damage had largely been done. Again, modernisation of iron and steel works is a very costly process Those concerns whose profits provided the funds have made great improvements in their plant The others, which either lost money or just made both ends meet, perhaps by postponing payments on their prior charges, can scarcely be reproached for not installing modern equipment which they could not afford or were unable to finance Thus the circle is a vicious one excess capacity and old-fashioned plant mean cut-throat competition and small profits or none, small profits result in unpaid creditors, unpaid creditors prevent funds from being raised, lack of money blocks the modernisation of plant and the scrapping of excess capacity

Can this circle be broken, and, if so, where, and how? The answer, to use the current catchword, lies in rationalisation. Gradually, during the last couple of years, the true nature of the position and the urgency of rationalisation have been increasingly realised. A beginning has now been made What does it amount to, and what promise does it contain for the future?

8

Before examining the changes and developments of the past few years it is important to grasp clearly the nature of the essential tasks which schemes for rationalising the iron and steel industry must carry out. Since rationalisation essentially means

[8] *Op cit*, p. 27.

the elimination of waste by adjusting supply as closely as possible to demand and attaining the maximum efficiency at the minimum cost through the best technique and most appropriate organisation, it is plain that the foundations of reconstruction can only be well and truly laid upon a prior estimate of demand. Not that a wholly accurate calculation can be arrived at except by chance. The problem is too intricate, and the variables too numerous, for success to be at all certain. But sufficient accuracy is possible at least to ascertain the probable limits of demand during the next few years.

Recently published figures show that in relatively normal post-war years the amount of steel consumed at home and exported has not fallen below a minimum of 9,710,000 tons or risen above a maximum of 12,660,000 tons.[1] Whatever may happen ten or fifteen years hence, there is no clear reason for assuming that the latter figure will be substantially exceeded in the *immediate* future. In all the three years 1927 to 1929 British exports amounted to roughly 4,900,000 tons (in terms of ingots), and, contrary to the general conception, were practically 10 per cent larger than in 1913. Home consumption totalled nearly 7,800,000 tons in 1929. These totals, though small by comparison with Germany or the United States, are not unsatisfactory in the light of our own experience. Those who expect them to be outstripped during the years immediately before us will not find it easy to establish their case.

The figure of 12,660,000 tons of steel ingots consumed and exported during 1929 is sufficiently close to existing steel capacity to suggest that the position is satisfactory. Actually, of course, there is a fly in the ointment, for the total is made up of imports to the extent of 3,010,000 tons, and only the balance of 9,650,000 tons comes from British steel furnaces. And in any event, the output of pig iron—7,580,000 tons in 1929, which

[1] These are the figures for 1923 and 1929 respectively. The years 1921 and 1926 have been excluded because of protracted coal stoppages, 1922 because the industry was then recovering from the severe post-war slump, and 1927 because the total was swollen by abnormally large imports made in consequence of contracts entered into during 1926. All the statistics of steel given in this paragraph are in terms of ingots, i.e., allowance has been made for the shrinkage of weight between the ingot stage and semi-manufactured and finished steel. Retained imports are a net figure, i.e., re-exports have been deducted from total imports. The exact description of what is termed home consumption in the text is 'ingot equivalent of steel available for consumption in the United Kingdom.' This includes additions to stocks in certain years and excludes reductions of stocks in other years; it has been assumed that these cancel out. For the figures see M. S. Birkett, *The Iron and Steel Industry since the War*, Table VI. (a paper read before the Royal Statistical Society on March 18, 1930, and shortly to appear in the Society's *Journal*), and the Committee on Industry and Trade, *Survey of the Metal Industries*, 1928, p. 40.

was the best post-war year since 1920—employed less than two-thirds of existing blast furnace capacity.

The pig iron problem has peculiar features which cannot be discussed here.[4] But many industrialists and other authorities argue that the difficulties of the steel industry would be solved and full capacity worked if only the 3,000,000 tons of imported ingots were excluded from our shores and the same tonnage produced at British works This proposal raises at once a horde of issues which are highly controversial whatever one's fiscal opinions. Suffice it to say that the policy of increasing British output and employing British plants by erecting a tariff against foreign steel depends for its success—and, indeed, even for the arithmetical accuracy of its argument—upon the assumption that the exclusion of foreign steel from Britain will not increase the competition of foreign producers elsewhere in the export market, and will therefore have no effect on British exports of British steel. If this assumption should prove incorrect, if shutting the door against the entry of foreign steel into Britain also meant shutting the door against an equivalent tonnage of British exports, then plainly a tariff on steel would merely shift the market for which British manufacturers produced and would not result in any net improvement in the situation The point is vital. But it is not unfair to say that, apart altogether from all fiscal arguments for or against a tariff, no one has ever succeeded in proving that imports of steel into Great Britain could be reduced by means of a duty without also reducing British exports by an approximately equivalent tonnage In few lines, if any, and in very few markets—including even those Empire markets which now absorb about half of our exports—is Britain's position so strongly entrenched that a serious, prolonged, and determined attack by foreign producers could be viewed with equanimity. And it is obvious that foreign producers would not allow their plant to stand idle because the British market was shut against them without making a determined effort to find outlets for their steel in other markets which Britain now serves

From these facts and arguments, if correct, a single though unpalatable conclusion follows If *at present costs of production* the maximum amount of British steel which can be disposed of at home or abroad totals some 9,500,000 to 10,000,000 tons, then,

[4] The particular difficulties of the pig iron industry result from changes in steel making and in industrial practice Scrap is used in steel making to a far larger extent than before the war, and has therefore displaced corresponding quantities of pig iron, scrap is also used in the iron foundries and the wrought iron trade—formerly a large consumer of pig iron—has been seriously depressed. Another consequence of these changes is a heavy decline in exports of pig iron—which, indeed, more than accounts for the reduction in our total exports of *all* iron and steel products

after making a reasonable allowance for plant held in reserve against contingencies, approximately 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 tons of existing productive capacity is redundant. Experts in the problems of the iron and steel industry may dissent from these figures. In themselves, the figures possess, of course, no importance whatever. But if they are broadly right, then they do show the rough limits of possible output under *existing* conditions, and therefore the approximate amount of plant which is surplus to current needs If, on the other hand, they are seriously wide of the mark, then the experts will find it an easy task to demolish them ; and in this labour of love the present writer will gladly join

Given the approximate size of the market, the next step in rationalisation is to consider the industrial organisation and technical equipment best fitted to produce most efficiently and most economically Since in present circumstances a large quantity of productive capacity is superfluous to current needs and must be scrapped, since efficiency must be raised by modernising, reconstructing and reconditioning existing plant, and since substantial resources are required for these purposes, it is obvious that the machinery of amalgamation must be employed Not nation-wide all-inclusive amalgamation of the entire steel industry of Great Britain That is neither desirable nor possible Not mere financial amalgamation, designed as an umbrella to save already water-logged resources from further wetting. That, though perhaps possible is not desirable What is really needed is essentially sound and constructive amalgamation framed with a constant eye to the real necessities of the situation and to the objectives ultimately aimed at

The principles which should be followed are four

First, it must be recognised that what is loosely called the iron and steel industry is in reality a complex of a large number of separate industries manufacturing a diversity of products, and that amalgamation can only be attempted between firms manufacturing similar products and articles cognate, ancillary, allied or associated with these

In the second place, it should be clear that, if plant can be worked to full capacity, the most economical and efficient unit for iron and steel manufacture is a complex in which coking and by-product plant and blast furnaces, steelworks and rolling mills are operated in combination, one stage of mass production being followed smoothly by the next, the maximum fuel economy being achieved, and waste and surplus gas and heat disposed of for public use or for the generation of electricity It is often argued that such an industrial complex produces too large a quantity of uniform products to be well suited to British con-

ditions and to the diverse needs of Britain's many and varied export markets. However this may be—and there is no reason why suitable adjustments should not be made in the general plan so as to meet our specialised needs—the type of plant which other great producing combines have found to be most economical and most efficient cannot be rejected out of hand by Britain.

Thirdly, it should be recognised that amalgamation must take place within suitable geographical areas, and that, unless the manufacture of a particular product is concentrated in a single area, it is unlikely that the whole production of any branch of the trade will be brought under the control of a single firm. Accordingly the type of amalgamation which is necessary must be based on the great existing iron and steel areas, such as South Wales, the North-East Coast, Scotland, the West Coast, and Sheffield, groups in each of these areas stretching out tentacles to cognate and complementary firms elsewhere

Finally, it should be plain that, even when the necessary amount of amalgamation has taken place, there will still remain many independent firms, some of a considerable size, which, because of their position or specialised products or goodwill or established connexions, cannot be brought wisely and well into any larger organisation

Against this background the importance and significance of the recent reorganisation movement within the industry can be surveyed and measured During the past two years many changes have been made They mainly affect half a dozen firms situated in four of the principal producing areas

Practically the first big advance was made in November 1928, when the South Durham Steel and Iron Co , Ltd , amalgamated with the Cargo Fleet Iron Co , Ltd These two concerns both belong to the Furness group, are neighbours, complement one another, and now form one of the three most important firms on the north-east coast Eleven months later the two biggest producers in the same area, Dorman, Long & Co , Ltd , and Bolckow, Vaughan & Co , Ltd , announced the successful completion of negotiations which had been started about December 1928. With this fusion one of the largest steel concerns in Great Britain was constituted The next advance took place in January 1930, when it was announced that Baldwins, Ltd., and Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds, Ltd., the principal firms in South Wales, had agreed on terms of amalgamation, and that William Beardmore & Co , Ltd , and David Colville & Sons, Ltd., the two largest producers in Scotland, had reached a working agreement. The most recent development occurred last May. In that month

the reorganisation of an important Lancashire group was announced comprising, *inter alia*, the Pearson and Knowles Coal and Iron Co., Ltd., the Wigan Coal and Iron Co., Ltd, and the Partington Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., together with allied and associated firms. These businesses are splitting their coal and steel resources between two concerns; the steel plant will be controlled by a new company to be called the Lancashire Steel Corporation, which will concentrate its activity mainly in a reconstructed and thoroughly modernised works at Irlam, on the Manchester Ship Canal

Alongside of these changes in the heavy iron and steel industry progress has also been made in the reorganisation of the heavy engineering and armaments industry, which, in turn, have also had reactions on the heavy steel industry proper In January 1928 Vickers, Ltd, and Armstrong, Whitworth & Co, Ltd, amalgamated certain important sections of their businesses, and at the end of the year they were joined by Cammell, Laird & Co, Ltd, in founding a new company the English Steel Corporation, which took over and concentrated the manufacture of steel. Finally, a reorganisation scheme for John Brown & Co, Ltd, was announced last May, and this, when completed, will not only carry the rationalisation of the heavy engineering and armaments industry a stage further, but will have repercussions in the heavy iron and steel industry as well

The upshot of all these developments has been the creation, at all events in the principal producing areas of great corporations which dominate the local output In Scotland is the Beardmore-Colville group, on the North-East Coast are the Dorman-Bolckow combine (which is bound to become more closely associated with the Furness group) and the independent firm of Consett; in Lancashire is the new Lancashire Steel Corporation, the industry in South Wales will be ruled by Guest-Keen-Baldwins, while in Sheffield the United Steel Cos, Ltd which was formed just after the war, will be the largest producer Between them these firms probably control from half to three-fifths of the pig iron and steel output of the country Though the hematite producers in north-west Lancashire are still largely unorganised, the only important remaining area in which democratic anarchy prevails is the Midlands, and there long-standing traditions of independence are being stubbornly maintained

Any person outside the industry who attempts to appraise the exact significance of these changes faces an extremely difficult undertaking. On the whole the firms concerned publish very little information about the amount of reorganisation and modernisation they intend to carry out. This may be natural and even wise; but it makes the task of appraisal well-nigh

impossible. On the one hand, it is clear that even the amalgamations hitherto effected or already in train are pigmies by comparison with the great German and American combines. The largest of these groups cannot produce more than 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 tons of iron and steel a year, whereas the German Steel Works Union (Vereinigte Stahlwerke, A.G.) made over 6,000,000 tons of pig iron and nearly 6,500,000 tons of steel in its last financial year (when output was reduced by a month's lock-out in November 1928); the smallest American combine accounts for 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 tons, and the vast United States Steel Corporation for 20,000,000 to 25,000,000 tons. Not that the whole difference in scale is necessarily disadvantageous to Britain; it is probably more suited to British conditions. On the other hand, the existing state of the industry plainly makes thoroughgoing reconstruction and modernisation a most urgent necessity. The amalgamations and agreements thus far effected will succeed in putting their portion of the industry on its feet only if, eschewing mere financial manipulation, they tackle the real changes which are pressing and vital. The measure of their success will not be available until the financial results are published a year or so hence. Meanwhile the names of the concerns involved and the reputations of their sponsors may serve as a reassurance.

But even though the task of reorganisation may now be regarded as well under way, a number of problems still remain.

The first problem arises from the firms outside the present combination movement. Some of these outsiders are already strong, well-equipped and efficient. Others account for a very large proportion of the productive capacity which is surplus to current needs, cannot produce profitably at ruling prices, and yet overhangs and depresses the market. By one means or another this surplus capacity and the firms which own it will have to be disposed of. The problem is of very substantial magnitude, for the capacity which must thus be scrapped totals between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 tons divided up amongst a score of firms. In Germany the leading iron and steel companies have been grappling with a similar problem by buying up small undertakings. Half a dozen minor concerns have been dealt with in this way at a cost approximating to 3,500,000*l*. In Britain the shipbuilding industry, confronted by the same difficult issue, have latterly formed the National Shipbuilders' Security, Ltd., with the object of closing down and scrapping redundant yards. Whether one of these methods will suit the circumstances of the British steel industry, or whether other means must be devised, the problem

of the superfluous outsider must somehow be tackled and solved. It is a thorny problem, for many interests are concerned to keep these firms alive in spite of the harm they do; but if approached broadly and wisely it will not prove insuperable.

A second question is that of personnel. This matter, one of the most elusive and most intractable of all the difficulties confronting the iron and steel industry and many other industries also, springs largely from the evil effects of the war. The depleted ranks of those who should now be rising to the higher command may be insufficient to fill all existing needs, but, if so, there is all the more reason for making certain that no competent man is put off by inadequate remuneration. All industries tend to have their own scale of conventional rewards. The iron and steel industry stands to benefit most by paying highly the men who can make its profits greatest.

A third problem is that of labour. As recent speeches by recognised and conservative leaders show, the workers regard rationalisation as a very mixed blessing. Too often it yields them only a crop of Dead-Sea fruit, throws men out of the industry where they have won their training and spent their lives; and leaves them, at an advanced age, at best with their earning power seriously curtailed, at worst with no jobs and no prospects. It is true that no man—nor any investor, for that matter—has an established right to a specific position or definite earnings. It is true that economic change is no respecter of persons. But so important is it that reorganised firms should enter on their next stage with that good-will of the workers which can contribute so largely to success—just as ill-will, working through countless channels, can increase costs, lessen efficiency, and contribute to failure—that both wisdom and justice demand that the workers' interests should be especially considered and safeguarded in every rationalisation scheme.

What of the future? Is rationalisation worth while? Can the British steel industry again be made prosperous? Can it continue to live and thrive and grow? Or is it a failing trade which only superhuman efforts can save from speedy decay?

Whatever the future may contain, as regards rationalisation, at all events, the answer is clear. Disregard France, Belgium, the United States. Suppose that practically complete reconstruction after the war and capital costs halved or quartered by inflation make conditions in France and Belgium utterly different from conditions in Britain. Assume that the United States also is quite incomparable for other reasons. There remains Germany, where the most thoroughgoing rationalisation has been carried

out in circumstances certainly not less adverse than those ruling in Britain to-day. Recall the circumstances: a population demoralised by the most terrible inflation the world has known; markets topsy-turvy; productive equipment swollen in some places and atrophied in others; organisation utterly inadequate to the needs of peace; capital, particularly working capital, practically unprocurable. How could conditions have been worse than they were in Germany in 1924, when to all her domestic troubles were added the complications produced by the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr? And yet the German iron and steel industry carried through a reorganisation so complete and so effective that the profits of six principal Ruhr firms have averaged 11,500,000*l* during each of the last three years, and, after placing large sums to reserves, have permitted the payment of dividends ranging from 6 to 8 per cent per annum[5] If Germany could achieve this striking success in spite of all her initial difficulties and the extremely heavy price she had to pay for capital raised abroad, why cannot similar results be attained by the British steel industry in circumstances far more favourable?

That Britain's position is more favourable is shown both by the distribution of the world's steel industry as a whole and by her own natural advantages.

In round figures the world at the present consumes 120,000,000 tons of steel a year. Of this total 55,000,000 tons are consumed in the United States, 35,000,000 tons in the main European producing countries (Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium), and 30,000,000 tons in the rest of the world. Roughly two-thirds of the last amount is produced in the consuming countries themselves, and the rest is imported from the great producers. Exports to these consuming countries from Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and the United States total some 12,000,000 to 12,500,000 tons,[6] and of these exports, Britain's is the largest share, amounting to nearly 30 per cent. of the whole. Her position in these markets

[5] The firms are Vereinigte Stahlwerke (capital 40,000,000*l*), Mannesmann (capital, 9,250,000*l*), Krupp (8,000,000*l*), Klöckner (5,500,000*l*), Hoesch (3,580,000*l*), Gutehoffnung (3,000,000*l*). The gross profits of these six firms aggregated 11,554,000*l* in 1926–27, 11,388,000*l* in 1927–28, and 11,644,000*l* in 1928–29. Although the context is not quite clear, it appears practically certain that these profits are calculated *after* the payment of debenture interest. Full details of the sums placed to reserve and depreciation are not available; in the case of Vereinigte Stahlwerke, however, they have amounted to well over 4,000,000*l* a year. See *The Times Trade and Engineering Supplement*, June 14, 1930, p. 325, and the *Economist*, February 22, 1930, pp. 399–400.

[6] In addition to these exports to the *consuming* markets, Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium exchange a further 7,000,000 tons amongst themselves. In this trade Britain plays a small part as exporter, but, of course, an important part as importer; while the United States is here a negligible factor.

is remarkable. In Australasia her supremacy is practically unchallenged. She supplies half of all exports to Africa, two-fifths of those to Asia, a quarter of those to South America (a market in which American, German, and Belgian competition is extremely fierce). Even the continent of Europe (apart from the great producing countries)—a market which one might expect the Germans and the French to monopolise—takes one-tenth of its steel from Britain, or more than Belgium supplies

These facts make it plain that, so long as foreign competition is not stimulated by mistakes of British policy, the British iron and steel industry, even in the worst of times, has a place in the sun which her competitors will not easily conquer The reason lies in Britain's natural advantages With blast furnaces and steelworks very favourably placed, often on the coast and always near her coal supplies, with capital in normal times both plentiful and cheap, with the most highly skilled and most reliable workers in the world, with unrivalled trading connexions and an untarnished reputation for products of supreme quality, it is only natural that Britain should have maintained her position even throughout the troublous years through which we have just passed.

On the whole, there are now reasonable grounds for moderate optimism After years of isolation and individualism the industry has at long last come together and has formed an Export Association for developing trade overseas and a Steelwork Association to extend the market at home After years of hesitation the task of reorganisation is now well under way There is much still to do, and, in the face of continued improvements abroad, our own efforts cannot be relaxed for an instant Nevertheless, fortified by Britain's immense natural advantages, the industry can now face the future with a measure of reasonable confidence

JULES MENKEN

THE CHANNEL TUNNEL

DURING the last few months the Report by the Channel Tunnel Committee of the Economic Advisory Council and the recent parliamentary debate have once more focussed attention on this long-discussed project With the refusal of the Government to countenance the scheme, the practical question has again relapsed into a state of suspended animation, which permits the whole matter to be judged strictly on its merits At first glance the question of whether such a tunnel should be built or not appears one to which an easy reply could be given in the affirmative or negative. Further contemplation of this problem demonstrates that the proposal is hedged around with extreme difficulties, and the incidence of effect impinges on a great variety of interests. The question of national defence, for instance, has definitely precluded for many years even the preparation of data upon which engineering estimates could be made Political changes, in regard to foreign policy, are as kaleidoscopic in their nature as the colours which adorn a rainbow, while the economic considerations, which would ultimately make the tunnel a financial success or a failure, shift as constantly as do the trade returns of any great industrial country

In view of such difficulties the Report of the Channel Tunnel Committee was naturally somewhat guarded: it could hardly have been otherwise, since the recommendations in its Report had to be based upon assumptions as to the probable situation in 1938, by which time it is estimated the tunnel could be completed. The conclusions of any committee are naturally far more valuable if unanimous, and in a case as closely affecting the national welfare as this one it is particularly unfortunate that a minute of dissent should have been added by one member of the Committee It is, however, a matter for surprise that the minute of dissent of one member should have received so much more attention in the Press than the conclusions reached by the remaining 80 per cent. of the Committee, including the chairman. Discussion of national defence questions must be the preserve of those who are responsible for that defence. The engineering aspect is one to be left in the hands of the engineering profession, but in the Committee's

conclusion No. 5 the majority report that they believe 'a Channel Tunnel could be built,' and even the minute of dissent admits that 'if a tunnel could be built' the opposition expressed is primarily 'based on economic grounds.'

One may thus assume that a Channel Tunnel can be regarded as an engineering possibility and that the approximate cost, to be shared by the British and French Channel Tunnel Companies, would be rather over 30,000,000*l.* Just as the military and naval strategist must envisage every possibility in a situation which may develop years ahead, so the economist or statesman must estimate future trends before designing his policy in order that it may yield the maximum of satisfaction to society and the nation. It is to the political and economic background that attention should be given if the true importance of this project is to be realised. Let each of these be taken in due turn

The Channel Tunnel Committee, by its terms of reference, was asked to confine its Report to an examination of the economic aspects of the construction of a Channel Tunnel, or other new form of cross-Channel communication It will be seen that no mention is made of the political aspect, yet such a side to the question certainly does exist apart from all questions of national defence There are without doubt many in this country who dislike entanglements of any kind which may bind Great Britain to continental Europe It is, perhaps, somewhat difficult to diagnose this sentiment, but it is none the less powerful for that reason, and may be ascribed to insularity or to tradition. In many ways it is comparable to the feeling which is so much in evidence in the American Senate and House of Representatives, the desire to keep free of European politics, with all their intricate undercurrents American sentiment in this respect is easier to understand, for it was the desire for freedom, often religious, which led to the settling of America and what is now the Dominion of Canada The resultant force of this great body of American opinion is too often ignored in Europe, even President Wilson under-estimated its strength, and by so doing brought about his own fall, and with it every hope of America's entry into the League of Nations Its effect upon the Disarmament Conference has not been without importance; in short, it is one of the great factors in world politics to-day

That the same subtle current, as strong as any ebb-tide, has guided British foreign policy cannot be gainsaid New York is nearer London to-day than London was to Paris a century ago, and modern inventions, such as wireless, tend to bring the farthest capitals into as intimate a touch as those geographically closer. The barrier of language makes Paris, Berlin, or Rome more

distant than ever New York or Montreal can be to many of those who have once visited the New World. It is the competitive attraction of directing foreign policy towards the Anglo-Saxon countries, or the Continent, that creates the clash of opinions which underlies most political controversies in Great Britain to-day. Truly such political considerations are closely linked with the economic; the campaign of the Empire Marketing Board, the birth and rapid decease of the United Empire Party, the whole concept of economic Imperial unity, and the close relations of the Bank of England with the Federal Reserve system of the United States, all bear witness to the attempt to turn away from Europe and seek increased trade through politica ties with the English-speaking world elsewhere. To those who hold this view, often subconsciously, the Channel Tunnel scheme is anathema Its progress would seem like the steady forging of a chain binding this country to Europe, to its national and racial hatreds, a guarantee that the country would be drawn irresistibly into feuds, and political bickerings, which it could not hope to understand It would hardly be an exaggeration to term this feeling national, and the lack of welcome in this country accorded to the suggestion emanating from Continental sources, to set up a United States of Europe, shows how mistrustful Great Britain is of becoming a continental nation One must admit that it is a logical result of British history, the freedom from invasion for centuries and the era of peace during the nineteenth century, which permitted this country to reap the maximum benefits of the Industrial Revolution, have given ample cause for the growth of a tradition which is part of the national outlook

On the other hand, equally strong forces have recently been working in a direction diametrically opposed Participation in a European war may have brought its inevitable reaction and the determination to draw apart as far as possible for ever, but it left the nation a heritage which not even the strength of tradition can ever undo Active participation in the League of Nations, while yet the United States remains outside, a trade depression, which enforces the development of every possible trade route, European or inter-continental, and the recognition that the purchasing power of European countries is vital to this country's economic prosperity, all show that withdrawal from European conferences would deal a fatal blow at Britain's social welfare and industrial progress. Granted that these links, not forged from choice, but from necessity, exist, and for the same reason cannot be broken, it is doubtful if any physical connexion with the Continent would prove more than an invisible bond, joining together two political entities, which geographical conditions have placed in juxtaposition. The function of transport is the

breaking down of such barriers through reduction of the cost of movement and increase in speed, and the success of a transport system must be judged by its power to achieve these ends. Ocean, rail, or air transport as it grows in efficiency diminishes the natural barriers to social intercourse and induces closer political connexions The gradual orientation from home affairs towards Dominion and foreign politics is a major trend in post-war Government endeavour. Recognising the present position as a *fait accompli*, any transport facility which helped to increase the mutual understanding between Great Britain and continental nations is to be welcomed as a lubricant to aid the smooth running of international conferences, whose actions are so liable to get clogged by grains of sand and, consequently, thrown out of gear.

To-day the separation of conceptions economic from those political is somewhat difficult to accomplish; unemployment, for instance, has been the sport of politics, but in reality it is an economic problem, and the successful remedies for it must be built upon sound economic foundations Whilst the political aspects of the Channel Tunnel scheme are of importance, especially in the wider sphere of statesmanship, the economic viewpoint, though perhaps a little narrower, is hardly less intangible and makes an even more attractive study To this side of the picture one may now turn one's consideration

Economics has been termed the study of business in its social aspect, yet the Channel Tunnel Committee translated the adjective 'economic' as being almost equivalent to financial With one exception they judged that the tunnel could be maintained and operated by private enterprise at a cost which would permit of the traffic through it being conveyed at rates not higher than those at present in force on the short cross-Channel route Occasionally estimates are somewhat impolitely termed shrewd guesses, but such a term would be inapplicable in the present case, and from a perusal of the Committee's Report it is clear that accurate estimating of passenger traffic possibilities must have been a very heavy labour, since the results arrived at could only be obtained by scientific reasoning The Report places the estimate of passenger traffic in 1938 at 2,357,000—a figure considerably higher than the estimate made by the Southern Railway, and materially lower than that of the Channel Tunnel Company or that of the Nord Railway of France The percentage diversions from each of the existing cross-Channel routes have been estimated and appear in the Report, spreading from 100 per cent. for the Dover-Calais service to 45 per cent. for the Newhaven-Dieppe service and 21 per cent. for the Harwich services to the Hook of Holland, Flushing, Antwerp, and Zeebrugge It would be idle to quarrel with such carefully calculated figures; though

individual faults could be found with them, equal objections could be raised against any set of figures put forward as an estimate. Even one member of the Committee itself characterised them as not likely to be reached, but added that he did not propose 'to examine in any detail the complicated figures and tables set out in this section.'

To form any estimate of probable passenger traffic, the psychologist is probably the best equipped technician, but accurate students of the psychology of nations are difficult to come upon, and in this case a knowledge of many nations is essential. To the Englishman the Continental horror of a Channel crossing is by no means easy to comprehend; to him it is a commonplace affair to visit France or Belgium, it is a small deterrent to a holiday programme, and many make the crossing on business each month. To the average Frenchman, on the other hand, a visit to London is an adventure not to be embarked upon lightly, and often regarded as the first and last chance in a lifetime. Letters from friends in France frequently conclude 'and when the tunnel is complete I shall visit London again' Perhaps rightly, the Committee ignored this psychological aspect, which might well redress the proportion of three to one of British to other cross-Channel passengers, but it probably accounts for the higher estimates of passenger travel submitted by the Nord Railway and the Channel Tunnel Company, which are both familiar with the Continental viewpoint

Extensive reference has been made in the Press, and its shadows are reflected in the Report, to this question of lack of balance in the traffic A well-balanced traffic is the aim of every transport concern, whether by rail, ocean, or air, and is well exemplified in the rapid fluctuations quoted for tramp tonnage plying outward bound with coal and homeward with cargoes of cotton, wool, or wheat. A railway equally offers exceptional rates in an endeavour to eliminate the empty haul so far as possible, and even the tramway attempts to fill its cars in the slack periods by offering especially cheap midday fares. It is claimed by some that a Channel Tunnel would accentuate this discrepancy rather than redress it, but to assume such a situation is to disregard the possibility of adjusting charges in accordance with seasonal or other variations, such as is the regular practice in the North Atlantic and other ocean passenger trades.

The regulation of railway charges through the tunnel is not specifically mentioned in the Report, and this may prove a somewhat difficult question, because the British Railway Rates Tribunal will obviously have no power to regulate the charges over the French section of line, and presumably the fare per mile should be the same in the French and British sections of the tunnel. The

regulation of railway charges by a body appointed by a Government, or by a Government department itself, is admittedly the relic, so far as Western Europe is concerned, of a past era, when railways were monopolies and not subject to unregulated competition. Nevertheless, certain traffics can only be handled to best advantage by rail, so that the consumer of these commodities, and *not*, be it noted, the producer of them, must be protected However, the futility of the present degree of regulation is evidenced by the inability of the British railways, in spite of wholesale economies, to earn their standard revenue, as provided for by the Railways Act of 1921, and to yield which the Railway Rates Tribunal was instructed to design a scale of charges. Similarly, the American railways have never yet been able to earn their 'fair return,' of 5¾ per cent on property investment, as ordered in the Transportation Act of 1920. Ability to earn sufficient net revenue to induce a continued flow of capital into an industry must be left to the initiative of that industry itself Railways suffer materially in this respect, and a Channel Tunnel railway would have to be free from these needless shackles in a competitive arena Cross-Channel shipping and air services would each in their own specialised spheres act as a safeguard and should suffice to keep the charges reasonably low.

Demand for goods or services is dependent upon price, and estimates of the volume of passenger traffic must vary with the level of fare per mile The Committee's estimate seems to have been based on the present average charges, but there is no reason why a reduction of 10 per cent in the charge should not induce an added 20 per cent of passenger traffic. Admittedly, British railway experience and that abroad shows that the demand for passenger travel by rail is not as elastic as might be expected, and reduced fares have frequently resulted, at any rate for a considerable time, in reduced gross revenue, but, on the other hand, more frequent service by itself may offer the added inducement to travel. The Southern Railway, as a result of its progressive electrification policy, has increased the passenger travel from station X fivefold within a comparatively short period by offering a fourfold increase in the number of trains, the London and North Eastern Railway, by increasing the steam service at station Y, has brought about approximately the same results. Thus it would appear that increased frequency of service offered to the public does, in practice, materially increase the volume of traffic to be handled. True, there is a limit to the frequency with which trains could be operated on such a route, for every railway system has its bottle-neck sections which create congestion, and it is somewhat difficult to foresee with accuracy where such points would be most likely to occur. Much would depend upon the

degree to which present barriers to international travel would apply at the time of the completion of the tunnel. Greater delay exists to-day on the London-Paris route through Customs examinations than is caused by weather or late international connexions at the Channel ports. The greater the severity of Customs examination and the number of dutiable articles, the greater the bar to tourist development of a country. The silk duties imposed on those tourists entering British ports are a fruitful source of conversation on the decks of Atlantic liners, they are the subject of mention when holiday tours are being planned in Minneapolis or New Orleans. Such echoes resound as the word passes around, and have tended to divert much tourist travel from this country to our Continental neighbours They completely frustrate the well-meaning efforts of such campaigns as the 'Come to Britain' movement, supported by hotels whose prices are higher than those of many American hotels and which are frequently unable to offer modernised accommodation At one large hotel specially catering for American visitors a deposit is demanded on arrival—hardly a fitting welcome in a country supposedly intent on attracting tourist travel It may be hoped, however, that such evidences of the post-war malaise will have disappeared by 1938, as their evil effects become better realised by the general public.

It is sometimes claimed that the construction of a Channel Tunnel would be valuable in that it might create work for the unemployed, a perverted form of economic theory which might well be compared with the suggestion to dig up road surfaces so that work might be made for road-repair men No great project should be dependent on such arguments, and the case in favour of a Channel Tunnel is on a totally different plane With unemployment rife for many years the country must strain every nerve to better its competitive position in the race for export trade Whatever view may be taken of taxes upon imported manufactures, it is incontrovertible that if this country is to retain its position in international trade it must import heavy tonnages of raw materials and food supplies, and be in a position to export semi-manufactured or fully manufactured goods at as low a cost as possible. The Channel Tunnel has been regarded primarily as a route suited to passenger traffic, and probably the bulk of revenue will be derived from passenger travel, but the freight situation is by no means to be ignored, and an important percentage of valuable goods would utilise its facilities when they become available. Rail haul is rightly regarded as more costly than waterborne movement, but the elimination of handling charges and the risk which such handling must entail are powerful incentives to through loading without breaking bulk, in the case of perishable or fragile commodities. The steady growth in traffic of high

value by the existing train ferry from Harwich to Zeebrugge bears witness to the demand for such facilities, and it is extremely doubtful if certain contracts, as for example the cars built in England for the International Sleeping Car Co., could have been obtained but for the ferry which enabled the cars to be shipped over practically ready for service.

It is unfortunate that the loading gauge, namely, the width permitted to rolling stock, is more strictly limited on the lines leading to Dover and Folkestone than on the majority of main lines elsewhere. But the point cannot be stressed too strongly that the difference in width of British and Continental carriages is not more than a few inches. The Continental carriages are considerably longer than those which are built to the standard design of the four railways on this side of the Channel, but extra length does not reduce the weight per seat which has to be hauled, and it is doubtful if carriages over 70 feet in length ride as smoothly as somewhat shorter ones. The smoothness, comfort, and quietness of British express trains are always the subject of favourable comment by foreign railway officials, and many have been sent over in recent years to study the means whereby this has been achieved. Speed, safety, and comfort in railway travel are three respects in which the British railways remain peerless, and it is fitting that this should be so in view of the fact that England witnessed the birth of the steam locomotive, which has few rivals among the civilising inventions that the world has seen. Owing to our early ability to export locomotives, the running gauge of Continental railways other than Spain, Portugal, and Russia is similar to our own for all practical purposes, and provided the carriages did not exceed about 63 feet, they could run through from London to Sicily, Sweden, or Turkey. The Harwich ferry has shown in this direction what can be done with freight traffic; unfortunately, export traffic by that route has not reached the volume of imported goods. In spite of a widespread advertising campaign, the ferry service is better known in Continental cities than in Great Britain, and it is not uncommon to find British manufacturers who are oblivious of its existence. Such a situation throws much light upon our difficulties as an exporting country, and it might be that the existence of a Channel Tunnel, if completed, would be similarly ignored, but it would be less likely; there is little reason to suppose that the balance of trade would be more adverse with a tunnel in existence than it is to-day. There would doubtless be some diversion to the tunnel route from existing services, but comparatively small tonnages of high-class goods now enter or leave by the Dover and Folkestone gateways.

The Committee's Report, in its final conclusion, states that,

'although some interests would probably be adversely affected, the construction of a Channel Tunnel, by creating new traffic and thus increasing trade, would be of economic advantage to the country.' The minute of dissent expresses an opposite opinion, but it is difficult to understand this after perusing the detailed trade statistics, mainly applying to agricultural products, which are included in the Report. For instance, it is explained in regard to potatoes that only the early kinds grown in Spain would travel by the tunnel route, 'as after the first ten days of the season, when it is profitable to send Spanish early potatoes by the fast goods train across France to Boulogne, these supplies are sent by direct boat from Barcelona.' It is pointed out that there would be no competition with home-grown supplies, because these are not available until later in the season; under such conditions it is difficult to see how agriculture is likely to suffer to any material extent. Paternal care of British agriculture is in the hands of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, yet, whilst agriculture, it is stated in the minute of dissent, must be protected from any possible competition, no mention whatever is made of the aid that such a tunnel would give to the export of British fish, which even to-day travels daily to Marseilles Any study of new traffic likely to be created by the tunnel is one of the most fascinating problems of transport economics, but to do it full justice one must first banish the conception of a London-Paris route.

International trade routes are as delicately woven as a spider's web, and just as the unwitting fly shakes the whole web, so a new artery affects the other arteries, until the flow of trade becomes stabilised once more under the new set of conditions Transport is ever dynamic, and the condition of *cæteris paribus* is never really applicable. The prosperity of this country has been due in the past to the taking of risks, indeed, few great things are achieved, and few great battles won, without taking risks There may be an element of risk to British trade in the construction of a tunnel, but there are advantages to be gained if the country is plucky enough to chance that risk. During the post-war period trade has slowly turned from the British ports to their Continental rivals, much American passenger traffic which flowed to Liverpool has been diverted to Italian ports, and returns to the New World from Cherbourg or Havre or Hamburg without touching Great Britain are frequent. Is it the *rôle* of this country to watch idly this steady transfer, and to make no move to recapture it? Social intercourse is said to result in good feeling and mutual understanding, while the dice are loaded in our favour by the tie of a common language and common ancestry. The shortest open sea passage between Europe and the North American continent

is from the north of Ireland to Halifax in winter, or the St. Lawrence in summer. To capitalise this geographical advantage on the route to Chicago and the huge industrialised area around it might not prove a heavy task, and a Channel Tunnel should do much to induce the inclusion of Great Britain in a European summer vacation. American tourist travel to Europe increased from about 280,000 in 1914 to over 430,000 in 1928, but only about 100,000 are stated to have visited this country in the later year. Transatlantic air services of the future will also take the shortest sea route. Ease of transit between England and the Continent will offer an important attraction, provided it be coupled with the elimination of unnatural barriers to travel, such as high visa fees, detailed Customs examinations, and the like. British products have always excelled in quality and in the output of the highest grade articles, a heritage of long-acquired technical and executive skill; this trend continues, and for its success depends upon the availability of quick transport facilities.

The clash of views over the Channel Tunnel is in reality the fundamental cleavage of two schools of thought—the one believing in the littleness of England, that it should become a small self-contained unit complete in itself, and assuming that its internal trade is its bread of life; the other realising that we are a world Power with world interests and responsibilities, that we live by export trade and cannot survive without it, whether directed to other sections of the Empire or to foreign countries. It is not hard to chose between these two conceptions, the one more suited to a dying Roman Empire, the other more becoming to a nation whose prosperity has been built up by adventure and the will to succeed. A Channel Tunnel may involve some risk, but it would certainly be an engineering wonder of the world, which would show that this country was capable of making an effort to remain the bridgehead of Europe.

C. F. R. SHERRINGTON

WORLD WHEAT AND THE BRITISH FARMER

A REPLY

As the crop-growing districts approach an unparalleled crisis, leaders of political thought promulgate their policies. The Government of the day alone is silent and is content to watch most known civilised countries assisting their primary producers to swamp the farmers of England and cause this country to receive the coincidence of the surpluses of the world

The official policy of *Labour and the Nation* is pressed from behind the Government benches—that is, the policy of an Import Board as advocated by Mr Wise in *The Nineteenth Century* of June; and this article is designed primarily as a reply to it But before coming to actual criticism of Mr Wise's suggestion of a wheat monopoly for Great Britain it is well to follow his example and to consider the importance of policies for wheat, which is in itself significant, not only in the agricultural rotation, but also as a factor in the life of the nation Sir Oswald Mosley, speaking in the House of Commons on May 27 and again on July 16, referred to the necessity of insulating this island from the electric shocks of international price juggling He claimed that this is one great benefit of the Import Board, but it seems possible to introduce other wheat policies which would insulate us without electrocuting private enterprise The principle of preference to the home producer in the home market can be worked out on a much simpler scale It would not be nearly so difficult as Mr. Wise makes out to enforce a certain percentage of British wheat in the grist of the millers. The inevitable difficulty inherent in a regulation of this kind could be overcome when the necessity arose, and would present a much smaller administrative problem than the vast upheaval inherent in a scheme which implies complete State control of trading in the staple basis of the nation's food supply and the nationalisation of a vital industry.

Mr. Baldwin's Glemham speech offered a guaranteed price to the arable farmer, a tax on foreign malting barley, and a promise to stop the dumping of foreign oats. He thereby showed at long last a realisation of the gravity of the situation and ' held out his

hand to the industry.' In this policy there is a complete acceptance of the theory of the paramount importance of wheat legislation. Within the ample folds of the statement there lies undoubtedly the salvation of the corn-grower. No actual definition of the method of guaranteeing a price is given, but it is clear that a subvention which assures a working price to the farmer, while avoiding State control, is intended This form of legislation has been very successful in France and Germany without a subsidy, and can be described as the quota policy In France at the moment 97 per cent of the home loaf must be made of French flour. In Germany the figure at present is 50 per cent These policies seem to have been extremely successful; there has been need for few inspectors in Germany to visit the mills and to see that the quota is being zealously observed, and there have been very few cases of conviction The English problem being different, since our percentage of home-grown grain cannot be so high, and other circumstances being as they are, it is doubtful whether a quota policy without subsidy would be sufficient, even if the Legislature insisted on the milling industry paying a fixed price to the grower. Mr Baldwin has at any rate opted for a subsidy, and it is possible to suggest that the State should make up the difference between the world parity, or Liverpool option, and a remunerative price, which will be presumably between 50s and 55s The money for this purpose is to come from safeguarding duties Thus agriculture will not be able to complain of neglect *vis-à-vis* industry By this provision, and this provision only, in Mr Baldwin's declaration, British agriculture is tied up to an international or Imperial scheme It is its only contact with the outside world The great principle is established that British agriculture wants, and must get, special individual treatment

Meanwhile, Mr. Wise, in his article referred to, has definitely come out with an addition to his policy which takes into consideration the Imperial aspect And Lord Beaverbrook, in his policy, claims that British agriculture can be saved by duties on foreign foodstuffs while Empire-grown foodstuffs come in free. In both cases British agriculture is linked up with the Empire; in the first it has to submit to the doubtful experience of an Import Board, and in the second it has to welcome Dominion shipments with open arms It has been seen that Mr Baldwin's policy lays down the principle of specialised treatment for British agriculture. There are many who feel that, while they want specialised treatment for the British wheat-grower, they want a wheat policy to be Imperial rather than parochial It is therefore not impossible that the Glemham declaration will grow Imperial wings while at the same time retaining its own inestimable

value for the home producer, who feels that with the prospect of a fixed price the burden of his bank overdraft may be lightened. In order to give the Glemham policy Imperial wings it seems that the quota suggestion should be added to it, so that a certain percentage of the home market may be reserved at a fixed price to the British producer, a certain quota to the Empire, and the residue to the foreigner Thus the home grower has specialised treatment, the Dominion exporter has an assured share in our market, and a gradually diminishing share is reserved to unrestricted world trade in order to avoid immediate confusion and to act as a safeguard in the transition from a free world market to a free Imperial market The percentages can and must be scientifically calculated, and a complete Empire loaf should be ultimately envisaged

This scheme has so far made no mention of tariffs, for which Lord Beaverbrook has worked with such dynamic energy. His great service seems to be that he insists on the fair consideration of the tariff principle, and is bidding fair to break the intellectual atrophy which, unless frontally attacked, might insist forever and a day that no duty of any sort shall ever be put on any article of foodstuff whatsoever Lord Beaverbrook has in fact reintroduced the tariff principle But there are many who feel that to save British agriculture by tariffs on foreign food there would have to be so immense a duty that the consumer would be bound to feel it. Yet consideration of the tariff weapon should not be excluded in the process of giving the Glemham policy Imperial wings The 'moderate fixed duty' advocated by Palmerston in the Corn Law discussions might supplement the quota scheme While it is too early to enter into detail, the system of a small cess or registration duty on the bulk commodities which has the recommendation of successful experience in Switzerland would arouse no serious economic objection or prejudice the consumer Meanwhile there are certain foodstuffs of a quasi-luxury kind which would submit smoothly and easily to tariff treatment or embargo In the debate of July 16 in the House of Commons the advocates of an Import Board rejected tariffs because these could not adapt themselves to fluctuations. The sliding-scale principle has dealt with fluctuations before, and the percentages of the quota might be adjusted upon a sliding-scale system.

In that portion of Sir Oswald Mosley's speech which reproduced Mr. Baldwin's Coliseum declaration upon this subject reference was also made to the need for Imperial rationalisation. There seems general acceptance of the need for rationalisation on an Imperial scale. The Conservative Party was the first to give serious weight in its policy to the tendencies noticed by

Lord Melchett during his recent visit to South Africa with regard to wool, and discussed also in Scotland by the farmers in framing their attitude towards the Canadian Wheat Pool. The quota policy forms an integral part of such generally accepted developments. In a quota policy British agriculture, fearing to be squeezed out, finds its safeguard in a market and a fixed price In a quota policy the Dominion exporters find a market guaranteed to them It is surely better to allow such a cadre of Imperial rationalisation to grow up guided by legislative wisdom but unfettered by Governmental control Within this framework and upon such principles highly organised marketing arrangements offering reciprocal advantages will erect themselves which at the same time contain safeguards against any cornering tendency in the quota system

The advocates of Import Boards insist on control, and their arguments find favour with those who cannot face tariffs or free trade, and who have an intellectual attachment to Socialism. They may grow in stature, but, despite their efforts to stop electrocution, they can so easily be short-circuited themselves. Simple legislative enactment can take the place of all the Socialist revolution they desire

The premises upon which the advocates of a Wheat Purchase Board in Great Britain base their claim for a monopoly for the import of wheat are for the most part sound No one can quarrel with Mr Wise when he says that the steady diminution of arable cultivation requires the adoption of some drastic remedies [1] There is also much truth in Mr Hurst's statement that 'it is a species of mental laziness to reason by analogy from the economics of a free wheat market to the economics of a market whose supplies are rigidly controlled' [2] Though one may not agree as to the exact extent to which it is held that supplies are rigidly controlled, or as to the extent that the milling industry in this country is trustified, it is at any rate certain that bulk purchase and delivery are more pronounced to-day than they were before the war It is therefore axiomatic that problems in the wheat trade, being different, require a different mental attack; moreover, conditions in the arable districts of England require new policies to set them right. It is important to allow this much to the advocates of a wheat monopoly, that they do at any rate suggest something drastic, something which to Great Britain in peace-time is new, and something apparently evolved to meet modern conditions. The whole strength of their case lies in these three points; that is why their plan has received such universal attention. for, in reality, it may be shown that

[1] Paper to Farmers' Club, *Stabilisation of Wheat Prices*, col. 1, p. 11.
[2] Hurst, *The Bread of Britain*, p. 27.

the proposal is not one which is suitable to modern post-war conditions, being one which, though new to England, has been tried and rejected overseas, and one which is too drastic in scope for the benefits, if any, which could be expected from it.

The salient features of the scheme can be summarised thus. The whole purchase and import of foreign wheat for consumption in this country should be undertaken by a statutory corporation set up by Parliament for this purpose with full monopoly rights of import. It should be independent of detailed political control, and subject to a board of directors appointed by the Minister under certain conditions. Prices should be published ahead for as long a period as possible, and the board should purchase home-grown wheat at guaranteed published stable prices calculated on a proper parity with import prices. The milling industry should be rationalised under Government control, and supplies of wheat to the mills regulated so that there would always be a market available for the supply of British wheat of milling quality offered for sale.

Mr. Wise makes various points in his *résumé* of the monopoly idea. For it is that which we are primarily here considering, rather than the other wheat policies adumbrated above. The question of the necessary immunity from interference of the wheat monopoly leads directly to the first avenue of criticism along which it is proposed to travel. That criticism is based on the experience of such a policy in this country. The outstanding example occurred during the war period. Though it is often said that war experience is not applicable to peace-time, I think it would be unfair to maintain that a study of Sir William Beveridge's account of British food control would be irrelevant in considering the aptitude of a monopoly to deal with the wheat trade. The necessary allowances can be made.

In the opinion of the author of 'British Food Control,' [3] the conduct of such a monopoly needs a relaxation of parliamentary scrutiny and it needs secrecy. As the Report of the Wheat Commission says [4]:

> The accepted system of public and concurrent scrutiny of the normal financial work of Government departments is not readily reconciled with the attitude of reserve which is advisable in the case of commercial operations. When it becomes necessary for the State to assume vast commercial responsibilities, especially in relation to overseas Governments and traders, those entrusted with such duties must be invested with a measure of secrecy claimed and enjoyed by every private enterprise, or else the seller will benefit by knowing the needs and intentions of the buyer.

[3] Sir William Beveridge, 'British Food Control.' *Economic and Social History of the World War*, British Series, p. 340.

[4] Cmd. 1544 (1921).

In times of peace the Import Board would draw upon its actions a glare of publicity which, as Lord Crawford has acknowledged, would not benefit its activities. We are told that it is to be free of detailed political control; but will the representatives of the people be satisfied to let questions upon the hard-won nourishment of the masses go without explanation? Very often the actions of the Board, while being moral and defensible, would arouse the deepest suspicion and resentment in the country whose right of interpellation in this democratic age it is proposed to restrict. Sir William Beveridge confesses that it would have been irksome for his Department to have been submitted to the rigours of Treasury control extended in normal times of peace to the departments of State. Sir Samuel Hoare, speaking in the House of Commons on the Air Estimates this year, referred to the need in the defence services for lightning decision and lightning action, and in a constructive speech dwelt on exactly the same question of the delay caused by reference to the Treasury. While the Board as proposed would not be subject to the same discipline as a Government department, the analogy holds good in that the same need for lightning decision in operations of international commerce, and the same delay over reference and control, would inevitably arise. Delay might cause expense, however efficiently the Board were conducted, and the consumer would pay. Private initiative must be quicker than the motion of a public corporation.

Sir William Beveridge says further that '*Effectiveness depends on completeness.*' In Mr. Wise's scheme as it stands, without the addition of opinions or hopes, it is not proposed to control the bakers and their methods of distribution. The whole conception of complete control of our daily bread in peace-time makes the scheme appear the more obnoxious; but when the completeness, which we are told on unimpeachable authority is essential, is absent, the economic value of the scheme immediately suffers. Moreover, this stopping short before distribution takes away from the promoters all possibility of offering a solution of the question most vital to every citizen—that is, the unsatisfactory discrepancy between the prices of wheat and those of bread.

Sir William Beveridge draws the conclusion that control is definitely an organisation for dealing with a shortage. Though the machine, as tried in war-time, differs in many respects from that now proposed, the conclusions he arrives at are useful in assessing the potential value of the theories we are discussing. Except for this experiment, there have been few similar attempts in English history. Perhaps it was the failure of the Victualling Board in Napoleonic times which caused Burke [8] to say: 'Of

[8] Burke, *Thoughts and Details on Scarcity* (originally presented to the Right Hon. W. Pitt in November 1795).

all things, an indiscreet tampering with the trade of provisions is the most dangerous.'

As described in the latest book on the Corn Laws,[6] 'when the war broke out in February of 1793, the Government took over the Corn Trade with the avowed intent of starving France. Apparently this policy came nearer to starving England than France. The merchants who were engaged in the foreign Corn Trade became alarmed by the uncertainties created by Governmental interference, and either abandoned the trade or bought cautiously.' [7] To-day the merchants would be put out of action, but the uncertainty as to the duration of the monopoly would remain, together with the subsequent difficulty of restarting the grain trade on private lines It was this uncertainty as to the duration of the monopoly, and also the fact that it became so much a political plaything, which caused Switzerland to reject the scheme by the referendum of July 1926 and Norway to abandon it during the years 1927 and 1928. Holland had a State wheat monopoly until shortly after the war, when it was abolished as being not suitable to post-war conditions

This question of immunity from interference has therefore been studied and answered from a consideration of British experience in the Great War, and also in previous history The other questions of completeness and uncertainty have also come up. Mr Wise raises in his article some new developments since what he describes as the last publication of Labour policy He acknowledges that the farmer would not be satisfied with parity with world prices This is made patent by the very recent fall in wheat prices and the recent shipments of French wheat at prices very near 30s a quarter, which are the only foreign attacks which Mr Wise does not mention in his world review He therefore acknowledges that it would quite possibly be necessary to subsidise the farmer to the extent of 10s a quarter to make up the difference between 40s and 50s This presupposes, first of all, that the world parity is 40s, which is not the case at present. But, accepting this as a very generous estimate, it means that the cost of administration of the monopoly, together with this large subsidy, would involve a subsidy This takes away from Mr. Wise's scheme much of the novelty which he had previously claimed for it. The stabilisation of prices by State purchase has often called down upon its head the criticism that it is inverted protection. Here we see that it is not only inverted protection, but that it has added to it the necessity for a direct subsidy.

[6] D. G Barnes *The History of the English Corn Laws*, p 75

[7] See also Francis Chalmer, *An Appeal to the County of Lancaster on the present Scarcity* (1800).

There are simpler ways of granting a subsidy and more direct methods of giving—Protection.

For the purpose of examining the economic questions of prices and costs, it may be well to study the history of the monopoly abroad. Switzerland is, perhaps, the most interesting country in which to consider the conditions of State trading in wheat. This was started in January of 1915 and lasted till 1926, with a transitional period from that date till 1929, when the present system was introduced. Under the present system, chosen by the people in a referendum, the Confederation takes upon itself the responsibility of storing wheat. The Federal Government takes over all home-grown grain suitable for milling at a price which will render possible the home cultivation of cereal crops. To protect the mills foreign flour is taxed, and the Government reserves to itself the right to import flour. If necessary, it may interfere to adjust the price level in remote districts by assistance in the matter of freights. The expenses of the subsidy to the home grower are made good by a registration fee according to the weight of all imports of every sort. (There are the requisite technical adjustments to make the cess equitable.) The Swiss Peasants' Union, which almost consistently supported the grain monopoly, the Consumers' Co-operative Association, and most independent voters in the Confederation support these proposals as achieving more for producer and consumer and risking less than the monopoly. Under State organisation the Import Board was responsible for indirectly subsidising the home grower (*Mahlprämie*) for free delivery all over Switzerland (*Frankolieferung*) and for undertaking sufficient storage of grain. Though the expenses of management were kept as low as possible (M. Paul Graber puts these at 15 cent. per quintal), all these charges had to go on the bread of the people. This was a first grievance against the monopoly. Further, it was held, not without justice, that under such a system there can be no cheapening of the price of bread. This is borne out by figures included in a pro-monopoly pamphlet by M. Paul Graber,[8] which do not appear to be suitably answered, and by figures compiled by Dr. Oskar Schär,[9] of the Consumers' Co-operative Association, on the basis of published bread prices of the Allgemeine Consum-Verein, Beider Basel, and the published import prices of corn. Dr. Schär comes to the following conclusion: that in 1913 (before the monopoly) where the cost of importing a quantity of grain fixed in relation to the amount needed to make a loaf was 24·41 centimes, the price of

[8] *Annals of Collective Economy*, vol. xi., p. 270, No. 3, July–October 1926 (M. Paul Graber, 'Concerning the Wheat Monopoly in Switzerland').

[9] *Die Wahrheit über das Getreidemonopol* (Dr. Schär, 'Auftrag des Konsumentur Komitees').

bread was 34·80 centimes, and the difference, therefore, 10·39 centimes, whereas in 1925 the price of import was 36·18 centimes, the price of the loaf 52·60 centimes, and the difference 15·82 centimes at the lowest and 23·82 centimes at the highest. He claims that the difference between 10·39 centimes and 19 centimes (the average in 1925) is too great to be accounted for merely by an increase in the price level and by the details in the new regulations which he specifies. Deducting these additions, which could bring the difference to 17 centimes, there still remains a definite rise due to State trading

The quality of the flour caused dissatisfaction to the Swiss housewife, who had to take what she was given '*par l'ordre du moufti.*' The psychological effect of putting anything under the State is to invoke criticism, and when the resentment of the housewife is aroused it is hard to allay The agitation was increased by the fact that the frontier dwellers declared that on their shoulders fell all the expense of free delivery to the mountain-tops, and the human population rose in revolt at the thought that the State monopoly of import of feeding-stuffs had been rescinded so that animals fed free while human beings took what they were given at a fixed rate The two monopolies go together, so it was held It is interesting to compare Sir William Beveridge's assertion that the quality of flour was hard to maintain under food control, and to reflect that if wheat is to be controlled in this country all other cereals and feeding-stuffs will have to be controlled too.

Norway imports 90 per cent of her wheat, and her problems are in some ways similar to ours The alignment of parties as regards the question differs from that in Switzerland Here the farmers are opposed to the scheme because the small farmer buys more grain than he produces and the question of feeding-stuffs is involved The Consumers' Co-operative Movement, which handles 20 per cent of the wholesale flour trade, were opposed to it on the ground—(1) that all monopolies are bad; (2) that the grain monopoly did not benefit the consumer, (3) that the fixed milling charge is a subsidy to inefficient mills and gives undue profits to the large mills, thus unduly raising the bread price level (this is also the argument of the Swiss Co-operative Movement); (4) that the monopoly is and was the sport of political parties and political changes Dr. Oskar Jahnsen, Director of the State grain business,[10] analysing the effect of the suspension of the monopoly in 1927, when the Conservative and Agrarian Parties came into power, gives figures which show that the consumption of wheat flour has slightly

[10] Extract from *Norway*, February 1929 (published in vol xxix, No. 1, *Journal of Department of Agriculture*, Dublin)

increased at the expense of imported grain, but that the Norwegian mills have been able to keep up their position very well, and that several new constructions and expansions in the milling industry have been carried out in the two years' interval, which will enable Norway to mill all her own flour. The opponents of the monopoly claim that the monopoly did not encourage milling efficiency Dr. Jahnsen finds that during the last two years wheat imports have vastly swollen at the expense of rye He points out that under the renewal of the monopoly the premium to the home producer will be included in the general expenses of State control, whereas under the open system from 1927–29 the cost of premium, preserved in a system not dissimilar from the new Swiss policy, was borne for one year by import taxes and for the second year by general taxation It seems to have satisfied the advocates of the monopoly that the main benefit was an assured supply and an average by stable price It is difficult to find any attempt to calculate the average ratio of Norwegian to the average world price The price of bread was not controlled, and the main problem of the relation of the world price of wheat to the home price of bread was again shirked, though the same level of bread prices was maintained over the country by a pooling of transport charges Approximately the same level of home production of cereals and the same prices prevailed whether there was or was not a monopoly, since the policy of rewarding home production in some way was never dropped

In studying Professor Stares' suggestions for State control of grain in Latvia [11] we find that the objects are to maintain an assured supply of breadstuft cereals, to stabilise alike the home market and the volume of imports, to stabilise the price of grain and consequently bread, to improve grain-growing conditions in Latvia The scheme is worked out without any particular novelty

Having examined the matter from the points of view of experience at home and abroad, there remain certain general considerations to append before resuming conclusions already formed Reference was made above to the need for drastic action The only drastic element in the plan proposed by Mr Wise is the conception of State control The mind, having taken this drastic decision, comes up against the slow, lumbering execution of bureaucratic administration The time taken in establishing the organisation, delays and inevitable blunders, culminating in a realisation of the inadequacy of the machine to perform the duties required of it, would lead to the immediate conclusion that it was

[11] Professor P Stares, *The Grain Monopoly as the Means of Improving the National Agricultural Situation*

at once too drastic in conception and not drastic enough in action —in fact, to the realisation that it would be too long a way round— whereas the new Swiss plan achieves results by a short circuit. From the international point of view the too drastic element would be manifested in the acrimonies resulting from the assumption of the *rôle* of shopkeeper by a sovereign State. Refusal to purchase from a country anxious of soliciting the 'patronage' of the State board would result in international spleen. The secrecy so strongly advocated by authorities might perhaps prevail before a transaction, but the completed transaction would have the full glare of publicity. For every transaction the State would have to take responsibility before the world When the international price level is steadily falling it may be questioned whether it is wise to fix prices on a parity with world prices The farmer's economic position is entrenched upon the soil. He rests upon rockbottom As the price level sinks he is the first to be crushed. Artificial economic strata in the nation use his resiliency to save them from feeling the hard reality of Mother Earth, and he is to be consoled by chains binding him down and under

To resume the threads of evidence which theory and experience alike support. (1) State trading and control of foodstuffs is even more obnoxious than nationalisation in any other form The public may have daily occasion to criticise quality, methods, or price, while being obliged by the testimony of the Wheat Commission to exercise restraint and patience. (2) Control without being thoroughgoing shirks the main problem Control of all cereals and feeding-stuffs must be considered From the consumer's point of view, the relation of wheat to bread prices is not considered Stabilisation of price at a certain level, though it means much to the working-class budget, is not enough if the price he has to pay has to bear the costs of State management and premiums to the producer. (3) A State board entering the world market is slower than private enterprise, is most likely to flutter the price dovecotes and send them soaring, and is likely to encourage retaliation on a national scale, so leading to serious results. (4) The producer can be helped much more expeditiously by legislation, without the need for, or the danger of, control. He will not be consoled by being attached to the world price level when this is falling. (5) The chief benefit to be acquired is that of certainty of price: this is counterbalanced by the uncertainty which would prevail as to the future of the monopoly with a change of political parties.

Experience seems to show that Government control is too cumbersome and controversial a method for the normal economy of a State in times of peace. Benefits to the producer can better be assured with less trouble, while the evils of private speculation

which it is designed to cure are said by competent authorities to cheapen supplies to the consumer, whose particular problem needs at any rate far more consideration than the 'stabilisation of wheat prices' proposes to give.

It remains only to say that if the controversy about wheat imports wakens the country to the need for adopting a responsible attitude towards our home agriculture and food supplies it will have achieved much The country, when awake, will realise that the particular problem of our countryside and our food-producing Empire demand consideration in an individual way.

There is no further scope in this article for more, but surely the co-ordination by legislative action and the guidance of Imperial and home agriculture and food supplies offers far greater practical hopes of development and prosperity than a drab State monopoly.

R A BUTLER.

LAND, POPULATION, AND GENERAL SMUTS

THERE is one aspect of African policy which immediately concerns white as well as black, and that is the apportionment of African land between white settlement and native development. This in its turn is inextricably bound up with questions of population, and since without a proper perspective on population we are liable to go off the track about land, I propose to begin with this

It has often been argued, for example by white settlers in East Africa, and by those at home who favour intensive white settlement, that reserves should be demarcated on the basis of the existing native population and that the rest of the land should be made available for white occupation Some go further and claim that natives have no right to possess land of which they are not now making adequate economic use In other words, if white men can make better use of it, white men are morally entitled to possess it

This criterion, it will be readily seen, would be fatal to the economic future of a country which is seriously underpopulated and whose perennial cry is for more native labour, and it is manifestly unjust in that it allows for the expansion of the whites, but not for that of the blacks, and ignores the proved capacity of the blacks to improve their methods of production under proper guidance.

More just was the principle advocated by the Hilton Young Commission, who urged that the extent of land reserved for native occupation should be conditioned by the needs not only of the existing native population, but also of the probable increase in the next generation Clearly, however, this was only intended to cover the immediate future the Commissioners themselves recommended further inquiry with a view to the discovery of more fundamental principles on this as on other questions, and it would be a thousand pities if this compromise of theirs, valuable as it was as a deliberate temporary expedient, should become erected into a permanent guide for policy.

The perspective we need is that of the biology of the growth

and decline of populations. For the last quarter of a century most native populations in equatorial Africa seem to have been stationary or going slightly downhill (though there are salient exceptions); and this seems due to the combined effect of indigenous and introduced disease, of various native customs and tabus, and quite possibly to the strange distaste for living or conferring the gift of life which has seized upon various primitive peoples, notably the Melanesians, on being brought under the influence of an alien and incomprehensible culture. There is, however, every reason to suppose that, by an improved public health service, by education, and by providing incentives to a fuller life, we shall be able to counteract and overcome these destructive tendencies and set native population on the upgrade again (as has, for instance, just been achieved in Uganda). And if so, it will not be long before the available spaces fill up. In South Africa the pressure on space has already begun. This is partly due to the insufficiency of the area reserved to natives, but at least equally to the fact that in the Union a fair rate of increase of native population has been maintained.

In point of fact, the sufficiency of an area for the needs of an existing population, or of its estimated increase in the next generation or so, is in the long, biological view a principle of secondary importance. Population density must tend towards a final equilibrium, and on its way thither will halt in various positions of comparative stability, each adapted to the general mode of life at the time. But when a relatively stable phase of life is upset, as African tribalism is being upset by white impact to-day, the stability of numbers is upset too, and we shall find population either growing until it puts pressure on the available land, or else shrinking until it is inadequate to the land it occupies. Shrinkage is a comparatively rare phenomenon, and the empty spaces can always be filled up from the surplus of more expansive peoples; thus the general tendency, as Malthus saw a century ago, is for populations to 'press upon their means of subsistence' —unless, as the Neo-Malthusians soon pointed out, deliberate steps be taken to keep the population at a lower density, before the pressure has become painful.

The consequences of this for our problem are obvious enough. The principle of reserving land which is enough for the needs of this or the next generation is a minimum principle whose observance will ensure that the canons of humanity and fairness are not violated at the outset; but it is entirely irrelevant when we consider the future and the definitive adjustment of populations which we would like eventually to see established.

I have in what follows deliberately avoided consideration of

the Indian question. It is a grave complicating factor, but need not be more. Since racial problems bring such peculiar difficulties, I personally should welcome the gradual disappearance of Indians from Africa—not from the least hostility to them as Indians, but because their presence at once trebles the number of racial problems. At any rate, I cannot conceive any responsible person in the present position of the world advocating intensive settlement of Indians in Africa.[1] We Europeans happen to be responsible at the moment for Central Africa. If we genuinely believe that the presence of Asiatics introduces extra complications there, and that we can educate natives to fill the Indians' place in the economic scheme, we have not only the right but the duty to try and prevent extra complications.

When we begin thinking of these questions (which are none the less urgent because their final solution lies a few generations further off), we see, if we are frank with ourselves, that the sole criterion for action is one of racial and social aspirations, not of population needs. There is a limited area of the world's surface—Africa—to be filled with people. With the suppression of wars and slave raids, and the encouragement of health and agriculture, population pressure will fill it in what, biologically speaking, is a very short space of time. We are at present going on the assumption that over much of Africa the filling process could be equally well accomplished, merely as a physical fact, by whites or by blacks. The only question of long-range principle of apportioning areas for native occupation, therefore, is this—how much of the surface of Africa would we like to see reserved for the growth of an essentially black civilisation, how much for the growth of one which is primarily white? And in deciding this we have to take into account a number of factors. First there is the existing native population and its present requirements in land. As I have said, however, these are minimum requirements, and there are many areas which are to-day grossly under-populated. The next is the suitability of a given area for white settlement. There are some regions in which it is difficult or impossible for the white human organism to live permanently; and there are many others in which he could exist, work and reproduce, but where the black organism could exist with much more comfort, work with much greater efficiency, and reproduce with much greater freedom. Such areas should be reserved for the growth of native civilisations; if white planters are to be allowed to settle there at all,

[1] Since this was written I find that Professor Thompson, who is certainly a responsible person, has advocated this very thing in his book. He would seem to be so much obsessed by population pressure that he shuts his eyes to the biological perspective of the matter, and therefore puts a temporary adjustment of Indian pressure above the more lasting achievement of a true African civilisation.

they must be few, and they must reconcile themselves to being strangers in the land, as they would if they settled in China or the country of any other alien civilisation. Within tropical Africa there remain the highland areas, in which both white and black can live and work on more or less equal terms, and those very few high areas to whose temperature, it would seem probable, the white man is actually better adapted than the native African (though the altitude may be bad for the hearts and nerves of both). The die is here cast, and the principle of reserving some of this land for white settlement is now recognised What is not decided, however, is the proportion of such areas to be reserved to Europeans, and the density of the white settlement which is envisaged The only rights which Europe has in the matter are those of conquest, occupation, and superior power. What she proposes to do in detail will depend upon how she tempers those rights derived from power with the principles of corresponding duties, and with considerations of long-range efficiency.

For instance, Western civilisation seems to have tacitly accepted the general principle explicitly laid down in Lugard's *Dual Mandate*, that colonial powers have a double duty, not only of protecting native populations and promoting their development, but also of making available the resources of the country to the world as a whole

Policy must thus often be a compromise, for the two duties by no means invariably point in the same direction Where the world has need of African crops or minerals and cannot get them without white settlement, or can get them better with white settlement, then white settlement is, to our present view, legitimate However, there may well be cases in which, though legitimate, it might not be desirable For instance, if the area suitable for whites was small and was in the middle of a larger area where native production and native development was being pushed forward, it might legitimately be felt that the difficulties created by a white island would overshadow the increased production of certain special crops This is the situation in parts of Tanganyika to-day The influence of extensive white settlement on native social life must also be considered If it disorganises tribal life by withdrawing the majority of able-bodied men from their villages for large parts of the year, is this not a grave disadvantage, economic as well as social, to set against the advantages it confers? Parts of Rhodesia are said to be now almost bare of men owing to the magnet of highly paid employment in the Rhodesian and Congo mines.

Then are you to restrict the white man in tropical Africa to supervisory functions, so that, even in the 'white' areas, natives

will always be in a very great majority? or do you wish to have a civilisation in which the numbers of whites are not overwhelmingly disproportionate to those of the blacks? In the latter case, of course, you must envisage white men engaged in various quite subordinate kinds of work, including skilled if not unskilled labour, and therefore in competition with natives; and you must face the terrifying possibility that a 'poor white' spectre may arise in tropical as in temperate Africa to haunt and mock the civilisation which has given it birth.

Further, from the point of view of the world at large, are you going to exploit the resources of tropical Africa more efficiently if you bring in a large population of white men, whose standard of living is high, or if you rely as much as possible on the labour of independent native producers?

At the moment we do not know for certain if white men can continue to live and reproduce without impairment of health or efficiency in tropical Africa, even in the highlands. Though we can foresee that white immigration on a large scale might easily lead to grave difficulties, such as a 'poor white' section of the community, economic friction between white and black, or excessive demands for native labour, we find it much harder to see how such difficulties could be effectively guarded against. And we have no reason to suppose that a large white community would be more efficient than a small but picked one for promoting the material prosperity and development of the country as a whole. In the circumstances it would seem wise to go slow, and to envisage the white population of tropical Africa, settlers and traders as well as Government servants, as a limited and selected body of men on whom devolves the duty of acting as the agents of Europe in the dual task of supplying the rest of the world with what they want from Africa, and of helping Africa to develop along the lines best suited to her own people and her own conditions.

I have so far refrained from discussing General Smuts' very definite ideas of land and settlement policy in East Africa, as set forth in his recently published Rhodes Lectures (*Africa and Some World Problems*). His conclusions, however, are so different from mine, and seem to me to lead to such a curious and undesirable compromise, that they demand a detailed consideration.[1]

[1] This article was written before I knew of Mr. J. H. Oldham's little book, *White and Black in Africa: a Critical Examination of the Rhodes Lectures of General Smuts* (Longmans, Green & Co.), which was published while I was still in the tropics. It is, I think, interesting that my general conclusions, arrived at quite independently and from a different standpoint, agree closely with his.

With regard to the actual areas reserved for white settlement, the geographical considerations so forcibly put forward by General Smuts must clearly weigh with us—namely, the existence of an almost continuous belt of high land, much of it suitable for white settlement, from Kenya through Tanganyika and Nyasaland to Rhodesia and South Africa. The idea of a new area of continuous white civilisation from the Cape to north of the equator has undoubtedly a potent attraction, and should dictate the broad outlines of any policy of territorial segregation as between white and black. But that is a dream for the future; while it is desirable that nothing immediate we do in the way of encouraging native development will prevent its possible realisation later, for the present other factors should dictate the actual allotment of land to white immigrants. The desirability of going slow is one; and the other is the need for giving white communities the best possible chance of success. This cannot be done by scattered or haphazard settlement. Definite areas of reasonable but restricted size should be opened up in succession, and some trouble should be taken to plan each venture and to guide its development as a single whole; each area can then be enlarged as circumstances allow. In this way we shall get experimental cultures, so to speak, of white civilisation in different parts of Africa, and find out what white settlement can do under various conditions. If they work satisfactorily we can gradually encourage their extension until they join up into a more or less continuous area of white settlement, or at least white predominance. If they do not, we can relinquish the 'white backbone' idea without too much disappointment and without having prejudiced other methods of helping Africa's development.[a]

In any case, a consideration which ought *not* to weigh with us is the possibility (envisaged by General Smuts on p. 64 of his book) of using the 'vast empty spaces' of Africa in the attempt to reduce unemployment in Britain. In the first place, the remedy is in itself, not a remedy, but a mere palliative; problems of population can only be solved biologically, and not by such mechanical means. But in this particular case the palliative would not even palliate appreciably. The total white population of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Nyasaland, and Northern Rhodesia in 1926 was about 25,000. To-day it appears to be rather less than double that figure. The most intensive schemes of settlement could not hope to add much more than

[a] General Smuts writes as if lands above 4000 feet were always, or usually, suitable for white settlement. This is not the case: in certain regions much of this land is mere dry scrub, barren and hot. The 'white backbone' could not, as a matter of fact, be really continuous.

10,000 a year to this white population without dislocating the region's whole economic life; and this quantity is often exceeded in the monthly fluctuations of our unemployed, who now amount to over 1¾ millions. In other words, we could not hope to reduce unemployment even by 1 per cent. by dumping unemployed men in tropical East Africa. Further, unless General Smuts envisages the presence in Central Africa of large numbers of white artisans and clerks as well as of settlers, which would enormously increase inter-racial difficulties, the most prolific sources of our unemployment would hardly be touched. As the population of Great Britain will, within a decade or so, be either stationary or declining, and as this fact and the practice of birth-control will alter the whole problem as far as it concerns later generations, we are justified in dismissing from our minds emigration to Africa as having any real relevance to unemployment. It is, if I may be Hibernian, a fleabite in an ocean, and a temporary ocean at that.

Apart from drawing attention to geographical facts, General Smuts lays down two principles. One is that any enduring or desirable African civilisation can only be based on rather intensive permanent white settlement in all areas where permanent white settlement is possible; for East Africa he would include in this area roughly all land of over 4000 feet elevation. The other is that there should be territorial segregation of white and black. All areas not reserved for white settlement should be reserved for natives, and they should be there encouraged to develop along their own lines, with the maximum amount of responsibility for their local self-government. But the fewest possible number of natives should be allowed to live in white areas, and *vice versâ*.

I may quote a few of his own words to illustrate the meaning which he attaches to his first principle. On p. 67 he says that, as foundation for the future civilisation of Africa, 'a large white population seems to be a *sine qua non*'; and it is difficult to imagine a white population which shall be large and not contain many skilled workers, clerks, and technically trained men, who would then compete quite unnecessarily and very unpleasantly with the natives we have been laboriously educating to take up just such work. On p. 55 he says that 'the wasteful character of native production is being realised' even, I understand him to mean, in West Africa; and on p. 51 writes that 'the white settler is the most effective and expeditious means of pushing forward the economic progress of the continent.' And finally (p. 50) we read: 'granting in principle that native interests should rank first, I still submit that white settlement under proper safeguards remains the best means to give effect to that priority'—in fact, that it is always better, as a means of fostering native develop-

ment, 'to have natives working for white masters than for themselves.

General Smuts, in fact, quite definitely regards native production as a *pis aller*, a second-best to white settlers producing with the aid of native labour; he lays stress on the *rapidity* of white exploitation of African resources, without discussing whether this will conduce to ultimate stability or no; and he quite definitely prefers that the future civilisation of Africa should be dominated from the start by the ideas of an immigrant white community rather than that it might develop along lines of its own, though, of course, profiting by Western ideas under the guidance of administrators and missionaries.

It is impossible not to sympathise in many ways with the idea of the 'white backbone.' The ample grandeur of Rhodes' ideas has captured the imagination of General Smuts, and this is the form in which he sees them realising themselves in the future. But he goes too fast; he takes too many things for granted; and he fails to envisage the essential differences between temperate and sub-tropical Africa on the one hand, with abundant areas as suitable for Europeans as for natives to live in, and tropical Africa on the other, where much of the area is definitely unsuited to white settlement, and the bulk of it better suited to black than to white. As a minor detail, he also overrates considerably the amount of fertile land at low levels When he states (p 56) that in addition to the highlands over 4000 feet, which he would reserve for white settlement, there are 'immensely larger areas of fertile lowlands and river valleys,' this is simply not true for some of the territories concerned. In Kenya, for instance, the greater proportion of such land is desert or semi-desert, as little suited to native agriculture as to white

He very airily dismisses native production as wasteful, and therefore a second-best to white settlement. This is not, however, the general view in Tanganyika and Uganda, and from what I can gather is quite contrary to the facts in West Africa. General Smuts, I believe, has never been in the Gold Coast or Nigeria: perhaps a visit to these coast-lines, which are prosperous in spite of the alienation of any land to white settlers being virtually prohibited, except for certain limited purposes, would cause him to modify his views. Do not let us forget, for instance, that the Gold Coast produces more than half of the world's cocoa, and all by native production.

But the real weakness of General Smuts' position appears when we follow out the effect of his two policies, white and black, upon each other.

He definitely lays down (pp. 98-99) that we should force the native wage-earner to retain his home in the native areas by

compelling married native women to stay permanently in the reserves and prohibiting men from being engaged by white employers if they are accompanied by their wives and children. This, he admits, will be difficult, since many white men prefer (not unnaturally !) their houseboys to live with their wives, and since the general experience of employers of native labour, including such important bodies as the Kenya and Uganda Railway, is that the men are more contented, work better, and stay for longer spells if they are encouraged to bring their families.

Personally I cannot imagine any proposal more calculated to hinder the development of a stable African civilisation than a system which would always ensure that a large proportion (for with intensive white settlement it would be a large proportion) of married native men would be separated from their wives and homes for six or even three months out of every twelve, and that the native villages would always contain a large proportion of grass-widows.

Even if you adopt the principle of intensive white settlement of a 'white backbone,' this state of affairs could still be avoided, but only by encouraging squatter settlements and model native villages in the white area. Not only, however, would this sacrifice General Smuts' cherished principle of territorial segregation, but such mixing of the races in close proximity clearly contains the germs of many grave difficulties for the future—as regards land for instance, or racial discrimination. And the greater the extent of the white area and the more intensive its settlement, the more acute will every such difficulty become. General Smuts' solution, to my mind, is no solution at all: it is the setting up on an equal basis of two principles which are both admirable *in vacuo*, but which cannot be prevented from interacting and by their interaction producing a crop of highly undesirable results. One of them must relinquish its claim to equality; in the tropical parts of Africa this must surely be the principle of white settlement and white production. We are committed by the facts of history and by official promises to some degree of white settlement in East Africa; and for some purposes, both economic and political, white settlement is necessary, or at least very desirable. But white settlement should, as regards the interests of the country as a whole, be, not equal, but subordinate to native development and native production. And if it is definitely regarded as subordinate, the violent clash and wholesale difficulties inherent in General Smuts' scheme would be avoided. This is not to imply that difficulties will not arise under any scheme, or that white settlement, even on a small and carefully regulated scale, will not involve compromise. All government involves compromise; and all contact of markedly different races

and cultures brings peculiarly difficult problems. But at least, if white settlement is not regarded as an end in itself, but as subordinate to the general progress of a country in which the social and economic development of the native population is the first aim, then difficulties can be adjusted as they arise. Compromise is the oil of the social machine; but if the machine incorporates two antagonistic principles of equal driving power, no amount of oil will ensure efficient working.

JULIAN S HUXLEY.

WOMEN AND PRIESTHOOD

'For any sane person the thing is so absolutely grotesque that he must refuse to discuss it.' The quotation is from an editorial comment in the *Church Times* of July 24, 1914; and the 'thing' that no sane person would discuss is the ordination of women to the priesthood.

> The monstrous regiment of women in politics [continued the *Church Times*] would be bad enough, but the monstrous regiment of priestesses would be a thousandfold worse. We are not inclined, however, to treat the proposed Conference [on the subject] as a sane scheme; we regard it as of a piece with that epidemic of hysteria which has manifested itself in the violence of feminine militants. It will pass with time . . .

The point of view of the *Guardian* was very much the same as that of the *Church Times*. Reference was made in the issue of July 16, 1914, to a 'preposterous' suggestion which 'emanates chiefly, if not entirely, from a little band of women who have pushed the claims of their sex to such a point that they have lost all sense of proportion.' And in the next week's issue there appeared a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury in which the writer, Mr Athelstan Riley, alluded to the assertion of 'the equality of men and women in the sight of God—equality in privilege, equality in calling, equality in opportunity of service' —as 'very mischievous nonsense,' the acceptance of which 'would make the Church of England a laughing-stock throughout Christendom.' Mr Riley professed himself to be aghast at the self-deception of those who were raising the question of the ordination of women, and asserted that they were snatching at empty shadows which could never satisfy their higher nature.

The monstrous regiment of women in politics seems nowadays a very tame affair; the leader of the epidemic of militant hysteria has had a statue to her memory unveiled by an ex-Prime Minister, and, so far from having died away, as the *Church Times* prophesied, concern with reference to women's ordination has now spread to the episcopate itself.

The prelates at this time in conference at Lambeth have received for their consideration a memorandum on the subject very carefully compiled by a group of Anglican men and women

working with the encouragement and under the guidance of an episcopal chairman. Among the memorial's signatories are four bishops, four deans, an archdeacon, eight canons, four doctors of divinity, two principals of clergy-training colleges, one rural dean, and five parochial clergy. Exactly what reception the memorial will receive it is difficult to anticipate, but no one in the least acquainted with the present episcopacy can suppose it possible that the tone of any comments which will be made will at all resemble the vituperative shrillness of the Church Press of 1914

It is clear that the compilers of the memorandum are very far from expecting the bishops to set about ordaining women to-morrow. They are engaged in no 'conspiracy to capture the priesthood for women'—to quote once more the phraseology of 1914 The memorandum shows no failure to realise that the exercise of a vocation within the Church depends upon the Church's recognition of the validity of that vocation Indeed, it is because of this realisation that the memorandum has been put forward. Perhaps the most impressive section is the final appendix, which consists of statements, quoted for the most part from letters, by women who believe that they have a call to the priesthood It is impossible to think that these letters can be ignored by a body of men met together in virtue of the fact that they themselves are aware of a call which the Church *has* recognised. The statements will inevitably revive for them the recognition of their own vocation and the response with which, as young men, they found their own claim to consideration received by the Church They will find themselves thinking of the encouragement and the welcome given them, of the way in which their doubts and hesitancies were understandingly eradicated, and their aspirations strengthened and affirmed. They may find themselves wondering how they would have felt had their sense of vocation been incontinently ruled out as necessarily presumptuous, based upon self-deception or conceit, and obviously unworthy of a moment's serious consideration. Possibly some will find themselves forced to admit either that such a reception would have embittered them against the Church, or that it would have caused their own convictions to dwindle into nothingness. Others may find themselves admitting that, had their disability been universally assumed in advance, their vocation would not have revealed itself to them at all

There is very little, if any, bitterness in the statements quoted in the memorandum. One writer says: 'I tried to strangle it'—*i.e.*, her sense of vocation to the priesthood—'in bitterness against religion, but without success.' Another: 'The only thing I can see is to teach divinity in girls schools.

While I like this and think it well worth doing, it does not give me what my vocation demands.' Another: 'I did go through a period of intense spiritual bitterness, but all that passed.' (Although her bitterness passed her sense of vocation did not pass.) Another: 'There is something which I can hardly put into words which makes it very difficult to let it be known that one believes herself called to this work. If there were any authority to which the vocation could be submitted (as in the case of men) it would be simple. But as the claim rests entirely on one's own personal judgment, which no one in authority will ever examine or confirm, the sense of being presumptuous is very difficult to overcome.' Yet another: 'When I left school I was quite sure that, if it had been possible, I should have sought ordination. . . . I love teaching and have no sense of having lived a frustrated life, but am perfectly conscious that for me it is only a substitute.'

Seventeen women—most of them with good academic qualifications and with practical experience in social work or in teaching—have agreed to the inclusion of their statements in the memorandum. How many women share the experience of these seventeen it is impossible to know—probably a considerable number; but whether there are seventeen, or seventy, or seven hundred is not the point. If there were only one woman with a sense of vocation to the priesthood, the question at issue would be the same. What has to be faced is quite simple: Is there any *principle* against the ordination of a woman? Is a woman who believes herself called to the office by God necessarily deluded? Is there something in womanhood, as womanhood, that debars a woman from the priesthood? Now that the sense of vocation in seventeen women has been made articulate and has been presented to the bishops in conference with a request for judgment, the time is clearly past in which it was enough to say: 'The thing is unthinkable; it has been settled once and for all. Moreover, women do not seek to be ordained.' It is difficult to think that the bishops—men whose sense of vocation is a reality—will be able to dismiss such an appeal with a curt command to put away the thought of ordination as a temptation of the devil. 'One deep calleth another.' The bishops are men who have themselves experienced God's call to the priesthood; they have, moreover, recognised the call in other men. They will, surely, as they read the letters of these women, recognise the call again. It is difficult to suppose that they who have found in the exercise of their vocation a sacred privilege capable of bringing deep spiritual satisfaction should placidly seek to dissuade these others from 'snatching at an empty shadow which can never satisfy their higher natures.'

It will be urged by many who are themselves outside the Church that the futility lies, not in the fact that women are seeking something which is and must be the exclusive prerogative of men, but in the fact that the whole notion of the priesthood is out of date and absurd Obviously, if one does not believe in the Church, one does not feel the need of ministers in the Church. If one does not want to have priests, one does not want to have women priests. To argue the general question of the value of the priesthood would be beyond the scope of this article. It may be worth while, however, to emphasise the fact that the women whose statements are quoted in this memorial have a very genuine belief in the Church and in her need for priests. They have not put foward their statements in the spirit attributed to them by the Church Press of 1914. They are not 'claiming' admission to a 'profession' on feminist grounds. They are not insisting that to exclude women from the ministry is 'unfair' or 'unjust' to the women The writers quoted do not want to be priests in order to prove that there is nothing men can do which women cannot do; they do not want to be priests primarily because they feel that that there is need for the expression in the pulpit of 'the woman's point of view,' or need in the confessional for help which 'only a woman can give a woman.' They want to be priests for the same reasons that certain men want to be priests; they feel that God has given to them a call to serve Him and His Church in a particular way—a call which, in their eyes, would not be fulfilled by, for instance, ministry in any of the Free Churches. They believe that *incidentally* much good might come of the women's special appeal, but it is important to state clearly that they do not desire priesthood as the last step forward for feminism, but as a means towards the coming of the Kingdom of Christ. The weight of custom appears to them to be quenching the Spirit of God, and the loss to the Church appears to them lamentable. Again, none of these women is asserting that she has a vocation which she ought to be allowed to exercise immediately and without scrutiny Any of them would take for granted, and indeed would feel an urgent need of, both testing and training before ordination.

It is difficult for those who have for long been accustomed to the idea of women priests, and whose own shock of surprise at the notion became a thing of the past a generation ago, to reiterate with any degree of freshness the counter-arguments to the objections put forward by those who continue to be distressed or enraged by the notion. 'Christ took upon Him the form of a man, not of a woman': true, but it is His humanity, and not His sex, that is essential to His incarnation. 'Christ chose none but men to be apostles': admitted, but neither did he choose a

gentile. 'St. Paul forbade women to speak in the Church': yes, but St. Paul was making regulations in a pagan city in the first century. 'Christian tradition supports the sex-limitation': it does, but it also supported slavery. 'A woman's physiological constitution is different from a man's': it is, but priesthood calls for no feats of physical endurance greater than those expected of, say, women doctors. One might easily prolong the to-and-fro of argument; but the exercise has some resemblance to a game of badminton played by opponents whose interests lie elsewhere.

It is doubtful whether any of the arguments brought forward against the admission of women to the priesthood have, at any rate for more than a few moments, seemed significant to anyone who did not, independently of argument, feel that there was something unseemly in the idea. Some people admit frankly that they can see no reason against having women priests, but that they would feel uncomfortable if they came into a church and saw a woman at the altar or at the confessional. There seems to be something very deeply rooted in nearly all Catholics which is moved to distress or to hostility when the idea of women priests is first brought to their notice In some cases the emotional reaction is brief, in other cases it is protracted, but it is very rarely absent altogether. An objection which is based, not upon reason, but upon an instinctive emotional reaction, may be a sound objection or it may not The subconscious, as Myers pointed out years ago, may be either a treasure-house or a rubbish-heap, and the same is probably true of the unconscious, if by that controversial term we may be allowed to designate whatever it is that stimulates a person to mental activity which he not only does not but cannot analyse

The distress experienced by most Churchpeople fifteen or twenty years ago upon first meeting with the suggestion that women should be priests could scarcely have been more extreme had the suggestion been one sympathetic to, shall we say, incest. Are we, then, to assume that the instinctive reaction in the one case is necessarily as well justified as in the other? Surely not. An instinctive reaction may be valuable under certain conditions and worthless under others. When a lamb grows too big to stand beneath the ewe at time of suckling, it learns to kneel. This is a valuable reaction But the cade lamb, when it has reached the same stature as this ewe-fed lamb, kneels too—a reaction wholly futile when its nourishment comes from a bottle in the adaptable hand of the farmer's wife. It is possible for civilised human beings to resemble the cade lamb and to react instinctively to one situation in a manner appropriate only to another. The people who dread to see women priests in England

in the twentieth century are like dogs trying to bury a bone in the drawing-room carpet.

The choice of metaphors must not, of course, be taken as implying that civilised life can do without those primitive elemental things which may be symbolised by mother's milk and mother earth. To set up as praiseworthy a world of feeding-bottles and drawing-room carpets and to depreciate the breast and the soil is not in the least the intention of this article. It is the writer's firm belief that the primitive elemental things 'birth, and copulation, and death,' along with the rhythm of the seasons and the crops, have intense primitive value, and will have so long as the world endures, but that Mr T S Eliot's Sweeney is wrong in asserting that 'That's all, that's all, that's all, that's all, . that's all the facts when you come to brass tacks' It is the firm belief of the writer of this article that there are also two other facts—creative religion and creative art—which have an equally intense positive value, and, furthermore, that these two facts are in a unique relation to all that Mr. T S Eliot sums up in Sweeney's formula

To work out the analogies between the creative religion of the sacraments (' the outward and visible signs of inward and spiritual grace') and the creative art which has been defined as the 'expression in a medium of an æsthetic impression which has been apprehended as worth while in itself,' and to analyse the relation of both to 'birth, and copulation, and death,' would take a great deal more space than is available here It must suffice to suggest that in such an analogy and in such an analysis may be found the basis for a rational explanation of the age-long hostility to the admission of women to the Christian priesthood. A Christian woman priest has for generation upon generation been taboo Certain taboos (*e g* , that upon incest) may reveal themselves as in accordance with rational ethical judgments which have a binding power of permanent value Others—as those upon the woman doctor, the woman nurse, or the woman priest—have had a value which has proved itself to be transient. The taboo upon women priests is out of accord with a condition of affairs which includes an articulately expressed need on the part of women for the opportunity to share with men the human activity of creative religion.

It is more than likely that these latter paragraphs will seem to the reader both fantastic and obscure Their relevance to the earlier sections is, however, so fundamental, in the opinion of the writer, that it would have been disingenuous to have omitted them.

To return from these speculative regions of psychology and metaphysics to the issue of the moment, and to put that issue in

its simplest form: certain women believe that they are called of God to serve Him in the priesthood; certain priests, certain bishops even, believe that these women are indeed called of God; these facts are being brought before the conference of bishops now assembled at Lambeth. It is clear that this is not a question only for the bishops and for the women who think that they have a call; it is a question for all Churchpeople. Either a number of serious-minded women are deluding themselves and others, including many leaders of the Church, with regard to a very important issue, or the weight of custom is quenching the Spirit of God. This article is put forward primarily as a plea that no Church person should dismiss the question without thinking about it, and that no Church person should think about it without praying about it.

URSULA ROBERTS.

EUGENICAL REFORM—THE PLUTOCRACY

I

THIS article is the second of a series intended to elucidate the obstacles in the way of so reorganising our institutions that they would cease to function dysgenically and to inhibit our efforts to improve man as a biological organism The series contemplates also a eugenical reform of the House of Lords, of the democracy, and of the intelligentsia , but only the article on the House of Lords has so far appeared, in the *Eugenics Review* for January 1929.

Now a reform of the House of Lords may at first appear a very hopeless and reactionary undertaking But it makes a convenient starting-point for an attempt to sublimate human snobbishness into a basis for positive eugenics, to transform our present 'nobility' into a real aristocracy, and to stimulate everywhere an appreciation of aristocracy in the original and proper sense of the word—*i e*, a regard for human excellence. Its intention was so to modify public opinion that institutions aiming at the improvement of the human stock could grow in it. Thus the reform of the House of Lords was to be a starting-point on the path of progress, the easiest, and perhaps the nearest, to a very distant goal.

It was not, however, overlooked that actually the House of Lords is a stronghold of the plutocracy, and little more than a clubhouse for the rich. Nor yet that the plutocracy is one of the great social forces which need to be converted to eugenics if eugenical progress is to be achieved It may, indeed, be regarded as the most difficult and important to convert It is certainly the most ubiquitous For all capitalistically organised societies, and perhaps even those which profess communism, have plutocracies to a greater or less extent , so that many 'democracies' may well be camouflaged plutocracies In America, for example, the plutocracy is clearly very powerful, and though it need not be contended that it is the *dominant* factor in American political life, a plausible case might be made out for this contention.

I

Plutocracy may fairly be called the most elusive of all political institutions. It is often very hard to detect and to drag forth into the light of day. For it prefers to work unseen, and the infinite ramifications of corruption and graft which it injects into the body politic may well elude the most lynx-eyed investigator. Not that plutocracy has not an overt side: under favourable conditions a social display of wealth is possible, and indeed occurs wherever this does not too promptly entail the unwelcome attentions of the taxgatherer or the executioner. But the display of its power is not essential to the being of plutocracy. It can just as well keep in the background, and work in the dark, beneath the surface of political life. It resembles an iceberg in that nine-tenths of its extent escape the eye; but it can also, like a fungus, send forth tentacles to pervade, corrupt, and transform all political and social institutions. Like a termite, it can undermine all constitutions, corroding their whole substance and leaving only a deceptive *façade* which crumbles at the merest touch of adversity. Like a very Proteus, it can assume all forms and tempt all characters, for money is a means to all objects of desire and a frequent motive for all acts. In short, it is a very formidable power, and to succeed, eugenics must win it over to its side.

II

But plutocracy has also curious weaknesses. It has the defects of its qualities. It has, for example, the demonic rather than divine quality of being no respecter of persons. Thanks largely to the occultness of its power, it tends to impersonality, and even to hostility to personality. Hence, though plutocracy endures, plutocrats do not. They have not the staying power of monarchs and aristocrats. No dynasty of millionaires, not even the Rothschilds, Vanderbilts and Morgans, has yet lasted for centuries, like the dynasties of kings or the ancient houses of nobility.

Nor is the reason for this phenomenon far to seek. Plutocracy is definitely more demoralising, or rather more enervating, than the other forms of power, and saps the strength of those who wield it even more rapidly. In a monarchical dynasty there has usually been a great deal of natural selection. In former days fool-killing apparatus was plentiful and effective, even when it stopped short of the extreme Oriental method of procuring a capable ruler—namely, systematic civil war among the offspring of a deceased ruler. Right down into our times kings who got

too insane, or idiotic, or profligate, have been deprived of their thrones and their places have been taken by more efficient or reputable relatives.

For the royal clan generally formed a matrix in which, in spite of multitudinous temptations, efficiency could grow up and ability could come to the fore. Moreover, a strong *esprit de corps* was generated, and an ample field for ambition and endeavour was generally open. Even where a king had only one son to inherit his crown and no further complications, his relations to his successor were generally such as to demand a strenuous life from both of them and to put a premium on intelligence and circumspection. The wearers of a crown might sleep uneasily, but for this very reason they could not sink into total torpor.

What is true of monarchies very largely holds also of aristocracies. They, too, were practically forced to develop a strong family spirit, capable of stimulating, training, disciplining, and in the last resort controlling, their erring members. The maxim *noblesse oblige* and the *bushido* of the Japanese *Samurai* indicate this moral backbone of aristocratic power. Nor should it ever be forgotten that the greatest political achievement on record, the transformation of mediæval into modern Japan, of an impotent feudal State into a great world-power within the brief space of a single generation, stands to the credit of an aristocracy. From this point of view also *primogeniture* is an entirely rational and defensible institution. It is not merely that it produces 'only one fool in a family,' but that it directly stimulates ambition, and offers to the younger sons of noble families careers and possibilities of public service which could not have been afforded them if they had had to rise from the ranks. Social philosophers are apt to overlook how much energy is expended by the able merely in rising, and that this energy is merely wasted from the social point of view. Could the able only be discovered at twenty instead of at fifty, would not the world enjoy their services for the thirty best years of their life? But in a democratic State it is simply inconceivable that anyone, even an athlete or a film star, should become Prime Minister at twenty-three, like the younger Pitt, and by the time a politician has become of national importance he is nearly always past his prime. The achievements of the *cadets* everywhere, then, stand to the credit of aristocracy.

But when we come to plutocracy we behold a radically different picture. The plutocrat is one of the most uncontrollable of social forces. He can make money out of anything, from salutary invention and the organisation of new industries to speculation and corruptly acquired monopolies. Once he has made his money the *non olet* principle begins to apply. Ill-gotten

gains are just as powerful as the rewards of ingenuity and enterprise. Nor is he bound to use his money in any specified manner. The plutocrat is not, as such, under any obligation to anybody. True, he may not be, and very often is not, a lover of money for its own sake. He may have taken to money-making merely because he recognised money as the most universal, most liquid, and most pervasive form of power. He may merely have perceived its unique advantage—namely, that it is enough to be known to possess riches, and that he need not *spend* his money to enjoy the power it confers.

III

Having made his fortune, he can pretty well do as he likes with it. He can spend it or accumulate it as he pleases. He need not even live conspicuously. Indeed, both his power and his sense of power may be all the greater if he does not display his wealth but leaves it latent and lets its influence percolate through the social structure secretly

Nor need he found a family. He may prefer to found an institution or to endow a craze. In America he very often does. In England he more often buys a title from the politicians who recognise his 'public services' (*and* his contributions to their party funds !), in order to please his wife and children, thereby recruiting the 'nobility.' But in so doing he is perhaps greasing the wheels of 'democracy' rather than exercising plutocratic influence, and the British method of financing politics is far less harmful socially than the American method of buying legislation. And even when the plutocrat has been 'ennobled' his family feeling is apt to be less intense and exacting than that of the old nobility : besides, he has often been too busy and too intent to shun delights and live laborious days to have much of a family. The money-maker rarely attains his end without sacrificing many things to Mammon, his god, in his own person.

IV

But his own sacrifices are nothing to those he imposes on his descendants and heirs. To these, under our present dispensation Mammon all too often proves to be another name for Moloch He becomes a monster arrayed in the girdle of Aphrodite and accompanied by Dionysus, the Muses and all the Graces, who corrupts their nature and destroys their life ; while they all unwitting become his joyous victims. Much more attention than is usual ought to be bestowed upon the moral and biological effects of inherited wealth upon the stock of its possessors Actually one of the quickest ways of exterminating a stock

would seem to be to endow it with great wealth. The ancients were far more alive to the destructiveness of what they called 'luxury'; we have been far too blind to the truth contained in their moralistic cant.

The truth is that, with our present provision for dealing with it, money acts in some respects as a racial poison. Even the liquidity of money power has serious disadvantages. Not only can it easily flow away again from the favourites of fortune—perhaps owing to circumstances beyond their control—but it is far too easily transferable to other hands to serve as a criterion of social fitness. Owing to the whims and vices of its possessors it gets 'dissipated' with them.

In former days it used to be a universal literary convention that the son of a rich man must be a spendthrift; nowadays this possibility is less obvious or less emphasised It may be that the social classes from which plutocrats arise have become more immune to the allurements of prodigality and so more retentive of wealth; or it may merely be that accumulations have grown so vast that few prodigals know how they can spend so much. At any rate, the old adage 'three generations from shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves' no longer seems to hold extensively. It is rather 'three generations from shirtsleeves to tombstone.'

But though mere prodigality is no longer so fatal to great fortunes as it was, the liquidity of wealth still works great havoc with the personnel of the plutocracy A millionaire's son is still very apt to lavish his wealth on actresses, and his health on bacchanalia, and his daughter to become the bride of a groom or a handsome 'good-for-nothing' There is not, therefore, much guarantee that money will remain in the strong hands that made it, nor that the qualities which earned it will be found also in the hands into which it passes. If these qualities are valuable—and if not, why were they so lavishly rewarded?—there is no adequate provision in our society for their perpetuation.

Riches, moreover, are not only slippery and elusive, but also directly demoralising In our modern capitalistic societies they provide the most effective stimulus to exertion—and the greatest allurement to work *before* they are gained; they function as the normal reward of labour, of ability, of distinction of every sort, as the source of honour and of power *after* they are gained. But they then also destroy the strongest motives to exertion and efficiency and almost inevitably entail degeneration. Thus the classes which produce and inherit wealth are largely paralysed by it. It puts them in the position of having what most men have to work for, but it provides them with no other work or useful social function. It does not overtly empower them to rule and to feel responsible for the conduct of affairs; for all our capitalistic

States profess to be 'democracies,' and plutocratic influence is exercised in secret. Thus the rich young man is deprived of the most urgent motive for exertion, the most available reward of ambition; the sinews of his energies are severed. Sooner or later he discovers, as in America, that there is virtually *no* career open to him. He has just to remain a rich man all his life, and nothing can be done for him. Society appears to have no use for *him*, though it is assiduous in begging for his money. Is it a wonder that he becomes useless to those who will not use him?

Nor does society merely show itself indifferent to getting any work out of him, it also sets to work to corrupt him. Every temptation to idleness and dissipation is thrown in his way, his resistance to temptation is sapped by every conceivable device. He is condemned to be a drone, and a vicious drone at that; the marvel is that any escape from this doom.

V

All these facts are really familiar enough to us all, though they are rarely mentioned. Eugenical reflection is needed to render us aware of their whole monstrosity. It reveals that the social attitude towards inherited wealth is as idiotic as it is iniquitous. For, after all, the material which we take such pains to spoil is the best we have, and the way we treat it is an outrage. We first enact that wealth shall be the greatest common measure of ability of every sort, and its appropriate reward. We do not, indeed, bestow it in due proportion to the ability displayed, nor always show a just perception of the social value of the ability rewarded; but still wealth, more or less, attends success in every walk of life, and no other rewards are really recognised. For with singular shortsightedness our 'democracy' has swept away the power of kings and nobles and all the claims of hereditary privilege, and has emancipated itself from the spiritual powers and theocracies: for science and the power of intellect it has never acquired any real respect. The power of money alone has not been disputed or touched. For money is a power *all* can understand, an idol *all* can worship. With money our democracy rewards its favourites, whether they be film stars or politicians, jockeys or heavy-weights. Thus it has *de facto* abdicated in favour of a plutocracy.

But our democracy does not respect the plutocrat, nor recognise in him any *personal* superiority. It declares that all men are born equal and hankers after such an equality of opportunity that anyone can become a millionaire. But if he succeeds, envy arouses hatred and he is treated shockingly. *Sterilisation of the fit* is the first law of reproduction in our 'democratic'

societies. That is the inner meaning of the statistical fact that the birth rate contracts the higher we rise in the social scale. The refusal to *employ* the rich, which we have traced above, is the second social law. The third is the systematic corruption of the 'idle rich.' The total result, as I have now pointed out for many years, is an elaborate social mechanism for enabling ability to rise to the top, which pretty effectively drains all classes of their ability. But when it has risen, it is destroyed. This is comparable with skimming off and casting away your cream after it has risen, or churning it into froth. Surely so fatuous a social policy must be fatal to the *progress* of humanity, and in the long run even to its survival.

VI

No doubt, it will be said, but what can be done about it? What way can you suggest for extricating us from this disastrous situation?

I would suggest, first, a little lucid thinking about the future, a little forethought. This will have to be done by all who are capable of thinking and have leisure to think; for our politicians, whose job rational forethought might be supposed to be, never think far enough ahead. They are all opportunists, hopelessly mired in the details of politics.

Secondly, an obvious expedient to arrest the corruption of the descendants of the rich, and to make them work, is the abolition of inheritance. In England we seem to be moving in this direction, and it would only be necessary to raise the death duties to 100 per cent. to do the trick. I confess that this expedient seems to me more specious than sound. In the first place, while it might arrest the degeneration of the sons of the successful into our 'idle rich' class, it would do nothing to increase their number, but, if anything, diminish it. So, the law of the sterilisation of the fit would still be operative. Secondly, it would have tremendous repercussions on the whole social structure. It would rob the able of all but *purely selfish* motives to work. And I am inclined to think that their output of work would suffer seriously. To what extent, one could hardly say; but it would appear to be a counsel of the most elemental prudence to wait and see how the present *experimentum in corpore vili* of 'Holy Russia' ends. At any rate, to all who have not been able to persuade themselves that communism can form an enduring and progressive social order and are not willing to scrap all the strongest motives to exertion which have so far animated men, no real case for abandoning the individualistic ordering of society has yet been made out.

But there is a case for reforming it, and that in the interest of the individuals themselves. If we realise the folly of utterly subverting the social order, we shall have to reconcile ourselves to a certain measure of plutocracy; but it need not be the sort of plutocracy we labour under now. It rests with us to render plutocracy a blessing rather than a curse. For it is not impossible to make it socially valuable and to *use* it. It is not impossible to stop the spoiling of our best stocks and the wasting of the 'cream.' It is not impossible to reverse the dysgenic tendencies of civilisation and to make the social order an instrument of betterment rather than of deterioration.

VII

To those who doubt this, and demand to know by what means this great change can be accomplished, I can answer by one word: by Education But not by the education of those who are easy to educate, who crave for it and feel they need it, that is, of the poor, but by the education of those who are hard to educate, who do not want it but resist and resent it, that is, of the rich. And I know that this is a terribly arduous task

All through human history the education of the rich and powerful has been a sorry chapter, one of the great unsolved problems, one of the outstanding failures of the social order At no time, in no country, and under no constitution, whether monarchic, oligarchic or democratic, has society succeeded in giving to the children of its chief and ruling men sufficient stimulus and motive to exert themselves and to live worthily of their station and their ancestors, far less to persuade them to utilise their fortunate position in order to improve themselves and others. Of course, this source of weakness in all government did not escape the acumen of the Greeks We learn from Plato that it was a common topic of remark in the Athens of his time and that the common inference from it was that virtue could not be taught. And certainly the greatest schoolmen and sages have made but a sorry job of the teaching of princes From the days of Confucius and Plato down to that of the distinguished German professors who tried to instil some grasp of the realities of politics into the volatile mind of the Kaiser the record is one of all but unmitigated failure. Plato can hardly have been proud of Dionysius, even though we are told that he finally took to keeping a school, nor Seneca of Nero, even before he received his death warrant from his hands; and it is not easy to trace any influence of Aristotle on the world-conquering career of Alexander.

But should it be inferred that the lesson of history is that the problem is insoluble? That would be to recognise an insuperab

barrier to human progress. Before we do this, ought we not to explore other possibilities? Let us rather mobilise our educational experts, of whom every civilised community supports an ample number, and summon them to devise a system of training that will at least pave the way to a solution, even if it only succeeds in making Eton about as efficient an organon of education as the ordinary elementary school.

VIII

In order to help them I will try to analyse out some of the causes of past failure, and, to conclude with, will venture on a few constructive suggestions of my own. Presuming that we are agreed that the fundamental cause of failure is a failure to provide sufficient stimulus to exertion for those situated as are the offspring of the rich, we may yet discern some serious secondary flaws in every system of education that has hitherto been tried.

It is, for example, a remarkable fact, and surely more than a curious coincidence, that the aim of all education, both intellectual and moral, has hitherto been to turn the eye of the soul *backward* into the past and not *forward* to the future. Among the intellectual subjects of training the leading roles have been assigned to some ancient, obsolete and sacred language, and to the traditions of the tribe and the achievements of ancestors as enshrined in a highly selective but patriotically stirring version of history. Moral education has similarly appealed to the wisdom of antiquity, to sacred writings embodying an original unchanging and unprogressive revelation and to immemorial custom.

We are constantly assured that all this is salutary and even necessary to preserve social continuity, and to inculcate a spirit of reverence into the young, and there is doubtless much truth in this. But does it not harp somewhat monotonously on one string? And what stimulus to progress does it provide and to what ideals does it teach us to look forward? At no point in this handing down of the cultural tradition can one find any allusion to the many problems of human life yet to be solved, any appeal for resolute thought about them, any tonic for the reason, any effort to elicit a spirit of adventure, any admonition to the young to shoulder the great tasks yet to be accomplished in a greater and more glorious future.

Yet, is it not precisely to such appeals that the soul of youth most easily vibrates, and to which its very ignorance and innocence render it more sensible? We complain of the 'cynicism' of the young, and sigh, contentedly, *ah, si jeunesse savait, si vieillesse pouvait!* and overlook that in our present

dispensation youth is not *allowed* to try even the most harmless experiments with the most effete conventions, because the old have sealed their minds against new knowledge and lost their faith in social progress.

If we ask, Why have the tribes of men always assumed this obstructive attitude ? I fear we must answer that the real reason for their enormous emphasis on the past has been *selfish*. It has not been the good of the taught so much as the convenience of the teachers. Under the guise of arousing reverence for antiquity, of teaching the lessons of experience, of transmitting the traditions of the tribe, of preserving the continuity of its life, they have really aimed at inculcating respect for masters, pastors and parents, and so assuring their position. Otherwise, why is so much more stress laid on preservation than on progress, and why is not the continuity of life prolonged into the future ?

Thus education, instead of being conceived broadly as preparation for the *whole* of life, for the exploitation of all its possibilities, has been narrowed down to an instrument of social discipline, a means to conformity. It is essentially a method of controlling the young and subjugating their minds, or at best of keeping them out of mischief so far as possible

Of this sort of education our English public school-and-university training, especially in Oxford, is the *beau idéal* What is it but a subtle conspiracy skilfully designed to implant traditional customs and stereotyped ideas ? Both what is taught and what is omitted seems to have the underlying purpose of fostering a conservative bias in our leading minds and of stamping a caste-mark on the soul It succeeds only too well. Its stamp is indelible, like tattooing It turns out by the dozen polished sceptics who have never tried to know, and disillusioned cynics who have never tried to do, anything worth while

Of course, the system incidentally enlists also the services of many able and devoted men who strive to make the best of the conditions, and perform wonders in overcoming its limitations and keeping the system (relatively) sweet and fresh But the odds are heavily against them, and their activities hardly obscure the truth that the innermost aims of our social education, as well as its earliest and plainest manifestations, are best revealed, and can still best be studied, in the initiation rites of savages.[1]

[1] Since writing this I have read an excellent article by Mr J. Langdon Davi[es] in *Harper's Magazine* for April 1930 He points out that the social relations [of] youth, under the conditions of the public schools, are still those of savage lif[e] and that while some of their seniors are 'anti-savages' and resent the artifici[al] degradation into which they were plunged just to remind them of their origin[,] no 'civilised' education is in sight. I agree, but, to get it, it would not suffi[ce] to civilise the young 'savages'; we need also to change the attitude of the seniors and the aims of the 'education' they impose.

IX

These methods, however, raise a grave psychological question. Are they the best adapted to develop the minds of the young? This seems hardly credible. They may be good politics, but they are surely bad psychology. They fail to tap the reserves of energy and enterprise latent in the soul of youth.

Now here is where, I think, there is a great opening for us eugenists to come in. It ought to be possible, nay easy, to arouse in the young enthusiasm for our cause. For, unlike tribal training, eugenics is essentially an affair of the future. It looks to the future to redeem the past. It is full of promise. It is an adventure. It is pervasive of all the activities of life. It demands an all-round training of all our powers. It connects up directly and intimately with the most pressing problems in the lives of the young. It must moreover evoke personal pride and the spirit of emulation, yet its ideal is social and not selfish. Its appeal is to anyone who feels he is good for anything. What can be better calculated to appeal to the psychology of youth?

X

On this psychological basis in the mind of youth what educational institutions can we build? In the first place, it is clear that our education must be *selective*. We must pick out the able and segregate them from the common herd. We shall thus avoid one of the chief causes of educational waste and failure by the contamination of good, quick-witted minds by masses of dulness and stupidity which keep them back and drag them down. This is one of the great sources of weakness in American and German schools; it is less felt in English, because a clever boy is generally allowed to run up the school despite his youth, although, of course, it is only in a few of the best schools that there are enough clever boys to extend him fully. This selection of the capable means special schools for the *élite*; for it is worse than useless to waste resource and energy in striving, vainly, to turn sows' ears into silken purses.

Secondly, having selected and segregated our ability, which is to be also our nobility, we shall train it *competitively*. It will inevitably train itself in that way, and we need not fear that under these conditions it will fail to be extended to the utmost and developed to the full.

Thirdly, the educator's function will mainly be to put before the eugenical *élite* high ideals, and to see to it that their development is harmonious and explores alike the physical, the intellectual, and the moral avenues to excellence.

Fourthly, the appeal of eugenic education will be universal that is, it will reach all the classes which generate ability. It wil be so far democratic. But, for the reasons we have analysed, it appeal will make the greatest difference in the quarters where i is most needed, which are at present most deeply sunk in sloth most resistant to endeavour, and most indifferent to education Without assuming that at first all the children of the successfu will be found to have inherited the ability of their parents, w may fairly hope to draw many of our most valuable recruit from this class, and shall thereby materially restrict the ranks o the idle rich.

Lastly, if the scheme succeeds as it should do, its working wil *progressively* alter the conditions so as to increase its own effective ness. For in proportion as the products of our eugenical educatio increase in numbers and influence and display their superiority the *prestige*, the attractiveness, and ultimately the necessity, c such education will be impressed on all. It will become a con dition of success in life The antithesis and tension between th able and the rich will disappear, because we shall have devised mechanism which will induce the rich to develop their abilit and will reward the exercise of ability and excellence with wealt Thus shall we draw the poison-fangs of our present plutocrac and transform it into a true aristocracy. Nor need any eugenis be told that human societies *must* bring about the survival c their superior members and *must* recover the capacity fc *biological* improvement, if the progress of humanity is to b assured.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

(*To be continued*)

GRAPHOPOLIS—A UTOPIA FOR LITERATURE

PLATO, greatest of poets, banished poets from his Republic. On the other hand, the knights-errant of the Ideal would scorn the ideal State, and the land of dreams is not fit for dreamers Denounce the ugliness and vulgarity of our age as savagely as you please, and the poets are with you, but any definite scheme of reform will make the artistic temperament shudder. The poetic mind is invincibly attached to the picturesque past, and averse to the logical, purposive future. Victor Hugo abominated the metric system as much as Anatole France despised Esperanto, and Sir Hall Caine, worthily expressing the prejudices of his fellow-craftsmen, declared that 'Shakespeare's spelling was good enough for him' In our own day, George Moore may be considered as the *beau ideal* of consistent art worshippers, and to his mind social progress, including universal education, is 'not even a beautiful dream.' When genuine artists stoop to practical schemes of improvement they immediately lose caste Anatole France's *On the White Stone* is dismally Philistine Utopia is the paradise of the commonplace

This opposition between two kinds of prophets—poets and reformers—is a paradox and a problem The problem is not so fanciful for our own time and our own country as it may appear at first. Are we Americans losing poetic power because we are drawing dangerously near the dismal coast of Utopia? For in comparison with nineteenth-century Europe and its marvellous flowering of artistic genius, twentieth-century America is Utopia indeed. Our cataclysmic industrial progress, our appalling prosperity, our boundless democracy, our universities wide open to the masses, have outstripped the imaginings of such as Saint Simon and Cabet. Rabelais's *Thélème* is literally fulfilled in a great coeducational institution on the Pacific coast I heard Pastor Russell tell us that the millennium had begun in 1897: we had merely failed to realise the fullness of our beatitude We are already treading the pavements of the New Jerusalem. It is hard to conceive a material Utopia as far ahead of our present civilisation as we ourselves are of 'the Man with the Hoe.' We may travel much faster; we may add a telephote to our tele-

phone, and shake hands with distant friends through a tele-dactyl; we may even skyrocket to Mars or Venus over the week-end: in other words, we can make the world infinitely smaller and destroy the last vestiges of solitude and privacy. But the actual limits to a material Utopia are within the range of our conception, if not of our attainment. Just as victory over matter is almost within our grasp, we lose all conceit with it. The miracle of radio, as Aldous Huxley remarked, has chiefly served the broadcasting of twaddle. Interstellar communication might very well bring us no nearer spiritual perfection. The conditions vaunted as ideal by the Boosters' Clubs and other disciples of Macaulay seem to produce no Shakespeare; and there are many who wonder whether the same soil and the same climate can be equally favourable to poets and to plumbers.

Mr. Stuart Chase has touched upon the problem in his suggestive book *Men and Machines* But the difficulty does not lie chiefly with mechanical appliances: it lies rather with the mechanical spirit, the spirit of standardisation, and that seems inseparable from a normal, harmonious, classical static, or Utopian world. We might smash all the machines, as they did in Erewhon, and spiritually find ourselves none the richer Arcadian simplicity may be as tedious and stifling as the zippy atmosphere of Zenith; indeed, Sheila Kaye-Smith has found unplumbed stupidity in unplumbered villages. Here is our dilemma. we do not want brutal and wasteful anarchy, but perfect organisation turns society into a soulless machine Poetry is the eternal protest against the mechanising trend towards Utopia.

In presence of such a problem three attitudes are possible. The first is, candidly and heartily, to damn art and literature. If they are in any way incompatible with sanity and sanitation, decency, comfort, orderliness, let them go '—a good riddance. Spiritual values which cannot be translated into terms of good citizenship have no validity at all But this opinion is seldom frankly voiced · the rankest utilitarian does lip-service to anti-utilitarianism. He has his pew in church, and allows his wife to lionise long-haired virtuosi. Unfortunately, perhaps, the thorough-going Benthamite of to-day is dumb, in the original sense of the term.

This leaves us with two solutions, in both of which the claims of art and those of the social order will be recognised. Strange yoke-fellows, which may shy at each other! We must on no account start with the heretical assumption that art may have a social message: let us be faithful to the sacred doctrine of art for art's sake. But no artist will object if we admit that art is worth while, and that conditions inimical to art are therefore undesirable. Let us, then, ask the artists themselves to write

the specifications of their own Utopia. They like neither our present world, nor the world that reformers are attempting to create: what kind of a world do they want? In other terms, what civilisation would be most favourable to the production of art? The last method of approach would be to admit the feasibility, nay the inevitability, of a materialistic and social Utopia of the standard type. But, instead of taking it for granted, as George Moore does, that all art will of necessity perish in such an atmosphere, we may attempt to forecast what forms of art could possibly survive, and even what new kinds might be evolved. Are we so sure that art depends entirely upon ignorance, injustice and chaos? Are irregular verbs alone fit to be used in poetry and love? Let us assume the perfect state so dreaded by poets: could a niche be found for them?

The nearest approximation to an artistic Utopia remains William Morris's *News from Nowhere*—a paradise for house decorators and Roycrofters, a magnified Carmel-by-the-Sea before they put in the drains. The book is still a delight; but it is pretty thoroughly unconvincing. For it is ambiguous in its ideal and in its methods. Purely archaic in spirit, it brushes aside all the conquests of the machine age, yet it admits the services of a mysterious 'Power' which is the ultimate triumph of science and industry. Then Morris was a professed Socialist as well as an artist: at times, the voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau.

André Maurois offers a purely literary Utopia in his fantastic trifle, *Voyage to the Island of the Articoles*. But the intention is too evidently satirical, not constructive. And the target of his satire is neither art nor society—only the well-known foibles of professional men of letters. For our purpose, this charming pamphlet is of no avail.

All Utopias are retrospective as well as prospective; their Golden Age is made up of elements borrowed from the past. We shall follow the same method in describing, without irony, the civilisation of *our* Articoles. We shall take into account the lessons of history as well as the desires of men. We shall apply the famous theory of Taine: art is the result of race, environment and time. If it be true, it ought to be reversible. In order to secure the kind of art we want, what social conditions are necessary? This question resolves itself into the historical problem: under what conditions has the art we admire been produced in the past?

It is evident that in such a complex product no single factor is absolutely indispensable: an unfavourable climate, for instance, may be offset by an abundance of natural resources.

It is evident, also, that if our prescriptions were taken too literally, they would sound like a satire of Taine's ideas and of the whole sociological method in artistic criticism. With these words of warning we may embark for Graphopolis, in the Land of the Articoles.

Graphopolis lies in the temperate zone. The tropics have failed so far to produce a literature that would rank supreme, in spite of natural wealth, beauty, and teeming population. The arctic regions can boast of Iceland, which in proportion to its numbers, took a high place among centres of poetry; but we are safe in assuming that the mean temperature of Graphopolis is decidedly higher than that of Rejkjavik There are sharply contrasted seasons—an almost torrid summer, a mellow golden autumn, a glorious winter of hard frost and snow, followed by the yearly miracle of the spring how much poorer would poetry be in a land without April! Scotland is not barred out as the possible seat of our Utopia a surly clime drives you to the fire-place and books—or to the radiator and poker Too ideal a climate might be a handicap I would not endorse the claims of San Diego, where they play the organ outdoors every day in the year, or those of Yuma, Arizona, where they offer you a free lunch every day the sun does not shine

The country round Graphopolis is a varied land of mountains and vales, with a rugged, deeply indented coast Mountains alone will not necessarily evolve great art watches, cheese and hotel, not the poems of Carl Spitteler, are the chief products of Switzerland At sea level or below the Dutch and Venetians have created great schools of painting they are less prominent as writers—perhaps for the lack of Parnassian heights to scale Moderate cliffs and crags will do, as in England, Scotland, or Attic Greece; even the molehills of Rome, Florence, and Paris may suffice. But the devastating platitude of Russia and of our Middle West is an obstacle to be overcome· Russia had no great literature until the nineteenth century We once tried to induce a millionaire to give Houston, Texas, an artificial hill, in the hope of making that friendly city the Athens of the south-west. Cathedral heights and the palisades will serve the purpose for New York, and twin peaks for San Francisco; but there is little hope for Chicago.

Graphopolis is watered by a noble river, which in olden times was worshipped as a god. Poets find inspiration in the thundering falls above the city; in the swift-flowing stream, which they liken to human destiny and which grows sluggish before it merges with the measureless sea; in the sombre fury of the turbid floods in early winter or spring. It is also convenient for a watery

grave: romantic Paris needs the Morgue. The banks of the Chicago drainage canal rather discourage lyrical effusion. The Los Angeles river, so far as we know, has not become famous in song; yet it is not much worse than the classic Ilissos. Although the land is well watered, it would be advisable to have a small desert at hand: here Los Angeles scores a definite point. But Los Angeles, wasteful of artistic possibilities, is reclaiming and banalising its desert—as short-sighted as the fabled Auvergnats, who, blessed with the possession of a volcano, carelessly allowed it to become extinct.

Graphopolis is not a vast empire. A huge country is slow-witted. Whether it lives under a tyranny, or enjoys the alleged benefits of democracy, it is inclined to think in masses, crudely. How much more favourable is the city-State, Athens or Florence, or the tiny principality, like Weimar! A ruler has a ruler's psychology, whether he rule a thousand men or a hundred million; Dante was as truly an ambassador as Paul Claudel, a court is a court, even though it be that of the Hawaiian Islands or that of Emperor Soulouque And patriotism, in the city-State, is concentrated, vivid, all-pervading, not a dull thing of hearsay and statistics Party politics assume the dramatic intensity of family feuds The city wall is infinitely more real than the arbitrary frontier The artists in Montmartre once proclaimed the secession of the sacred mound from the deplorably *bourgeois* French Republic; and they were well advised In Chesterton's fantasy the Napoleon of Notting Hill reconstitutes a colourful world on a purely local basis The true Napoleon owed his greatness to his Corsican cradle Culturally, vast entities are barren. The formula of the future is communalism, as in 1871—a world federation of independent cities

What kind of community is Graphopolis—pastoral, agricultural, commercial, industrial? Pastoral life has given rise to a huge body of literature even with us, cowboy songs are among the few authentic lyrical notes in a most unlyrical country, although they can hardly compare with the negro spirituals. In so far as herding is a lazy life, it favours dreaming, the prerequisite of all artistic expression, but it favours even more the vague musing which is so characteristic of contented cows. Pastoral poetry is mostly the work of city dwellers, and remains exceedingly conventional. Theocritus and Vergil are not much more convincing than eighteenth-century shepherdesses. The number of actual poets among actual shepherds is not impressive. He of Ettrick, James Hogg, is the first that comes to mind. Pasture land, like the desert, should be kept as a minor background; but, in itself, it would prove disappointing

Agriculture is far less favourable to artistic expression than

cattle or sheep ranching: it is too busy a life, a life of constant, absorbing, benumbing care. So, in our modern folklore, the cowboy is the hero, the hayseed is the butt of unending jest. Yes, Burns did sing in his furrow, and cast a word of Franciscan sympathy to the 'wee, sleekit, tim'rous, cowerin' beastie,' whose housie he had laid in ruins. But how many Burnses are there on the roll of fame? France was long a land of peasants, but only the city birds were vocal. The fields are needed for material sustenance and spiritual refreshment, but the artistic power of Graphopolis, like the political, is concentrated in the city. 'Urbanity,' 'civilisation,' imply the *urbs* and the *civitas*.

Graphopolis is therefore a mart and a workshop, a place wherein the wits of men are sharpened by constant fencing. But Graphopolis is no mere country town, the all-sufficient centre of its own rural district. Such a condition would lead to parochialism and intellectual atrophy. Graphopolis is a commercial power, sending caravans and argosies to the farthest ends of the world. Preferably it is a *thalassocracy*, like Athens, Venice, the Hanseatic League, Holland, Scandinavia, or Portugal at the time of her literary glory. To be sure, the Phœnicians, navigators and merchants though they were, left no great literature; at any rate, they taught us our letters. Overseas trade is of commanding cultural importance, for it brings wealth, leisure and luxury, broadens the horizon, fosters the spirit of adventure. So to the wharves of Graphopolis cluster ships of all nations, spice-laden, freighted with dreams, even when they carry nitrates, hides, or guano. To Anatole France, who accused her of lacking imagery, the philosophical poetess Madame Ackermann triumphantly replied: 'No imagery? Have I not THE SHIP?' A complete bard is as inconceivable without the ship as without the spring. For no other reason we, as students of literature, are intensely interested in the proposal to make Paris a seaport.

Many arts and crafts are plied in Graphopolis, for artisans are creators of beauty, and may sing at their work. But the country is not predominantly industrial. It is somewhat premature to condemn industry as artistically barren. Industry is a very young giantess, barely out of an ailing infancy and of a sprawling, brawling, sulky, quarrelsome childhood. So far it has made for ugliness, hardly mitigated with evidences of power. We are told that a new beauty can already be descried under the grime, but it takes very optimistic eyes to see it. Industry, as distinct from the crafts, means mass production. The maker loses his individuality; freshness, creative power, spontaneity, are ruled out of his life; and all originality is likewise eliminated from the product. Witness the short stories turned out to-day by our most approved literary factories.

It is commercial England, seafaring England, with the sturdy background of rural England, that has made England's name glorious in art and letters. It was in its commercial, not in its industrial, days that New England was a power of the spirit. New York's intellectual supremacy has a mercantile rather than a manufacturing basis. Let us admit, then, that Graphopolis is poor in coal or iron, so that she will not be tempted to turn into Pittsburgh or Birmingham.

The crowds of Graphopolis are at home in the streets of their city; they do not rush feverishly, but they can afford to saunter and loiter. They stop for a friendly chat, they gaze at the evanescent and delightful art of window display, they have time to admire a marble statue in a public square, and, no less frankly, they feast their eyes on those living statues for whom the country is famous. They listen to some orator, poet or musician at the cross-roads; they sip the ambrosia of the land at little tables set on the very sidewalks, under the trees

I surmise that the alcoholic content of Graphopolitan ambrosia is well over one-half of 1 per cent Utopia settled the temperance question in an ingenious way licences were issued to those drinkers who could plead that they needed stimulation for artistic thought If they failed to produce valuable art, their licence was revoked, if they were successful, they were made Doctors of Potatorial Philosophy A nation brought up in the worship of art could be trusted not to make beasts of themselves · gradually the privilege of the D P P became a universal right. Those who abuse it are punished to the full extent of the (natural) law: through discomfort and loss of efficiency for minor offences; through disease and degeneration for repeated transgressions; and the ultimate penalty is death

There is great variety among the types you meet in Graphopolis A few dashes of colour are noticeable—ebony, black, brown, red and yellow, with many shades which demonstrate that no race prejudice prevails But these picturesque notes are the exception. the enormous majority of the inhabitants belong, broadly, to the same race, and that race, needless to say, is our own. Asia and Africa each have their Graphopolis, friendly and independent.

The coexistence in any large number of widely different breeds creates such harrowing problems that no Utopia could settle them or survive them Almost inevitably, pride, oppression, jealousy, resentment would spring up. One race, in all probability, would isolate itself in splendid conceit and quasi-mystic snobbishness, thus stunting its own intellectual growth and mutilating its human sympathies: a superior caste is never more than the pitiful fragment of what it might have been. Yet we might

conceive of conditions similar to those which prevail in Hawaii, where stocks from all parts of the world mingle with almost complete freedom. The literary results of miscegenation in Alexandre Dumas or Du Bois are decidedly encouraging. Perhaps in Graphopolis eugenics will have reached such a point that various bloods can be exactly dosed for the procreation of a great dramatist, a lyric poet, a sculptor, or an inspired cook; whilst race mixture would be sternly prohibited when the result is likely to be a synthetic-syndicated humorist.

Graphopolitans, as we visualise them, are white. But they are not all blonds. Complexions may be olive, amber, magnolia, ruddy and even pinkish; only the chalky pallor induced by artificial means will be under the ban. Hairs may range from Venetian red to raven black, through all the tints of bronze and gold: sonneteers would not be happy without dark ladies as well as ladies fair. Stature may be petite or impressively tall; figures slender or majestically rotund. we could not think of banishing G. K. Chesterton On the whole, there may be a slight predominance of the Mediterranean type; but Nordics will not feel out of their element Alpines specialise in plodding research and dismal realism we have Mrs Gertrude Atherton's word for it, and she has it on the authority of Madison Grant, who had it from H S Chamberlain, who had it from Gobineau, who had it from God Himself so the chain of evidence is perfect. Alpines will have their modest place in the general scheme; but no book of poems will be allowed to appear if the author's cephalic index is above eighty. This simple rule will avert many literary calamities.

These people speak a sonorous, highly inflected, strongly accented language—full of idioms, allusive phrases, veiled metaphors, quaint survivals and delightful absurdities They love it so that they revel in playing with it · they are great punsters, and they are constantly coining new words, logical or fanciful, pregnant with thought or merely musical They rejoice in the possession of many dialects and forms of slang, closely related enough to remain mutually intelligible, but different enough to give a racier tang to any man's speech. Purism and standardisation are frowned upon as inartistic teachers in elementary schools strive to release the latent originality of their students in matters of spelling and syntax. The Graphopolitans like the Greeks and Shakespeare, are not widely interested in the speech of other nations; they have too rich a fund of their own They realise, further, that polyglottism is not conducive to literary excellence: neither university professors nor *concierges* in cosmopolitan hotels rank very high as creative artists. A simple practical, artificial language is used for business, for scientifi

purposes, for international relations, and even for those branches of literature in which logical thought is of more importance than form: the literary tongue is held too sacred for such commonplace or utilitarian services.

In politics as well as in religion Graphopolis is pluralistic, or, in simpler parlance, tolerant. A goodly proportion of the population owe allegiance (including a very light contribution towards the upkeep of the court) to King Wenceslas XI., who is known as a good sport, and represents the gorgeous tradition of a thousand years. His annual procession through the streets of the city on the 5th of November is a magnificent pageant. Others pay tribute to Emperor Tamburlaine XXII., a mild little scholar who, by immemorial custom, never moves without an escort of wild horsemen. Still others do homage to Queen Cleopatra XLV., the winner of a beauty contest; and not a few join the strict, austere organisation known as the Anarchistic Brotherhood. It makes little difference, as the mere business of the State is transacted by managers, mostly Alpines, independent of king, queen, emperor, or grand Anarch.

The managerial State lives at peace with all its neighbours; but the king and the emperor occasionally wage war against each other or against foreign foes. The populace looks forward to these contests with the keenest delight. The ringing challenges, the Pindaric poems and battle hymns, the enthusiastic meetings or rallies on the eve of the strife, the departure of the gaily-clad heroes for the Field of Glory, add enormously to the enjoyment of life. Pacifists who would suppress that supreme form of entertainment are summarily condemned, by such authorities as Elie Faure, as the enemies of art and poetry. The Field of Glory is a large and wild tract reserved for that purpose within convenient distance of Graphopolis; from neighbouring hills, and from specially built towers, the whole population can follow the magnificent spectacle. The return of the conquering host, laurel-wreathed, with a golden nimbus in the sunset fire, is a sight never to be forgotten; but connoisseurs aver that a defeated army slinking in, ghost-like, in the dead of the night produces a subtler and more profound effect.

In religion all creeds are welcome, except scientific determinism, which spells artistic death. Graphopolitans are good pragmatists: all faiths are valid if they *work*—that is to say, if they enhance the enjoyment of beauty. Hellenism, Hebraism, and Christianity alternate in popular favour, and at times blend rather prettily. Some artists claim that without paganism there can be no salvation, and they are seen devoutly prostrate in the fanes of Aphrodite. But it is usually conceded that Christianity offers a more dramatic setting for human destiny, and casts a

richer glow round the mysteries of birth and death. The notion of sin, in particular, is considered as a marvellous, an inexhaustible, artistic device. Frankly acknowledging the services of æsthetes to the true faith, the Graphopolitan Church has beatified Baudelaire and James Branch Cabell. We need hardly say that a notable number of Graphopolitans are orthodox devil-worshippers.

There are classes, although there are no castes, in Graphopolis: several aristocracies, several clergies, a vast bourgeoisie with many subdivisions, and tiers upon tiers of 'masses.' These classes are definite enough: a man knows without a doubt whether he belongs to the upper middle class or the lower nobility; but interpenetration is not absolutely barred. The classes are in constant rivalry, and even conflict, but not at war. A system of airtight compartments between the social ranks would be detrimental to culture; but the total abolition of class distinction, if it were possible, would be even more deadly. For art as such thrives only on a class basis: whatever is universally enjoyed ceases to exist for the genuine æsthete, and 'popular' literature is a fallacy. The creation and appreciation of art are essentially methods of securing admission among an *élite*.

The Graphopolitan social scale is established on the basis of literary taste—from the highest aristocracy who read James Joyce's latest in the nursery to the lower middle class who can barely rise to the level of *The Little Minister*. The chief interest in Graphopolitan life is the breathless attempt of each class to catch up with the one immediately above. As soon as an *élite* is overtaken it ceases to be an *élite*, and its proud place is assumed by another group, which, in its turn, will strain every nerve to keep ahead in the chase. It is the national game. Fads, cults, shibboleths may be resorted to in order to baffle pursuers. But it is considered poor sportsmanship to take refuge in total incomprehensibility: it is as bad as shooting the fox, which, to the British, is the sin against the Holy Ghost.

Artists enjoy the picturesqueness and dramatic possibilities of the social ladder, with clusters of men fighting for a precarious foothold at every rung. Poets move up and down at will: they associate with kings or beggars, and consciously relish the paradox of both situations. Each class has a traditional costume, a code of ethics, a manner of speech of its own, which are carefully preserved *in fiction*. In real life every one is aiming to imitate the oddities of some other class, above or even below, and the result is delightfully confusing.

There are marriage laws in Utopia, and they are extremely strict. Without them, half of the world's tragedies, and four fifths of its comedies, would cease to exist. These laws are part of the indispensable conventions of dramatic or narrative art

Judging by the precedent of the most purely *artistic* civilisation that ever bloomed, that of the Troubadours, we may surmise that in Graphopolis poets will love with special ardour every wife not their own. The honour of the Graphopolitan husband will be satisfied if the verses inspired by his wife are of sufficient merit: G. B. Shaw gave us an adumbration of such a state in his skit *How he lied to her Husband*. For worthless poetry the only redress is an exchange of visiting cards, seconds, and bullets. For a woman to be sung by three bad poets in succession gives the husband sufficient ground for divorce without alimony. A chivalrous custom provides that the woman should have the first chance of using a love affair for literary purposes: the man's version can appear only six months later. A quaint statute, honoured mostly in the breach, prohibits addressing the same intimate poems to more than five lovers.

What think you of such a world: Cabell, Valle Inclán, d'Annunzio, André Gide, exquisite company of exiled prophetic Graphopolitans? Would you find in it enough colour, chivalry, adventure, and that tang of sorrow which makes life doubly sweet? Or will you spurn a world visibly made to your order, because it would rob you of the divine discontent and the transcendental scorn which mark you as poets?

ALBERT GUÉRARD.

THE POETRY OF THOMAS HARDY

The recently published biography of Hardy's earlier years, by his widow, confirms the suspicion which many of us had long entertained, that he was a poet first and last. The biography in many respects is a tantalising document, merely whetting our curiosity; but this one thing it makes abundantly plain—his meditation of the muse was strict and lifelong. Great as they were, the novels were an interlude.

The poetry is large in bulk, much greater in amount than that left by Tennyson, for example. It includes an octavo volume of 800 pages, the long 'epic-drama' called *The Dynasts*, and the posthumous volume *Winter-Words*, containing scores of poems—not to mention *The Queen of Cornwall*.

It is my purpose to make some critical estimate of this poetry, beginning with the assumption (which I think is warranted) that my readers have not read Hardy's poetry to any great extent. Hardy the novelist is well known. When he died, two and a half years ago, the whole English-speaking world seemed to be of the opinion that it was the passing of the greatest living novelist. But comparatively little was said of his poetry. I meet few people who have read it, except a few well-known pieces, such a *Lizbie Brown* and some of his late poems which were published i the *London Mercury*. I meet fewer still who have any hig opinion of it, and the notion is fairly prevalent among suc criticisms as I have read that his verse is harsh and unmusical—very recently Professor Grierson has called it 'awkward,' 'ugly,' 'wheezy.' To me Hardy seems to be one of the great Englis poets. I think he has not been given his due because he i 'between sizes,' as Bagehot would say. The critics cannot fin labels for him. He is both Victorian and un-Victorian, intensel English, and again detached and aloof from English interests an prejudices; deeply religious, and again as rational as Voltair His form, too, is as difficult to label as his mood and tempe Beginning with a complete mastery of the Elizabethan sonne and the English ballad—into which old forms he poured, fro the first, a highly original content—he went on to explore eve lyric rhythm known to ancients and moderns, and to fashio

quite new forms as well; and then, between the ages of sixty-three and seventy, when he was known as a novelist who had written some lyrics, he startled the world by publishing a gigantic work called *The Dynasts*, for which no literary name could be found at all. It was poetry, and it told the story of the Napoleonic Wars, but it was not an *epic* in any European sense of the word. It had 'stage directions' and '*dramatis personæ*,' but these terms were wrenched beyond any meaning hitherto applied to them, for the stage was sometimes the whole panorama of Europe, and the *dramatis personæ* and choruses were intelligences and sentiences, quite unwarped by the anthropomorphic imagination of a Shelley or an Æschylus. In Hardy, in short, poetry has so much enlarged its bounds that many wonder whether it is poetry at all. His rhythms also are so new that many find them unrhythmical. But just as the history of music shows that what were once considered discords were later accepted as concordant, so the history of poetry shows a steady acceptance of new metres, rhythms and harmonies. It is my opinion that a continuous reading of Hardy enriches one's conception of poetry, both as to substance and as to form.

Examining his poetry, one is struck first of all by the fact that, *The Dynasts* apart, it is predominantly lyrical. Except a very few long narrative poems (*Panthera* is the chief example), a rather larger number of dramatic pieces, it looks as though the rest could all be called lyrical. I do not think of any other English poet, of such bulk at least, of whom this could be said. A. E. Housman is predominantly lyrical, so is Burns, but their work is much slighter in extent. So much for the predominant form. What is the predominant theme? One might guess 'love,' and it is true that Hardy has written love lyrics comparable in number with Goethe's, but the real subject of a large part of Hardy is death. Speaking of this, I once made the rash statement that one could not read five poems in succession in his collected works without coming on one devoted more or less to graves, coffins, worms or the like. The next time I picked up the *Collected Poems* (1928 edition) I tested this. At the first trial I hit upon ten consecutive poems, each of them with allusions, at least, to these subjects. I then opened the book at random four times. Each time I happened on such a poem. In the preface to *Late Lyrics and Earlier*, published 1922, Hardy indignantly repudiated the charge of pessimism. But I do not think it can be denied that he is gloomy. It is not merely that he is obsessed with death. Lucretius is obsessed with death, too. But Hardy is obsessed with it in a gloomy way.

alid ex alio reficit natura, nec ullam
rem gigni patitur nisi morte adjuta aliena.

writes Lucretius—which is the text of a homily in *The Woodlanders* and of other homilies in Hardy; but while there is often in the English poet something of the triumphant joy of the Roman in observing such a process, there is in him far more than in Lucretius, and, indeed, far more than in any other poet I know, a gloom, and a repining over death. So many of his mortals lament that they are mortal, and that this life is flitting away. He makes bereavement so terribly poignant. It would sometimes appear, even, that man's capacity for anguish is, to Hardy, the most human characteristic This is the terrible doom of mortals; they are figments of creation, but, as the Chorus of the Pities sings in *The Dynasts*, they are figments, unlike the sun and the stars and the gases—they *feel*

> But O, the intolerable antilogy
> Of making figments feel!

These are the things that strike the reader of Hardy, I say, at the outset Yet we must not push the generalisations too far. To revert to my earlier warning—labels do not fit him. No sooner have we resolved that he is grim and gloomy, than we discover him to be a great humorist, a lover of Nature, who has caught much of natural beauty, and recorded almost every human mood, not merely the sad ones, that can be awakened by life outdoors. We have no sooner concluded that his gift is lyrical, than we come on a fine narrative poem, short or lengthy, or a short lapidary thing reminding one of the Greek anthology. If his purely satirical poems were collected, such things as *In Crinoline Days*, *The Curate's Kindness*, etc, they would fill a considerable volume. Again, even apart from *The Dynasts* and *The Queen of Cornwall*, Hardy is remarkably successful in dramatic poetry. Using 'song' in the stricter and narrower sense than lyric, he is a great writer of songs—songs that demand, somehow musical accompaniment, and which one feels were conceived with that accompaniment The fiddler in him makes him infallible in this suggestion of music I open at random to find

> When friendly summer calls again
> Calls again
> Her little fifers to these hills,
> We'll go,—we too—to that arched fane
> Of leafage where they prime their bills
> Before they start to flood the plain
> With quavers, minims, shakes and trills
> '—We'll go,' I sing, but who shall say
> What may not chance before that day!
>
> And we shall see the waters spring,
> Waters spring

> From chinks the scrubby copses crown,
> And we shall trace their oncreeping
> To where the cascade tumbles down
> And sends the bobbing growths aswing,
> And ferns not quite but almost drown
> '—We shall,' I say, who, who may sing
> Of what another moon will bring!

Sometimes the suggestion of the kind of musical accompaniment is given; for example, we are told that some verses of *Could I but will* are for major key, some for minor. Sometimes the poet would have us believe that a certain bit of music had fashioned his verse for him. The following exquisite poem is called *To a Movement in Mozart's E-flat Symphony*:

> Show me again the time
> When in the Junetide's prime
> We flew by meads and mountains northerly!
> Yea, to such freshness, fairness, fulness, fineness, freeness,
> Love lures life on.
>
> Show me again the day
> When from the sandy bay
> We looked together upon the pestered sea!—
> Yea, to such surging, swaying, sighing, swelling, shrinking,
> Love lures life on.
>
> Show me again the hour
> When by the pinnacled tower
> We eyed each other and *feared futurity!*—
> Yea, to such bodings, broodings, beatings, blanchings, blessings,
> Love lures life on.
>
> Show me again just this:
> The moment of that kiss,
> Away from the prancing folk, by the strawberry tree!—
> Yea, to such rashness, ratheness, rareness, ripeness, richness,
> Love lures life on.

Hardy has often been called Shakespearean; in nothing is he more Shakespearean than in some of his shorter songs—for example, *If Grief come early*. Nor must we fail to mention among his songs *Murmurs in the Gloom*, to which he gives the sub-title *Nocturne*.

In brief, then, both in style and form, and in mood and interest, there is the greatest variety in Hardy. He ranges from little love-songs and dialect poems to philosophic questionings, from slight martial songs to *The Dynasts*, which in sustained poetic intensity, greatness of theme, and universality, in the artistic sense, ranks with the great things in literature.

All this, however, is perhaps a trifle general. I have not yet grappled with the question: *What is the quality of Hardy's poetry?*

The poet, as artist, must weld his material, which is language, words, to a perfect and inevitable form, and a form, moreover, which is rich in meaning. The slighter the thing the poet means, the easier it may be, perhaps, to hit the perfect form. *The Forsaken Merman*, by Matthew Arnold, is, I have often thought, the most perfectly expressed thing in English literature; but the thing which it expresses is, after all, slight—mere fantasy, in fact. It is not to any great degree 'a criticism of life,' to use its creator's own phrase; not very directly concerned with life, as most of us live it. In *Antony and Cleopatra*, on the other hand, we have pictured the passion and tragedy of a man who flings away half the world for love, and of a woman who can win such love; and the expression of this tragedy and passion matches the greatness of the theme There is no point in objecting to my comparison that it is not fair to the two authors to compare themes so dissimilar. The great author chooses the great theme, it will be found. But the reader who is susceptible to the poetic spel does not go about analysing the themes of the poets. He recognises greatness in poetry, and is at all times sure of the quality of the poet, at the first touch of 'frenzy'—though it be only a single phrase. True, a single fine line does not make a great poem (to quote Arnold again) But it will be found that the grea poems are encrusted here and there with jewels, and these hav much to do with the quality of the poetry They are not acces sories or trappings, the thought of the poet burns with sucl intensity that these crystals are wrought on the surface, lik sapphires on a volcanic seashore The late Poet Laureate, in a recently published essay on Keats, has a passage comparin some of his expressions of this kind with those of Shakespeare He does it in a manner that to my mind lays bare the shee quality and character of either poet The late Katherin Mansfield used to lie, on sleepless nights, exclaiming over some c the perfections of this kind in Milton, and hitting, with her sur artistic instinct, the very quintessence of Milton's genius.

I think I can cite things of this kind from Hardy, the crysta lised outcroppings of a great poetic intensity, as unmistakabl Hardy as Shakespeare is Shakespeare, and Keats Keats Fo example:

> The years have gathered grayly
> Since I danced upon this leaze
> . . . . . .
> Is it worth while, dear,
> Now to call for bells?
> . . . . .
> thought outbrings
> The many-sided mournfulness of things.
> . . . . . .

An aged thrush, frail, gaunt and small,
In blast-beruffled plume
Had chosen thus to fling his soul
Upon the growing gloom.
So little cause for carolings
Of such celestial sound
Was written in terrestrial things
Afar or nigh around,
That I could think there trembled through
His happy good-night air
Some blessed hope, whereof he knew,
And I was unaware

Never a care-worn wife but shows,
If a joy suffuse her,
Something beautiful to those
Patient to peruse her --
Some one charm the world unknows,
Precious to a muser
Haply what ere years were foes,
Moved her mate to choose her

In *The Dynasts* the Spirit of the Pities and the Spirit of the Years look on, as it were at a dumb show, while the Cardinal crowns Napoleon in Milan Cathedral Pity asks

'What is the creed that these rich rites disclose?'

The Spirit of the Years

A local thing called Christianity,
Which in the wild drama of the wheeling spheres
Includes with divers others such in *dim*
Pathetical and brief parentheses,
Beyond whose span uninfluenced unconcerned,
The systems of the suns go sweeping on,
With all their many-mortaled planet train
In mathematic roll unceasingly

Few readers, I think, will miss in some at least of these cadences the miraculous quality which only the divinest poetry has. It may be replied that poetic beauties may be culled from many poets. Arnold's

Unplumbed, salt, estranging sea,

or even Campbell's

At Linden ere the sun was low,

and perhaps hundreds of phrases in Virgil have each, for a moment, the power to transport us magically into an imaginative world. Yet none of these are great thoughts—' thoughts that wander

through eternity '—completely molten into beauty. In them, or near them, there lurks, in the case of Campbell, mere rhetoric; or in the case of Virgil, a troublesome artificiality, and even a lack of demonic force or in the case of Arnold, a tone of weariness, calling up the formidable shade of his father. Other poets, again, are unfailing in artistry, but they are not sufficiently great-souled, not quite magnanimous enough, to impose themselves upon us and hold us Unlike Coleridge's Mariner, they do not have their will with us By this I do not mean that we have to be interested in Milton's theology, or Shakespeare's politics, or Homer's geography and history These are the accidents of the poet's theme His theme is always Life, Humanity, or at least the world and life as a powerful human mind, like that of Lucretius may conceive it. However local this conception, it is always universal. The power of a poet lies in his firm grasp of life and in his ability to carry his readers with him in his own poetic frenzy. He must call attention neither to his language nor to himself He must conceal both art and artist He must, in short, to use Plato's magnificent metaphor, thoroughly magnetise us with the magnetism that has drawn himself His ideas must be deep and permanent; his soul must be great, noble. his poetry must be intense. It was said a long time ago that there is no recipe for securing a combination of these gifts. But, while Horace is often cited, the extraordinary difference between poet and poet is often forgotten Yet our own Shakespeare and Milton show how widely differing are the moulds into which poetry is poured

Now, in an attempt to enter into Hardy, we may begin with the circumstantial, with the background of his poetry, and proceed, if that is possible, to the fibre of the man's mind Behind, and woven with Hardy's poetic power, there is a rich and multifarious mind and experience Like so many of the great artists, he was at home in several arts His interest, and indeed his learning, in literature, music, art, science, history and philosophy, reminds one of Goethe But more than Goethe, and indeed in a Shakespearean way, he lived among, and completely caught, the life of common people They are the 'commons,' however, not of a mongrelised and desocialised, but of an age-long society—shepherds, and woodlanders, and village-folk of long breed, with a speech partly moulded by the English Bible and the Anglican Liturgy, and of a secular habit and occupation, that has brought them close to the soil and the elemental truths of life On the one hand, then, Hardy's studies have unwound for him the vast scroll of human achievement in seeking truth, of human folly in pursuing wealth and power; on the other hand, he has lived among a peasantry not very different, he feels, from the Roman legionaries whose memorials remain among them, perhaps no

very different from the serfs of Babylon. An intense awareness of the poetry of it all haunts him always. He can

find
Poetry ever lurk where pit-pats poor mankind

His poetry is a powerful and intensely vivid expression of some of the deepest and some of the loftiest workings of the human heart and mind.

The words last quoted bring us to Hardy's conception of human life. 'Pit-pats poor mankind'! The phrase is characteristic of Hardy. He is no contemner of his kind, nor is he bitter nor cynical, but he is naturally gloomy, and he thinks man labours under a terrible fate. Man he conceives of as the creation—in an evolutionary process—of forces utterly blind and careless of their creations. Their 'figment,' Man, is unhappily endowed with feeling. He is only partly a free agent. He is so tiny a creature on so tiny a planet, and whirled in so vast a universe, that he cannot do much, and unfortunately his best efforts, as the best of men conceive them, are often thwarted, not merely by the action of his fellows, but by elemental forces. One of the commonest manifestations of this to Hardy is unrequited love—love of a noble kind, like Marty South's, for example. War, again, is a multiplied self-destruction of the human race, and the blasting of almost every human virtue, yet it is one of the commonest activities of men. The last poem but one in Hardy's last volume is a sonnet on this subject. 'We are getting to the end of visioning.' Again and again in his prefaces the poet warns us that he nowhere attempts 'any harmonious philosophy,' yet the cosmic scheme which is the frame of *The Dynasts* is hinted at in so many of the poems, early and late, that we may fairly take it as a settled conviction. The thing which, in my opinion, justifies the contention in Hardy's prefaces, that to label him 'pessimistic' is stupid, is his conception that man is at least partly free, and that the universe is possibly capable of amelioration. Meantime, gloomily and grimly, a fine example of English paganism, he bids his fellows ply their task and amend their lot as best they may. That man's inner light will ever deceive him he has not much fear—another refutation of the charge of pessimism. His great powers of irony and satire Hardy reserves chiefly for convention and hypocrisy, though he has a kindly tolerance for superstition, knowing it to be so deeply human. His poetry kindles most at devotion, love and pity, bravery and loyalty, and it is characteristic of him to find these virtues chiefly in the lower walks of life.

These *leitmotifs* in his thought are illustrated very clearly in *A Commonplace Day*:

—Yet, maybe, in some soul,
In some spot undiscerned on sea or land, some impulse rose,
Or some intent upstole
Of that enkindling ardency from whose maturer glows
The world's amendment flows ;

But which benumbed at birth
By momentary chance or wile, has missed its hope to be
Embodied on the earth ;
And undervoicings of this loss to man's futurity
May wake regret in me.

Again in *A Plaint to Man*—the whole poem (which is too long to quote) ; and in *An Inquiry* :

I said to It : 'We grasp not what you meant,
(Dwelling down here, so narrowly pinched and pent)
By crowning Death King of the Firmament ;
—The query I admit to be
One of unwonted size,
But it is put to you sorrowingly,
And not in idle-wise.'

'Sooth, since you ask me gravely,' It replied,
'Though too incisive questions I have decried,
This shows some thought, and may be justified
I'll gauge its value as I go
Across the Universe
And bear me back in a moment or so,
And say, for better or worse.'

Many years later when It came again,
'That matter an instant back which brought you pain,'
It said, 'and you besought me to explain ;
Well, my forethoughtless modes to you
May seem a shameful thing,
But—I'd no meaning that I knew,
In Crowning Death as King !'

In *The Lacking Sense*, of which these are the last three stanzas

Ah ! knowest thou not her secret yet, her vainly veiled deficience,
Whence it comes that all unwittingly she wounds the lives she loves
That sightless are those orbs of hers,—which bar to her omniscience
Brings those fearful unfulfilments that red ravage through her zones
Whereat all creation groans

She whispers it in each pathetic, strenuous, slow endeavor,
When in mothering she unwittingly sets wounds on what she loves ;
Yet her primal doom pursues her, faultful, fatal is she ever ;
Though so deft and nigh to vision is her facile finger-touch
That the seers marvel much

. . . . . .

And while she plods dead-reckoning on, in darkness of affliction,
Assist her where thy creaturely dependence can or may,
For thou art of her clay.

The Dynasts opens in 'the overworld' with a question from the Spirit of the Earth.

> 'What of the Immanent Will, and its designs?'

and the Spirit of the Years replies

> 'It works unconsciously, as heretofore,
> Eternal artistries in circumstance'

> Deal then her groping skill no scorn, no note of malediction
> Not long on thee will press the hand that hurts the lives it loves.

And the 'after-scene' of the same poem transports us to 'the overworld' again, in which the Spirit of the Years is saying.

> 'Thus doth the Great Foresightless mechanise
> In blank entrancement, now as evermore,
> Its ceaseless artistries in circumstance
> Of curious stuff and braid, as just foreshown,
> Yet but one flimsy riband of its web
> Have we here watched in weaving—web enorm
> Whose farthest hem and selvage may extend
> To where the roars and plashings of the flames
> Of earth-invisible suns swell noisily
> And onwards into ghastly gulfs of sky
> Where hideous presences churn through the dark
> Mountains of magnitude without a shape
> Hanging amid deep wells of nothingness
> Yet seems this vast and singular confection,
> Wherein our scenery glints of scantiest size,
> Inutile all—so far as reasoning can tell'

The Spirit of the Pities queries

> 'Shall blankness be for aye?'

The Spirit of the Years asks the Pities how they would have fashioned things had they had the chance, which elicits a chorus almost Shelleyan, and with something of Shelley's anthropomorphism. The Spirit Ironic girds at this, and the Years chant an agnostic reply. Partly, I think, in artistic compensation for the horror of the tale (the Napoleonic Wars), partly in explanation why, when Life is so terrible, man struggles on—and certainly not to make a 'happy ending,' or to express his own belief—Hardy closes the poem with another chant from the Pities—two questioning and despairing semi-choruses at first, and then a full and triumphant chorus

SEMI-CHORUS I

> Nay—shall not Its blindness break?
> Yea, must not Its heart awake,
> Promptly tending
> To Its mending
> In a genial germing purpose, and for loving-kindness' sake?

SEMI-CHORUS II.

Should It never
Curb or cure
Aught whatever
Those endure
Whom It quickens, let them darkle to extinction swift and su

CHORUS

But—a stirring thrills the air
Like to sounds of joyance there
That the rages
Of the ages
Shall be cancelled, and deliverance offered from the darts that were,
Consciousness the Will informing, till It fashion all things fair!

But we must beware of taking even the last word of Th Dynasts for Hardy's last word.

Of the supreme poetry of *The Dynasts* as a whole space doe not permit us to make a detailed analysis. But some remark on the stuff of it, its background and texture, and the author' point of view, may be serviceable as an approach. War, next t love, is the theme of the poets, it must not be forgotten, and it i a remarkable thing that one of the greatest wars of all tim attracted no poet until our day. From the very first Hardy wa attracted to the theme; some of his earliest verse, and some o his earliest prose, centres upon it. Traditions of it were rife i the home of his boyhood. The South of England has alway been the recruiting place of the Navy, but it was not the Navy and the glories of Nelson even, that attracted Hardy so much a the rustic turned foot-soldier. The type brought all his poeti qualities into play. The mixture of simplicity and swagger; th grim humour, the love-making, devoted and otherwise; th glamour of swords and spurs, and the pulse-quickening fifes an drums; the exalted loyalties often evoked, and occasionally th sheer heroism—all these things were heightened examples of th 'purblind doom' of Man. It cannot be doubted that he viewe the whole history of the time from this angle, from the Wesse landscape and the scenes of his boyhood, which were the ofte rumoured landing places of Napoleon. Just as Tolstoi viewe the defeat of Napoleon from the standpoint of the blindly strivin Russian peasant, so Hardy saw it through and from the hal conscious patriotism of Wessex. But Tolstoi is Oriental in h fatalism; Hardy is much more Greek and European in h philosophy. It has often been remarked that Napoleon's care strangely fits the conception of Greek drama. He is Fortune darling and grows insolent; like a Persian monarch, he aims conquering the whole world. But the Scythians, or Russian give him his first check by allowing him to wander over their va

plains; and a despised maritime people subdue him by sea and finally by land. The long tale of victories in Italy, Austria, Prussia, with the Peninsular and Russian campaigns for countercheck, and finally the matchless soldier fighting a world of foes, themselves make a dramatic scheme; and Hardy, more than any Englishman since Shakespeare, has the dramatic sensibility of the Greeks. He is Shakespearean in his range of sympathies also. He tells us, indeed, in his preface, that he hopes the work will correct the writing of Continental authors, who have not sufficiently considered England's achievements But though Nelson and Wellington and a dozen other English leaders are heroes to him, Kutuzof, Marie Louise of Prussia, the Duke of Brunswick, and Blücher are his heroes too, and on the other side Napoleon, Ney and others are heroes no less, and all manifestations of the Immanent Will Not that Hardy sees everything in the grey, with no distinctions between right and wrong, devotion and selfishness. But the distinctions by no means lie along the national frontiers What a picture of stupidity and self-seeking he draws in Hapsburgs, Romanoffs, and Bourbons! And the ruling classes of England fare hardly better As Tolstoi's pictures of patriotism are largely confined to 'anonymous Russia' and the heroism of serfs, so Hardy's are in large part taken from anonymous Wessex

But when all is said, every comparison with Greeks, with Shakespeare and Tolstoi, breaks down—*The Dynasts* is a completely new and original work of art, both in conception and execution. And this originality has its roots in the fact that Hardy is the first to introduce into poetry the ideas of nineteenth-century science I am half-convinced that it is the suddenness with which he has done this that puzzles and angers his critics. The only other European poet who ever behaved so rashly was Lucretius, and the world of critics has hardly forgiven Lucretius yet. The claim used to be made for Tennyson that he was the poet of science, but that claim is sheer nonsense. Darwinism and astronomy furnished Tennyson with a few metaphors, but he no more accepted these things, nor made them part of his thought, than did the bishops His metaphors are as hollow as the Platonic metaphors in the sixteenth and seventeenth century poets of Italy, France, and England. Now, we do not demand, of course, that the poet be up to date or abreast with the science of his time. We do not accuse Milton of error or hypocrisy because he completely overlooked Copernicus. We allow him the Hebrew cosmology as a literary convention. On the other hand, it should be clear that we have no right to confine our poets to antediluvian notions. Wordsworth in his day cleared our poetry of much poetical lumber; he arrogated to himself the right, also, of extend-

ing the scope of poetry to subjects hitherto considered unsu able, or at any rate unpoetic He has had his way at last, though we now all recognise, what Byron and Shelley saw the first, that he often failed to distinguish poetry from pr But this was a small, a mere literary, revolution compared the originality of Hardy Educated people in the last generations see human life as Lucretius saw it, in the perspecti of a universe that is vast and limitless in both directions—in th direction of the infinitely great and of the infinitely small. No many men of Lucretius' time—certainly not many Romans understood this scientific attitude But in our day geology chemistry, biology, astronomy, the new physics and anthropology and the history of religion, have a much more general appea though signs multiply that the human mind grows weary of i and plunges, ostrich-like, into hocus-pocus for relief.

One could cite dozens of poems and phrases in Hardy that hav a Lucretian ring. I mention, almost at random, a few examples *Life Laughs Onward, Proud Songsters, He Never Expected Muc Regret not Me*—and such bits as:

> When some one said, on a day in the prime,
> He would bow to no brazen god again,
> He doubtless dazed the mass of men.

Or,

> the sure unhasting, steady stress
> Of Reason's movement, making meaningless
> The coded creeds of old time godliness

But the minds of the two poets are utterly unlike. Lucreti calls his long poem *The Nature of Things*, and he means what says. He has written marvellously of human passion, ambiti and with almost unequalled pathos of human bereavement. B he is really not more interested in Man, he sometimes makes feel, than he is in things; and by 'things' I do not mean mer birds and animals, in which so many poets have been interest but also cloud, rain, the forces of the heavens, magnetic attracti the twitchings of life in the primeval slime. If any strict appli tion of Arnold's definition be made, that poetry is a criticism (human) life, then most of Lucretius is not poetry at all. Inde many before Arnold and since have denied that it is poetry. course, in one sense, Lucretius' poetry is all criticism of hun life. But we need not quibble; let us rather state it rounc If Arnold's definition cannot be interpreted to include one of most sustained poetic flights in literature, so much the worse the definition! It is, indeed, the speed and rapture and stren of Lucretius' poetry that fatigue prosy minds, like Macaula In Hardy, on the other hand, humanity occupies the stage: th

is no question of that. Nor does Hardy make his appeal to a Memmius only, nor to a few choice souls. His theme is conspicuously the common man; and, indeed, he elevates the moods and passions and thoughts of the common man to a great height, and magnifies the struggles of his soul to titanic proportions. But he sees it all, and he makes us see it all, in a Lucretian perspective. It is all a transitory show; the earth soon covers even the carnage heaps of the Peninsular campaign. A thousand years of human struggle are as a day to 'It'; and in importance they weigh as a scruple, a grain of sand. Helen's face could launch a thousand ships; but 'It' never noticed either face or ships. The 'proud songsters' were last year

> particles of grain,
> And earth, and air, and rain

'And we?' we may ask, musing thereupon. 'Why write of us, or think of our state at all?' But Hardy never brushes us aside. Not a mood nor a whim of us. Our life is all poetically explored, harmoniously conceived, and set forth with intenseness, passion, as though of endless significance. I have mentioned before Hardy's preoccupation with death. With this goes an intense interest in anniversaries, and in the revisiting of scenes of former events—the sort of thing that in a weaker mind than Hardy's we should call morbid. Not only is a fleeting mood of vast consequence to him—every recollection of it, every association with it, is important, memorable, precious. When a lad of fifteen Hardy met a girl whose glance caught his. Passing her in a country lane he murmured 'Good-evening' to her, but at the same time walked on, out of bashfulness. But he followed her to Weymouth later, where she was at school, and took pains to find out her name. If the record is exact, nothing more happened than this. Yet a few months before his death, at the age of eighty-eight, Hardy penned the passionate lines *To Louise in the Lane*:

> Meet me again as at that time
> In the hollow of the lane,
> I will not pass as in my prime
> I passed at each day's wane.
> —Ah, I remember!
> To do it you will have to see
> Anew this sorry scene wherein you have ceased to be!
>
> But I will welcome your aspen form
> As you gaze wondering round
> And say with spectral frail alarm,
> 'Why am I still here found?
> —Ah, I remember!
> It is through him with blitheful brow
> Who did not love me then, but loves and draws me now!'

And I shall answer: 'Sweet of eyes,
Carry me with you, Dear,
To where you donned this spirit-guise,
It's better there than here!'
—Till I remember
Such is a deed you cannot do:
Wait must I, till with flung-off flesh I follow you.

Mentem mortalia tangunt indeed! But very often—not onl *The Dynasts*, but all through his poetry—his eye glances f this terrestrial scene 'of scantiest size' to the *flammantia mo mundi* of Lucretius, and again in the other direction, as Lucre does, to tiny atoms of 'earth and air and rain,' which, tho tiny, are of infinite meaning and importance Lucretius is wh a protest against the man-centred mind, Hardy is comple man-centred, yet he flits to the 'back of the sky,' to use the ph in the *Phædrus*, with a Lucretian facility

Some, I suppose, would connect his gloominess with philosophy, quoting his own phrase:

thought outbrings
The many-sided mournfulness of things

But I do not think there is any necessary connexion His glo I fancy, is part of his temperament, part of his physical make perhaps. In his late years, as both the poems and the published notes from his diary seem to show, this was reinfo by thoughts of his childlessness


I have written this, first of all, in the hope that I may in more readers to turn to Hardy's poetry, and, in a less degree, protest against most of the criticism of it that I have read be true, as Mr. Santayana has said, that a poet's importan measured by the degree in which his imagination has 'domin reality,' it surely is necessary for critics, in the first place, to what 'reality' is for men to-day, when science has more c pletely transformed our universe than it has ever done befo and that not for a few of us—and then to trace the contou this reality in Hardy's imagining That may be an arduous for some who have donned the mantle of critic But poetry not wait for them to catch up. This is not to say, of course, only the scientific minds can appreciate Hardy Science is thing, the revolution in human minds which science has caus another. It is the latter which is 'reality' for Hardy. U this his imagination plays, and, in my belief, with great p power.

CARLETON STANLE

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MOSUL OIL AND THE PIPE-LINE

The matters now arising in connexion with the construction of a pipe-line to take the oil of the Mosul oilfields to the Mediterranean are of international importance. There are in Iraq two proved and tested oilfields, the development of which is held up by the absence of a pipe-line. The first is the Baba Gurgur field, near Kirkuk, on the north-western border of Iraq, in the hands of the Iraq Petroleum Company, consisting of British, French, American, and Dutch groups holding in equal shares; and the second, the Naftkhana Field, near Khanakin, on the Persian border, worked by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. This field lies partly in Iraq and partly in Persia. The Baba Gurgur oilfield is probably one of the largest and most prolific in the world, but its distance of some 600 miles from the Mediterranean must make the carriage of the oil to a port on that sea very expensive. On the other hand, Basra, at the head of the Persian Gulf, is only about 450 miles away, but the Suez Canal dues upon oil-tankers are so heavy that it would be profitable to the company to avoid them

at the price of constructing the extra 200 miles of pipe involved by the Mediterranean route.

The present low price of oil, its over-production in Ame and the immense oil resources held in reserve in Venezuela w in the absence of other considerations, make most of the g international oil interests sharing in the Iraq Petroleum Com reluctant to bring the Iraq fields immediately to the poi production The American, British, and Dutch interests long been working for a general agreement for restrictio output throughout the world, and, were they free to follow inclination, they would undoubtedly, after exploring th resources of the Mosul area, refuse to develop them further consumption had overtaken production But they are not agents Under the terms of the Iraq Petroleum Company a ment Iraq has the right to declare the whole concession forf if the company does not, within four years of completing testing of the area of the concession and the selection of wo plots, begin to construct a pipe-line to the sea And Ir growing impatient It is now nearly four years since the ta of the first great 'Gusher' well in the Baba Gurgur field one well alone is said to be capable of yielding 1,000,000 to oil a year Iraq is in financial difficulties owing to the fall price of agricultural produce on which she mainly depend revenue, and she needs the royalties on her oil.

France also is impatient, so impatient that some of the E financial papers have hinted that her withdrawal of gold England is due to a desire to put pressure upon the F financial and oil interests and force them to agree to an early struction of a pipe-line from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean France has made her share of the Mosul oil the basis of al arrangements for the monopoly of the refining and sale within her boundaries and she regards its delivery at a conve Mediterranean port as a vital factor in her defence She c longer contemplate dependence in time of war upon the co ance from vast distances in neutral vessels of so essential a modity, nor the being forced to bid for it in the open m against enemies or neutrals At great sacrifice she has comp all plans for her security, and she cannot tolerate the gap l them by the absence of an assured supply of oil under her control. Up to this point the desires of France and Ira identical. They both wish to have the Mosul oil flowing Mediterranean port as early as possible But the question of port it shall be, whether a Syrian port (Tripoli or Alexand or a Palestine port (Haifa), divides them sharply.

France, with her mandate over Syria, naturally press a Syrian port. Not only would the delivery of the oil o

Syrian coast increase the prosperity of the chosen port and so benefit Syrian trade, but it would also in the event of war give France greater security for the conveyance of the oil to her own shores. For, even were Great Britain a benevolent neutral, France could not have such a free hand at Haifa, under British control, for organising the delivery of the oil to her tankers as she would have at Tripoli or Alexandretta. And supposing that Great Britain's sympathies were not with France in the war, there might be, she fancies, unpleasant possibilities of obstruction She is prepared, therefore, to go to great lengths to secure her object.

Iraq is at least as impassioned in her stand for Haifa. Her reasons are various First, she believes that a pipe-line from Kirkuk to Haifa would inevitably be accompanied by a railway, since between the Euphrates and the Jordan the line would traverse an almost uninhabited desert, and without a railway its construction and maintenance would be difficult For a pipe-line to Tripoli or Alexandretta a railway would not be so essential, as the line would at no point after entering the desert be more than about 100 miles from existing railways (Aleppo-Nisibin or Aleppo-Homs), and supplies are easier to procure on that route Thus, if Iraq can insist on the Haifa route, she hopes to get a railway to the Mediterranean constructed by the oil interests without expense to herself Such a railway would run wholly through Iraq, Transjordania, and Palestine—Transjordania ruled by King Faisal's brother and Palestine under the mandate of his British ally There have been times when relations between France and Iraq have been difficult, and leading Iraqis have even had trouble in getting passports to traverse Syrian territory. Iraq does not wish to be dependent on French policy for her intercourse with Europe Moreover, a Haifa railway would secure for Iraq a large share of the profits arising from the transit of European and American goods to Persia These now go round by the Red Sea and Persian Gulf to Basra and thence on the Iraq railways through Baghdad to Khanakin, on the Persian border But Persia is building a railway from the Persian Gulf to Teheran, which will divert all this traffic, and threatens the Iraq railways and Baghdad commerce with a serious loss, unless a new route through Iraq can be devised which will be even more attractive to Persian imports than the new Persian railway

Now, a railway from Haifa would enable all goods destined for Persia from Europe and America to avoid the Suez Canal dues; and this saving, combined with the greater speed of conveyance, should attract them to Haifa and retain for Iraq the profits of their transit, leaving to the Persian railway from the Gulf the carriage only of Persian trade with India and the Far East. Again, a railway from Haifa could bring British military

help and military stores quickly to Iraq, if required, under terms of the new Treaty of Alliance, without the delays of circuitous voyage through the Suez Canal, Red Sea, and Pe Gulf. Such help could not be ensured by a railway starting a Syrian port, even if the pipe-line on the Syrian route accompanied by a railway, for if Iraq were attacked by or her neighbours, France and Syria might well be neutral might forbid the use of the Syrian portion of the railwa British forces or material destined for Iraq Iraq, there considers a railway from the Mediterranean traversing only a and Iraq territory vital to her interests

Secondly, Iraq hopes that a railway and pipe-line to H would permanently secure for her the desert corridor joining territory to Transjordania and Palestine, which the ambitio the desert tribes of Nejd threaten, in spite of the cordial rela recently established between King Faisal and King Ibn S This corridor passes east and west between the southern fro of Syria and the northern frontier of Iraq and is at its narro not more than 70 miles wide The Nejd tribes resent its existe since it runs right across the routes followed by their cara trading with Damascus, and they have often proclaimed intention of obliterating it, although agreements between and Transjordania provide for the free transit of such cara If they had their way, they would completely cut off Iraq the Mediterranean and would block the air route between (and Baghdad. The British Air Company using that route w then have to bargain with Nejd for leave to fly over this de and might have to pay heavily for it, if indeed their passage not entirely prohibited It is evident that if a railway and line were built through this desert corridor by internat interests, the Nejd tribes would not dare to encroach upon it Iraq need not trouble further about the security of her acce the Mediterranean and Egypt

The railway would run for some 450 miles through mainly in flat desert country where construction would be cl and for some 250 through Transjordania and Palestine, p in hilly country The latter section would be proportion expensive. Palestine is no less anxious than Iraq that the line shall go to Haifa, and shall, if possible, be accompanie a railway She has received a large loan from the British Go ment for the improvement of Haifa Harbour, and were this to be the point of departure for oil-tankers, and to be conn by rail with Kirkuk and Baghdad, its prosperity would be ass Numbers of passengers between Europe and India would use route, and the tourist traffic both in Palestine and Iraq wou immensely encouraged.

Lastly, Great Britain must prefer that the pipe-line shall terminate at a port under her control. It would be inconvenient that the British Mediterranean Fleet should be dependent on a Syrian port for its oil, and Great Britain is keenly interested in the stability and prosperity of Palestine, Transjordania, and Iraq.

Thus there is a sharp conflict of interest between France and Syria on the one hand, and Great Britain, Palestine, and Iraq on the other, as to whether the pipe-line shall debouch on the Syrian coast or at Haifa, being in the latter case accompanied by a railway But, be the political interests what they may, the decision would normally rest with the Iraq Petroleum Company, which would obviously be guided by considerations of cost, harbour facilities, and security As to cost there can be no question. The pipe-line to the Syrian coast, probably to Tripoli, would be cheaper, since it is about 100 miles shorter and avoids the expensive crossing of the Jordan valley. Moreover, water is more plentiful on this route In the matter of harbour facilities there is some doubt Tripoli could be equipped no less easily than Haifa with storage tanks and with arrangements for the discharge of the crude oil, but it is said that the prevailing wind at Tripoli is such that the oil-tankers arriving there empty and awaiting their load would have difficulty in mooring, and that the anchorage is inferior to that of Haifa

The question of security is debatable The western portion of the Tripoli line in Syria would pass just north of the Lebanon, near territory inhabited by a turbulent population which gave trouble to the French during the rising of 1925 If Alexandretta were preferred to Tripoli, the terminus would be threatened by Turkish ambitions and by brigand inroads from Turkey. On the other hand, the Haifa line would, for some 200 miles in the Iraq-Transjordan corridor, run close to the northern frontier of Nejd, exposed at first sight to attack But all this country is practically uninhabited, and is far to the north of the area infested by the warlike Akhwan tribes of Nejd, who bearing in mind the danger of bombing from the air, would scarcely venture to raid so far from their bases On balance the security of the Haifa line seems greater than that of the line to Tripoli If the Iraq Petroleum Company were free to decide, they might incline to the Syrian route, the question of cost outweighing all other considerations. But unfortunately for them they have difficulties about their concession, for the solution of which they may be obliged to bargain with Iraq; and Iraq, with unyielding voice, demands as her gain from the bargain that the pipe-line shall go to Haifa and that it shall be accompanied by a railway.

This situation has arisen in the following way. Shortly after the war the American Government were obsessed by the ground-

less fear that their oil supplies were approaching exhaustion, by negotiation with Great Britain they not only secured American interests a quarter share in the Turkish (now I Petroleum Company, but also succeeded in limiting the orig monopoly of the company over the whole Mosul province by 'policy of the open door.' Under this arrangement the comp were, after a reasonable period of prospecting for oil, to sele fixed area for their operations, and the whole of the rest of Mosul province was then to be thrown open to public ten The Americans doubtless hoped that in this competition t financial resources would secure them the lion's share, wl would be additional to the quarter share of the company's already obtained by them Later on in the negotiations of 1 between the company and Iraq, the company who probably not then realise the enormous extent of the Mosul oil depo themselves proposed that the area to be selected by then pursuance of this arrangement should consist of twenty- rectangular plots of eight square miles each, and the final c vention between the company and Iraq embodied this provis It was stipulated that the company should thereafter act as ag for the Iraq Government in conducting the auctions for additional areas outside the company's twenty-four selected pl These were to be held by the successful bidders from Iraq on same terms as to royalties and other obligations and rights as company's own plots, the element of competition consisting the sums offered at auction The Iraq Petroleum Company consideration of the fact that it originally held the conces over the whole Mosul province, was to receive the sums bid the successful bidders at the auctions the Iraq Government be content with its royalties on the oil

The time has now arrived when under the Convention Iraq Petroleum Company should select its twenty-four pl But it is most unwilling to do so, because it is doubtful whe the 160 square miles allotted to it by the Convention will su even to cover the whole of the Baba Gurgur oilfield, the c oilfield which it has had time thoroughly to test If this oil were not completely covered by the company's holdings, and r companies were able to secure a corner of the field by bid at the auctions, an era of competitive drilling, which has pro so injurious to the American and other oil industries, would in; for the huge oil pool underlying the field could be tappe the rival companies, and a frantic and uneconomic race m then ensue, each trying to drain away as much oil as poss before the others should succeed in exhausting the oil. would obviously be grossly unfair to the Iraq Petroleum Comp which has borne the heat and burden of the day in securing

concession and discovering and testing the field, and it would be against the real interests of Iraq. These would be best served by the methodical development of the field through one agency, which, like the Anglo-Persian Company in southern Persia, could make large plans undisturbed by competitors It is true that the oil of the field might be got out more quickly by the competition of two or more rival companies, and that for a comparatively few years Iraq might gain huge royalties ; but this would be achieved at the expense of so flooding the market with oil and lowering its world price that, with the expense of constructing and maintaining the long pipe-line, the operations of the rival companies would scarcely pay and the whole oil industry of Iraq might suffer a setback It would be better for Iraq to receive a substantial, but not enormous, annual sum in royalties for a long period than for it to receive an extravagant amount for a few years ; for when it had learnt all the financial vices of opulence, it might find that its chief oil pool was empty and that the oil interests of the world were unwilling to risk the expense of testing and developing other fields under the ruinous system of competitive drilling. Moreover, experience elsewhere has shown that competitive drilling into one oil pool is a very wasteful system and may spoil the field and lose a great part of the oil. The wisest policy for Iraq, then, is to insist on receiving early an adequate sum in royalties from what is suspected to be her greatest oil pool, but at the same time to conserve her oil resources and prevent waste by leaving its development in a single hand.

These reasons combine to make the Iraq Petroleum Company anxious to obtain from the Iraq Government a modification of the terms of their concession which shall give them a larger area, and perhaps a longer period, for experimental borings before they have to make their final selection But the *quid pro quo* demanded by Iraq, the selection of Haifa as the terminal port for the pipe-line, and the construction of a railway alongside it, is too expensive for them.

And even were Iraq to get her way, it seems doubtful whether the opposition of France could be overcome France feels so strongly on the subject, for reasons already explained and to which the Press of Paris and Syria bears witness, that she would probably be prepared to use all the resources of her diplomacy to frustrate the Iraq plan ; and the means lie ready to her hand She is none too enthusiastic about the proposal that Iraq shall enter the League of Nations in 1932, since this may embarrass her in Syria. Moreover, as traditional defender of the Eastern Christians, she sympathises with the objections of the thousands of Christians in the Mosul district to being left in the uncontrolled power of an Arab Government, as contemplated in the new Anglo-

Iraq Treaty. The protests of these Christians have alre reached the English Press, and the Baghdad newspapers in tl comments on the new Treaty have already expressed a fear t France will oppose the candidature of Iraq and prevent obtaining the suffrages of two-thirds of the League Assem which are necessary for her admission. Or even if France not go to this length, she might insist on reimposing the 'capit tions' in Iraq, which she, like some other nations, professes c to have suspended for the duration of British control of the l courts. If there is a real danger of such action, the exaspera of France over the pipe-line question would increase it, and opposition of France in the League might bring all the painf worked-out policy of Great Britain and Iraq to the ground. issue must be sought from this dilemma

Nor do the complications end here. While the tussle betw Iraq and the oil company has dragged on, new interests h intervened and made Iraq even more reluctant than befor yield her point A syndicate known as the British Oil Deve ment Company, under the presidency of Admiral of the F Lord Wester Wemyss, and with the backing of Lord Inverf and other leading financiers, came forward in 1927 and a for a concession similar to that of the Iraq Petroleum Comp of twenty-four plots of oil-bearing land in the Mosul area out the plots to be selected by the latter company They urged it was to the interest of Iraq to make the Iraq Petroleum Comp select its plots without delay and to throw the rest of the cou open to development, and, learning that in the eyes of Iraq decisive factor was the construction of a railway to Haifa, dangled before her somewhat indefinite prospects of fina help for that purpose Later on, in order to avoid the oppos which might grow, both in Iraq and in the League of Nation the grant of a special concession to a purely British comp they invited to join them an Italian group, the Agenzia Gen Italiana di Petrolio, and subsequently a German group ba by certain well-known German industrial concerns, and a S French group They carried on propaganda in Baghdad, the result that the public opinion of Iraq has become conf and distracted between the rival offers, and tends towards dri the hardest possible bargain with the Iraq Petroleum Com and refusing any amendment of the original concession, ex at the price of a pipe-line and railway to Haifa.

The position of the British Oil Development Compan however, weak, because their demand is, not that they sha allowed, as provided in the Iraq Petroleum Company's Cor tion, to compete with other aspirants at an auction for the which they desire, and to pay the price to the Iraq Petro

Company, but that these areas shall be assigned to them in return for definite financial help to Iraq. This could be arranged only by an amendment of the Convention, to which, of course, the Iraq Petroleum Company would, in its turn, not consent without a substantial *quid pro quo.*

Thus we have the following position Four great oil groups—British, American, French, and Dutch, joined into one company—have discovered and tested an immense oilfield. They are now bound by the Convention to begin the construction of a pipe-line to the Mediterranean, which, after traversing Iraq, must go either to a Syrian or Palestine port. Great Britain, France, Iraq, and Syria have under the strict terms of the Convention no voice in the choice of a route or harbour, which rests with the company. The route to a Syrian port (Tripoli) is cheaper, but less secure, than that to a Palestine port (Haifa) The French group favours Tripoli; the other three groups probably favour Haifa France and Syria back the French group, Great Britain, Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordania desire Haifa and would support any groups which freely decide to vote for that port The company is forced by circumstances to ask Iraq for an amendment of the Convention, failing which it may suffer grievous loss at the hands of rivals This gives Iraq her chance to insist that her choice of Haifa shall prevail and also that a railway shall be built alongside the pipe-line to Haifa

Iraq really cares only about the railway, and is indifferent as to the route of the pipe-line, provided it is built quickly so that she may begin to get her royalties on the oil The company shrinks from the heavy cost of a railway in addition to that of a pipe-line, for though the railway might ultimately pay some years would pass before it would do so Iraq is adamant and will refuse to amend the Convention in the way which the company desire unless she gets her way France is equally adamant, and might ruin the future of Iraq if her views are not met In the meanwhile another great company consisting of British, Italian, German, and Swiss-French groups has intervened and asks Iraq to grant, in return for financial help to Iraq which might go some way towards building the railway, an oil concession outside the area to be selected by the Iraq Petroleum Company. Iraq would like to do this, but is prevented by the Convention with the Iraq Petroleum Company. She, therefore, in her turn wishes to amend the Convention so as to enable her to grant areas to the new company. This latter would probably agree with the three non-French groups of the Iraq Petroleum Company in favouring Haifa as a terminus for a pipe-line, either an independent line, if they found enough oil, or a joint one with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

What is the solution of this conflict of desires and policies? In the first place, it seems obvious that the two great companies should come together and attempt by mutual concessions to work out an agreed plan to present to Iraq If they could each give a substantial contribution towards the railway, Iraq and Palestine might borrow on favourable terms the balance required —Palestine for the expensive portion within her own territories, and Iraq for the cheaper portion within hers The British Government might then well help with its credit—at all events, for the Palestine section. In return for such an arrangement Iraq might amend the Convention so as to give the Iraq Petroleum Company the right to select and work a larger area than that which they at present possess, and a delay of a year or two more in which to make the final selection of such additional area Against this the company would undertake to build immediately a pipe-line to Haifa for the oil of the already proved Baba Gurgur field, and would consent in their turn to an amendment of the Convention as desired by Iraq This amendment might permit the new British Oil Development Company to begin prospecting for oil at once, and to select a separate area as soon as the short additional period granted to the Iraq Petroleum Company should expire. To meet French views a separate branch to carry the French quarter share of the oil might take off from the main pipe-line to Haifa at the nearest point to Tripoli, which would probably be at Rutbah, in the desert, half-way between Baghdad and Damascus This branch would be about 250 miles long, and the French group would doubtless be ready to bear the exclusive cost of their branch, in lieu of sharing in the cost of the remainder of the main line between Rutbah and Haifa, which would be some 400 miles long The result would be that the British, American, and Dutch groups would each bear one-twelfth more of the cost of the latter portion than they would have done had there been only a single line to Haifa paid for equally by all four groups. Such a plan as regards the French share of the oil was suggested by a French writer in the *Correspondance d'Orient* as long ago as April 1928, and would probably satisfy the French groups.

An amicable arrangement between the Iraq Petroleum Company and the British Oil Development Company might provide that the latter shall, if successful in finding oil, either pay a proportionate share of the cost of construction of the Haifa pipe-line or a fixed charge for the conveyance of their oil in it—a plan which the Convention already envisages for the oil produced by outside companies. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company would also wish to have the use of the pipe-line to Haifa for their oil from the Naftkhana field which was mentioned at the beginning of

this article. There should, therefore, be no real difficulty in the way of providing funds for the pipe-line.

The foregoing is, of course, merely a slight sketch of a possible solution. It depends primarily upon the willingness of the British and French Governments to bring pressure to bear upon the eight international groups concerned (two British, one American, one French one Italian, one German, and one Swiss-French) to co-operate in friendly fashion. Iraq would benefit, not only from the early receipt of her royalties on the oil and from the advantages of the Mediterranean railway, but also from the fact that so many international groups would be vitally interested in her stability and prosperity. France would obtain the desired delivery of her share of the Mosul oil at a port under her control while Great Britain would similarly have oil delivered for her Mediterranean Fleet at a port under her mandate; Palestine would rejoice in the prosperity of the port of Haifa and in the profits of the large passenger and tourist traffic which the railway would bring. Finally the construction of the pipe-line and railway and the provision of the oilfields plant, would give an immense amount of employment in the countries of all the groups. So far as the British Oil Development Company is concerned it has already arranged that Britain and Italy shall divide between them 50 per cent of all orders, and that 38 per cent shall go to the German and 12 per cent to the Swiss-French interests. With a similar arrangement between the groups of the Iraq Petroleum Company Great Britain would secure such a volume of orders as would sensibly help to solve her unemployment problem. All interests would then be satisfied.

HENRY DOBBS.

A FOREIGNER LOOKS AT THE BRITISH SUDAN[1]

I AM not British, and I hold no brief for the British system Most emphatically do I wish to state, at the beginning of this article, that I hold no brief for the British system In the course of my wanderings in tumultuous places abroad I have had a good many encounters with the English under their various administrative forms diplomatic missions, army and navy, police and law I have always emerged from these brush-ups second best—an experience which still rankles If on the one hand I was aggressive, finding much to criticise in their methods of bolstering up an obsolete Empire when they should be building a new world order, they, on their side, allowed no vestige of a scruple to interfere with the brutality of their reprisals

That, however, is as it may be I only mention these facts to explain that when I went to the British Sudan I had, *a priori*, no disposition to enthusiasm Every single colony, protectorate, and mandate-run country I have visited has invariably moved me to anger or despair and to expostulatory writings There was no reason to suppose that the British Sudan—of which, moreover, one hears exceedingly little in Europe—was likely to prove an exception to the rule It was without hope or faith of any kind that I strolled into the British Sudan and discovered what I believe to be a unique experiment in colonisation, which has stirred very deeply both my heart and my brain

The little museum at Omdurman, on the White Nile, plunges the visitor straightway, by evocation, into one of the blackest, most cruel and lawless chapters of African history, and no human record will ever set down all that African history has really been It was Africa that made Winwood Reade call his great world history the *Martyrdom of Man* The weapons—the thickset clumsy guns, the deadly barbed spears—the chain armour, the flags, red robes and seats of the chieftains, the old gala carriages, so carefully preserved in the small grey rooms, bear witness to a period of outlandish atrocities a living generation can still remember :

[1] This article is a much abbreviated version of an essay which will shortly be published in book form.

the domination of the Mahdi and the worse tyranny of the Khalifa, his successor. From 1884, when the Mahdi drove out the Turco-Egyptian exploiters of the country, to the defeat of Abdullahi at Omdurman in 1898, there stretch fourteen years of massacre, torture, looting, raping, without a break, all that religious fanaticism, racial ferocity, individual rapacity could invent and practise An evil and repellent tale Not a link in the chain but appears to be forged out of despotism, pain and blood.

Not even a Bolshevik could say that by taking over the Sudan in 1898 England made an enviable haul The first administrative pioneers were military, and, unfriendly though I am to every sort of professional army, I recognise that homage is due unreservedly to the indomitable pluck they showed and to the enduring work they did I am told they were given imprecise magisterial powers, a copy of 'King's Regulations,' and general instructions to push onwards in every direction They were turned loose into a country that—it sounds unbelievable, but it is true—is as big as British India They had to persuade a population, excessively and reasonably suspicious of all strangers—to whom, indeed, all strangers hitherto had been slave-raiders—that they were not Turks (It was an uphill job, and even to-day the old people refuse to believe the English are a different race and call them obstinately 'Tourkawi') And these English proved that the government they were establishing was, though a government, unlike the ancient despotisms. They created just rules unheard of before; they collected equitable taxes and brought the whole region under an elastic form of central administration. In some ten years they had taught a large portion of the Sudan that order and peace were realities and that men could be subjects and yet live protected and helped and not like hunted beasts. Behind them, Khartum, with an unprecedented quickness, consolidated their achievements and threw out new progressive organisations on an essentially civil basis. To-day, at the end of three decades, the Sudan counts over 6,000,000 souls, as a whole, it is self-supporting, the British taxpayer not giving a penny for its upkeep; individually, according to native standards, it is prosperous; it is disciplined, and climbing towards education. Public security is practically complete Compared with other European colonial possessions 100 years old—and more—it is quieter, happier, richer, healthier How have these astounding results been achieved?

Let us get it into our heads once for all, we Europeans, that the Sudan never had a civilisation—for I take my solemn oath that in thirty years or so from to-day the *Jeunes-Soudanais*, who are inevitably beginning to come into existence, will assert that

once upon a time it had a glorious past. This is a depressing prophecy, but it will come true. Every subject race, as soon as it becomes conscious of its subjection, seeks compensation in the spontaneously created legend of a glorious past. The Poles have bored us to death with this legend; so have the Irish, the Hebrews, the Arabs; India has made herself an intolerable nuisance with the same sort of nonsense. All alien-governed people develop this obsession, and so, too, will the Sudanese invent, in the near future, the romantic and fantastic annals of a gorgeous national history. They will discover that they, too, possessed an Alexander, a Cæsar, a Napoleon, a Mussolini. Already they are showing signs of idealising the Mahdi and the Khalifa, two of the most unmitigated monsters the world has ever produced. Until this scintillating halo of imagination appears, however, the drab truth remains that the Sudan has never been an ethnical or a historical entity. Consequently, when the English undertook its administration, they had a clear, if miserable, sheet on which to draw designs They might have drawn the most detestable designs The British might have done with impunity in the Sudan what the Belgians did in the Congo, or what the Germans did in West Africa. They might have reverted to the methods by which Algeria was pieced out by France for the benefit of her own settlers. They might have behaved like the Spanish and the Portuguese in South America, and like the Dutch in the East Indies They might even have repeated their own record in India and in Egypt, which, to my mind, taking it altogether and in regard to the time they have been in occupation, is a very poor one

To their eternal honour, be it said, they did not choose. They invented. The point I wish to stress here, as forcibly as I can—for it is the corner-stone of all their building in the Sudan—is that, either because they were particularly intelligent, or particularly honest and humane, or most surprisingly and fortunately imbued with the finest elements of the spirit of the times, they manifested from the beginning an admirable *modern* conscience and acted upon its dictates They avoided the follies and the sins that up till now have invariably attended every attempt at colonisation. The Sudan is the latest thing in European exploitation, and it is the best. The English rulers struck straight out for an incredible objective—the welfare of the conquered alone They inaugurated a *régime* that in at least three tremendously important things was completely new. (*a*) They left the native owner in possession of his land. Even where that land was capable of growing cotton—plantations that have become the main source of the individual native's prosperity and the firm basis of the equilibrium of the Sudan budget—they gave him seed, water, technical super-

vision, and yet left him his own master. (*b*) They did not allow the small settler, the small trader, and the middleman from home to come into the country. And (*c*) they abstained from every kind of forced and unpaid labour.

The British have moved with astonishing promptitude, enterprise and success. They have created a corps of agriculturists and entomologists to destroy the pests that attack the native crops; a group of veterinaries to look after and improve the native cattle; and a quite unrivalled body of biologists, bacteriologists, laboratory workers and doctors to fight native diseases. They have already trained native women to become midwives. They have instituted hospitals, primary and secondary schools and what corresponds to a native faculty of medicine. They have built railways and dams and ginning factories, opened roads and developed ports, and they *paid* the natives whom they employed as workmen. There is such security now in the land that when I had to travel back to Khartum from the extreme southern limit of Kordofan I was given only a car, a Sudanese driver who spoke no English, and the valediction of the District Commissioner. Armed with these, I was rushed for days across a blasted, withered, sun-bleached region where the tall camels stalked ponderously along the tracks and where the only human beings I encountered were stark-naked black savages with three or four spears in hand. They surrounded the car every time we had a puncture, silently watched the chauffeur at his repairs, looked at me, my luggage, my fat handbag—they could have snatched it from me with the slightest of gestures—and salaamed with their curious hesitating imitation of the military salute as I drove away. Not a soldier on the roads; not a police patrol; not the ghost of any authority.

I went to call on the Sudan Government. I had been warned that it did not care overwhelmingly for tourists, that I could not move a step without its permission, that I had to submit all my plans to its approval, and that in any case there was no possibility of my going on trek if it did not put its rest-houses—not that there is anything royally luxurious about them!—at my disposal. I have already pointed out that I am a foreigner, and before I climbed the stairs of the civil secretary's imposing dwelling I gave myself a little lecture which, I am convinced, sums up the beliefs ninety-nine foreigners out of a hundred hold with regard to the British character. 'Now,' said I, 'mind what you're about. . . . You have to deal with a very queer beast. When it is alone, it will be intelligent, fair, modest, sympathetic, natural, humorous, and it will know a prodigious lot. Altogether, it will be very charming. But when it is in a herd it is pig-headed, stupid, ignorant, unimaginative, prejudiced, appallingly self-

conscious, consequently ill-mannered; of an abysmal contempt for everything that isn't itself, and arrogant to the point of lunacy. Try, therefore, to get it alone, and it will help you with the greatest and most disinterested courtesy. Get it in its herd form, and, without more ado, you may as well pack and return home.'

I got it in a party, for at Khartum they are all in and out of each other's offices and houses, and yet I found that it was, collectively, as intelligent, liberal, and considerate as if it was isolated. It was untainted with officialism; it discussed everything under the sun as broadly as if it was in a Paris drawing-room—and talk, in a Paris drawing-room, can be very untrammelled!—and it was heart and soul and body immersed in its job.

I am doing my best to prevent this article from becoming statistical, because in the Sudan statistics, though absolutely honest, are so spectacular that I might not be believed, but I must quote a few figures here, just to show the significance of the Gezira plantations On a small scale, and subject to all sorts of interruptions and climatic accidents, the Sudan has always grown cotton. The Khartum Government studied the conditions, and, after various trials, mapped out a very bold scheme with a private company, the Sudan Plantations Syndicate It was decided to grow long staple cotton of the best Egyptian type, which no other country had been able hitherto to produce But the first necessity was a regular supply of water By means of a loan guaranteed by the British Government the Sennar Dam, a gigantic undertaking, was built to hold up a quota of the annual Blue Nile flood which descends from the Abyssinian plateaux, and to organise the irrigation of the cotton plantations by gravity instead of by pumping plants All the other cultivations benefited too, for the estates in the Gezira are divided into portions and produce cotton and food crops in rotation That idea of co-operation with the native which dominates the Khartum mentality came into play again, and the land is worked on the basis of a three-fold partnership The native cultivator receives 40 per cent. of the value of the cotton, the whole of the rotation food crops, and free water and free technical counsel. (His land is rented from him by the Government for a term of forty years, at the end of which he recovers full ownership. If he wishes to cultivate his own land, he may, if not, he gets a very enhanced rental for it. This measure ensures the complete cultivation and the good husbandry of the irrigated area, for, abandoned to himself, the native would certainly never have succeeded.) The Government and the syndicate share the remaining 60 per cent., in return for which the syndicate breaks up new soil, provides villages and cultivating plant, and collects, ships and markets the cotton. Whatever are the fluctuations of the commerce of

the world, the native growers, at least until the expiration of the syndicate's contract, are assured of the disposal of their crops. To-day the syndicate manages an area of about 550,000 acres, and the gross value of the ginned cotton, together with the cotton seed, can be estimated roughly at 3,500,000*l*. sterling a year.

Beside cotton, the rest of the indigenous cultivations immediately prospered—durra (the staple food of the Sudanese), wheat and barley, lentils, beans, onions and melons, the castor-oil plant, ground-nuts and sesame. The rapid and steady expansion of the railways stimulated native agricultural effort all over the country, for the Atbara-Suakim and Port Sudan branches opened up a very important field to transit and commerce—a direct trading access to Asia and Europe, such as the long, costly desert-and-river route up the Nile to the Egyptian coast had never been. There is a good deal of timber—'sunt' for boat-building, and mahogany—rubber, ivory, hides and skins; some minerals, such as gold, lignite, iron ore and copper. A special breed of tall, strong camels is raised, and most of the natives possess donkeys and bulls for transport, cows for milk—they do not kill them for meat—sheep and goats.

I do not know what ethnologists make of the various strains of this population, but one thing is certain: the blend has produced an appallingly ugly type. The harsh black faces are neither completely negroid nor completely Arabic; the bodies are tall and look like walking frameworks—every rib protrudes—the long limbs are as lean and repellent as the dry membranes that fall from the trees. The men are clothed, and the women enwrapped in stuffs from their waist downward, but their bust is ordinarily exposed, and never in my life did I see such unredeemably hideous breasts. All these people are certainly not poorer than the sedentary Arabs of Southern Algeria (for instance); they are freer in their customs and lead a more normal existence, and there is among them nothing like the same tragic prevalence of rotting eyes.

I learnt a good deal about 'devolution'—an expressive word—the spreading of life outward instead of a synthetic concentration. Devolution is the keynote of British administration in the Sudan, and means the decentralising of power and its distribution among native chiefs, confirmed by the Government in their hereditary functions. The alternative to that would have resulted, evidently, in a fearful over-centralisation at Khartum, a tighter grip over the provinces and a terrific increase in salaries—money that can now be used for the betterment of native conditions. But it might have been done if the authorities were less liberally inclined.

One of the strangest paradoxes about the Sudan, and a fact

that you must always make an effort to remember (so little apparent it is), is that *in principle* the Government is essentially and thoroughly autocratic. Indeed, it is, *in principle*, the most autocratic I know. It is responsible, not to the Colonial Office, which, being obliged to deal with inferior peoples, has never learnt *savoir-faire* and possesses the deplorably low-bred habit of interfering, but to the Foreign Office, which moves in the best circles of sensitive nations, all acutely conscious of having won the war, and consequently insisting on parity, perfect consideration, equal treatment, huge portions of continents and whole seas—things that have schooled it to an admirable tactfulness. So the Foreign Office, for all practical purposes, leaves the Sudan alone. Its constitution is such that it would be the easiest thing on earth for it to turn into sheer satrapism At one end of the pole is Khartum ; at the other, the Sudanese peoples—no complicated web of native institutions in between ; and, all along the line, nothing but the British administrators, rendering accounts only to the capital Just a little ferocity in these administrators' hearts, just a little distortion in their brains, and there would have been another disaster to add to the list of the colonial catastrophes of the world The administrative system in the early stages tended to insist on the application of the Government code in the Government courts, and the use by the native chiefs of their own inherent powers was restricted But in the past ten years the wisdom of this began to be questioned by the administration itself, and the feeling gained ground that Western law is not necessarily always most suitable for Eastern peoples, and that the administration might be placed on a steadier basis if native custom was given a freer hand These speculations were translated into very definite action by the present Governor-General, who pointed out on his arrival that the bureaucratic form of government then prevailing was bound, in the course of time, to lead to a repetition, in the Sudan, of the train of happenings in India, and that the best safeguard against the eventual cry of ' The Sudan for the Sudanese ' was that the British should be able to reply with truth ' Well, you've *got* it ! ' Now the northern Sudan is a congeries of Arab tribes An Arab tribe in its natural circumstances is presided over by its sheikh, assisted by the elders He directs their movements, keeps the peace and punishes offences He administers traditional local custom, plus what he can remember of Islamic religious law His authority depends on consent, the Arab being the most tenacious lover of personal freedom in the world and the least socially minded. Devolution reinstates the Arab chiefs in many of their old functions, and as a result minor offences are now dealt with by the sheikhs and elders themselves, and where men with the

necessary ability and prestige are found they wield considerable powers, which will be extended as the opportunity occurs. This new policy appears to be startlingly successful. Native administration will not be, of course, as efficient as direct administration, but the British accept that in the belief that in the long run it will be more valuable to the people. There is more margin for injustice and corruption, but the strength of public opinion, the insistence on public proceedings, on the co-operation of the tribal elders and on the recording of brief particulars of each case, and constant supervision and inspection by the English staff, lessen the perils of extortion and unfairness. It is essential to the scheme that these judicial powers should be used not by native magistrates appointed *ad hoc*, but by tribal chiefs in whom they are inherent. In the Fung province alone last year some 650 cases were dealt with by native authorities, and only half a dozen appealed against their verdict. The majority of the sheikhs are obviously gratified by the trust that is being shown in them, and are making conscientious efforts to justify it.

A similar policy is being adopted for the pagan black tribes, giving as much play as possible to their own institutions while suppressing such barbarous practices as are repugnant. But here the going is more complicated, and the British administrator must tread very lightly. Witchcraft, for instance, is the very devil. When a whole community assures the District Commissioner that one of their number is a wizard who is blighting their crops, killing their cattle and making barren their women, what is he to do? He cannot knock into their heads with a hammer the knowledge that witchcraft is a myth. If, on the other hand, he takes no action, the probabilities are that very speedily they will cut the sorcerer's throat. A pretty exercise in Pragmatism. I do not know how the British officials work it out, though in the frequent case of the 'rain-owner' perversely withholding the rain indispensable to the crops they place the wretched man under arrest for a time literally to save his life. My own very simple suggestion is that Khartum should come to the help of its harassed administrators by instituting as quickly as possible elementary classes in meteorology and biology, but when I say these logical things I'm *always* turned down!

I visited the Kordofan province, where the principal element of interest, both geographically and ethnologically, is the group of Nuba hills, the original home, it is supposed by some, of the Nubians. Before achieving that visit, however, quite a lot of telegraphing had to be done by Khartum, for you cannot wander about as you please in the interior. There is occasional unrest among the hillfolk—questions of taxes, or discontent with their own headmen, or simply the organic need for a stirring up of the

blood. All these races, it seems to me, relish an upset from time to time; they have lived so long in unstable conditions that complete peacefulness palls upon them. They fall into the most dangerous of all states—boredom. I propose that the Government should divert this perilous superabundance of energy into such channels as cricket and football No, I am not joking. Bickering vanished from English life with the advent of cricket and football; and I do not see why tribal conflicts here should not succumb to the same treatment

Dilling remains for me a place of very pleasant memories I saw a perfect native hospital, and I was taken to visit the Nubas in their grim little hills It was altogether an instructive halt The native hospital is a thing to be proud of It consists mainly of twelve brand-new airy tukls, which the Nubas much prefer to wards, each containing three or four pallet-beds There is nothing tragic about it, perhaps because the black races will not, or cannot, keep up a tragic expression very long Perhaps, too, a foreign eye is so diverted by the appearance of the patients that it does not instantly take in the pitifulness of their plight

The competent native doctor, just graduated from the Kitchener Medical School in Khartum, who runs this establishment under the supervision of his English superiors, did the honours of the place with a quiet amiability which had neither servility nor swagger There were cases of tropical ulcer, malarial fever, bilharzia, against which the Tropical Research Laboratories are waging a tenacious war, some syphilis, no consumption—a fair sample of the diseases prevalent among the race I saw comparatively little conjunctivitis or trachoma, and what that means to a Socialist writer, who has spent fifteen years frantically trying—and perhaps by her very frenzy defeating her own aims—to get home Governments to fight native ophthalmia adequately, cannot be told (I firmly assert that out of every ten Arabs in North Africa seven are blind or on the road to blindness) We fetched the dispensary books and pored over them and found that out of 60,000 inhabitants of the district 46,315 were treated as outdoor patients in 1929, and 622 people were hospitalised That is a first rate record

The *whole* record of medical and health work in the Sudan is first-rate. At the top comes a great institution, the Wellcome Lee Stack Laboratories, which in the domain of tropical diseases and research now constitute a world-known scientific centre. There is nothing like them in any other colony, and the men who made them what they are, and those who maintain them at their invariable level of brilliant efficiency, are among the best and most devoted servants of our species The Kitchener School of Medicine trains native doctors at the expense of the Govern-

ment. This school has already turned out about twenty fully qualified Sudanese practitioners I learnt an interesting little fact concerning these graduates: last year the final batch of examination papers was carried off, by an American doctor, to one of the foremost universities in the United States, and the examining board of professors there declared that the papers were fully as good, and the medical standard reached was fully as high, as the corresponding tests set in the American university Beside the very well-equipped and very well-managed hospitals in the big towns—Khartum, Atbara, Port Sudan, Wad Medani, Kassala—there are a number of provincial hospitals, such as the one I visited at Dilling, and the Government maintains a steamer which is partly a hospital and partly a laboratory to keep in contact with the inhabitants of the horrible swamps of the Upper Nile An excellent measure taken by the medical authorities has been the licensing of sanitary barbers The class of men who previously practised was an extremely low one, but to-day the members of this corporation assist the *mamours* (minor officials) in the notification of births, deaths, and vaccinations The Government allows them a small annual payment, while in some provinces the barbers who have already been licensed receive ten days' annual training in the hospitals, where they are taught the treatment of simple cases slight wounds, the routine handling of trachoma, aseptic precautions These sanitary barbers are proving a decided success

One of the ways in which the work of the doctors is brought near to the natives—recalcitrant at first, they always are, poor things '—is at the tribal gatherings when the people flock in to attend native sports, races, horse shows Then a doctor is likely to be present with his travelling hospital and the people are afforded an opportunity to get into touch with him and his magic, and see for themselves what it all comes to A very efficacious method Another splendid achievement is the creation of a group of native midwives—there must be 100 of them now—trained in Khartum by two most energetic and competent sisters, who travel through the roughest districts to find recruits Once trained, these women return to their villages, and their work and influence there can have very important results I hope the Government will see its way to paying them, too, however modestly, for in that case their authority will be immediately increased, and perhaps a stand made against the hideous ritual mutilation practised on Moslem women in the Sudan

One last word. In the far south, on the borders of French and Belgian Africa, a campaign against sleeping sickness has been carried out with conspicuous success, and the threat of this illness to the country—at one time extremely serious—has been practi-

cally averted. Camps are organised and admirably kept. All the natives who display symptoms are concentrated in the camps, where they live under the conditions that are natural to them, cultivating their own crops, and these places are so far from being unpopular or regarded as prisons that the sick are joined there and helped in their work by their healthy relatives and friends. Facts such as these need no comment—they are beyond praise.

The Nuba mountaineers give trouble now and then. They are very vigorous, simple-minded, excitable; they have been accustomed from time immemorial to pounce upon their weaker neighbours or to defend themselves against the Arab slave-raiders. So they evince a chronic disposition to take to the warpath for no rational motive whatever They live in a district of very peculiar hills, not really high, but which consist of millions of fragmentary tumbled stones forming caverns and tunnels, in which labyrinths they disappear as soon as they perceive they are to be called to account No other native tribe, and certainly no European force, can follow them there When they have killed an English officer, or a policeman, or one of their own chiefs, they vanish entirely, and all that can be done to them in reprisals is to destroy by bombs from the air their *tukls*—which they rebuild in one day—and their flocks, which is a chastisement that displeases them more. But such childish minds cannot be really impressed

The Nubas are heathen tribes with any number of separate languages and different intricate religious and ethical systems Their District Commissioners, who love and defend them with a great and touching fervour, stoutly affirm that they are very moral and singularly devoid of cruelty, that they do not lie, do not steal, they murder each other sometimes, indeed, but without premeditation—only in the rage of a sudden nerve-storm (They are never hanged for such murders) They hardly ever filch their neighbour's husband or wife If, inadvertently, they succumb before marriage to the reprehensible solicitations of that old *maquerelle* Nature, remorse and complicated (and remarkably funny) purifications immediately ensue in expiation of such grievous behaviour It seems to me that there are two capital problems in this province how to prevent the Nubas from piling on clothes, out of a spirit of imitation or emulation, as soon as they become prosperous—a proceeding which impairs their robust health and fine physique—and how to keep them from learning the Arabic language, a medium which will undoubtedly imbue, and contaminate, them with the Arabic mentality and customs. I should like to see the extremely conscientious Commissioners here become the protectors of the pagans against trousers and Islam, the dispensers of English and Biology, and

perhaps in two generations they will have in this district an astonishingly enterprising race.

My visit to the Nuba hills had the effect of reviving in my mind a very worrying question to which I find no satisfactory answer. It has to do with education, so I shall set it down here. I may be a crabbed, carping, carking, cantankerous spirit. Several colonial Governments have assured me heatedly that I am. I may argue too passionately and harshly I may have a mania about education Certainly I believe that all our main faults and miseries and madnesses are due to a bad, or timid, or selfish, or muddle-headed conception of education But I must speak according to my lights

Let me begin by acknowledging what Khartum has done. It has already created a good many educational establishments and is strenuously pressing for more, as every conscientious ruler should In 1928 there were eleven primary schools in the Sudan, eighty elementary schools or *kuttabs*, 489 subsidised native schools, three instructional workshops, a girls' training college, and seventeen girls' elementary schools—the latter are quite wonderful—with an attendance of 28,315 pupils in all I have said something of the Kitchener School of Medicine Another very important institution is the Gordon College, where natives are trained as teachers, engineers, and for minor posts in the clerical branches of the administration There is also a section for Moslem law. It is thanks to this college that large numbers of young Sudanese are employed to-day all over the country as assistants to British chiefs, and have been able to replace the Egyptians and the Syrians whom it had been necessary to import in past years An excellent thing that the Sudanese themselves, and not strangers, should be associated with the English in serving their own nation I went to see some of the more modest schools—the most significant, I always think—and found them all clean, well equipped, and well run The number of girls schools established in so short a time is unprecedented Everywhere pupils are increasing—in 1928 there were some 5000 more than in 1927—the native demand for education is spreading, and steady efforts are made to meet this need

These figures are very good, but the progress made takes place almost exclusively in the north That upsets me. I wish I could have discovered more schools in the southern provinces. The latter are not yet well cared for Some districts there have no schools at all There is a certain tendency to forget them. I know that the difficulties are great lack of money, climate, a small personnel, the multiplicity of languages among the pagan tribes. But the consequence is that all the institutions in the heathen regions are mission schools. It is extremely distressing

that a divided Christianity, purporting to have the same deity and yet teaching bewilderingly different dogmas, should have already got a grip on the negroes. Presbyterians, Baptists, Anglicans, Roman Catholics train them to read and write, but they also put into their heads their own religious notions. I have seen enough of mission schools to realise that, however deep the sincerity of the teachers, and however gentle their persuasion—when they are at their best, that is, for they can be tyrants just as well as anybody else—the inevitable favours which neophytes enjoy play a considerable *rôle* in conversions They also lead to scissions in the native communities themselves. In any case, education in a colony is a State affair, not at all the business of more or less self-righteous religious congregations, and these intrusions are in reality a proof of the sluggishness of the State in a vitally important department Khartum should get a move on in that direction itself, instead of letting its work be done by priests, nuns, ministers and clergymen's wives

Moreover, I am depressed because of certain prepossessions on the part of the Government. In this English colonial venture, so extraordinary in almost every other way, the educational policy of the authorities is to 'develop native civilisation on its own lines.' This maxim applies to the Moslem races Now, Khartum thought out its methods very carefully before it practised them, so there can be no question here of casualness or 'muddling through' But the theory that underlies all this thought, this carefulness, this time, these pains, this spending of money, is, I submit in all humility, a ghastly mistake

I owe it to myself to say that I am not speaking at random I was born in the Orient, where my father held a high post in the foreign diplomatic service of his own country. Thus, during my adolescence, I lived in a Moslem land and spoke its language. When I was fully adult my work as a writer took me back to the East, and I spent my most impressionable years in different Mohamedan communities By the test of my intelligence, my conscience and my experience, I believe that Islamic 'civilisation' is an abominable welter of superstitions, prejudices, limitations, degrading traditions, confused morals, and very often cruel customs I am not talking here of the quality of Islam at its origin, though it has always seemed to me that its virtues, its generosity, its chivalry have been incredibly exaggerated I am talking of what it grew up into and what it represents to-day. I believe it builds up a mentality utterly antagonistic to science I believe that this mentality has to be shattered before any notions of modern knowledge can be instilled into a Mohamedan brain. I believe it is incapable of constructing a public *morale* and an idealistic or even merely honest civic spirit.

I live, furthermore, in a country which, apart from its two conventional devotions of 'La France' and 'La Famille,' possesses the shrewdest, most lucid, practical, hardest and most unsentimental intelligence conceivable. It has had to do with Moslem 'civilisation' for an incomparably longer period than the British. For centuries its propagandist services, its missionary and secular schools, its political institutions have been established in the Islamic world. A great portion of its colonies is Arabic. Its opinion, therefore, cannot be dismissed with a shrug of the shoulders It holds the view—and in every detail, almost, reason and experience confirm that view—that Moslem 'civilisation' is an insuperable bar to progress, comprehension, essential order, cleanliness and hygiene Sometimes circumstances have obliged it to subsidise existing Islamic schools, and the result is—take Tunisia, for instance, which has the most advanced Moslem 'intellectuals'—that not one of these centres of native learning has ever produced anything that is not sheer puerility in the domains of literature, philosophy, sociology All this is so true that, in spite of its determination to 'develop native civilisation on its own lines,' Khartum, to make professors, doctors, superior clerks, anything with an atom of modern competence or a sense of responsibility, has to shove the natives into the higher colleges where the framework is *English*, where the professors are *English*, where instruction is given in *English*, and where the whole intellectual atmosphere is exclusively *Western* So long as Khartum goes on teaching Arabic in the Sudanese schools, no profoundly new conceptions can take root in the Arab brain

There remains the question of education among the pagan tribes, and here Khartum does not yet seem to have quite made up its mind Oh, great and good Khartum! may I put in, with the profoundest deference, a timid word? You have, in this matter of dispensing necessary instruction to the heathen, a slate before you on which the marks already inscribed have not bitten very deep. They can be converted into something else without smashing the slate, as you would have to do in the case of the Arabs. Among these pagans there is complete ignorance of the Arab language There are no Moslem inhibitions and traditions at all The religious beliefs are entirely different, and the morality and social customs do not touch Islam at any point It is certain that these pagans must learn a common tongue, for at present each village has a separate mode of speaking Teach them English! I have been told by some of your cleverest officials that if these people do not know Arabic they will be hindered from entering Government employment and commerce. That is so; but they can be taught Arabic in the highest classes of their schools the while the basis of their enlightenment rests

on English. As language is the means of transmission of ideas and habits, they will be drawn directly into contact with Western civilisation, which, after all, is the most rational because the most critical. Moreover, since you have shown amazing genius in the accomplishment of bold and novel things, add one more experiment to the list of your successes! Mould these primitive, relatively unencumbered and plastic brains in the cast of a simple scientific ideology, and instil into them the clear understandable doctrine of evolution instead of the elaborate mysteries of still unsuspected divinities. Here is a programme, good and great Khartum, which can be followed more easily than you think, if only you shed the light of your countenance upon it:

English and Biology! English and Biology all along the line!

Yes, give, oh Khartum! the minds of these poor pagans a chance by starting them on the level of modern knowledge, and not with the religious dogmas of dead centuries and you will have deserved well of the invincibly clarifying and aspiring spirit of man.

Before I leave the subject of education, let me ardently congratulate Khartum on its wisdom in the matter of cinema films. A cinema does exist, but it is inconspicuous, unobtrusive, and hardly encouraged Thanks to the lack of official enthusiasm, the Sudan—a country in formation where, *in its own interest*, it is indispensable that the white man's prestige should be maintained—has not yet been pervaded by Hollywood And the Sudanese have still to learn—may Khartum put off indefinitely the day of illumination '—that we are all, according to the portrait we so complacently draw of ourselves on the screen, mental and moral defectives, crooks, sharpers, imbeciles, criminals and whores—in a word, a people for whom the only hope of salvation is to be governed by those we are governing now

The success of the Sudan experiment is due to the quality of its British civil administrators Every observation I made during my weeks of wandering confirmed this opinion, everything I saw went to prove that the land itself and the native peoples in it are utterly incapable of producing results or forging ahead unaided. The little body of alien men that governs this country has alone made it what it is But how this body of men manages to be so indisputably first rate remains a mystery which I cannot solve. They are all drawn from the British universities. They are all appointed when they are very young The Commissioners of the Sudan who examine them personally in England make a point of knowing their athletic record, and their physique is taken into consideration. Their moral reputation is closely investigated. Still, such inquiries are at best only precautionary

measures and involve no guarantee that the candidates will turn out well.

Here, again, I must speak as a foreigner. Most of us Continentals, at one time or another, have met the young Englishman abroad—on his holidays in Switzerland or on the Riviera; tramping in Italy and Spain; on board boats during sea-trips. I do not think I am exaggerating when I say that, through his own fault, he presents himself to us generally as an exceedingly silly, rowdy and obnoxious young animal. He is carelessly dressed. His manners are loutish or intolerably casual. His recreations are purely sportive or childish to a degree. He drinks too freely and smokes endless vile pipes. He plays the gramophone at all hours without the slightest regard for his neighbours' rest. He dances incessantly. He revels in rushing about and yelling like a half-wit on 'treasure-hunts'—or whatever the foolish amusement is called—and he indulges in indescribably inconsiderate and sometimes very brutal 'rags'. After you have listened to his conversation, you go about in a state of hyper-amazement, asking yourself what the English universities imagine they are doing in the matter of educating English youth. Suddenly you think that you, too, might have been born English, and, smitten into bottomless horror by such a fancy, your ecstatical sense of escape makes you instantly revert to a forgotten religious fervour, and loudly do you thank the Lord God of Nations that you are not as the British are. Very well.

Then you go to the Sudan, as I did, and you find that this same vacuous, noisy, deadly dull, inconsiderate, irresponsible English graduate is governing men. Different men, complicated men—for the mind of an inferior race is much more sombre and tangled than the civilised mind. His governing of these men includes the dispensing of justice, and to be just he has not only to assimilate a hitherto unheard of legal code, but to understand impulses and mainsprings of emotions which he cannot possibly feel himself, and motives of behaviour and conceptions of morality which have nothing to do with his own experience. He is obliged to learn a very difficult language in a very short time, often with no other instructor than a text-book. He is forced to turn his hand, with no preliminary warning, to every sort of technical work that crops up in lonely far-away understaffed places—building roads, repairing bridges, surveying districts, even engineering—and he must acquire knowledge of such work as best he can, without giving away the secret of his ignorance to his native subordinates. He has to be well groomed and dignified in his person, *pour l'exemple*; cheerful and helpful in the society of his equals, who sum him up with great quickness and acumen; unselfish professionally—not out for personal kudos,

but falling readily into team-work—tenacious to overcome obstacles; stoical to resist the material discomforts and dangers of the climate and the special colonial temptations of drink, drugs and bodily neglect. In short, that youth we know in Europe as a Nuisance and a Stupid has to become one of an order of Samurai. And he *becomes* one of these Samurai! Such is the paradox of the young Englishman I cannot even begin to explain it. There it is.

I have already said that the creators of this administration were from the very first bold, valiant, and distinguished minds. But it is one thing to have a high standard of honour and capacity for yourself, and quite another to infuse it into a service, and, what is more, to keep it at the same level for over thirty years! There must be in all these young Englishmen latent but potent forces which mature with startling promptitude as soon as they fall within an appropriate frame When you see this maturity occurring in almost every case, you are obliged to go even further and admit that it must be a trait of the race For, in spite of all my scepticism and alertness for gossip, I discovered no lapse and no exception The record is sterling throughout

Unlike the revered Mr Kipling's, my own experience of Colonies until now has been that the white man is supremely ready, not to shoulder his burden, but to clamp himself as an unremovable Old Man of the Sea to the back of the native he has overpowered or annexed But in the Sudan the practice is different There the white man really is the servant of his order and of his time No: *not of his country*—here it is that a miracle happens This black land is not a mine to be ripped open and exhausted for the richness and glory of the home country Far less is it the happy hunting-ground of the adventurer, the gold-digger, the industrial or commercial brigands, the ten-thousand-times accursed concessionaire Graft is as if it had never appeared on this planet of ours. The custom of accepting 'presents' from the natives has never been started The exchange of reciprocal '*bons offices*' between administrator and administratee is unknown. I have seen no bullying (a method of governing which you cannot miss in a colony, so vivid is it in tone and gesture), not only no bullying in high places, but none in the relations of native police and native soldiers with native civilians Yet if anything is a fact in this world of illusion and appearances, it is that as soon as a particle of authority is put into the hands of native minor officials the result is extortion. I have witnessed acts of kindness which made me gape; the insistence of District Commissioners on the good quality of the food to be distributed to the patients in native hospitals, or administrators on trek, who needed all their provisions, giving them away to the natives who required

them—infinitesimal things, to be sure, but revelations of the character of this humane and honourable service. Above all, I have found that every man feels a whole-hearted interest in his job—and proves it. The victories in the eyes of these British officials are a new train, a new road, a new dispensary or school, the checking of some devastating epidemic. Whatever the field in which they work, I certify that their chief goal is the amelioration of native life and native conditions. There may have been—there probably will be—some defaulting, but the movement up till now possesses such homogeneous strength that the inadaptables or the offenders are rapidly eliminated, and the effort continues unchanged in its essence, its implications and its achievements.

One word more, concerning the present discussions of Great Britain and Egypt on the subject of the Sudan Personally I think it is a great pity that the Sudan should ever have been shared with Egypt, and that Egyptian money should have been used in the country. It would be incomparably better, to my mind, if England volunteered to pay the 750,000*l*—the seventh or eighth part of the cost of a single battleship—that Egypt still gives, and which constitutes the basis of her claims on the Sudan But economic considerations cannot for one moment be allowed to obscure the ethical issues of this question The duty of the higher and better civilisation that has stepped in here and has made order out of unspeakable poverty, demented cruelty and chaotic lawlessness, is not to Egypt but to the Sudan. There are obligations by which our whole species lives or dies—above national prestige and *amour-propre*, loans and subventions, historical associations (pseudo-historical associations, in this case). The unforgivable sin against the world-spirit of to-day is to destroy or impede progress The Sudan is making immense progress, and its advance is exclusively the work of its English administrators. To introduce among them as colleagues with equal powers of government an inexperienced and inefficient people who detest the English, and who are in their turn traditionally detested by the Sudanese, would lead to the arrest of progress and perhaps to a reversion to the old conditions, for it is easier to degenerate than to evolve It is not by right of conquest, but by right of salvage, that, until it has reached a definite degree of civilisation, the still infantile Sudan should remain under the sole tutelage of the race that is training it to manhood.

ODETTE KEUN.

THE NEW PROTECTIONISTS

It is not difficult to understand why the bankers who pleaded four years ago for Free Trade have now announced themselves Protectionists. Their appeal for a reduction of European tariffs has failed. In most countries, both in Europe and outside, tariffs have risen since then, not fallen. Four years ago hopes of a substantial trade recovery with full employment were still entertained. No recovery has taken place, and the unemployment figures are worse than ever. Banks find themselves more deeply embarrassed by the monetary help rendered to textile and other depressed trades. Near ahead lies the dismal prospect of a revenue deficit and the imposition of increased direct taxation, with further bad reactions upon industry and commerce.

The inheritance of traditions is fatal to the vitality of principles, and business men of our time, who have accepted from the nineteenth century the gospel and the practice of Free Trade as essential conditions of our commercial supremacy, easily persuade themselves that the loss of that supremacy has falsified the gospel and requires us to adapt our fiscal policy to the changed conditions of our time. Few business men are believers in any general economic laws: their particular business experience makes opportunists of them. It does not, therefore, seem strange to them that, whereas Free Trade was our true policy a generation ago, Protection is best for us to-day. Timid in their verbal commitments, many of them have clung hitherto to Fair Trade, safeguarding, or some other subterfuge. Even now many would hesitate to come out for straight Protection. Fortunately the approaching Imperial Conference enables them to put a highly reputable covering upon their conversion. Their policy presents itself as the economic integration of the Empire, with Protection incidental. How far there exists a real compatibility between this economic Imperialism and a sound, not to say scientific, Protectionism they do not stop to consider. In a hot atmosphere of Imperial sentiment and financial apprehension they serve up this mixed grill.

Before turning to discuss its merits, I wish to express a certain measure of sympathy with the resentment of the new

Protectionists against the intellectual arrogance and the pontifical utterances of many of the past and some of the present prophets of Free Trade. It is idle to ignore the important changes that have taken place in the structure and operation of both industry and commerce since the mid-Victorian days In this, as in other countries, the growth of trade unionism, with its substitution of collective for individual labour contracts, the enlarged part played by State and municipal business enterprise in production, insurance, and other social services, the replacement of competition in many important industries and trading processes by cartels and other combinations, have substantially affected the operation of the *laissez-faire* individualism, of which Free Trade seemed a natural appanage

But have these changes rendered Free Trade no longer sound as a principle and beneficial as a policy to this country? This question deserves to be debated as coolly, clearly, and closely as possible before this country is committed to a political and economic change more momentous than any in our modern history It is sometimes profitable to attack a large issue not immediately along its full front, but at some one or two critical points Two such points, not distant from one another, are presented in the claim that this Imperialist protectionism will increase our export trade and will cure unemployment

The severe suffering of our leading export trades, especially textiles and metals, is indisputable, due partly to increased competition from America Germany and Japan in those European, Asiatic, and South American markets which before the war were large purchasers from us and now buy from these strong competitors who "dump" their surplus goods at prices below their costs, partly to the erection of tariff walls behind which some former customers now manufacture for themselves Now my first comment on this situation is that, serious though it is, it is not so desperate as it seems The value of our export trade for United Kingdom goods in 1929 was 729,554,967*l*.[1] as compared with 525,253,595*l* for the year 1913, which, allowing for the rise in price level, presents a small decline from a high peak of prosperity. It is true that under normal conditions our improving plant and increasing population might have been expected to export a larger value, and that on the import side the same years show an increase from 768,734,739*l*[1] in 1913 to 1,221,591,024*l*. for 1929 But when it is suggested that such an unfavourable balance indicates early difficulties in paying for our necessary overseas supplies of foods and raw materials, the large value of our unseen exports (interest on overseas investments, shipping, banking and entrepôt services) is left out of

[1] Uncorrected figures (annual statement of trade, December 1929)

account. When it is remembered that we are still the largest creditor nation, having overseas investments which Sir Robert Kindersley estimates at about 4,000,000,000*l.*, we shall recognise that, though we are not investing abroad so large a sum as before the war, we are not actually strained in our foreign purchasing power.

The depression from which we are suffering is due in part to the failure of expansion of export trade, but also largely to the failure of internal markets. For, excepting cotton, the textile, and still more the metal, trades depend for success upon the rising standard of consumption of our growing population and the growing demand for metal goods in our own industries. After all, three-quarters of our manufactured goods are normally for home consumption. We could put up with some failure of expansion in our overseas trade were it compensated by an adequate growth of our internal markets.

But, having in mind these qualifications, let us admit that any policy which can stimulate our export trade is desirable, and ask whether the proposed protectionism is likely to do so. Now, though there are many variants of this policy, I take it that there is a general agreement to put on duties which will prevent our importation of foreign foods and raw materials, if our Empire is able to supply them, and to keep out foreign manufactured articles which we are equipped with the plant and labour to make for ourselves Our Dominions (and possibly our whole Empire) will give a substantial preference to the importation of our manufactured goods over similar goods from foreign countries

How would the adoption of such a scheme stimulate our depressed export trades ? The first effect of confining our purchases of foods and raw materials to Imperial resources will be to raise their prices in this country We must pay more for the same quantity and quality than if we bought them in the world market. Although the proportion of our food imports drawn from the Empire has considerably increased since 1913, the actual amount thus obtained is far less than that obtained from foreign countries, the value for 1928 being 330,000,000*l.*, as compared with 201,000,000*l* from the Empire For raw materials the increase from the Empire has been very little, and leaves us in 1928 dependent on foreign countries for 213,000,000*l*, as compared with 121,500,000*l* from the Empire Now, is it reasonable to expect that any steps taken for the development of Imperial resources can enable us safely and profitably to release ourselves from dependence on foreign supplies ? There are many important materials, such as cotton, timber, iron ore, and petroleum, which at present we derive

wholly, or almost wholly, from foreign sources. If we are to dispense with these sources of supply in order to encourage the discovery and development of Imperial supplies for such articles, we are engaging in a most hazardous procedure Again, there are important foods which we derive predominantly from foreign countries and others where Imperial supplies fail in certain years, compelling us to fall back on foreign supplies. Dependence on Empire wheat would put our daily bread in jeopardy. For last year nearly three-fourths of our imported wheat was from foreign countries By far the greater part of our imported beef comes from South America Yet wheat and beef are the two first articles recommended by Mr Amery for bulk purchase within the Empire [2] Now we cannot bind ourselves by tariff arrangements to our Dominions for the purchase of their foods and raw materials without imperilling the foreign supplies When Imperial harvests fail as they sometimes will, we shall place ourselves at a great disadvantage in buying from foreign countries whose regular custom we have abandoned My contention is that, as regards our imported foods and raw materials, we must pay more for a less secure supply if we try to substitute by tariff preferences the Empire for the world market What, then, will be the effect of this procedure upon the costs of production in our export trades? The cost in our mines and manufactories will be raised, first, in respect of the higher prices of many raw materials, secondly, from the rise in money wages to meet the higher price of foods and of many manufactured goods as a result of the tariff I am aware that some business men holding that wage standards are too high in this country to enable them to sell in competition with European countries, look to a tariff as a substitute for the monetary wage cuts which they dare not press upon the workers. But they are mistaken A "food tax" would only be accepted, if at all, by the workers on condition that they were compensated by a rise in money wages In many employments wage rates are already regulated by the cost of living When they are not, the refusal of employers to raise wages to meet a rise in the cost of living due to tariffs would bring about so much trade friction that industry would suffer in quantity of output and in cost

Our export trades would meet the full brunt of this attack. Their selling prices in foreign markets, already too high, would be raised still higher and we should lose many of the markets we have retained so far Would the Empire compensate this loss by the enlargement of its purchases of our more highly priced manufactures? It is true that the Empire has in recent years increased its purchases of our manufactured goods at a

[2] *Nineteenth Century and After*, August 1930, p 148

considerably faster rate than have foreign countries. But in 1928 we were still selling to the latter 303,250,000*l*. as compared with 275,500,000*l*. to the Empire. Our tariff on foreign foods and materials will therefore damage seriously our largest export markets. Will that damage be compensated by any corresponding enlargement of our Empire markets? Will our Dominions, which already buy so largely from us in proportion to their incomes, increase their purchases at the higher prices they must pay? This question will serve best to bring out the peril to our export trade that lurks in the proposed 'integration of Empire trade.' The Dominions would rather buy from us than from foreign countries, provided the difference in relative prices is not considerable But if we raise our export prices, owing to higher costs of production, three results will follow. They will buy less at the higher prices, foreign goods will come in over the preference, and lastly, they will be induced more rapidly to develop their own manufactures Take Canada, for example. Her purchases from the United States have been growing far faster, in spite of the preference, than her purchases from this country. This is partly from a natural affinity in demand, partly from territorial proximity, and largely from the fact that the preferential tariff in our favour operates mainly in classes of goods where the United States do not compete. Our higher priced exports will certainly not encourage the inhabitants of our Dominions, or our Colonies, to buy more of our goods. Each one of our Dominions and several of our Colonies are bent on developing their own manufactures, so as to become as economically self-sufficing as possible. Canada and Australia have been conspicuously active in this policy They will only buy from us what they cannot yet produce themselves But they set no limit in their industrial development They will buy from us their boots, clothes, tools, etc, until they can produce such articles themselves. Even then they will buy from us the machinery and other plant needed to equip their factories. But their set common policy is towards a self-sufficing nation. No proposals we can make at the forthcoming Imperial Economic Conference will bring any weakening of this resolve. Canada, Australasia, and South Africa will not for a moment entertain the idea of binding themselves to the production of foods and raw materials for the Mother Country, and of relying upon our manufactures for the supply of their industrial requirements.

Before concluding this section of my argument I should meet one bold objection that is sometimes raised. It is urged that a policy of tariffs would not raise the prices of foods and raw materials for our people. It would tend to such a development of Empire resources under the stimulus of a guaranteed market

that supplies would be as abundant, as cheap, and as reliable as when we bought freely from the world's market This claim rests on the hypothesis that capital and labour, poured from this country into the vacant spaces of the Empire, would, by improved transport, irrigation and other developments, open up new agricultural and mining tracts potentially more fertile and richer than the areas first populated. In other language, the extension of the existing margins of cultivation will bring in lands that will be better, not worse, than those already occupied. Now, it cannot be denied that there are cases in support of this claim. The late Professor Simon Patten, of Pennsylvania University, based his support of Protection largely on this tendency of American pioneers to leave the more accessible lands of their early settlement for new, richer lands further west. But to represent this as the normal course of economic development in modern times is to fly in the face of facts The costs and risks of any huge experiments in opening up central Australia, or in hoping for great successes in the unpeopled parts of North-west Canada, are not likely to tempt sound financiers in this country, even if the migration necessary to engage on such an economic policy was forthcoming The normal history of farming and of mining does not encourage the adoption of so hazardous a theory Even were such experiments successful, they would involve immense outlays of capital and labour for long periods before the success was established Moreover, they presuppose a spirit of pioneer adventure which does not exist in the population we can spare The sentimental Imperialist is easily captivated by talk about the congestion of population in Great Britain and the huge vacant areas in our Empire waiting to be peopled If our Government were in charge of a Pharaoh, who could move whole populations at his sole behest and set them to some great 'task,' the problem might be soluble. An imaginative economist like Professor Stephen Leacock finds no difficulty in framing a project for 'the development of the resources of the outside Dominions by the credit, capital and labour of the United Kingdom' He proposes

> That a Committee be appointed to report a plan of Empire Migration Settlement and Development of Resources the plan to involve, as its leading features, the investment of private capital from within and without the Empire, the grant of free passages, initial support and work under contract, to British labourers and their families, Government assistance from the Dominions concerned, in the making of surveys, roads, and communications, and the creation by Empire Incorporation of privileged companies to undertake the operations of development and settlement on a commercial basis and with a view to the pecuniary return to their shareholders.[a]

[a] *Economic Prosperity in the British Empire*, p 246

If two or three superfluous millions of our adult population were willing to leave English city, or even village, life in order to embark on this novel adventure in a distant, unknown country, and the occupants of that country were willing to receive them, and if in this period of depression our investors were willing, in face of the financial straits of Australia, Canada and South Africa, to embark all their spare savings upon this great Imperial adventure, one could only conclude that the British Isles and Empire were occupied by the most romantic people the history of the world has yet disclosed

Now, we are not a romantic people, willing to plunge into some new gigantic enterprise out of a passion for the economic integration of the Empire, and willing to pay, to risk and suffer, for this great ideal. Nor are our Dominions thus minded. Business men, of course, are not devoid of sentiment They will even admit a tincture of it into their trade operations. They will prefer to deal with their friends rather than with strangers. If they can afford it, they will even pay a little more for a friend's commodities, and will sell to him on slightly easier terms. But they will recognise that, though some occasional preferences of this sort are possible and agreeable, they cannot afford to run their business as a whole upon these lines They will not deal with a friend if they can get a definitely better article at the same price from a stranger, or the same article at a considerably lower price And they will always prefer not to bind themselves in buying or in selling to a friend, but will reserve free access to the wider market So far the trade and financial relations between Great Britain and the Dominions have been run along these lines On both sides amity and kinship have been allowed to influence economic relations. Because the slight structure of our import tariff has not permitted us to give preferences comparable to those accorded to our manufactures by the Dominion tariffs it is sometimes suggested that we are not contributing our fair share But this view ignores the importance of the preferences given in the Colonial Stock Act of 1900, the Colonial Development Act of 1929, and the Empire Marketing Board (each of the two latter endowed with a yearly fund of 1,000,000*l*), the Imperial Shipping Committee, the Overseas Settlement Board, the Imperial Agricultural Bureaux, and the Imperial Economic Committee designed 'To consider the possibility of improving the methods of purchasing for market and marketing within the United Kingdom the food products of the overseas parts of the Empire with a view to increasing the consumption of such products within the United Kingdom in preference to imports from foreign countries and to promote the interests both of producers and consumers.' These terms

were agreed in 1925, and the next year 'raw materials' were also brought within its scheme of operation. The more rigorous Free Trader may object that the investment and trade preferences indicated in these measures infringe the strict tenor of his gospel. But the political unity of the Empire and the sentiment of kinship will reconcile most Free Traders to this policy, provided it is not carried so far as to place positive barriers upon foreign imports.

It will be said that our safeguarding policy has already carried us a little way along this road. But quite apart from the expressed intention of the Labour and Liberal Parties to remove these scraps of Protection as soon as financial considerations permit, the existing duties are almost negligible as factors in our fiscal policy. Their danger lies in the false economic and dangerous political implications they harbour. The protectionist proposals we have so far considered have passed under the cover of economic Imperialism, the protection posing as incidental to the claims of a closer economic Empire. From the standpoint of a 'scientific tariff' designed to protect the industries and employment of the United Kingdom, the intrusion of the Imperial motive is very disconcerting. The largest, and in many ways the most important, of our depressed industries is agriculture. If any trade can claim the title of a key or essential industry it is agriculture. But it makes no difference to our farmers whether the cheap wheat, or beef, or bacon, which overwhelms them, comes from Canada, Australia, Argentina, or the United States. If our development of the Empire enables the Dominions to shed an ever-growing surplus on our markets, the tariff that keeps out Argentina's wheat and beef will be little consolation. No doubt a period of respite and recovery would be provided by a tax on foreign foods which, by raising prices in this country, would put some land back to arable use and more money into farmers' pockets, to be taken later on in rising rents—all at the expense of the consuming public. But if the proposed development of Empire resources came off, British agriculture would soon be back in the depression from which it had temporarily emerged. It would be a victim to the prosperity of Canada and Australia. A sufficient all-round tariff directed equally against the Empire and foreign countries is what our farmers really want. They could then keep prices on a continuously profitable level, assuming that the better organisation of millers and bakers were not too strong for them. Why should farmers be left to the free importation of Empire foods when our industrialists would be enjoying full protection, until Canada was so fully equipped with American capital as to push her manufactures into our free market?

Enough has been said to show how injuriously the policy of Protection is affected by the dilution of Imperialism. If as is assuredly the case, our future depends primarily upon low costs of manufacturing production, enabling us to sell overseas as much of our goods as will enable us (with the aid of our 'unseen' exports) to buy the increasing supplies of foods and raw materials we shall require, the only Protectionism that is plausible is one which keeps out foreign manufactures and leaves us free to buy untaxed foods and raw materials wherever we can get them cheapest and to develop markets for our manufactured goods wherever we can find good customers. I have no doubt that many of our Protectionists are not fooled by the mirage of imperial economic self-sufficiency, and would frankly prefer a straight policy of keeping out industrial imports which 'invade our markets Too much futile controversy has been wasted upon the effects of the Safeguarding Acts upon the trades they were designed to benefit No economist would dispute the statement that particular trades can be, and often are, benefited by tariff protection New trades can sometimes be nursed into prosperous childhood, depressed trades may be rescued from collapse. But these achievements are at the expense of other trades. When Mr. Amery declares that 'Free Trade as an intellectual conviction is dead,' denouncing it as 'a very superficial economic doctrine, deriving some justification and plausibility from the facts of the time,' he misunderstands the mind of the great majority of economic thinkers and the claim that Free Trade is a principle, not a passing expediency Free Traders have consistently held that this policy is based upon the law that the widest measure of freedom of exchange between traders in different countries tends to induce producers in each country to put their economic resources, human and natural, to the most productive uses, and that the benefits of this system are shared by the producers and consumers of all the countries engaged in this co-operation. This is a basic principle of trade whose validity is not affected by the measure in which it is applied to the utilisation of the resources of any particular country, though the amount of advantage attaching to its application varies greatly with the intelligent direction of the capital and labour at each country's disposal.

The contention that the Protectionism practised by most other countries invalidates our policy of free imports is erroneous. It is true that we should gain more if these other nations had followed our example, as Cobden believed they would. But because they will not admit our goods freely into their countries, it by no means follows that we should gain by refusing free access to theirs. Because they prefer to adopt the foolish and

expensive method of taxing their consumers by a tariff which keeps out some cheaper goods, and raises the price not only of those admitted from outside, but of the home products, for the benefit of the producers of these latter, it does not follow that we should act in the same foolish manner. It is equally to our advantage to buy freely and to sell freely in the widest market Because we are prevented by foreign tariffs from achieving the latter advantage, that is no reason for repudiating the former. To buy well is as important as to sell well, though the superior organisation of the producing over the consuming interests obscures this truth We let in free the foreigner's goods, not for his advantage, but for ours, because the policy of free imports adds to the total volume of wealth at our disposal There is something comical in the widespread belief that the foreigner is ever planning to dump the fruits of his labour on our shores without taking payment in the fruits of our labour, the only way in which payment can be made If he gives more labour than we give in return, so much the better for us and the worse for him In 'a new moral world' organised on a basis of equitable exchange this economy may be superseded In such a world a better apportionment of the product to the workers in every country would furnish so much larger a volume of demand in the national market that the surplus available for export would be restricted, and its price would be higher than at present. But until such organisation of world resources is available, each nation will find it advantageous to buy what it needs in the widest market, without loading its producers with costs of production heightened by a tariff and its consumers with the heaped-up burdens of these higher costs as they emerge in high retail prices

The folly of keeping out supplies of cheap food and raw materials from our markets is, indeed, so manifest that most Protectionists who remain unblinded by the Imperialist enthusiasm would confine their tariff to the case of imported manufactures. But there is little ground for such distinction The greater part of the manufactured goods which enter this country is machinery or tools or materials, or other capital goods used in some productive or distributive business in this country, entering at some point into the costs and selling prices If by a tariff we kept these goods out, we might employ more capital and labour of our own in producing articles dearer or worse, or both. But since this policy would, as we see, mean higher prices for the final commodities, consumers, called upon to pay these higher prices, would have to reduce their purchases of other goods, causing unemployment in the trades producing these goods.

Protectionists often summon to their aid the new terms

rationalisation, standardisation, and bulk production. If, they argue, our manufacturers could rely upon the complete possession of the home market, they could afford to equip and organise their business with all the best modern labour-saving devices. Secure of a large regular sale of their products, they would work at full pressure, reducing overhead costs to the lowest figure, and, where necessary, organising cartels for the disposal of any surplus products in the overseas markets at prices accommodated to these markets In fact, they ask us to imitate the policy of Germany and America But what is that policy? High prices at home, lower prices abroad Two years ago, when Germany and America were enjoying a boom, this might have seemed plausible But hardly now, when the conditions of production and employment are about as bad in these countries as in ours The truth is that the project of securing a full regular employment of plant and labour by keeping out imported goods does not work For the fluctuations of a kept home market are greater, not less, than the fluctuations of the world market. Here once more we touch the core of the Free Trade doctrine A wide, free, various market is safer and more profitable than an artificially restricted market It is better for us to continue to buy the foods, material, and finished goods we want from a number of customers bidding for our custom than to confine our purchases to sellers in our own country or the Empire The narrower market not merely means less choice, but it encourages and enables conspiracies to regulate and hold up prices If, as seems likely, the industrial world will organise its staple industries more and more along the lines of cartelisation, it will be more important than ever that we should not permit our consumers to become the victims of the restricted supplies and dictated prices of one national or international cartel, but should retain the utmost liberty of dealing with as many independent sources of supply as possible.

It is equally important that we should retain as many markets as possible for the sale of our manufactured goods, and increase our efforts for the opening and growth of markets in those areas of the world that are occupied by large populations in a backward condition and therefore amenable to education in new economic wants. The notion of selecting a time like this for specialising upon the development of markets in thinly populated parts of our Empire where we already possess most of the custom that is available, when there are immense areas with vast populations, such as Russia and China, whose development in the industrial arts, and in progressive standards of consumption, is capable of rapid growth within a single generation, is an almost incredibly foolish one. It will be said that there is nothing

in the proposed Imperial Protectionism to prevent us from taking our full share in the development of these and other foreign markets. Our export trade, furnished with a monopoly of the Empire market, will still seek to expand in these backward countries. But we should suffer from two grave disadvantages. On one I have already dwelt—namely, the increased costs of our manufactures owing to the dearer foods and raw materials consequent on our Imperial Preferences Countries, such as America and Japan, which have made large recent inroads on our markets in South America and Asia will cut further into our trade, while our European competitors will enjoy a similar advantage in Africa and the Near East Nor would this be the worst result of our reversal of our Free Trade policy The acquiescence of other Great Powers in our absorption of a quarter of the globe has been in large measure due to a recognition of the fact that we have not sought to conserve these markets to our sole use, but have allowed other nations to buy and sell freely with the peoples of our growing Empire Though the existing preferential tariffs have aroused some feelings of annoyance, the resentment that would arise from the new proposals would be deep and dangerous To reply that, as reasonable people, they would recognise that Great Britain and her Dominions and Colonies have as good a right to impose Protection or prohibitive tariffs as they the complainant Powers, is completely to ignore the lessons of history Suddenly to withdraw from traders in these foreign countries valuable trading rights which they had long enjoyed would inflict grave damage on business interests influential with their Governments and would worsen international relations at a time when all intelligent and serious citizens of civilised countries are striving to better them We are well aware how bitter are the feelings on the Continent generated by the raising of new and higher tariff barriers The withdrawal of our Free Trade practice would be an abject surrender to the principle of economic war which history has so often shown to be the instigation and the prelude to a war of arms This performance by a nation which has taken the most active part in establishing an international instrument for the pacific settlement of disputes and the active co-operation of the commonwealth of nations would be a more dangerous blow to the prospects of a pacific civilisation of the world than any other that can be conceived

Let me end upon a practical note. There is no accepted union either of hearts or interests between the Dominions and the rest of the Empire. This is expressed in no uncertain terms by Mr. Leacock, who tells us that ' None of the Dominions wants to link up their economic life with the goodwill or badwill, the

aspirations, the hatreds and the convulsions of the welter of peoples who live in British India and the Indian States. The inclusion of India and the Crown dependencies or half dependencies in the Economic Conference, of which I speak, would guarantee its failure.'[4] Everyone acquainted with Dominion opinion knows this to be true. In other words, there does not exist throughout our Empire that sense of community of interests and desire for co-operation which is assumed by Imperialists in this country as a prime motive of their scheme and an essential condition of its success. 'The British Empire Economic Family'[5] desiderated by Sir Basil Blackett is composed of elements so discrepant in race, government and civilisation as to afford little prospect of turning out a happy family. A policy relying upon enlarged future export trade with India, hitherto by far the largest of our Empire customers, but repelling Argentina, the most useful of our foreign economic *protégés*, nourished by our invested capital and paying us in large annual supplies of wheat and beef, would indicate a complete collapse of business intelligence in any Government that should adopt it.

J. A. HOBSON

[4] *Op. cit.* p. 243.
[5] *Nineteenth Century and After*, July and August 1930.

BRITISH AGRICULTURE AND RATIONALISATION

RATIONALISATION has only escaped being an 'ism' because it is applied to the health of industry rather than to a mental or physical culture Yet, however much we may mock those for whom it is a panacea of political speech, it means something in the mind of most of us for which there is no other word, not even a marriage of co-ordination and reorganisation quite produce the meaning It is vague and misused Compulsory rationalisation is nearly always the remedy in our minds for others of whose methods we disapprove Not unlike the author of *Hudibras*, we

> Compound for sins we are inclined to
> By damning those we have no mind to

In agriculture, at all events, we are apt to consider the farmer as if he should be a shopkeeper rather than a husbandman following the most skilled profession in the world In no other industry can the hobbyist find so many enchanting dappled horses to bestride Therefore, for the land, before finding remedies, it is well that we should define the meaning of those remedies implied in the word 'rationalisation' Very briefly, it would seem to be the practical application of a sense of proportion, not only within the industry, but in its relation to unemployment, the State and the Empire.

An instance comes to mind from an article in the last issue of this Review by Mr R A Butler He dealt shortly with the quota method of compelling our millers to use a certain proportion of home-grown wheat as a means of relieving the agricultural distress in this country. Mr. Baldwin, too, has spoken favourably in public of a guaranteed price for home-grown wheat coupled with an Imperial wheat quota This line of thought is at once of the most far-reaching importance to the Empire and at the same time dangerous for us who farm, since it may obscure the other issues in home agriculture. Its importance is its great help to the Imperial wheat growers. It links, as few proposals have, the home farmer with the Empire farmer. For my personal belief is that the golden era of rationalised agriculture will

only come when we are organised to farm imperially. But wheat has assumed so large a hold on the public and the farming mind that we forget that it forms only 10 per cent. of our agricultural output, when grown on about 1,100,000 acres. Again, let us look at wheat in the light of potential agricultural development. If by uneconomic subsidy we pushed the wheat acreage up to 2,000,000 acres, we would re-absorb 17,000 men directly, and probably increase our output to 16 per cent.—not higher, because the highest yielding wheat land is still under cultivation. Therefore, the bigger the acreage relatively, the poorer the yield would tend to become On the other hand, if we were to produce economically (as we could do in time) all the condensed milk, butter, and cheese now imported, together with all our own bacon and pork, we could re-absorb in direct labour alone over 400,000 workers. Thus a wheat policy in isolation is only an excuse for not going to the root of our agricultural difficulties. Hence my definition of rationalisation as a sense of proportion in practice.

But one cannot easily make remedies obvious without an analysis of our difficulties These difficulties are rooted in the past, nourished by our climate and geography, and they will be with us in the future except through the most careful pruning. In the past the Industrial Revolution brought wealth, but it disinherited agriculture, which turned gamekeeper for a living Wealth in the towns meant population, which means cheap food Only a highly organised modern factory type of agriculture could have produced this in England But the growth of wealth coincided with the maintenance of snobbery. The self-made Englishman seeks the secure established dignity of broad acres The successful Frenchman peacocks on the scene of his triumph and builds a machicolated château beside his factory. But while the Englishman's hobbies are in the country, his brain is in the town Absentee landlordism is a dead-letter, but there are few landlords who are not absentees in brain and leadership Now, if a business man buys an estate, he takes up home farming in the week-ends He is the victim of his manager and his stockman, for good blood stock is not only the *cachet* of a country gentleman, but the instinctive pleasure of the English. So he prefers to lose money on fat beasts at shows (and to scratch their gross, uneconomic backs with the chosen guests on Sunday afternoon) to spending wealth in the thankless task of furthering the industrial organisation of his land. I doubt if there would be much of an agricultural problem if the great industrial leaders had realised the importance of agriculture to them as something to develop rather than to exploit, or if millionaires in private life had worked like the old

eighteenth-century landlords, using their wealth, not to subsidise amenities, but to make agriculture self-sufficient, as Mr. Ernest Debenham and a few devoted colleagues are trying to do to-day. But now that the harm is done the amenity money is no longer available. Political prejudice, working through the tax-collector, is draining the landlord's supply of cheap capital. Yet no amount of public ownership or peasant holdings can make the desert blossom with the rose of profit. Indeed, that things are no worse than they are is largely due to the landlord still acting as buffer in the lean years.

Cheap food has sacrificed land to factory Lack of leadership has wasted the farmer's opportunities in the past. What of the farmer himself? He is a very highly skilled empiricist of the soil, of plant and animal life, something of a rule of thumb scientist, botanist, meteorologist, veterinary surgeon, mechanic and manager, under such changeable conditions that factory labour organisation is child's play in comparison. His task is sufficient without expecting him to organise in his market as if he were a pocket Woolworth In fact, one of his faults is that he pays too much attention to selling For we have a market at our doors, though with transport rates out of all proportion to the mileage This should be an advantage, but a market outside the farm gates destroys voluntary co-operation The essence of co-operation is necessity and interdependence, long-sightedness, and freedom from suspicion The man with a successful milk round in a small town will naturally not move to help the organisation of a cheese factory The bottle-neck of export is what has made Danish co-operation the model for the world.

Our long-sighted farmers are not sufficient to leaven the loaf. Long-sightedness implies a willingness to forego traditional habits—if necessary, to forego old friends who are too often old parasites. There are few long-viewed farmers who have not invested and lost money, through lack of loyal support from their neighbours, in co-operative failures. Individualism and a lack of economic sense and inability to support anything but ready-made successes are at once the strength and the curse of the British farmer The dealer in England is a ready-made success. He flourishes like the green bay tree. The farmer grumbles, sometimes unreasonably, at the middleman. He never forsakes him. He is nearly always in his debt. Above all, the English farmer has not organised his buying or his selling, because he has lacked necessity. He is not a peasant. Yeoman or tenant alternatives, not only of modes of agriculture, but of ways of life, have always been his. At home every other form of industry or trade to which he may care to turn his hand is before him, and abroad there is always the Empire. In Denmark

since 1864 the whole nation has had to farm successfully to survive. In Europe the peasants have few unpeopled colonies. Their patch of land must suffice. In the New World self-reliance has bred foresight and eliminated suspicion. Space and loneliness have bred interdependence. From the colonies there is no emigration to a yet more promised land.

But geography has not only put a market at his doors; it has diversified the demand for his produce. Climate has stepped in to intensify the difference The dairy lands of Cheshire and the wheat lands of Norfolk are a far cry in all but miles. Lincolnshire, Lancashire, Ayrshire are the great potato districts. But in the triangle of which they form the corners there are twenty breeds of sheep, of cattle and of pigs, and as many more varieties of husbandry How, then, can one expect grading and orderly marketing out of this welter by voluntary co-operation, especially when the industry is depressed and little public money is available? An obscure gold mine in China is likely to command more subscriptions than an English agricultural venture

Money brings me to the last phase in this analysis World deflation has depressed world agriculture, but, owing to our climate and our more rapid deflation, it has hit the British farmer the most severely Owing to our climate, we can generally only grow two selling crops in four years, and as a principally stock-raising country our turnover in live-stock in under two years is very limited If one puts the average rate of cash turnover of English farming at once in eighteen months, then it stands to reason that a fall in commodity prices at 10 per cent per annum means that the farmer is losing 15 per cent between sowing and harvesting Even then he may have to carry over his crop in rick, owing to damp, for another six months, losing 20 per cent. by deflation alone While if his capital is borrowed he will have had to pay two full years' interest, about 13 per cent., as well as having to pay back money which was borrowed at 100 and two years later is worth 120 A steel ingot, on the other hand, goes into Gary steelworks on one day and is delivered, for instance, as railway rollers the next This may be an extreme example, but industry can always cut the time lag in periods of deflation vastly shorter than agriculture.

This illustration shows the distance between industry and agriculture, but one cannot analyse English agriculture's decline without the relation of agriculture to industry immediately leaping to one's notice. For many years the drift from the country to the town has proceeded at the rate of about 1000 a week. So long as industry was prosperous through export trade this depleted purchasing power at home was not noticed. The farm labourer and his family, as well as the 400,000 farmers, in

the country are still the largest single group in the community. But, while there is even now only a comparatively small growth in unemployment on the land, it is because the land has lost its potential unemployed to industry. Looked at from the point of view of capital equipment, the farmer's is almost the most heavily capitalised industry in relation to turnover. The wastage in his implements, owing to the rough nature of the work, is enormous. Again, the small market towns are dependent on the agriculture of the surrounding countryside. These towns are, in prosperity, enormous customers for factories. Moreover, the chemicals used in artificial manure are one of the greatest by-products of industry. Indeed, the great new agricultural research station of Imperial Chemical Industries at Jeallott's Hill points the moral. No industry uses transport of raw materials and finished products to the extent of agriculture. Last of all, physically and psychologically it yet remains to be proved whether industrial labour can be kept healthy without constant interchange of blood between town and country.

In direct labour alone, as I have shown above, one branch of agriculture might well absorb 400,000 extra workpeople; while so interlocked is the problem that only a highly successful industrial population can pay for the high quality of food products produced so well by home agriculture. Thus it becomes obvious that agriculture is the point at which one must start to unwind the vicious spiral of our trade depression; and it is obvious, too, that, if agricultural rationalisation, in its widest implications, is to be brought about, industry and the State must be eager—perhaps paying—partners. I say paying, because there must be two stages in this rationalisation. The one should dovetail with the other. In the first place, before we attempt to meet our difficulties in detail, we will be forced to 'contract out' of world agricultural depression. Most of the great agricultural countries of the world are doing this already. Their method has been to keep up prices at home, which gives the farmer a fair return, and to dump the surplus, subsidised or not, on other nations. In practice this means ourselves. France makes her millers grind 97 per cent. of home-grown wheat or else show an export equivalent of flour. Germany, to get ready cash in the autumn, subsidises her export of cereals in the same way. By paying reparations she benefits her own farmers and hurts ours. In the United States agriculture is backed by a fund of 100,000,000*l.* wherewith to flood the markets of the world in bumper years. The instances multiply swiftly.

For our Empire trade as well as our home farmer we must move swiftly. Leaving aside the Empire, there are only three ways—free imports and a home bonus per acre or per commodity,

an embargo, or protection. The repeal of the Corn Production Act ten years ago is a shattering example of the dangers inherent in a bonus. Subsidies should only be used in the transition stages, and then homœopathically. Protection must be very high to be effective, and thus must increase the cost of living. The simplest example of protection can be taken from wheat. A motor manager buys steel. He knows to a nicety how much steel he will need for one car. To him protection is obviously a benefit A farmer plants an acre of ground with wheat. According to the season and his methods, he may grow fifty bushels or he may grow twenty In this country wheat may be rotted by damp; in another country drought or locusts may have killed it utterly. This means uncertainty—bumper crops and famine crops Always on a rumoured crop report speculation leaps in the world grain markets. As I write the grain movements in Chicago, owing to drought in the United States, are out of all proportion to the facts. Thus, not only does price fluctuation make protection uncertain on an open market, but a tariff wall, unless it amounts to an embargo, is bound to be jumped by the countries who must dump their surpluses There remains, then, the embargo in one form or another for dealing with the great staples of agriculture. This might be accomplished by an Import Board Socialist doctrine is dangerous in practice But then, in the case of cereals, we have the quota method which disallows all, or all but a certain percentage of, foreign grain while interfering hardly at all with the private direction of trade, holding only the intervention of the State in reserve as a last resort. The case of meat is different Meat does not go through the bottle-neck of the mill like cereals Yet of meat we already produce 50 per cent of our own supply, and we could easily produce all our needs within a given time But an embargo at present is hardly practical politics, and protection is open to much the same objection as cereal protection Therefore, in the matter of live-stock, we are faced with the necessity of a variety of remedies, which means rationalisation of our farming in every direction.

For many people will say that agriculture in England is not one industry, but one hundred, and you cannot treat it as one. Yet they are often the same people who say that wheat alone is the key to agriculture, for they argue with some reason that a decline of wheat acreage means more land given to milk, barley, oats, and potatoes. Yet even this is not altogether true. Last year showed a grave decline in wheat, but we had fewer cattle and a nearly level acreage of other crops. Potato acreage, for instance, varies 3 or 4 per cent. per season. It generally depends on the previous season's prices rather than on any other crop.

It is true that agriculture is one hundred industries, but they are interwoven. And the fields of England are as much one cloth as the coat we wear, yet interwoven of a million separate threads. But in all this intricate industry the stock-keeping side recurs again and again. You can, for instance, grow bullocks or run hill sheep and never grow an acre of wheat, but you will not long succeed in England as a wheat farmer unless you put organic manure from sheep, pigs, or cattle on your land. Indeed, arable sheep farming has been the key to successful cereal growing in the past. From another point of view, farmyard dung is most often used for the root brake or the wheat fallow. The winter yarding of bullocks or dairy cattle provides the dung The root brake goes on a dairy farm to the sheep Sheep-folded land grows the best barley, for which, after maltsters, pigs are the best market. But a really successful pig industry is interwoven with the by-products of the dairy industry and is connected in glut seasons with the potato industry, market gardening, and fruit farming Thus it becomes an axiom that if you benefit one part of agriculture you benefit all parts, only for expediency it is best to begin at the centre rather than the fringes

Not long ago Professor Haldane wrote some illuminating articles in *The Times* about the future shortage of meat supplies. There is not space here to dispute, even if one could, the wisdom of his judgment But, given that world meat supplies are even steady, surely, if we have an island which by climate and skill can grow the best beef and mutton in the world and very fair wool, that can supply all its pork and bacon without any stretch of effort, that does supply all its fresh milk and could supply all its butter and cheese, it is worth beginning with stock farming It is no exaggeration to say that by winning the greater part of self-sufficiency in stock farming we will have cured the cereal farmers' ills. An entirely self-sufficient dairy industry would bring into employment on the present-day basis of output 350,000 men. As a rider, add to that the estimate of the national pig industry counsel that a self-sufficient pig industry would bring in another 68,000 and you have one of the bogies of industrial rationalisation disappearing—that is, a large temporary (perhaps permanent) increase in unemployment The above figures take no account of indirect labour in factory and mill But—and here is another reason for looking further than cereals—ordinary arable farming, if properly rationalised, must mean a decrease in men employed per 100 acres as our organisation and our labour become better. So far all the agricultural machinery inventions —*i.e.*, sixteen furrow ploughs and harvester threshers—have gone to benefit new countries. But the time must come when the mechanisation of our English tillages is advanced beyond our

dreams to-day. Our knowledge of soil mechanics and our methods of coping with the climate stand to-day where our knowledge of artificial manuring did 100 years ago.

Thus the problem of rationalising agriculture in general is narrowing on analysis to live-stock farming in particular. So far, unfortunately, our efforts at agricultural prosperity have been devoted largely to the fringes. National marks for eggs, fruit, and tomatoes, even a guaranteed price for wheat, and the prevention of dumping of oats is only scoring 'outers' on the target. In fact, the dumping of oats and cheap feeding barley is a national benefit for cheap production of live-stock, dairy and poultry products There are two reasons why one should help wheat and stop dumping, one is psychological—that is, the country, as it were, auto-suggests the necessity The other is because the eastern counties, by soil and climate, are so dependent on cereals for prosperity One cannot leave a great area out of one's plans But if we are to rationalise where stock-feeding cereals are concerned, we should make every effort to see that they are admitted as cheaply as possible into this country. For the Scottish cereal farmer milling oats and for the English cereal farmer milling wheat and malting barley are the things for which he needs protection by a quota

Not the least part of farming rationalisation is that the arable farmer should have live-stock to consume his low-price and low-quality cereals and other arable products One instance will suffice. Last year a south-country farm had a particularly heavy potato and pea crop These would have made a total loss on the market, but turned into pigs they made a handsome profit Indeed, the potatoes, which became pork and bacon, realised 20*l*. per acre clear profit Thus, even in the case of cereal farming, if one helps live-stock one not only makes for better farming, but provides an outlet for surplus production Now, to rationalise his stock farming, the farmer wants a double security—(*a*) a steady price, (*b*) a secure market In the beginning, at any rate, the State alone can provide this The fact must be faced But the State will not grant embargoes on imports, protection or subsidies, and a guaranteed price unless it is definitely certain that the farmer will rationalise his end of the industry Thus the State, in order to have an assured *quid pro quo*, should only give its help through channels that force the farmer to rationalise. I said before that the farmer should not be a shopkeeper His task should end when he has produced the required article and delivered it to the nearest collecting station

This means a rationalisation of transport for agriculture, and it may mean in the end a spread-over of the benefit now enjoyed by the sheltered industries to the unsheltered industries. It is

cheaper to ship a ton of wheat from Montreal to Liverpool than to send it by rail from Norfolk to Edinburgh. This accommodation of sheltered trades like transport to the depressed industries must come if we are to regain prosperity. High transport costs are as much a tax on industry as high rates Agriculture is an excellent starting-point for this reform Road and rail should be brought into unison Lorry bodies should be so made that they can be moved entire from the chassis on to the rail trucks, and *vice versâ* Milk and eggs are largely collected now, but a great transport organisation for collecting and delivering all farm produce, with special cheap rates, is one of the first moves in a rationalised distribution of farm products

Again, only granting help where you can force rationalisation, a guaranteed price for wheat should be paid according to quality at collecting centres One of the outstanding reasons for the forces and for public institutions to have home-grown supplies is that by buying only from organisations like National Mark abattoirs they would force co-operation to be successful. This forcing of co-operation among farmers is a necessity. Like everyone else, they want the benefit without the effort A few farmers standing out can ruin a whole district's co-operative effort The recent failure of the hop-growers organisation is an instance It cannot be too strongly urged that a farmer's business is to farm, not to be a dealer or a salesman One of the pities of our present-day opportunities is the Co-operative Wholesale Society, an organisation so large and so multiple that it could have embraced every phase of agricultural buying and selling Alas by its definite affinity with one political party, it has made conditions a hundred times more difficult for the State—to use it to complete the bridge between producer and consumer It may yet come about in the inevitable reaction from the English type of Socialism Be that as it may, wherever possible the State should only give at the narrow point of grading and distribution, guaranteeing help only for standard and quality

Thus it might well be feasible to give a bonus according to grade for every carcase going through a recognised abattoir or bacon factory Similarly, one might deal with wool by grade through wool-sellers' organisations, in each case until such time as we are able with the Empire, or entirely at home, to supply all our wants when protection or prohibition of imports could be granted. But in return for this aid the State should insist on no live-stock sires being used unless they be certified. The State, too, should narrow the number of recognised breeds of live-stock to produce uniformity. It is useless to try to build up a grading organisation with State help unless you ensure the

breeding of gradable carcases. In the milk industry the problem is different, since in this case it is not necessary to foster production. We are heavily over-producing in liquid milk. The State there has to help the industry to help itself by vertical organisation in absorbing gluts. A hard winter or disease on individual farms halves the milk supply. An exceptionally good May can temporarily double it. Therefore the distributors have a valid reason, since they suffer the surplus, for disproportionately high charges in retailing. If distributors and the farmers will not combine vertically—and they seem unable to—co-operative creameries and cheese factories should be set up in every district. Transport to these should be made as easy as possible. Even now the farmer could produce his milk more cheaply; it is certainly possible for the retailer, given an unfluctuating liquid supply, to reduce his charges. Lower price, cleaner milk, and education alone will increase liquid milk sales to the standards of consumption which one should assign to a healthy nation Cheap credit for such creameries, or even a bonus for condensed milk and graded cheese from recognised organisations, should be available until our output allowed us to put an embargo on various imported milk products But the standard of clean milk in return for these benefits should be set higher than it is to-day. Butter fat tests in the progeny and ancestry of dairy sires should become compulsory in the process of breeding up

The remainder of the agricultural industry deserves the same kind of attention, for its difficulties are largely based on lack of standard and endemic over-production Factories for tinning fruit and vegetables are being started They should be helped forward by grant and credit, with the eventual hope in sight that when their economic production is sufficient for our needs they will have a protected market In particular, farina factories for potatoes suggest themselves On bumper potato years one might order a 2 or 3 per cent quota of potato flour in the loaf. The luxury vegetable and fruit market should be secured at home by an embargo on imports during the luxury season In return for this the proper grading and packing of home-grown vegetables should be a condition This granting of credit to co-operators suggests another use—that of enabling the good farmer to borrow money in difficult times In agriculture, owing to the time taken in producing a given foodstuff, short-term credit needs greater latitude than in industry. The banks to a small extent, but mostly the dealers and merchants, now supply this. The latter cripple the farmer, who is always having to pay the bad debts of others. He is in their pocket for his sales. He knows no economic freedom. Not the least useful function of credit might well be a State guaranteed fund working first through the bank and then

through the co-operative societies. Credit should be forthcoming as initial payment on crops sold, also for the farmer who needs the raw materials for his industry, like manures, seeds, and implements. These could, in fact, be granted through the co-operative societies in a form amounting to post-dated cheques. The co-operative societies would be strictly ruled in lending only to the farmer, whom, knowing locally, they believe will succeed, as they would be responsible if they threw good money after bad The co-operative societies, in their turn, would be controlled in the auditing of their accounts by the banks Hitherto the lack of proper accounting has been a strong reason, among others, for the failure of agricultural co-operative societies. This method would involve no State control, greatly reduce the risk of loss, and materially strengthen agricultural organisations.

Last of all, the rationalisation of fixed capital on the land, such as buildings, water, fencing, electricity supply, and drainage, should be made an integral part of a permanent wealth-producing State campaign for the temporary alleviation of unemployment This whole policy of rationalisation as I have tried to outline it sums itself up in concentrating on what we can produce best by granting help, not indiscriminately, but through what is known in the United States as the merchandising end of agriculture—not hesitating to use import embargoes or protection where necessary, in the belief that no price rigging can take place in foodstuffs, with a Press ever vigilant to fan discontent for its circulation and opposition politicians ever happy to cry 'dear food'

I have not space, nor is it here appropriate, to deal with the fascinating subject of rationalising the farm labourer himself What I have outlined would cost money It would be more than saved in the dole Something for nothing only ends in paying 9*d*. for 4*d*. It will meet the bitter opposition of vested interests In its great days Conservatism, in opposing *laissez-faire*, has not flinched in facing vested interests It would be no mean task to carry out, for it demands singleness of purpose in the chaos of multiple counsels It would be worth while if by so doing we keep our roots in the soil from which alone we draw life.

LYMINGTON.

THE CANADIAN ELECTION

THE Canadian Election has come and gone, with results that have confounded most of the prophets and can hardly have failed to astonish the leaders of the Conservative Party themselves, pre-election predictions and prognostications notwithstanding The Liberal Government of the Right Hon. W L. Mackenzie King, which has been continuously in office since 1921, has gone down to ignominious defeat, Liberal candidates having been successful in only eighty-six constituencies, as compared with 119 at the last election Five Ministers of the Cabinet lost their seats, including the Finance Minister, the Hon C A Dunning, author of the election budget, the Hon T A Crerar, Minister of Railways, the Hon Lucien Cannon, Solicitor-General, the Hon Dr Cyrus MacMillan, Minister of Fisheries, and the Hon F. W Kay, Minister without portfolio, while Mr Mackenzie King's own majority in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, was reduced. The standing of the parties is now as follows

		At Dissolution
Conservatives	130	90
Liberals	86	119
United Farmers	10	11
Labour	3	3
Progressives	2	8
Liberal-Progressives	3	12
Independent	2	2
	245	245

The Hon Richard Bedford Bennett, the new Prime Minister, comes of United Empire Loyalist stock, and is a native of New Brunswick, although for years he has sat in the House as one of the representatives of the prairie town of Calgary, Alberta. He is a lawyer by profession, a bachelor, like his predecessor, Mr. Mackenzie King, and has just passed his sixtieth birthday. Mr Bennett has been called on at a crisis in the affairs not only of Canada but of the Empire at large, and as an untried man will have a more than usually heavy burden of responsibility resting

upon him. Since his path seems likely to be beset with difficulties from the start, a considerable volume of public sympathy will accompany him in his endeavours.

While the general depression in all lines of business and the acute unemployment problem, conditions which usually react against the political party in power, undoubtedly had a good deal to do with the consistent turning of all classes of voters against the Liberal Government, to attribute the entire *débâcle* to this cause alone would be to overlook the sectionalism that constitutes so important a feature of politics in this part of the world, and the purely local reasons that have meantime inclined many inhabitants of British Columbia at one end of the scale to abandon their traditional conservatism and at the other have split the solid Liberal vote in French-Canada as it has not been split during a period of forty years The terms 'Liberal' and 'Conservative' have to-day lost practically all their original significance, so that in attempting any analysis of the political situation in Canada it becomes necessary to deal with the country in its four main geographical divisions the Maritime Provinces, Quebec and Ontario, the Prairie Provinces, and British Columbia

The most moderate forecasts, based largely on the apparent apathy of the electorate, inclined to the belief that the pre-election state of the parties would not be greatly altered, and in some well-informed quarters it was even anticipated that Liberals and Conservatives might conceivably be returned in approximately equal numbers and the balance of power be held by the little group of United Farmers, Progressives, Independents, and Labour representatives from the West, who in recent years have learned to work more or less as a united body But the unexpected happened in nearly every case In the Maritime Provinces, while Nova Scotia contented herself with changing a representation of twelve Conservatives and two Liberals to one of ten Conservatives and four Liberals, New Brunswick turned heavily against the Government and took from them four of the seats held at the dissolution, thus leaving only one Liberal seat in the province as against ten Conservative Two of the three seats held in Prince Edward Island by the Liberals were also lost, so that of the total twenty-nine seats in the three provinces only six are now represented by Liberal members as compared with twenty-three held by Conservatives In Ontario the Liberals did relatively much better, emerging with a net loss of three seats only and electing a member in Toronto itself for the first time since 1896, ex-Mayor Church being defeated in that city Indeed, the Liberal vote in nine Toronto constituencies rose from 35,209 in 1926 to 65,622 in the present election, a good omen, indicating that Ontario's anti-Quebec *bloc* is showing signs of breaking up.

In Quebec no less than twenty-six Conservatives were elected as compared with only four in 1926. The three Prairie Provinces (Manitoba. Alberta, and Saskatchewan), which at the dissolution were represented by twenty-three Liberals, eight Progressives, eight Liberal-Progressives, eleven United Farmers, three Labour members, and only one Conservative, have now elected twenty-three Conservatives, fifteen Liberals, two Progressives, three Liberal-Progressives, nine United Farmers, and two Labour members. While British Columbia, where the Conservatives considered themselves almost impregnable, turned strongly the other way, the Liberals winning three seats in Vancouver city and one in the adjacent city of New Westminster The fourth Vancouver seat went to Labour, and the standing, from being twelve Conservatives, one Liberal, and one Independent, became seven Conservatives, five Liberals, one Labour, and one Independent; The Conservatives increased their lead in every province except Nova Scotia and British Columbia, and have now a majority in every province except Quebec

Beginning, then, with the Maritime Provinces, where a representation of nineteen Conservatives and ten Liberals has given way to one of twenty-three Conservatives and six Liberals, it may be laid down generally that that candidate usually makes the strongest appeal to the Maritime voter who promises the greatest amount of national aid in the form of money grants from the Federal Exchequer for highways, bridges, agricultural and educational institutions, and other such public undertakings, the people of the Maritimes having felt for years that in this respect they were not on terms of equality with the other provinces A Royal Commission sat on Maritime troubles not long ago, and drew up a list of recommendations which, the local Conservative Press claims, the Mackenzie King Government implemented only in a partial and unsatisfactory manner Whatever the actual validity of this charge, it has undoubtedly worked in Mr Bennett's favour, and the Conservative leader has also been fairly lavish in his promises. It is said, too, that in New Brunswick the French-Canadian vote, which is usually strongly Liberal, veered very considerably to the Conservative side because Mr Bennett is a native son, and the French were anxious to give the province its first Dominion Prime Minister This is possibly true enough, the *habitant* mind responding with peculiar readiness to such an appeal, while the fact enabled the Conservative leader to talk in his election manifesto of 'our righteous demand for Governmental assistance in equality with the other provinces '

The Conservative *Evening Times-Globe* of St. John, N.B., thinks increase in unemployment and the 'relatively hard times' are largely responsible, and insists that the result 'must most

emphatically not be taken as indicating the rejection of economic co-operation through preferences and other means.' The Conservative Charlottetown (P.E.I.) *Guardian* calls the result 'a glorious victory for Canada and sanity in legislation and administration.'

In the provinces of Quebec and Ontario, which constitute the second section, the manufacturers are practically all-powerful, and although the interests of the rank and file of both provinces are largely identical, yet differences of race and religion have so far kept them in opposite camps. The French-Canadian, by nature, tradition, and training an essentially conservative person, did as a matter of fact call himself a Conservative and voted accordingly up till the year 1896, when an election was fought on the Manitoba school question which involved the rights of his fellow French-Canadians in that province. On that occasion the *habitant*, against all precedent and in the face of the express counsel and even injunction of his Church, voted for the rising young Liberal Sir Wilfrid Laurier (then the Hon. Wilfrid Laurier), who suggested compromise rather than the coercion in the form of a Remedial Bill which the then Conservative Government sought to enforce. Sir Wilfrid was returned with a triumphant majority to the astonishment of all beholders, thus proving conclusively that the *habitant*, when sufficiently roused or properly appealed to, is capable of acting quite independently of his spiritual advisers in political matters. 'My compatriots think with me,' Mr. Henri Bourassa, the fiery Quebec Nationalist, once said to Sir Wilfrid Laurier. 'Yes,' replied Sir Wilfrid, 'but they vote for me.' Although it has really been the Laurier tradition as much as anything else that has kept him constantly in the Liberal camp for so many years, the French-Canadian demonstrates every now and again that he does not always allow his heart to govern his head.

Unemployment, which is always most apparent in industrial centres, undoubtedly played an important part in Quebec in the present election, while the inflow of New Zealand butter, which has increased enormously in the last few years and now amounts to many millions of pounds annually, was a bitter grievance with the dairy farmers of the Eastern Townships notwithstanding the fact that the treaty with New Zealand expires this autumn. It has been stated, also, that the leaders of the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec, alarmed at the spread of anti-Catholic sentiment in the West, had decided that the time was ripe for securing representation for their province in the Conservative Party, and counselled their flock accordingly, although this seems very doubtful in view of the fact that, in the past, expressions of anti-Catholic sentiment in other parts of Canada have invariably

resulted in further solidifying the Liberal *bloc* in Quebec. Signs have not been wanting, too, that the provincial Government, which has also been overwhelmingly Liberal for many years, was losing its hold on popular favour, and the Irish Roman Catholic vote likewise, which is often sharply at variance with the French Roman Catholic, is said to have gone almost wholly Conservative, following the advice of its influential organ, the *Catholic Record*, which has been preaching that Quebec's Liberal *bloc* was a menace to the country's welfare All of these local and sectarian interests and influences have doubtless combined to help the Conservative cause.

The Independent Montreal *La Patrie* says that Mr Bennett has 'solemnly pledged himself to the country. It remains for him to accomplish what he has promised'; while the Independent *La Presse* of the same city makes this shrewd comment.

> The economic unrest, universal in character, has favoured the opposition However satisfactory the King Government's record may have been, the majority of the electors thought fit to be severe, attributing to its administrators the decrease of prosperity which has marked the last period of this administration What has happened here is but a repetition of what has happened elsewhere Since the Great War people who have had the privilege of voting have a tendency to use it against the established order and to overthrow Governments More often than not the electorate is more easily impressed by criticisms than by praises, however deserved these may be

The Quebec Liberal *Le Soleil* says the King Government's administration was without reproach, but was beaten by means of a strong organisation, and that if 'grave economic uneasiness' had not existed all over the world the King Government would have been returned. But the Conservatives successfully exploited butter in the country and unemployment in the cities, making people forget the 'splendid Dunning Budget' and the fact that the average of employed people from 1925 to 1930 was equal to, if not better than, all previous averages The *Chronicle-Telegraph*, Quebec City's only English newspaper, thinks the result 'eminently wise and hopeful,' and rejoices at the break-up of the Quebec *bloc* and at the laying aside of 'lingering prejudices and worn-out shibboleths'

Ontario, which in the last election returned fifty-three Conservatives and twenty-nine Liberals and others, this time returns fifty-nine Conservatives and twenty-three Liberals and others. Although relatively the Liberals did much better here than was expected, the province is still, as it invariably is in national politics, mainly anti-Quebec, which happens to mean Conservative because of Quebec's unvarying preference for the Liberal label. Ontario in this election has run fairly true to form.

The Liberal Toronto *Star* thinks it is quite possible that Quebec, with its profound belief in Canada first, found itself attracted to the banner of Mr. Bennett rather than to the Liberal standard emblazoned with the call of 'Empire first.' The Conservative Toronto *Mail and Empire* says that Mr. Bennett was the first to suggest an Imperial Economic Conference, and that he will go to the Conference to build up a mutually satisfactory trade agreement by which Empire trade will be safeguarded by reciprocal trade agreements of a protective nature.

It has been in the Prairie Provinces that the voice of the agriculturist has been most loudly raised, and the anger of the farmers against the influx of New Zealand butter, the raising of the American tariff against dairy produce, agricultural depression, poor crops, and other things, and only very slightly appeased by the Dunning Budget, with its countervailing duties against American produce, has vented itself in political action at the expense of the Progressives and the Liberals There has also been the inevitable proportion of anti-Quebec sentiment, which has been kept alive partly, it is said, by Ku Klux Klan activities, and by the language of the French Press in championing the rights of their French-Canadian brethren in these distant parts. Only one solitary Conservative was returned by the three provinces at the last election, whereas no less than twenty-three have now been elected While the Alberta farmers have for the most part remained loyal to their farmer members, returning nine as against eleven at the dissolution, the Progressives and Liberal-Progressives have lost eleven seats between them in the Prairie Provinces (in addition to four in Ontario) and are reduced to two and three respectively, a much heavier relative loss than the Liberal loss of eight seats But since the principal swing has been in the direction of the Conservatives, and not to the farmers' political movement, all dreams of a balance-of-power party are at an end Last year the provincial Liberal Government, which had ruled in Saskatchewan since 1905, was defeated by a combination of Conservatives and Independents largely because it was suspected of being in too close accord with the heads of the French Catholic Church, and, although it is anticipated this new provincial Government will become a purely farmer Government in time, the Conservatives have apparently been able to profit by the religious issue in the national election and swing most of the disgruntled voters into their camp. Here, again, an entirely local or sectional interest has exercised its influence in national politics in a curious way, while the anticipated reaction in Quebec Province, that of solidifying the Liberal *bloc*, has failed to materialise.

The Conservative Edmonton *Journal* considers the out-

standing feature of the result was that Bennett's majority came from all parts of the country, and that Quebec and the Prairie Provinces were mainly responsible, also that the turnover shows how great was the electors' dissatisfaction with the King Government's policies and how those of Mr. Bennett appealed to them. The Liberal Manitoba *Free Press* refers to the Conservative victory as 'the triumph of the High-Tariff Party.' The people, it says, have shown a widespread desire to try Mr. Bennett's 'magic cure-all,' and it thinks Mr. King was beaten in political strategy by his opponent, who engineered him into holding an election at a time when it did not suit either himself or his party.

British Columbia, the fourth and last section of the country, sends fourteen members to the Federal Parliament, and as a rule these are mostly Conservatives. It is often claimed that the reason of this is because so large a proportion of the population is of English origin, retired Army colonels and middle-class people of small means, but all of essentially Conservative types. While the presence of such people undoubtedly has an influence in this direction, it is probably not so great as is commonly supposed, and the fact that here also voters in Federal elections are dominated largely by local considerations seems to have been effectively demonstrated on this occasion, when the province has swung away from the general trend and its own tradition by raising its Liberal representation from one member to five, and reducing the Conservative representation from twelve to seven. The reasons put forward by the local Press to explain this phenomenon are varied It is said that the preferential features of the Dunning Budget found special favour in the eyes of the large British-born element in the population, and that the Liberal Government's trade treaty with Australia, which was very profitable to lumbering, fishing, and other interests on the Pacific coast who wished to have it preserved, had been adversely criticised by the Conservatives These essentially local considerations were probably enough the main cause of the defection, coupled possibly with the recognition by the more alert-minded of the voters of the stagnation induced by consistently voting the same way.

The Independent Conservative Vancouver *Province* thinks unemployment was the principal factor in the election generally, and does not think Mr. King was sufficiently sympathetic when the issue was laid before him. 'He had the misfortune to be in office,' this paper says, 'when the wind went out of the balloon, and he had to come down.' The other factors were more or less local and provincial. But it has been a satisfactory election, the *Province* considers, and has broken the solid undigested *blocs* both East and West. The Liberal Vancouver *Sun* asks why

twenty-six out of Quebec's traditional sixty-five Liberal seats swung Conservative. 'Unlike British Columbia,' the newspaper says, 'Quebec did not want British preferences and emphatically said so. But industrial Quebec, like the rest of Canada, seems to have voted for a higher tariff.'

It will thus be seen that the reasons that have swung voters this way or that in Canada's different geographical sections are for the most part bound up with local conditions and interests. It seems fairly certain that no one specific cause alone has turned the general body of Canadian voters in the direction of the Conservative Party, and the claim of the Conservative Montreal *Gazette* that 'in this election the provinces all across Canada have been able to speak for the first time in many years with one voice' seems hardly borne out by the facts. Indeed, had the swing towards Conservatism been of the unanimous kind the staunch party men deem it to be, there is little doubt that its reaction would have been felt first of all in the traditionally Conservative provinces of Ontario and British Columbia. But such has not been the case The Liberals held their own fairly well in the former, and actually registered substantial gains in the latter.

The real puzzle is to discover to what extent, if any, the French-Canadian voter in Quebec was animated in voting Conservative against his customary tradition by motives similar to those of the prairie farmer in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, who turned from his allegiance to what were supposed to be advanced or left-wing Liberals and voted for the Opposition party For these two bodies of voters between them were responsible for practically the whole of the turnover. The Conservative representation rose from ninety at dissolution to 139, a gain of forty-nine seats Of these twenty-two were found in the Province of Quebec, eleven in Manitoba, and eleven in Alberta and Saskatchewan With gains and losses in British Columbia and Ontario practically offsetting one another, the remaining seats were picked up in the Maritime Provinces. Quebec and the Prairie Provinces practically won the day for the Conservatives.

The Liberal representation has dropped from 119 at dissolution to eighty-six in the new Parliament, a net loss of thirty-three seats. Twenty-two of these were straight losses in Quebec, the balance being divided between the Maritimes and the Prairie Provinces. The remaining sixteen seats won by the Conservatives have been almost entirely at the expense of the Progressives and Liberal-Progressives in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, whose combined numbers have fallen from twenty in the last Parliament to five in this one—a net loss of fifteen seats. The Quebec

habitant turned against the Liberal; the prairie farmer vented his wrath on the Progressive. These were the two decisive factors in the Conservative victory.

That these forces have had their origin in basic feelings of an identical kind seems scarcely credible when one remembers the wide variations in the types of voters. The prairie farmer is possibly the most independent thinker to be found in the whole Canadian electorate For the most part he is antagonistic to the financiers and manufacturers of the East, and he and his spokesmen lose few opportunities of declaring their belief that they (the farmers) are exploited by these interests He has gone into the wheat marketing business himself as the result of this belief, and has established farmer Governments in the provinces of Alberta and Manitoba In the Federal field the United Farmers and the Progressives arose, with the threat of supplanting the old political parties altogether in the West, at any rate, and when in 1921 they returned an army of sixty-six Progressives to Ottawa (which included some twenty representatives from Ontario) it was felt that a new force had arisen in Canadian politics from which much might be expected The new party, however, did not prove to be a cohesive body, and the working arrangement entered into with Mr Mackenzie King and his Liberal Government was not satisfactory either to the rank and file of the party or to their supporters in the country In the 1925 election their numbers were reduced to less than one-half, and the following year the Hon Robert Forke, who had succeeded Mr Crerar as leader of the new party, together with several other Manitoba members, returned to the Liberal camp Mr Forke ultimately went to the Senate as a Liberal, Mr Crerar became Minister of Railways in the Mackenzie King Government, and the new Progressive body split into several groups The swing of these farmer voters to the Conservative camp in the present election is to be interpreted in part as their way of expressing their displeasure with the Progressive leaders, Mr Crerar in particular, who failed to hold the new party together and sold its strength to the Liberals Further, so far are these voters from seeing eye to eye with French-Canadian *habitants* that many of them voted Conservative for purely anti-Catholic reasons The invasion of their dairy-farming market, too, by New Zealand butter, rendered possible by the Liberal Government's fiscal arrangements, has undoubtedly been a factor in the situation, and, although it is doubtful whether the claim made by certain Conservative journals in the East that industrial diversity in the development of the Prairie Provinces has resulted in a changed view of economic essentials in those parts could be wholly substantiated, there seems to be undoubted evidence of a strong

revulsion of feeling among the general body of the electors there against a political party based solely upon occupational employment.

As already stated, it is Quebec Province that provides the chief puzzle. Such a landslide was beyond the wildest dreams of the most ardent party prophets. No cautious, unbiased, or well-informed writer was found predicting it; the French papers gave no sign of any such impending change The English Montreal *Star* (Independent Conservative) calls it 'a political miracle' The reasons have already been gone into, but it may be said in addition that the propaganda of the Conservatives in this province was admittedly superior to that of their opponents, who were apparently lulled into a false sense of security by imagining the province was bound to vote Liberal as usual, and so did practically nothing to counteract the pamphlets and literature of the other party This could scarcely have happened, nor would the principal French newspapers have been so consistently against Mr Bennett, had the hierarchy made any strong request for a splitting of the vote between the two parties The movement was evidently initiated by the *habitant* himself

Although the tariff has been made one of the issues in this election, and no doubt a great many votes were cast for Conservative candidates because of the belief that Mr Bennett's proposal to increase the duties generally against the United States and bargain for favours on a reciprocal basis in inter-Empire trade would help business all over the country, as a matter of actual fact there does not appear to be a great deal of difference between the two parties on this question Mr Dunning was accused in some quarters of stealing the Tory thunder by framing his Budget as he did, while the Liberal Press, since the election, is predicting that the results will not change the general tariff policies of the Dominion to any serious extent, as these have continued under Liberal and Conservative Governments on practically the same principles for many years It seems likely that the Dunning Budget will remain in force for at least a year pending a studied revision by the Tariff Advisory Board, which will probably be reconstituted with a general policy along the lines advocated by Mr Bennett in the course of his campaign

A special session of the new Parliament is to be called early in September to deal with the unemployment situation, but this session will probably only last a fortnight or so in order that Mr. Bennett and his colleagues may leave at its expiry to attend the Imperial Economic Conference in London The promised relief of unemployment is supposed to take the form of a trans-

continental highway and other public works, but the special session will reveal its exact nature.

The times are certainly critical, not only in Canada, but in the Empire at large, and call for statesmanship of a high order if the tremendous possibilities of the British Empire as a whole are to be properly taken advantage of and the most pressing of its present difficulties relieved. New ways and means of knitting the structure into an enduring whole have got to be sought for and found. The problem is one in the solution of which the business man and the statesman must work hand in hand, and nowhere has its many aspects been more clearly and forcibly set out than in Professor Stephen Leacock's new book,[1] the appearance of which is most timely This interesting work by a Canadian economist should satisfy most reasonable people of the immediate necessity for what the professor calls 'the establishment of a system of mutual co-operation for the development of the vast potential wealth of the Empire and for the expansion of its present limited population.'

Whether Professor Leacock's proposal of large-scale colonisation by privileged or chartered companies settling communities instead of individuals, and with mineral, industrial, and commercial concessions as the incentive, the whole girt about with a British Imperial Tariff system, will be the final solution may be open to question; but it has this great advantage, that it could be put into operation speedily, and would not be too radical a departure from customary procedure But whether the movement is to be launched by financiers or politicians or a combination of both, it must be launched by somebody and got under way speedily. On that score there is little room for doubt. It is devoutly to be hoped that at the coming Imperial Economic Conference a start of some kind will be made

[1] *Economic Prosperity in the British Empire* (Constable, 7s 6d net).

J. B. M. CLARK.

THE SIMON REPORT

I. A NON-OFFICIAL EUROPEAN VIEW

THE Simon Commission Report has been awaited with feelings of anxiety and hope amongst what are commonly called in India the non-official Europeans. The word 'European' is used to connote all the British white men and generally includes, when applicable, French, Germans, Italians, etc., and to differentiate between them and the native-born Indians who are also British subjects. Recognising the difficulties inherent in the present Constitution in India established by Act of the English Parliament, and realising the weight of influence of the politicians vociferous against its defects and limitations and their epidemics of refusals to work it, even in its more favourable aspects, the non-official European could hardly hope that perhaps the Simon Commission would be able to achieve a miracle in producing a Report and recommendations which would be accepted by the Indian politician.

No normally minded European of long residence in India and practical experience can have the least confidence that Indians in bulk will be able for some time to come to weld themselves into bodies or parties of sufficient character, independence, and ability to govern the country by themselves upon democratic or Western lines. This is very far from saying that India does not produce numerous men possessing many of the requisite qualities who, in association with the European in the Government or the Legislature, can do a very great deal to help their country along the lines of progress towards self-government which Great Britain, in its wisdom or otherwise, has taken initial steps to confer upon the Indian people.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report underwent considerable criticism at the hands of the non-official Europeans. The views their representatives then expressed have proved to have been well founded. The experience since obtained of the actual working of the councils has borne out many of their contentions. Nevertheless, the non-official European representatives in the councils and Assembly did their level best to work the Reforms —in fact, they claim to have been the party which most con-

sistently co-operated, and the Simon Report, vol. i., par. 216, pays tribute to the contribution which they have made to Indian politics, and their distinction in the legislatures for their public spirit, sympathy, and width of outlook. Like other sections of the community, the non-official Europeans may now claim to know even more and speak from actual experience of the working of the Constitution and the councils. They claim nothing from the Government or the Legislature that they are not willing to share with their Indian colleagues and competitors, but they have often had to resist attempts on the part of others to harm their interests, to limit their activities, and even to expropriate their concerns.

In the first place, the non-official European lays a definite claim, by virtue of traditions, to be considered an integral part of the Indian polity, for it was from him that the civil administration originally sprang, until the Crown took over from the East India Company. It is the European who conceived the idea of Indian nationalism which the Pax Britannica alone has made possible. Though the terms of reference of the Simon Commission were to inquire whether and to what extent it is desirable to extend, modify, or restrict the degree of responsible government which has already been conferred, no responsible non-official European has openly advocated restriction. We favour slowness in development only because we are sure that premature advance will lead to a breakdown.

Disappointing and disheartening as the degree of Indian co-operation has often been, doubting as many of us do the suitability of Western democratic institutions for India at all, none of us has regarded it as feasible, especially in face of Lord Irwin's reiterations of the pledges of successive British Governments, to put back the hands of the clock. We have taken a very broad view with the desire to meet legitimate Indian aspirations in a more than liberal spirit, and we recommended to the Simon Commission the grant of full responsibility in the provinces subject to certain safeguards. The essential soundness of these safeguards was recognised by the Commission, which adopted most of them in principle.

After allowing for responsible government in the provinces, our first essential was the strengthening of the Central Government *vis-à-vis* the Assembly. The abolition of the Government *bloc* in the Central Legislature has at first sight the effect of weakening instead of strengthening the Government party. Our representatives were in favour of the nominated provincial Government representatives in the Assembly being free to speak and vote in accordance with the requirements of their provinces, and the Simon Commission brings this about by abolishing the

bloc. The adoption of a federal system of Government and the constitution of the Assembly by the election thereto of representatives of the provincial councils, instead of, as formerly, by direct election thereto from the constituencies, should have the effect of returning a much more responsible body of members. The form the final Central Assembly is to take cannot, however, yet be visualised, but one can guess where the recommendations will run counter to the hopes and wishes of the non-official European.

Our second stipulation for the Central Government to have powers of intervention in the event of breakdown of government in any province appears to have been accepted by the Simon Commission, which puts the case very well in the following words 'This is no denial of self-government, it is an ultimate resource if self-government is repudiated' (par 65)

A third proviso was that second chambers should be set up in the provinces This view the Commissioners do not accept, but they are not able to make a unanimous recommendation one way or the other Here then, is obvious matter for the Conference, wherein the question can once more be argued and the Commission's Report, in which the subject is very fully dealt with in a chapter (iv) all to itself, can surely be accepted as the basis for discussion The finding of any considerable majority of the Conference on this question would appear to be likely to be acceptable to the British Parliament

A fourth proviso that adequate safeguards be provided for the administration of the police, is, in non-official European opinion, one of the chief considerations of the whole problem of self-government The Associated Chambers of Commerce in the first instance went so far as to recommend (by a majority only) the transfer of the police and law and order to autonomous provincial Governments their reason being that the surest way to make those responsible for government realise the need for an effective police force is to make them responsible for the maintenance of order The European Association, however—the essentially (and only) political organisation of the Europeans in India—held firmly to the opinion that law and order should remain the equivalent of a 'reserved' subject, and the Associated Chambers subsequently came round to the same view

The Commissioners' final conclusion that dyarchy must be abolished (vol ii, par 46) leads them, after weighty deliberations of the case for and against (pars 60, 63), to the conclusion that the police must be a subject for which a unitary Government must take responsibility This will for some time, I think, remain one of the most controversial conclusions of the Commission, and, if enacted, it will be long before the non-official European can be

expected to approve the decision. The change, if effected, may appear to work well enough for some time; but this will be held, as in the cases of other institutions handed over to Indian control, to be largely due to the momentum of the past administration, and there are many who fear that there will soon be a decline in the discipline and confidence of the force. That it would give any marked impetus to the growth of public confidence in the police is too much to expect.

There is little doubt that in this decision the Commissioners took one of their biggest risks, and one which is likely to be regarded with much misgiving. It will be felt that both the magistracy and the police, under the control of a popular Minister, are likely to suffer considerable deterioration in honesty and efficiency. I deplore the thought of the police budget being subject to the vote of the councils, which have so far always shown a definite anti-police bias. I cannot envy the Minister who is to be responsible for it; he is, under the Commissioners' recommendations, bound to be the butt of the whole Council.

It can be no consolation to a member of the services that he will be given special facilities to retire on proportionate pension; this is no magnet to attract the best men to the post. It seems to me almost a logical conclusion that the member in charge of the police will have to be appointed in the same way as the other members of the councils if he is not to be in splendid isolation and disentitled to the support of his colleagues, and I further think an Indian will have to have equal chance for the appointment.

It is no part of the European case that an Indian is not as competent to administer law and order as an European; on that point they express no opinion. The view is generally held that no one could administer law and order in a province at a time when communal feeling ran high, if he were responsible to a popular council. If the Minister in charge were a member of either community, his position would be further complicated. There are Moslems who would be completely impartial, but no Hindu would give a Moslem credit for being so, if the police fired upon a Hindu mob. There are Hindus who would be equally unbiassed, but no Moslem would believe a Hindu was so, if he defended the shooting of Moslem rioters. Experience shows that when one community attacks an official for alleged unjustifiable severity, the official cannot expect anything more than half-hearted support from the community he has defended. The whole problem of keeping the peace in India differs from that in England, because in this country public opinion as a whole supports the forces of law and order passively and actively; in India it is usually either indifferent or, often, on the side of disorder.

An all-important proviso which the non-official Europeans demanded was that no legislation discriminating as between one British subject and another should be permitted under the new Constitution in matters of taxation, professions, trade, industry and commerce This is somewhat cursorily disposed of by the Commissioners in vol ii, par 36—'we consider that the only practical means of protecting the weaker or less numerous elements in the population is by the retention of an impartial power residing in the Governor-General and the Governors of provinces to be exercised for this purpose'

The question of commercial discrimination finds no place at all in the index to the two volumes, and the scanty reference to it in par 36 necessitates my enlarging upon it and giving it all the prominence I can In my address to the East India Association, in March 1929, I expressed the opinion that probably only actual members of the councils themselves really understood the spirit of hostility in the Indian politician's breast towards British commercial interests I admit at once it is certainly nothing like so evident (even if it exists to any appreciable extent) amongst the Indian commercial community, where usually only natural competitive instincts prevail and where the bulk of the business of the cities is done betwixt European and Indian together, and not betwixt European and European, as the politicians appear to suppose

Seats on the councils are not won or held to any appreciable extent by the Indian commercial community, and that is a grave commentary on the working of representative government in India The vast majority of Indian representatives are professional men—mostly lawyers It is men of this class who have been so active in the recent boycott of British goods propaganda, and not the commercial community, who only stand to suffer by it. In my seat in the Assembly I have had to listen to gross misrepresentation of British traders influence and methods.

I cannot lay too much emphasis on these facts nor on the actual passage by the Assembly into law, in the first 'Steel Industry (Protection) Bill,' of the enactment that no bounties conferred under the protective tariffs (to the payment of which the British trader is a principal contributor) may be paid to any company unless 75 per cent of the directors be Indian This, of course, means also that not more than 25 per cent. of the directors may be European, which is discriminating anti-British legislation, and the principle, having been agreed to in the Assembly by the Government, and by the Viceroy in his assent to the Bill, is likely to be pressed further on every occasion. Of what use, then, to the British in India is likely to be the recommendation of the Commissioners for 'the retention of an

impartial power residing in the Governor-General and the Governors of provinces to be exercised for this purpose'? It will be no security whatever; it can rarely, if ever, be used, because the contrary principle has already been agreed to by their predecessors. Moreover, the attitude of the Viceroy and the Commerce Member in regard to the Coastal Reservation Bill, when the announcement was made in the Legislative Assembly last Autumn that the Government proposed that a conference should be held between the representatives of the British shipping companies and the Indian interests concerned, does not inspire any confidence in the probable outlook of future Viceroys, who are neither selected from the commercial world, nor usually well versed in its point of view.

What I think is needed is a definite provision in the statute or the preamble upon which a Viceroy could and should take his stand The Commissioners say 'We are aware that such provisions have been inserted in many constitutions, notably in those of the European States formed after the war Experience, however, has not shown them to be of any great practical value' The obvious retort is in the Commissioners own words elsewhere (par. 10) 'In any case the time is too short for any real judgment to be formed . Ten years is not long enough to see the real effect of the new system, still less is it possible to forecast from the first decade what will happen in the next'

The insertion of such a proviso in the Act would not weaken the powers of the Viceroy, in whom it is professed the means should exist to make it effective There are under the present Constitution many matters which cannot be even debated in the Assembly without the previous leave of the Viceroy, and this proviso has, in my experience, worked well

Our associations pressed that it would be proper and practicable to forbid altogether discriminatory legislation in respect of taxation, trade, professions, commerce and industry, and to this view we adhere Our experience in the legislatures has made it only too plain what will be attempted unless a definite bar is there It would be folly to assume there will be no question of bidding for votes, as the common practice of democracy is the outbidding of one another by the different parties, and we know a popular shot will be against British commerce Witness such cases as the boycott of British goods at the instance of the Bombay Corporation, and the present series of boycotts against British goods of every description

Sir James Simpson, speaking in the Legislative Assembly on the Coastal Traffic Reservation Bill, said, 'The parties behind this Bill have to-day cast their greedy eyes on shipping. To-morrow others may cast greedy eyes on tea, coffee, oil, or anything

else.' He received the reply, 'Why not?' When he added the rhetorical question, 'Where are you going to stop?' the reply was frankly given, 'Don't stop.' Pundit Motilal Nehru, closing his speech in the same debate, said, 'We are trying to get out of discrimination by what you may, if you like, call counter-discrimination. Why should the people of this country not resort to it?'

I have given longer consideration here to the points which were stressed by the non-official Europeans in their evidence. Of the other recommendations of the Commission, their proposals in regard to the North-West Frontier Province are likely to meet with general approval, the abolition of dyarchy will be considered a wise course, and the method of choice of the Cabinet the one likely to secure the best men

That the Simon Commission should report in favour of communal electorates was almost a foregone conclusion, and in accordance with our representations

Adherence to the recommendations of the Lee Commission in regard to the nationality of the personnel of the services is another recommendation with which we are in accord

The recommendations in regard to a redivision of the boundaries to some of the administrative provinces are well put. It is a question about which Indians feel sensitively, but if carried out, as the Commissioners suggest by a separate committee, which advisedly should include a considerable proportion of Indians, the desirable changes may possibly be made harmoniously

There will be general approval of the principle that the Constitution should contain within itself the means for its own development and the avoidance of further specific stages of inquiries All who have been engaged in working the present Constitution know only too well the time wasted in the legislatures condemning the limit of ten years—which gave the character of a makeshift—and moving resolutions for immediate advance and so forth

Some principal matters to engage the attention of the non-official Europeans at this stage and preparatory to their appearance at the Conference must be—the composition of the Governor-General's Executive Council (par 160), the recommendation that the Commander-in-Chief should not sit in the Legislature (par. 170), the provisions of a special member as leader of the Federal Assembly (par 171), and the distribution of portfolios (par. 172). I imagine they will not quarrel with much of the Report in these respects.

I fancy there will be much more criticism levelled at the difficulties the Government will be faced with in the new Federal Assembly in consequence of the abolition of the Government *bloc*.

Personally I can only foresee grave difficulties, but, as I have known cases of members definitely voting with their party only because they were confident the opposite Government view would be carried, I am hopeful that a better sense of responsibility will be engendered by the means proposed.

Let there be no mistake in England as to the attitude of the non-official European in India. We numbered only 21,780 adult males at the last census, and are not seeking to order the system of government in India purely in our own interests We recognise clearly that the well-being of the Indian people depends as much on their economic resources as on their political development; we, having been largely responsible for the former, wish equally to help with the latter

Many of us doubt the suitability of Western democratic institutions to India, a land steeped in the principles of autocracy and caste distinctions, but, believing in the principle of self-government, we admit the right of Indians to wish for and to take an increasing share in the administration, and we in no way wish to stand in the path of their legitimate aspirations We wish only to give them a lead along the lines which we believe will carry them We realise that we can only be successful in this aim if we express the right views, both frankly and fairly, and we feel confident that no reforms on Western lines will work at all unless we co-operate, and with knowledge, sympathy, and patience

The immediate future Constitution for India cannot be a slavish imitation of Westminster, and India must go through a process of evolution and development until it reaches its full growth in the natural passage of time

We desire that, in addition to being represented at the Conference as a minority community, we may have a further opportunity of being heard in criticism of the draft Bill which Government will submit to Parliament Here, again, we ask nothing for ourselves that we are not willing to share with our Indian friends, since authoritative criticism is necessary to successful legislation and is essential to the peace of India, political and commercial

I entirely agree with Sir Stanley Reed's view expressed in your August issue about the Commission's proposal arbitrarily to expand the electorate to about 10 per cent. of the population As only 3 per cent of the population is literate, why on earth should the franchise be extended so as to include 7 per cent. of the illiterates, an electorate which would follow any religious crank or charlatan and with whom the moderates would not have a look in? Even as it is the moderates are definitely handicapped in opposing an impractical revolutionary like Gandhi and feel paralysed.

The non-official European in general has taken no definite exception to Lord Irwin's use of the term 'Dominion status.' We regarded His Excellency's pronouncement as merely clarifying an issue already clear to us as being implied in the Declaration of 1917 and the Act of 1919. We have only doubted the wisdom of expressing it at a time when it was specially likely to be misunderstood or misrepresented as meaning more than it did and so bringing about an increase in lawlessness The attainment in the fulness of time of full responsible government as an integral part of the British Empire has to us always been the goal, but no one has ventured to express a figure of decades as to when the goal can be reached. The uphill path is beslimed with genuine though regrettable distrust, disbelief, and the incapacity of inexperience, and is barred by political obstruction, a refusal to accept steps and stages which are likened to crutches, and an insistence on immediate and complete power Most of us know how that power, actuated by race jealousy, would be used

It is to be hoped that the British people have no intention of transferring the instrument of power they have built up into the hands of any class, who would use it for the furtherance of their own interests at the expense of every other class and community in the country, nor of Consenting to a form of constitution under which British citizens could be treated as foreigners

It is useless to disguise or deny the difficulties besetting the path—the just claims of the Indian States, the Army and Navy defence, the communal chasm between the Hindu and Moslem The first two can only be surmounted by complete co-operation with the British and the third by the two communities themselves No substantial effort has been made in the latter direction

The onus of making the Conference effective now rests more with the representatives of the Congress than any other party. But even the Conference is no more than a stage in the process of evolution of a Constitution suitable for India, with provision within itself for its own orderly development and with as leading Indians so generally agree, safeguards for the transitional period.

Lord Irwin, in an address to the Muslim zemindars of the Punjab on June 4, said that no settlement of the problem which confronts India can be considered satisfactory that does not carry the consent of and give a sense of security to the important minority communities who will have to live under the new Constitution. He has behind him in India probably a greater force of public opinion and support than is generally recognised in this country, and is on all sides acknowledged as a sincere

friend of and sympathiser with India. His patience and faith have earned him an enviable reputation.

It is vital that public opinion in Great Britain, where the ultimate responsibility will have to rest, should be accurately informed on matters of such importance to the great interests of the British in India, their stake in the country, their investments, and the price they have paid in blood and treasure in the development of that great country, in which the European is every whit entitled to the same equality of status as the Indian has in Great Britain

It will be a matter of extreme difficulty to find the twenty-eight Europeans required to serve on the Assembly in addition to the considerable number required in the councils, with the host of practical, intimate, and personal problems which beset them The British community is gravely anxious and worried about the future. Not only are commerce and livelihood at stake, but even the lives of the British men, women, and children

The non-official European will probably be found reasonably willing, despite considerable misgiving, to accept the Report as a whole and to work a Constitution founded upon it with such perfections as the Conference can add to it for the removal of any proved injustice, but he regards it as the limit beyond which no risk should be taken To him the Simon Report is the British Parliament's definite inquiry into and actual finding upon the conditions and facts which make up modern India He recognises that its recommendations are founded upon the realities of the situation, and that it is only by facing these realities squarely and taking the Simon Report as its basis that the Conference can hope to function effectively towards reaching the last word There is nothing in any of the public utterances of the Viceroy that can be legitimately construed into meaning anything to the contrary, despite all the protestations of those who wish to scrap the Report, especially those who assert that they have not read it!

W. S J. WILLSON.

THE SIMON REPORT

II THE CONGRESS SCHEME AND THE SIMON REPORT

THE Congress has presented the curious spectacle of an influential party, which has agitated for constitutional reform for many years, standing sullenly aloof from the Commission specially appointed to inquire into the present political situation and to report on the possibility of taking further steps towards establishing responsible government in British India The Congress has adopted an attitude in thus standing aloof which has baffled the understanding of the ordinary observer But in proceeding further to inaugurate a campaign of civil disobedience with the object of rendering fruitless the Report of the Simon Commission it has inevitably engendered suspicions as to its professed solicitude for the general welfare of India It is difficult therefore, for the British public to prevent prejudice influencing its opinion on the proposals of the Indian Nationalists, and it is the purpose of this survey to summarise the events leaving up to what is known as the Nehru Report and to set forth the Commonwealth scheme therein proposed for impartial judgment side by side with the recommendations of the Simon Commission for a Federal Government for India

The Congress was founded in 1885 with the object of obtaining progressive reforms in the existing machinery of the government of India. Constitutional means were to be employed and moderate opinion prevailed The goal was a system of responsible government similar to that in the Dominions But the Congress session at Surat in 1907 was wrecked by Mr Tilak's party from the Deccan, and the control gradually passed into the hands of extremists The Congress was finally captured in 1920 by Mr. Gandhi, who changed the creed to Swaraj for India The constitutional reforms of 1921 under the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme were received with unqualified opposition, though they marked an important step towards responsible government Mr Gandhi urged that the existing system was so 'materialistic' and 'satanic' that the only remedy was to sweep it away at once and substitute Swaraj. He never defined Swaraj He left

that to be settled by the 'spiritual' genius of the peoples of India. He relied on 'soul force' for protection of her frontiers, and said: 'I would introduce the spinning wheel among the Afghan tribes and thus prevent them from attacking the Indian territories. I feel that the tribes are in their own way God-fearing people.' He is, however, reported on another occasion to have soothed the apprehensions of practical Parsees with the naïve remark that he did not think the British would really leave India. The Congress has not, indeed, been remarkable for constructive statesmanship. Criticism of the existing system has naturally been the strong point of a party without responsibility. But, challenged from time to time to put forward a detailed and workable scheme of the system it proposed, it resolved in December 1927 to call together a Conference of all interests to draft a Swaraj Constitution for India. The Conference, known as the All-Parties Conference, met in February 1928, but it was found impossible to give practical effect to the resolution. It was therefore decided in May 1928 to constitute a Committee under the chairmanship of Pandit Motilal Nehru, which included 'spokesmen of some important view-points,' but on which 'it was not possible to represent all interests,' to consider and determine the principles of the Constitution for India. The Committee submitted its Report in August 1928, and the Report has since been known as the Nehru Report. It was approved by the so-called All-Parties Conference the same month with some important modifications. The Congress accepted it as so modified in December 1928, and resolved, on the motion of Mr Gandhi, to organise a campaign of civil disobedience if the scheme were not accepted by the following December by the British Parliament. But there can be little doubt that the scheme would not be welcomed by the great mass of non-Brahmans, and a solemn warning against trusting in the protection offered by the Nehru Report was uttered only this month by the president of the All-India Conference of Depressed Hindus. The Report was repudiated promptly in January 1929 by the All-India Conference of Moslems, and has since then been repudiated from time to time by leading Moslems. It is to be remembered that, quite apart from the numerous non-Brahmans naturally suspicious of the proposals, there are estimated to be 60,000,000 depressed Hindus and 70,000,000 Moslems out of the total population of some 300,000,000 in India.

The Congress Party clearly cannot claim to have produced a scheme satisfying all parties. Compromise between moderate politicians and extremists can at most be alleged with any show of truth, and the compromise scarcely veils the extremists' programme. The Committee decided that the Constitution should

be full responsible government on the model of the Dominions, and framed its scheme on this principle, but observed at the same time that the Constitution so framed could be applied almost in its entirety to complete independence The so-called All-Parties Conference emphasised this by resolving that acceptance of the scheme was not to be taken to restrict 'the liberty of action of those political parties whose goal is complete independence' The Congress accepted the scheme as so interpreted, and is therefore free to point to the Nehru Report as the scheme of the extremists for complete independence or Swaraj But the Congress cannot put it forward with any show of reason as the considered demand of the great masses of the peoples of India.

The Congress scheme as contained in the Nehru Report constitutes a Commonwealth Government with an Executive responsible to the Commonwealth Parliament The Parliament is to consist of a Senate elected by the provincial legislatures and a House of Representatives elected by the people on an adult suffrage There is to be a Governor-General appointed by the King The provinces are each to have an Executive responsible to the provincial legislative council, elected similarly on an adult suffrage, and there is to be a Governor appointed by the King There are to be joint or mixed electorates of all communities, with no reservation of seats for special interests such as commerce and labour, or for non-Brahmans and depressed Hindus But there is to be reservation for a limited period of ten years only for Moslem minorities on the basis of the Moslem population The Commonwealth Government is to exercise jurisdiction in all matters of common concern and the provincial executives and legislatures in all local matters according to the schedules of central and provincial subjects attached to the scheme A Commission is to be appointed to settle financial relations. Disputes between the central and provincial Governments are to be decided by a Supreme Court The civil services are to be reorganised and retrenched, and the judges of the High Courts to be recruited solely from the Indian Bar The Supreme Court is to take the place of the Privy Council, and there is no longer to be a Council for the Secretary of State The Commonwealth Government is to control the Indian Army, and there is to be a Committee of Defence to advise the Government and to submit schemes of retrenchment to the Parliament The Commonwealth Government is to have the same rights and discharge the same obligations in relation to the Indian States as the Government of India and to exercise the same powers in respect of foreign affairs as the Dominions. The Commonwealth is to have the same constitutional status as the other Dominions of the British Empire, but the Commonwealth Parliament is to have

power to change the Constitution at any time. Complete independence could therefore be voted without reference to the British Parliament, though there would remain the provision requiring legislation to receive the assent of the Governor-General or the King in Council in the way of immediate withdrawal from the British Empire.

The Commonwealth of the Congress scheme, though envisaging a federation of provincial units, differs in important particulars from the Federation of the Simon Report. The Commonwealth Executive would be directly responsible to the Commonwealth Parliament, with the Governor-General exercising no powers other than those of the constitutional representative of the King. The Central Executive of the Federation of the Simon Report, on the other hand, would remain substantially as at present pending the development of the self-governing units in the provinces It would not be responsible to the Central Legislature, and the Governor-General, with wide powers in reserve, would be the head of the Federal Government, and not merely the constitutional representative of the King Cogent reasons, which ought to appeal to all practical statesmen, have been given in the Simon Report for the retention, during the period of development, of a strong and impartial power at the centre to ensure the maintenance of the vital services, to safeguard minorities, to preserve internal security, and to defend the frontiers of India

The Commonwealth Parliament would as to the Senate be representative of the provincial legislatures and as to the House of Representatives of the people on an adult suffrage The Central Legislature of the Federation would, however, be representative both in the Council of State and in the Legislative Assembly of the provincial legislatures The constituencies in the case of direct election by the people would, it is pointed out in the Simon Report, be so unwieldy that the constituents could never be in practical touch with their members, while it is of prime importance, on the other hand, for development on federal lines, involving intricate questions of provincial relations and finance, to establish a closer nexus between the members of the Central and of the provincial legislatures It would, moreover, it is suggested, render practically possible the inclusion hereafter, if they so desired, of the Indian States in the Federation of Greater India

The Commonwealth Provincial Executives and legislatures also differ in important particulars from those of the proposed Federation. The provincial Executives in both schemes would be directly responsible to the legislatures, but important safeguards are provided for the protection of minorities and the preservation

of law and order in the proposals of the Simon Report. Dyarchy, together with the reservation of the department of law and order, would under both schemes disappear, but it would remain open under the latter, in view of the recognised risks, to strengthen the Ministry by the appointment of one or more official members. The Governor would also retain wide powers in reserve, and would be head of the Government, and not merely constitutional representative of the King.

The Commonwealth provincial legislatures would be elected on an adult suffrage. This would mean at once raising the electorate from the present 6,250,000 to 100,000,000. The impracticability of this proposal has been pointed out in the Simon Report and the more moderate proposal put forward of a present increase up to 20 per cent. of the adult population of 100,000,000. But communal representation has been the question which has given rise to the most serious of the perplexities surrounding the preparation of a workable scheme, whether under the Nehru or the Simon Report. The Committee responsible for the former, indeed, observed that 'the communal controversies are of no very great importance from the constitutional point of view,' and again that 'cultural autonomy provided and the fullest religious liberty given and the communal problem is in effect solved,' and it provided for these things in its constitution by a declaration of rights. But the Committee devoted nevertheless, a third part of its discussion to communal representation. Its scheme was, in fact, repudiated on this very question by the All-India Conference of Moslems. The Committee's conclusions were that communal constituencies ought to give place to joint or mixed electorates, and that there ought not, on general principles, to be reservation of seats for any special interests. Commerce and labour were therefore to lose their special representation, and it was observed that there was no need of reservation for the great mass of non-Brahmans. 'Their grievances against Brahmans are all traceable to the ascendency gained by the latter in the political and social life of the country. This is the natural result of their intellectual ascendency which is now seriously threatened by the rapid advance of non-Brahmans.' The Committee likewise provided no reservation for depressed Hindus. It was merely remarked: 'We feel strongly that the depressed classes must be abolished, or rather that they should be raised socially and economically so that they may take their proper place in the community . . . We have recommended that the education of all backward classes should be the special concern of the State.' But the Committee conceded reservation of seats for a limited period of ten years on a population basis, as opposed to the favourable weightage under what was known as the Lucknow

Pact, to Moslem minorities as a compromise with the Moslems. The Simon Commission considered, however, that commerce and labour and some other special interests ought to be separately represented. It concurred in stopping the reservation for non-Brahman majorities in the Madras, but not for the Mahrattas in the Bombay Presidency. The Commission recognised the force of the Moslem objection that the member returned by a joint or mixed electorate of Hindus and Moslems might well turn out to be more concerned to keep the favour of the Hindu majority than to represent the interests of Moslems, and it came to the conclusion that, in default of a fresh agreement between the parties, there ought to be separate electorates and reservation of seats for Moslem minorities according to the Lucknow Pact previously reached between the Hindus and Moslems

The Commonwealth civil services would be entirely reorganised and retrenched by a special Public Services Commission Control and recruitment would be placed under a permanent Public Services Commission The judges of the High Courts would be recruited solely from the Indian Bar, and an Indian Supreme Court would take the place of the Privy Council There would be no Council for the Secretary of State The Simon Commission, on the other hand, held that the success of the constitutional changes proposed would depend in no small degree upon the maintenance of the high standards which the services have established It would therefore retain the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police Service, and perhaps also the Irrigation and Forest Departments, on an All-India basis, at the rates of Indianisation settled by the Lee Commission, for recruitment by the Secretary of State The Commission would not modify the structure of the High Courts, but would place them all under the administrative control of the Central Government It would not interfere with the jurisdiction of the Privy Council, but would reduce the size of the Council of the Secretary of State

The Commonwealth military forces would be controlled by the Commonwealth Government, and it would be its first care to make the Commonwealth self-contained in military as in other matters It is not clear whether the scheme would include the withdrawal of British troops and officers Mr Gandhi, at any rate, would seem at one time to have expected that they would remain in India But, as observed by the Simon Commission, 'it is not to be supposed that units recruited in Britain and officered by British officers are going to be mercenaries in some future India where the ultimate military authority rests with an Indian Minister for War or with an Indian Cabinet responsible to an Indian Legislative Assembly' The Commission remarked, on the other hand, that 'at least for a very long time to come it

will be impossible for the Army entrusted with the task of defending India to dispense with a very considerable British element, including in the term British troops of all arms, a considerable proportion of the regimental officers of the Indian Army and the British personnel in the higher command.' The Commission then pointed out that 'the North-West Frontier is not only the frontier of India: it is an international frontier of the first importance from the military point of view for the whole Empire,' and suggested that the solution of the problem might well be, while continuing to encourage Indianisation, to place the Army in India under an Imperial authority which would naturally be the Viceroy acting in concert with the Commander-in-Chief. There would have to be by agreement definite facilities for recruitment, transport and other matters, and an equitable adjustment of the burden of finance between the Indian and Imperial Governments.

The Commonwealth's relations with the Indian States would be those of the Paramount Power. It is certain, however, that this position would not be recognised by the Indian States. It is recorded in par. 58 of the Report of the Butler Committee that 'the States demand that without their agreement the rights and obligations of the Paramount Power should not be assigned to persons who are not under its control, for instance to an Indian Government in British India responsible to an Indian Legislature.' The Commonwealth's claim to the position proposed is based on the technical argument that the Crown with whom treaties were made by the Indian States was the King in Parliament, and that the Commonwealth would succeed to all the rights and obligations of the British Government established by Parliament in India. But this argument confuses the King in Council, who is the executive authority for making treaties with Indian States and also for carrying on the government of British India, with the King in Parliament, who has legislative power in respect only of British territories in India. The King in Council has hitherto, as a matter of convenience, exercised the executive authority both in relation to the Indian States and in relation to British India through the Government of India. But there is no obligation for the arrangement to be maintained, and it would, indeed, hardly be suitable or fair to the Indian States when once the Government of India has become responsible to a Legislature representative solely of British India and has ceased to be responsible to the British Parliament. The Simon Commission therefore emphasised the important recommendation of the Butler Committee that the Crown as Paramount Power should act through the Viceroy, and not, as hitherto, through the Government of India, and the Commission suggested a consultative council composed of representatives from both British

India and the Indian States for the purpose of consulting on matters of common concern or matters affecting the whole of India. The Council would be presided over by the Viceroy and would be called the Council for Greater India. The Commission observed that it would be a step towards the goal, however distant, of drawing together British India and the Indian States into a Federation of Greater India under the British Crown.

The Congress, in conclusion, has compromised its case seriously by the campaign of civil disobedience organised under the misguided leadership of Mr Gandhi and by its refusal to present its scheme for impartial examination by the Simon Commission The conversations which have recently been in progress between the leaders of moderate opinion and Mr Gandhi's party offer it a final opportunity to join the Conference which will shortly meet at the round table and to co-operate in the preparation of a practical scheme for the future government of India. It is sincerely to be hoped that wiser counsels will prevail, and that the clamour for complete independence, which could only lead to disaster for India, will be relinquished once and for all in the common interests both of India and of the British Empire. The Congress scheme contains a number of proposals which would not be incompatible with the Federation envisaged by the Simon Commission But there are others which show an unfortunate failure to face the facts and to work out a practical solution of the intricate problems involved Sir John Simon has devoted to this task a ripe experience and an unrivalled intellect, and his presence at the Conference would be of inestimable value in separating the practicable from the impracticable and in helping the round table to prepare a workable scheme for the establishment of effective responsible government in India The Congress proposals as to communal controversies have in particular satisfied none of the opposing parties The Committee which framed them declared that 'we cannot have one community domineering over another,' but provided no guarantees against the maintenance in the future of Brahman supremacy over non-Brahmans and depressed Hindus Caste has been the curse of the country for centuries, and constitutional declarations of rights and pious resolves as to education are futile for removing suspicions inherited from the bitter experiences of countless generations. The definite guarantee of a reasonable share in the government and safeguards as recommended by the Simon Commission are essential to reassure the non-Brahmans and depressed Hindus. The Congress proposals have similarly failed to satisfy the Moslems. It is true that seats would be reserved for them in the legislatures, but only for a limited number of years and in reduced numbers. The elected members would

moreover be made dependent in joint or mixed electorates rather on the good-will of the Hindu majorities than on the favour of their fellow-Moslems. The Simon Commission has recognised these objections and would pay greater regard to the aspirations and sentiments of the Moslems who were once the rulers of India. The Congress proposals as to defence again disclose a deplorable refusal to face realities. The tribesmen have so far shown no eagerness to take to the spinning wheel, and recent events on the North-West Frontier ought to be sufficient to satisfy anyone of the necessity for a long time to come of a strong British element in the Army in India. The Simon Commission has provided for this by a proposal under which constitutional development need not wait upon the Indianisation of the Army, as the defence of the North-West Frontier would be undertaken as the responsibility of the Imperial Government. The Congress finally, in proposing to take over the rights and obligations of the Paramount Power, has signally failed to appreciate the spirit and point of view of the Indian States. The princes are not lightly to be persuaded to submit to a subordinate partnership with the modern provinces of British India, but it would be open to them to take an honourable place as the proud representatives of rulers of the remote past in the Federation portrayed by the Simon Commission for Greater India. The Congress is an important and influential party, and its views, constitutionally represented, would be entitled to respect, but it is not by factious opposition that it is going to satisfy the British public that it stands for the true welfare of the great masses of the peoples of India. It is rather by co-operation with the representatives of other powerful parties and with the representatives of the British Parliament that it can contribute its share towards securing the future progress and prosperity of the continent of India in honourable partnership with the other Dominions of the British Empire.

M. H. W. HAYWARD

GERMANY IN THE MELTING-POT

THE splendid era of stabilisation, reconstruction, and new prosperity which began for Germany in 1924, and which, in a way, was quite unique, seems definitely to have come to an end As the course of events in 1929, and more particularly as recent developments, have shown, the whole superstructure of German political and economic life is once again being shaken to its foundations Certain aspects of the German crisis are universal, and other countries are at the present moment faced with exactly the same problems and difficulties Especially universal is the complaint that Germany is suffering from the lack of leadership both in the field of politics and in the field of economics It seems to be one of the most curious and depressing features of the post-war world that there are no men who could or would lead it Like most countries, Germany can number among her politicians, industrialists, and financiers a few particularly able honest, and hard-working men Some of them are undoubtedly people of outstanding ability But there does not seem to be a single one among them who could claim to be regarded as a leader in the true sense of the word—a leader of national or even international, importance There is nothing specifically German in this absence of statesmen or heads of ' big business ' capable of showing the nation a way out of its troubles their opposite numbers ' elsewhere have not been conspicuous for their success either

But, whatever may be one's personal appreciation of the groups and individuals who are or have been at the head of the German State and the country's industry, commerce and finance, the fundamental fact remains that within a comparatively short space of time Germany succeeded in recovering from the immediate and most disastrous effects of the war, and after seven years of difficulty became once again one of the Great Powers. This she managed to achieve despite almost unsurmountable handicaps, such as an immensely complicated internal political situation, inflation, the collapse of the mark, stabilisation, reparations, the Dawes and finally the Young Plan, and a foreign policy that had to shape itself according to these quite unprecedented factors, as well as international politics. Having emerged triumphant

from a process which very nearly resulted in a complete collapse, Germany entered a period of consolidation and expansion which lasted about five years Is the present crisis merely an interruption in Germany's economic and political upward movement, or is she going to slide down again from the comparative height she had so painfully succeeded in reaching? Her vicissitudes are certainly manifold and plentiful, for she has to contend with some crucial difficulties, financial, social, and political, as well as with problems of a legislative, administrative, educational, racial, religious, and even of an ideological character, all of which demand a speedy solution These problems are by no means of recent origin, and most of them have been lingering in the foreground or background of German politics for a long time By constantly shelving them or by introducing half-measures and part-solutions successive German Governments brought it about that these problems, in the full accumulation of their combined weight, now present an exceedingly difficult and dangerous task for any new Government that will have the courage and the pluck to cope with them, or at least with those which are of immediate importance The last two Governments were quite incapable of doing so, and the recent dissolution was a result which came as a complete surprise to everybody—most of all to the Reichstag itself The elections to a new Reichstag will take place on September 14, and by the time this article is published the election campaign will be in full swing, and will be nearing its final—and no doubt very violent—stages

Not counting the National Assembly of January 19 1919, this will be the fifth general election since the establishment of the German Republic Owing to post-war legislation the franchise in Germany has been so enormously enlarged that whereas in 1912 out of 64,000,000 inhabitants only 14,400,000, or 22 2 per cent, of the population had the right to vote in the 1928 election there were 41,200,000 qualified voters out of a population of 62,400,000, or 66 per cent It is significant, however, that, despite the widened franchise, the number of people actually availing themselves of their right to vote is decreasing, and has sunk from 83 per cent at the National Assembly to 75 6 per cent. at the last general election which took place on May 20, 1928. This election deserves attention, for it was fraught with results which have led finally to the present position It was the first 'sober' election after the return to more or less normal conditions, for the two previous elections (which had both taken place in 1924) were still largely dominated by the spectre of inflation Together with the National Assembly and the first general elections to the new republican Reichstag, they must be considered as an integral part of that aftermath of war and revolution which it

took Germany seven years to outlive. The salient feature of the 1928 election was the great recovery made by the Social Democratic Party. This party, which since the very inception of the German Republic had been numerically the strongest, had in 1924 suffered a certain eclipse. Many hundreds of thousands then voted for the reactionary Deutschnationale Party, because it promised them a full revaluation of their bank and savings deposits, mortgages, war loan, and other holdings, the value of which had been destroyed by inflation. By 1928 these victims of inflation realised that they had been duped by the unscrupulous demagogues of the Right—who were no more in a position to compensate them than anybody else—and this time they voted Left. The result was a net loss of 1,800,000 votes to the Deutschnationale Party and a gain of 1,700,000 votes for the Social Democrats and Communists Out of 491 seats in the Reichstag the Social Democrats got 153 and the Communists 54 Together with the twenty-five Democrats they formed the rather heterogeneous and disunited *bloc* of the Left—a strong minority group of 232 members The other parties were no better off, forming two equally heterogeneous and disunited minority groups—that of the Centre and that of the Right The former included sixty-one members of the Roman Catholic Centre Party, forty-five members of Dr Stresemann's People's Party, and seventeen members of the Bavarian People's Party—a total of 123, to which occasionally had to be added the twenty-three members of the Economic Party, thus increasing the Centre group's strength to 146 members The minority of the Right consisted of seventy-eight Deutschnationale, who have since split up into several new groups, and thirty-five other members belonging to a variety of small reactionary parties, among them four elderly gentlemen from Hanover, whose battle cry was the restoration of the Guelphs to the throne the King of Prussia had robbed them of in 1866

This medley of parties, groups, and organisations in Germany is truly bewildering and most unwholesome Elected under the present system of proportionate representation carried to its extreme and absurd limits, the Reichstag, consisting as it did of three main minority groups all of which were full of internal conflicts and contradictions, found it quite impossible to fulfil its proper functions After a great deal of strife and argument a coalition Government of the Left was formed under the Social Democrat Hermann Muller, which led an ineffective existence, until early in 1930 it collapsed and was replaced by a coalition Government of the Centre with a distinct leaning towards the Right under Dr Brüning, the leader of the Roman Catholic Centre Party. This Government proved no luckier than its predecessor, and after a succession of failures there remained

no remedy but to dissolve the Reichstag. The significance of the dissolution and Dr. Brüning's further steps is far greater than that of an ordinary parliamentary crisis Pressing financial and social measures were decreed after the dissolution by virtue of the much-discussed par 48 of the German Constitution, which provides for emergency powers in case of national danger That the authors of the Weimar Constitution never intended this paragraph to be used for financial and social legislation is obvious; on the other hand, the critics of Dr Bruning would do well to remember that under the late President Ebert the paragraph was often invoked for legislation which was still further removed from 'national danger,' as, for instance, a decree concerning medical assistance and health insurance or the protection of the wireless trade However in the present circumstances the application by the Bruning Government of par 48, coming on top of dissolution, gave rise to much alarm and was interpreted by many as a definitely anti-democratic and anti-parliamentary step

The nature of the present crisis is altogether of a different kind, and it would be wrong to give the dissolution and the application of par 48 such an interpretation As a brilliant German writer once said, 'There was never a revolution in Germany, but only a series of counter-revolutions and there is a great deal of truth in this observation Yet the majority of the Conservative parties and groups formed as a result of the recent secessions from the too reactionary Deutschnationale Party are all proclaiming their readiness to 'accept the republic, and seem to be definitely giving up the idea of a possible return to monarchy. If for a long time Germany could be described as a republic with very few republicans now it can be safely asserted that she has very few monarchists left and that the question has lost its interest.

Finance and politics are the principal causes of the crisis, and they are so closely interwoven that it is almost impossible to draw a line of demarcation Germany must create new financial resources to meet the ever-expanding needs of her budget and to pay reparations That is the crux of the financial problem. And the crux of the political problem lies in the definite endeavour the bourgeoisie is making to get rid of the growing and all-permeating influence of organised social democracy—the frank desire to cut down social charges and wages At the same time the combined strength of Communism and Fascism is directed against both the Social Democrats and the bourgeoisie, against the very State and the Constitution Thus the crisis is one of adaptation of classes and groups to the new political and economic order, which became recently consolidated by the acceptance of the Young Plan and the liberation of the Rhineland. With these two events a new phase of Germany's political and economic

life has begun. Now that the solution of the two most pressing needs of foreign policy has been achieved—and it required a combined effort of the bourgeoisie and the Social Democrats—these two groups can give free play to their old dislike and distrust of each other. No longer held together by 'national interests,' which were dictated to them by the needs of foreign policy, both clans have become aggressive The Social Democrats, who can claim the highest credit for the *rôle* played by them in foreign affairs, proved to be singularly unreasonable in questions of domestic policy Not even the most ardent admirers of Herr Hermann Muller can call his Cabinet or the administration of the nation's finance by Dr Hilferding a success On the other hand, even the most violent detractors of Dr Schacht, the then president of the Reichsbank, must admit that his onslaught on that Government in December 1929 was very largely justified Albeit, in an extremely objectionable form, which the Muller-Hilferding Cabinet had every reason to resent, he told them a few fundamental home truths and protested against their indolent and profligate financial policy The Agent-General for Reparation Payments also repeatedly warned the Government and even quite recently in his final report once again stressed the need for financial reform and economy Both the Muller and the Bruning Cabinets turned a deaf ear on these warnings and allowed the crisis to reach its present state But, while the refusal of the Reichstag to carry through the necessary financial reform has led to its dissolution, the real reason for Dr Bruning's action, and for the collapse of the 'Grand Coalition,' has to be sought elsewhere It would have been perfectly possible for Dr Bruning to get his budget through the Reichstag and to avoid dissolution if he had chosen to come to an understanding with the Social Democrats in order to find a financial compromise But, responding to an acute mood of class consciousness, the bourgeois parties had for some time past taken up an absolutely uncompromising attitude towards the Social Democrats That is why they refused their further collaboration in the 'Grand Coalition' and turned out the Muller Cabinet immediately after the acceptance of the Young Plan And that is why they subsequently refused even to enter into negotiations with the Social Democrats in the matter of finding a financial compromise

The position of the Social Democratic Party in the 'Grand Coalition' Government had been a difficult one Flanked by fifty-three Communists constantly attacking them on the left, and sharing power and responsibility with the bourgeois groups sitting on their right, they were compelled to follow a policy of compromise, and were quite unable to put any of their theories into practice. And they had yielded in two important questions

of financial and economic policy—the increase of indirect taxation and the increase of import duties. But on two other vital issues they were adamant and refused to give in—namely, the reduction of wages through compulsory arbitration and the reduction of the unemployment subsidy Thus while social democracy was by no means militant in the Muller Government, yet it maintained a stubborn opposition to any attacks that were made on the fundamental principles of its social policy It is this aggressive position of the Social Democratic Party in the matter of their social policy that made the continuation of the 'Grand Coalition' impossible and finally turned the bourgeois groups against them Prompted by somewhat different motives, the People's Party and the Centre Party deliberately changed their tactics and turned to the Right The People's Party represents a strong section of industry and commerce, and it wanted to get rid of the Socialists in order to solve the most urgent problems of financial and social policy in accordance with its own interests As to the Centre Party, its action was very largely dictated by an ever-growing thirst for power a desire to be able to govern without depending on the Social Democrats for their support Its leader, Dr Bruning, hoped to form a solid bourgeois *bloc* in the Reichstag embracing not only the People's Party whose present leader, Dr Scholz, is much more a man of the Right than his late predecessor, Dr Stresemann, but also the various groups that had just seceded from Herr Hugenberg's Deutschnationale Party, and, in fact, that very party as well In attempting to get the support, or at least the benevolent neutrality of Herr Hugenberg, Dr Bruning went so far as to drag President Hindenburg into the political arena, and to use the aged and universally respected Field-Marshal as a tool to break up the 'Grand Coalition,' which is still firmly implanted in Prussia under Socialist leadership Had he been successful, Dr Bruning would have found himself at the head of an exceedingly strong political combination enabling him to govern without and against the Social Democrats But Herr Hugenberg refused to come in at any price, and now, after the dissolution which thus became inevitable, Dr Bruning is trying to pursue his policy of forming a majority of the Right by new methods The result of these endeavours to solve the financial and political problems simultaneously by a mere regrouping of parties and of the failure to achieve anything at all is that a situation which was quite complicated enough has been rendered even more so, and that the crisis is more acute than ever It is, indeed, a paradox that such a state of affairs should have been so largely due to the very Centre Party which is the best organised, most stable, and clearest thinking political party in Germany, possessed of true statecraft and of thorough parliamentary

technique. Since the split in the Hugenberg-Westarp clan the Centre has become the leading Conservative party in the land. And it is most significant that whereas up to 1929-30 the groups of the Right followed in the wake of the Deutschnationale, now the leadership of that group, excluding, of course, the extreme reactionary wing, seems to have passed definitely to the Centre, which is also numerically the strongest party to the Right of the Social Democrats. That the very moderate, constitutional, and republican Centre should have made up its mind to seek its future allies on the Right and no longer on the Left, and that it should have assumed the *rôle* of leading bourgeois Conservative party, is not due to some sudden change of political credo, but to certain developments which were gradually bringing it nearer and nearer the other groups of the Right.

This *rapprochement* proceeded along three main lines. In the first place, a strong link was established with the Christian National trade unions. This professional movement had for long been under the influence of both the Centre and the Deutschnationale Party. Herr Hugenberg's reactionary programme and hostile attitude to labour lost him the support of this group, which is now entirely dominated by the Centre. In the second place (and this very largely through the Christian-National Peasants' Party), the Centre became very closely connected with the agrarian wing of the Deutschnationale. This Peasants' Party, which had itself seceded from the Landbund (an organisation of big landowners), developed into an adroit and active mediator between the landowners of the Landbund and the peasant wing of the Centre. It managed to bring together the land magnates from behind the Elbe with the peasant provinces of the west and south-west. This collaboration had its results, and the unification of the different agrarian groups into a federated organisation, the so-called 'Green Front,' proved a pillar of strength to the Centre when the 'Grand Coalition' was drowned and the present course adopted. Finally, the Roman Catholic Centre discovered suddenly a great spiritual affinity with the Christian-Social-People's Party, a group which had also seceded from the Deutschnationale, and with whom the Centre could immediately embark upon an active 'cultural campaign' based on an inter-confessional Catholic-Protestant agreement. With all these new allies that have come to it from the Right, the Centre seemed to consider itself strong enough to change its tactics and make a bid for unrestricted power. The course chosen by Dr Brüning has been described above. Will the elections justify his expectations and put him at the head of that big anti-Socialist, bourgeois, Conservative, and perhaps even somewhat reactionary, coalition he is aiming at? It is obviously impossible to foretell the results

of the elections and to prognosticate on the future Reichstag or the future Government. There are a few things, however, which can be gathered from the respective positions of the different parties, and which appear fairly certain even now. The responsibility assumed by Dr Bruning in upsetting the old balance of powers is a heavy one, and the question not unnaturally arises whether he will not have to pay for it. His task is not rendered any easier by the various groups that have seceded from Herr Hugenberg's organisation and whose alliance he seeks. They all have their own programmes and aspirations, and so have the other old and new bourgeois parties. In some cases it would be no exaggeration to say that the difference separating them can only be discovered with a microscope. But all attempts to bring the bourgeois parties together have so far failed, and if instead of uniting they go on splitting hairs they are likely to be the heaviest losers in the elections. The regrouping of the Right has considerably weakened it, for, instead of one party, four are entering the field. There is Herr Hugenberg himself, who still commands a strong organisation, a powerful Press, and enormous financial resources. Then there is the new People's Conservative Party, the leaders of which are Count Westarp and Herr Treviranus, whose recent speeches on the Polish corridor achieved him international notoriety; further the Agrarian Party, under the leadership of Herr Schiele; and finally, the Christian-Social Party. Although as yet officially united, the People's Party, under the leadership of Herr Scholz, seems to be torn by internal conflict. Its endeavours to come to an understanding first with the groups of the Right, then with the newly formed liberal State Party on its immediate Left, having failed, some of its members have now chosen to pursue their own policy. Thus, while in Baden and Wurttemberg they are associating themselves with the Liberals—*i.e.*, State Party—in Thuringia they have formed a close alliance with the extreme reactionary groups of the Right. Even the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, a paper of the Right (not to mention the Liberal Press), points out that there are no fundamental differences between the People's Party and the State Party, and that the wisest course would be for them to amalgamate. But the old rivalry of Herr Scholz and Herr Koch-Weser, leader of the Democratic Party and now one of the leaders of the State Party that has absorbed it, seems to stand in the way. This State Party is the result of an amalgamation between the Liberal-Democratic Party and the Young German Order, a rather reactionary and anti-Semitic organisation, whose moving spirit, Herr Mahraun, looks strangely out of place side by side with the old leaders of the Democratic Party. The gradual crumbling away of the Democratic Party is in a way reminiscent of the

fate of the Liberal Party in this country. In 1919 it was represented by seventy-nine members; in the last Reichstag there were only twenty-five Democrats. Yet it is a party that has exercised the greatest influence both in the foreign and domestic affairs of the German Republic. It prevented the extremists of both Right and Left from carrying out their wildest schemes, it consolidated the State and, to the extent that this was possible, the parliamentary system, it did much to bring the complicated problem of the relations between the Reich and the States nearer to a solution; it initiated the policy of understanding with the Allied Powers, and its leader, Rathenau, was the author of that great work of reconciliation which it was left to Stresemann to complete. Some of the best brains in the country were Democrats. Yet, in spite of all this, the party lost votes and seats in every election, until the number of its representatives in Parliament shrunk to twenty-five. The very nature of the functions the Democratic Party had assumed in the German State was its damnation. It acted as a regulating and pacifying force in the political life of the country, and it was best qualified to serve as a bridge between the bourgeoisie and social democracy. It was essentially a party of the enlightened bourgeoisie, and certainly it never appealed to the masses. Too sound and too moderate, of late years it never had a chance of displaying any initiative, and, through being relegated to a position of inactivity, it completely lost its capacity for constructive work. Its occasional representatives in various coalitions were much nearer to the spirit of other parties than to that of their own, and Herr Dietrich, the present Vice-Chancellor and Finance Minister of the Reich, is a striking illustration of this. Prominent members like Dr. Schacht or Herr Theodor Wolff, the distinguished editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, resigned, either because they lost faith in the Party or because its atmosphere stifled them. The last thing left for the party to do was to dissolve or amalgamate with some other group, and the People's Party should have proved a suitable companion. But the Democratic Party formed an alliance with the Young German Order instead and started the new State Party. If the personal question between Herr Scholz and Herr Koch-Weser can be ruled out, and the People's Party finally does see its way to come in, here will be a nucleus of a bourgeois party of considerable strength, and a less Conservative one than the various other groups of the Right.

But the trouble in this election is that none of the parties, whether they are for or against the Bruning policy, is prepared to admit quite candidly the main point that is at issue. They all feel extremely uneasy about the problem of finance and the necessity of taking up a clear attitude in this matter, which is

Germany's most burning question. When a country is passing through an acute economic crisis it is always the demagogue who scores most. By giving rash and unscrupulous promises which he never intends to keep, he attracts the votes of all the embittered, disappointed, and exasperated strata of the population. Both the Communists and the Fascists are making political capital out of Germany's economic difficulties, and the number of their adherents has very largely increased. The split in the Right camp has weakened its fighting capacity, and the competition of the Fascists is bound to cause a great deal of damage to it. The moderate parties, including the Centre, the State, and the People's Parties, are rather apt to fall between two stools unless at the eleventh hour they can combine. What of the Social Democrats? After the unfortunate experiment of the Muller-Hilferding Cabinet, and with the wild attacks that are being made on them by the Communists, they will probably be glad to maintain their present position. They are also hampered by their desire, which is even now transparent, not to close the door completely to a possible understanding, or even coalition, with some of their adversaries in the future Reichstag. So far as it is possible to judge, then, no party will have an absolute majority, and once again a coalition Government will have to be formed. But who will have the balance of power, and will the coalition have a leaning to the Left or to the Right? Will the Social Democrats be able to rally in their camp all the real enemies of reaction? Or will the Centre succeed in grouping together the various bourgeois Conservative and even reactionary parties to form the solid capitalistic *Bloc* they have been aiming at? But the number of Communists and Fascists in the next Reichstag will probably be considerably larger than before; if economic conditions get worse it certainly will. Now, it is their avowed object to make the normal working of the parliamentary machine impossible, and they always seem willing to combine against any Government. They were frequently a source of great embarrassment to the Muller and the Bruning Governments in the last Reichstag. If their numerical strength is seriously augmented in this Reichstag they are bound to represent a very real danger, a danger not only in the domain of internal affairs but also in that of international politics. This appears unlikely, but it is a thing to be reckoned with. Excluding such a situation, however, it may be assumed that whatever the leanings of the next coalition Government in Germany, the foreign policy of that country will be carried on along established lines. More than ever the world has cause to lament the death of Dr. Stresemann and the vacuum left in German politics by his disappearance.

But, although the present situation in Germany is a difficult one, there is no need to get alarmed. Electioneering is, as we all know, a most peculiar process, when people do and say things to which it would be wrong to attach too much importance, and more than to any country does this apply to Germany in her present state. Some of her politicians see the key of all evils in the Young Plan, and no doubt they will bitterly attack it in their election campaign, or even claim a revision of the Treaty of Versailles Good sense, however, is bound to prevail. The Germans may not be a political race, but they are a most excellent business people They are suffering at the present moment from an unprecedented economic depression, caused partly by the world crisis, and partly by the second wave of rationalisation Suffice it to say that they have over 2,750,000 unemployed, and that the plight of agriculture is even worse there than it is in Great Britain Politics and economics being so closely interwoven as they are in Germany, a bad economic situation makes for bad politics Given a slight improvement in world trade, Germany is bound to recover, for the Germans are the hardest working race on earth Their effort of the period 1924–29 has proved it But their handicaps are great Shortage of capital stands in the centre of Germany's economic problem. The process of accumulation of home capital is not sufficiently powerful yet to satisfy the country's needs, and they are compelled to look to the foreign capital markets for their requirements During the period 1924-29 Germany imported in one shape or another 17,000,000,000 marks But Germany finds that the raising of foreign loans is getting more and more difficult, and this has had its repercussions on German foreign trade It reduced her capacity to import more foreign goods At the same time, the economic crisis having greatly reduced the purchasing power of the German population, a serious decline in domestic consumption was caused In order to counteract the effects of the deficiency of the home market a great effort had to be made by Germany to increase her exports The result has been that for the first half-year of 1930 foreign trade not only no longer weighed on the German balance of payments, but that exports, including Reparation deliveries, exceeded imports by about 510,000,000 marks, during the corresponding period of 1929 and 1928 there had been 'adverse' balances of 280,000,000 and 1,350,000,000 marks respectively

It is outside the scope of this article to discuss the economic position of Germany But to appreciate the political situation there it is essential to understand how largely shortage of capital on the one hand, and industry and foreign trade on the other, influence the trend of affairs in that country. The expansion of

foreign trade, therefore, should prove quite encouraging. If Germany can improve her financial and economic situation, her politics will get better. But the one thing is conditional on the other, and a business improvement can only take place if there are no political disturbances of any kind, and if she has a sound and stable Government. The arithmetical problems of the new Reichstag are, after all, a matter of secondary importance. What really matters is that the young German Republic, which only recently celebrated its eleventh anniversary, should put its parliamentary machine in working order, and have a Reichstag which is an instrument of, and not an impediment to the consolidation of the Weimar Constitution. All those who are the sincere well-wishers of Germany will most ardently hope that on September 14 she makes a choice which will render her return to prosperity possible, and will contribute to the further progress of international understanding, peace, and stability.

GEORGE SOLOVEYTCHIK.

AFTER SEDAN

SIXTY years ago—on Sunday, September 4, 1870, to be exact—the citizens of Paris were awakened by the cries of newsboys calling out that the Emperor was a captive in Prussian hands. The report confirmed a rumour that had rushed like wildfire through Paris on the previous day; and, indeed, the Government and the Empress had received secret intelligence of the awful defeat at Sedan. Between four and five o'clock on the afternoon of Saturday the Minister of the Interior had placed in the hands of the Empress Eugénie a telegram from Napoleon III. It contained these words: 'The army is defeated and captive; I myself am a prisoner.' For a moment the Empress had lost her self-control, realising, as she did, how the surrender of the Emperor would affect the future of her son. For nearly twenty years Napoleon III had inspired in the French in general, and in the Parisians in particular, a feeling of confidence in his energy. He had lived on the reminiscence of his *coup d'état*. The people had instinctively said of him: 'He is no poltroon to escape in a cab like Papa Philippe. He would blow himself up rather than give in.' And now the bearer of the greatest military name in France had capitulated with an army of 80 000 men.

The day which was to witness a revolution was one of cloudless sunshine—one of the most glorious September days ever seen. As it was Sunday, the streets were soon full. By eleven o'clock the Place de la Concorde was crowded, and from all the streets leading to it armed bands of National Guards were marching, shouting 'Vive la République.' On all sides, and hundreds of times, was heard the expression: 'An Emperor dies, but does not surrender.' The general feeling in Paris was one of relief, almost of elation: it was thought that now France, relieved from the incubus of a dynasty that had failed her, would arise with renewed and invincible strength. On the boulevards suddenly a cry was raised: 'La République est déclarée.' A regiment was at that moment passing by. It was met by a detachment of the National Guard coming from the Chamber. Guard, regiment, and people immediately fraternised. The *Marseillaise* was sung and the regular soldiers disappeared into neighbouring

cafés, where they were treated to drink. Exactly at twenty minutes past three the tricolour was seen to be lowered on the central tower of the Tuileries From the windows of the great barracks by the Quai d'Orsay soldiers were waving handkerchiefs and re-echoing the cries of 'Vive la République' raised by citizens and soldiers in the streets below Well-dressed ladies in open carriages shook hands with workmen and soldiers, all shouting the popular cry Strangers fell on each other's necks and kissed with effusion Men on ladders were everywhere wrenching down busts of the Emperor, and these, carried in procession with mock solemnity, were thrown into the Seine to the accompaniment of roars of laughter Portraits of Napoleon III and Eugénie were hurled out of the windows of the Hôtel de Ville, and the people danced on the canvas All was sunshine, laughter and good humour No blood was spilt The people of Paris were as full of joyful enthusiasm as a band of schoolboys whose usher had disappeared

But in a large city and not least in Paris, even a jolly revolution on a fine Sunday morning brings out an undesirable element mad with a lust for plunder There had been ominous shouts of 'Aux Tuileries' and a large crowd had hurried towards the palace Fortunately a detachment of the National Guard took over from the Imperial Guard just in time to keep out the mob which rolled back into the Place du Carrousel panting and breathless like a wild beast baulked of its prey Inside the building the safety of the Empress had become the subject of the gravest anxiety to her entourage The Austrian and Italian Ambassadors had called in order to urge upon her the necessity of flight About half-past three the Prefect of Police rushed in crying 'Nous sommes trahis,' adding that the crowds were beating down the railings The Empress throughout the whole crisis had displayed absolute fearlessness, and consented to take refuge in flight only to avoid putting the lives of others in jeopardy Yet she delayed to say farewell to her ladies and to one of them who begged to accompany her the Empress replied 'I fully appreciate your generous devotion to me, but I do not wish my misfortunes to be yours In France no one should be unhappy'

'Come,' cried Metternich and Nigra, 'there is barely time to get away' The Empress was literally pushed out of the palace by her friends The Austrian Ambassador gave her his arm Signor Nigra led her companion, Madame Lebreton, sister of General Bourbaki and the only lady of the court who was to share her flight It was soon realised that to leave the Tuileries by any direct way would be dangerous if not impossible, and the little party hastened, therefore, through the galleries which overlooked the Seine and passed into the Louvre finally emerging

near the Place in front of the church of Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois. It was necessary to wait while a troop of noisy demonstrators poured through the arched passage which leads from the inner court of the Louvre to the Place. Nigra offered his arm to the weary Empress. As a particularly uproarious band passed by with shouts of 'À bas l'Espagnole' and 'Vive la République,' Nigra asked the Empress if she felt afraid. 'You are holding my arm,' was the quiet reply. 'Do you feel it tremble?'

When the main body of the rabble had passed, Prince de Metternich hailed a closed cab, but before the ladies could enter it a street boy cried out 'Voilà l'Impératrice!' Signor Nigra instantly entered into conversation with the lad to distract his attention, and in the meanwhile the ladies had got into the vehicle, which drove off, Madame Lebreton having directed the driver to the residence of M. Besson, a councillor of State, on the Boulevard Haussmann. It is somewhat remarkable that neither the Austrian nor Italian Ambassador had any plan but to put the Empress into a cab, and, more curious still, that neither of them offered the unfortunate lady the shelter and protection of his Embassy. On arrival at its destination the cab was dismissed and the ladies ascended to M. Besson's apartments. Unfortunately the councillor was not at home, and after waiting for about quarter of an hour, seated on the stairs, the Empress said: 'I cannot wait any longer. Let us go.' The two ladies then left the house, and for a few moments walked aimlessly about the streets, which were here deserted. Finally they saw an open cab which they engaged, and after a hurried consultation between the two ladies the driver was directed to go to the house of Dr. Evans, an American dentist who numbered the Imperial family amongst his patients. Dr. Evans was out, but was expected back shortly, and the ladies were ushered into the library to await his return.

Dr. Evans instantly placed himself at the service of the Empress. She thanked him, saying: 'You see I am no longer fortunate. The evil days have come and I am left alone', and as she spoke tears filled her eyes. Dr. Evans then asked if Her Majesty had any special plans. 'Yes', she wished particularly to leave Paris, and hoped that it might be possible to escape to England. She had brought some passports with her—for several had been collected at the Tuileries for possible use in emergency—and one of them, obtained at the British Embassy, was soon declared suitable. In it all whom it might concern were 're-quested and required to allow Dr. C—— (a British subject), going to England accompanied by a patient, Mrs. B—— (also a British subject), to pass freely, also without let or hindrance,' and so forth. It was decided that Dr. Crane, a friend of Dr. Evans,

should impersonate the Dr. C——; the Empress was to be the patient. Apparently the passport contained a provision for some companion for the 'sick lady,' and Dr Evans was therefore to pose as her brother and Madame Lebreton as the nurse. Dr Evans's wife had been spending the month of August in Normandy and was still at the Hôtel du Casino, in Deauville. Dr Evans knew the neighbourhood well and, as his wife might be able to render some assistance, Deauville was fixed as the objective, it being hoped that a yacht or boat of some kind might be found there in which to cross the Channel. As it would be highly inadvisable to travel by rail, it was arranged to begin the journey in Dr Evans's own carriage and to count upon finding relays of horses and other vehicles along the route. Everyone was to be ready to start at half-past five the following morning.

Punctually at that hour on Monday, September 5, the party set off without any luggage. Dr Evans in his *Memoirs* emphasises the fact when he says: 'Not a bag, not a package even of toilet articles, did one of us carry.' The reason for the omission is not clear, for a party escorting an invalid lady to England without even a handbag between them might arouse suspicion were the passport to be examined. The Empress wore a black cashmere dress, which she had not taken off for nearly a week, subject as she had been to calls at every hour of the day and night. Over this she wore a thin waterproof. A narrow white collar about her neck, dark gloves, and a black 'bowler' hat to which was attached a plain black veil completed her costume. No attempt had been made to disguise her features or person. In the hurry of leaving the palace she had taken with her absolutely nothing beyond the clothes she wore, with the exception of a small reticule in which were a couple of handkerchiefs. Madame Lebreton was also very simply dressed and without wraps of any kind.

The first test occurred at the Porte Maillot, where the sentry ordered the carriage to halt. Dr Evans thought it better not to employ the story of the invalid lady, but merely to say that he was an American, well known in Paris, going to spend the day in the country with some friends who were with him, an explanation which satisfied the officer of the guard. The Empress had been silent and *distraite*, but as the carriage sped along the Route Impériale her spirits rose, and she talked with great animation about her present situation and the events which had led up to it. Of the French people she said that they had few convictions and lacked steadfastness. 'They are versatile but volatile. With them the standard of right is success.' She recalled how, but a few days before, she had told some of her friends that if ever the imperial dynasty should fall she would never leave the Tuileries in a cab as Charles X. and Louis Philippe had done.

'And that is exactly what I did,' she cried, and the humour of the coincidence made her laugh in spite of herself.

Some twelve miles short of Mantes the carriage stopped at a small wayside cabaret to water and rest the horses. The two Americans snatched a hasty meal, but the Empress and her companion thought it would not be prudent to leave the vehicle. Dr. Evans accordingly brought the Empress some bread and a piece of Bologna sausage, which she ate with relish when the carriage had moved off again It was about eleven o'clock when the party approached the outskirts of Mantes. The morning papers from Paris had just arrived, and Dr Evans, on purchasing the *Journal Officiel* and the *Figaro*, was immensely relieved to find that amid all the columns dealing with the Revolution there was no reference whatever to the Empress It was now thought necessary to procure a fresh conveyance and horses, which, fortunately, Dr Evans was able to do His own carriage was, therefore, sent back to Paris and the party continued their journey Her Majesty was intensely interested in the newspapers bought by Dr Evans, and spoke volubly of the constitution of the new Government of National Defence Of General Trochu, who had become President of this new Government, she talked with some bitterness 'Only yesterday morning, spontaneously of his own volition, he pledged to me, on his honour as a soldier, on his faith as a Catholic and a Breton, that he would never desert me' Her Majesty was quite overcome, her voice trembled and tears came into her eyes A cynic might observe that it was the Empress who was now deserting General Trochu quite as much as it was he who was deserting his sovereign Is it possible to detect in her utterance just the least little touch of spleen at finding her name unmentioned in either paper? Had she been such a cipher as all that? Only that very morning she had said to Dr Evans that in no country was the step from the sublime to the ridiculous so short as in France. Marie Antoinette had achieved sublimity Eugenie had left the Tuileries in a four-wheeler and only a corner-boy had cried out at her going Was there something in legitimacy after all?

About two o'clock the travellers arrived at the little hamlet of Pacy-sur-Eure, the end of the stage agreed on with the driver Here there was a difficulty in securing another conveyance. An old woman said she had a carriage but only one horse, unless she could borrow another to make up a pair This she was able to do, but the borrowed animal was diminutive in comparison with its fellow, and the 'carriage' proved to be the most bepatched, benailed, and ramshackle contraption in the whole of France. There was nothing for it, however, but to push on, and after an hour's delay the Empress was *en route* again. About five o'clock

the village of Cambolle was reached, and here the first alarm was experienced. While the horses were being fed and watered, down the street were heard loud cries of ' Vive la France ' and ' Vive la République ' Soon some waggons full of soldiers came in sight, but luckily they proved merely to be tipsy *mobiles* returning from a review at Evreux. Many of them waved their caps at the Empress's carriage and saluted it with shouts of ' Vive la République.' La Commanderie was reached just before sunset. Here a pair of fine horses were engaged—the owner declaring, to the anxiety of the fugitives, that ' they were fit for a queen '—and the Empress drank some coffee which Madame Lebreton had succeeded in getting made in the post office On again to La Rivière de Thibouville. It was now nearly ten p m , and almost 100 miles had been covered since dawn Fortune had favoured the party so far Not a single awkward query had been put to them The Empress had been unnoticed Yet it would be unwise to delay, for even now telegraph wires might be working all over France telling of the vanished Empress The officer of the guard at Porte Maillot might have remembered the carriage, with two ladies inside, which had passed through the gate at dawn, and every village official and every custom-house officer might have been put upon the alert

Dr Evans was therefore anxious to engage another carriage and horses and to push on, only to be met with by the 1870 equivalent of ' Napoo ' There was no such a thing as a carriage within ten miles In these circumstances the only thing to do was to make use of such rough accommodation as the *Soleil d'Or* could provide but there were only two rooms for visitors, and both of these were occupied by an English coachman and his family on their way to Trouville The coachman was, however, soon induced by a *douceur* to surrender the accommodation, and the Empress, acting the invalid, was escorted to her room When she reached it the rough and scanty accommodation so tickled her sense of humour that she burst out into a peal of laughter, greatly to the alarm of Madame Lebreton for the partitions were thin and a hilarious invalid might cause some suspicion

In the middle of the night Dr Evans and Dr Crane were awakened by the clatter of hoofs the sound of angry voices and a loud pounding on the inn door Had the flight of the Empress been discovered, and was this a squadron of gendarmes sent to arrest her ? Cautiously peeping out of the window, the two Americans listened intently and were soon reassured—the midnight visitors were merely some gamekeepers who had been scouring the neighbourhood for poachers In the morning there was further trouble : no carriage could be obtained except from Bernay, ten miles back, and this would mean several hours'

delay. True, the railway was near, the station being but a mile off, and it would be possible to get a train to Lisieux, only eighteen miles from Deauville. But could an invalid lady, who had to be escorted to her room, show such a rapid recovery as to be able to walk a mile? It was an awkward dilemma, but the luck of the Empress still held. A fine two-horse carriage drove up, and a gentleman descended at the inn to wait while his horses were resting. He readily responded to the suggestion made by Dr. Evans that he should allow his carriage to take the doctor's invalid 'sister' to the station At the station there was another alarm. Just before the train moved out the stationmaster suddenly opened the door and looked hard at the Empress, and closed the door with a bang She felt certain that she had been recognised, and even twenty years later she remembered the look the man had given her

Lisieux was reached without further incident, but there an exasperating delay took place It was a miserable morning, with heavy rain, and none of the party had an umbrella Dr Evans hurried into the town to find a livery stable, while the Empress and her two companions took what shelter they could in a doorway. Dr Evans tried half a dozen places in vain, and had nearly given up hope when at length he found a carriage proprietor who agreed after some persuasion to take a party of four into Deauville When the carriage had been driven to where the Empress was waiting she had been wet through and through by the drenching rain and looked wearied and exhausted from the long strain to which she had been subjected However, soon after leaving Lisieux the sun came out, and in the afternoon Deauville was safely reached Dr Evans got out some distance short of the hotel in order that he might go on and warn his wife, and then, helping the Empress from the carriage, he led her swiftly through the hotel garden by a side door into the building and thence rapidly up to his wife's apartments After greeting Mrs Evans the Empress sank back exhausted into an armchair, exclaiming 'Oh, mon Dieu, je suis sauvée'

So far the 'staff-work' of the American doctor had been flawless, but now the hardest part of his task lay before him—how to get the Empress safely across the Channel There were two possible methods—either to proceed as ordinary passengers by the Havre-Southampton packet or to hire some sailing craft for the exclusive use of the party. The first method was rejected, for Dr Evans felt sure that the flight of the Empress must now be public property and, this being so, every port would be under close observation He therefore decided to try his luck amongst the Deauville docks, where he made out two yachts, one an American schooner and the other an English cutter, the *Gazelle*.

Dr. Evans fixed on the latter, and, going on board, presented his card to the owner, Sir John Burgoyne, explaining that he greatly admired the yacht and would take it as a great favour if he might look round her. Sir John courteously agreed, showed the American round the vessel, and mentioned that he hoped to sail for England at seven a.m. the following day.

Evans then took Burgoyne aside and mentioned that he had a confidential communication to make, and that he was assured he was talking to a man whose honour he could trust. Sir John's reply was to hand Dr. Evans his card with the words: 'I am an English gentleman and have been in Her Majesty's service.' The American then unfolded his story, told Burgoyne where the Empress then was, and explained that it was Her Majesty's most earnest desire to escape to England, finally asking him whether he would be willing to receive the Empress, Madame Lebreton, and Dr. Evans himself on board the yacht and convey them to England. Startled by the revelation made to him, Sir John Burgoyne at first hesitated. Possibly a suspicion flashed through his mind that the plausible American and the 'Empress' might really be undesirables who had found France too hot to hold them. In any case, he had been weatherbound for several days, a heavy sea was still running outside, and he might not be able to leave in the morning, in which case the position of a fugitive empress on board a vessel flying the British flag but in a French port, might be an embarrassment. Dr. Evans hinted that he would now sound the owners of the American yacht, but Sir John Burgoyne asserted that in the weather which was probable the schooner would certainly go to the bottom. Dr. Crane now added his persuasions to those of his colleague, and finally Sir John said: 'Well, gentlemen, you may submit the case to Lady Burgoyne. If she is willing to have the Empress on board she can come.'

The three men then descended to the cabin and the facts were put to Lady Burgoyne. Was she willing to have the Empress on board? 'Well, why not?' was the immediate reply. 'I certainly shall be greatly pleased if we can be of any assistance to her, and I can readily understand how anxious she must be at the present moment to find a refuge. Let her come to us to-night, or as soon as she can safely do so.' The discussion then closed, and Sir John made an appointment with Dr. Evans for half-past ten that night to discuss details of the embarkation of the Empress. At this interview it was arranged that Dr. Evans should escort the Empress to the yacht at midnight and that Dr. Crane and Madame Lebreton should follow at a short interval. The programme was carried out without a hitch, although about eleven p.m. a French police agent visited the yacht and probably passed the Empress and Dr. Evans on his way back. It was a

wild night, and a strong westerly wind was blowing in sharp squalls. While the Empress and her escort were making their way by the rough road to the docks, off Cape Finisterre the newest British ironclad, H.M.S. *Captain*, commanded by a cousin of Sir John Burgoyne, capsized in a heavy squall with the loss of over 500 officers and men. At midnight Sir John Burgoyne met the two ladies, closely veiled, one of whom introduced herself as the French Empress. He conducted her on board the yacht. 'I know I am safe now, under the protection of an Englishman,' she exclaimed, adding 'Pauvre France!' The Empress then became very hysterical, but was soothed by the kindness of Lady Burgoyne.

The *Gazelle* was a cutter yacht of 42 tons originally built as a coastguard tender for the Royal Navy, but, proving somewhat too small for the duty, she had been sold out of the service and converted into a yacht. She was heavily sparred and carried a good deal of canvas for a vessel of her size, but she was stoutly built and a good sea boat. At dawn on September 7 Sir John went on deck and on coming below reported a fresh west-south-west wind and rain. He declared his intention of getting under weigh at seven a.m. Dr Crane accordingly left the *Gazelle* to return to Paris, taking with him some messages from the Empress to her personal friends. A little after seven o'clock the *Gazelle* was clear of the harbour and laid her course for Southampton. The weather was thick with rain and the sea was moderate to rather rough, but the wind was fair, and the yacht carried her spinnaker in addition to whole mainsail and second jib. A white ensign flew from the masthead and another from the peak, 'to show that we had someone of importance on board.' Up till noon there was every promise of a speedy crossing, but about one p.m. the wind shifted to almost dead ahead and increased in force. The spinnaker was taken in, the mainsail was reefed, the second jib was shifted for the storm-jib, and everything was got ready for a thrash to windward. Various stories are in existence as to episodes which are alleged to have occurred on the voyage. According to the account of Dr Evans, the owner of the *Gazelle* raised the question of putting back, to be met by expostulation from the American, 'who insisted that we ought to trust in Providence.' Sir John Burgoyne has no mention of this occurrence, and indeed makes it clear that by this time the American dentist was in no condition to insist on anything at all. According to another dramatic account, later Sir John rushed into the cabin, cried 'All is lost!' and disappeared again on deck. Sir John Burgoyne had been a soldier and was a very experienced yachtsman; the legend carries its own refutation, but it is of interest as showing the traditional French 'Nous sommes trahis'

done into English. We have it on the authority of Sir John Burgoyne that the sea was not really high until the English coast was approached, but then conditions became most unpleasant, and he has put on record that in all his yachting experience he had never met a worse sea During the night it was decided to heave-to until the force of the west-going tide had been spent The vessel was battened down and a canvas covering was secured over the cabin skylight A good deal of water was taken on board, but the *Gazelle* behaved splendidly, and, the weather beginning to improve after midnight she reached Ryde Roads in safety and dropped anchor about four a m on September 8

There the Empress landed and went to the York Hotel By the bed in her room was a Bible, and on opening it her eyes fell on the words 'The Lord is my Shepherd I shall not want He maketh me to lie down in green pastures, He leadeth me beside the still waters' From Ryde the Empress hurried to Hastings to meet the young Prince Imperial, who from northern France, had been brought to England by way of Belgium The waters of calamity had closed over the head of the unfortunate Eugénie But in her surging sea of sorrow she had yet one spar to cling to, in the person of her son In him the star of the Bonapartes might once more shine How that spar was wrenched from her grasp how that star sank for ever in the waters of the Ityotyosi, was told two years ago in the pages of this Review [1]

F E WHITTON

[1] The Death of the Prince Imperial (*Nineteenth Century and After* June 1928).

STALKS OF SORTS

I

THE stalking of the deer—that is the theme. Why not the stalking of the ibex, the markhor or the ovis ammon, with its exhilarating accompaniment of snowy mountain-peaks, rock-climbing and dangerous traverses? Simply because I have never had the opportunity of doing it. Why not of the elephant, the buffalo, the bison or the tiger? Because so extensive a survey would fill many pages and might well over-tax the editor's patience and the reader's credulity. Let us therefore confine ourselves to the stag. His pursuit is a noble sport and offers a satisfying variety. I am told that nowadays it is considered rather dull and is less popular than formerly. I am told also that it is wrong, that it merely encourages atavistic and bloodthirsty propensities, and that, if you want to stalk, you should do it with a camera and not with a rifle. I give all honour to the camera; its use involves courage and dexterity; its results afford pleasure, instruction, and the stir of romance to thousands who cannot have personal knowledge of the charm of the wild, who are doomed to toil in cities grey 'with no lance broken in life's tournament.' I freely confess to the old Adam in my blood; I am very, very wicked. But I plead at least some extenuating circumstances. My murderous habits were formed before the lens was perfected for the taking of animal pictures. For years my gun and rifle were the means of providing fresh meat for my camp-followers and myself. Even now, when I live in civilisation, the Highland farmer blesses me for keeping down the predatory herds; and he and the villagers enjoy the venison. May I add a more general defence? Stalking is one of the severest and most ascetic forms of recreation. It involves great exertion, long exposure to tropical heat or to bitter cold, endless waiting in clouds of midges or in wet clothes and a cutting wind, painful crawls, blank days and cruel disappointments. If it appeals to some of the evil in us, it also exercises certain virtues—endurance, patience and fortitude in misfortune; and it promotes bodily fitness. Let it be added that the true sportsman is humane; he shoots to kill

dead, not to wound; and, rather than chance probable disablement of his quarry, he will forgo his shot.

I am going to speak of three sorts of stalking—two done in India, the third in Scotland. The first is not stalking in quite the usual sense of the word It is the pursuit of deer who make the depth of the jungle their habitat Such are the mighty sambar (*Rusa aristotelis* or *unicolor*), who stands 13 to 14 hands and whose antlers may measure 40 or even 50 inches from base to tip of tine; and the beautiful chetel or Indian spotted deer (*Axis maculatus*) These beasts leave their shadowy haunts only for night feeding on neighbouring crops You may manage a sort of stalk by heading them off while they are returning to the jungle in that magic hour 'when light and darkness passing greet and vigil parts from slumber' I have got both species that way, but it is a bit of a chance. The other and more usual methods of hunting them are to have the deer driven or to go and look for them in the forest Now driving deer in a jungle is poor sport You may, it is true, have the opportunity of displaying your skill in a difficult running shot, and then you are as likely as not to wound On the other hand, the stag may walk up quietly and stand close to where you are concealed behind a bush or perched on a tree In neither case does the element of stalking enter at all, you are not pitting your own powers against the animal's In the latter case you simply cannot find it in your heart to shoot I have known a sambar stag come so near to me in a tiger beat that I could have touched him with the end of my rifle. I therefore say nothing about driving, but confine myself to the second method Nor is even this method true stalking, rather it is a sort of silent hunting But it calls for patience and perseverance, sharpens the eyes and the wits, and is invaluable as an education in forest-lore

How many an afternoon did I waste, when I was a 'griffin,' trapesing through miles of woodland in hope of sighting game! Vain hope. The game was often there—close at hand perhaps, but screened by a clump of bamboos, or blending so subtly with the lights and shadows beneath the trees that I saw nothing till too late. My foot might light on a dry teak leaf, my solah-topee might obtrude beyond the corner of a bush. Crash! In a moment the animal is gone I hear the sound of his going, but can see nothing Even in his haste he seems to keep cover behind tree trunk or brushwood, just as a flushed woodcock will flicker behind boughs. I return tired and empty-handed

Then one day I am in camp with H, a mighty and experienced hunter, the slayer of a hundred tigers The forest is renowned as a favourite haunt of chetel. It is the cold weather, and we sally forth at 2 p.m. Not long after I start I observe the crack of a

rifle behind me. When I have tramped many miles, heard twice or thrice the stampede of startled beasts, and effected nothing, I turn my steps campwards. It has long been dark before I see the light of the fires and hear the murmur of the servants as they prepare dinner. As I approach the tents I behold H. wrapped in a topcoat and comfortably seated before a wood fire. 'Well! what luck?' 'Nothing seen,' I reply disconsolately, as I sink into a folding armchair beside him. 'But I thought I heard *you* shoot.' The old fellow jerks his thumb to one side. I follow the direction with my eyes. There, under the trees, two or three men are busy skinning a stag. 'Not a bad chetel,' says H. 'I haven't measured, but I'd give the horns 36 inches. And where have you been?' To the best of my ability I describe my peregrinations. 'Humph!' says H. 'You've had some stroll! I got my stag within forty minutes of leaving the camp, and I've been back a couple of hours, had a tub and toasted my toes. Now I'll tell you:'

No good just stravaiging through the jungle. Haven't the beasts got eyes and ears? What chance have you against them in this thick stuff? They're listening to you or watching you before you've a ghost of a notion they're there. Look here, my boy, your one chance in heavy jungle is to *be* an animal—pretend to be, I mean. Don't attempt to cover more than a couple of miles. This afternoon you've walked eight at least. But you've walked 'em just anyhow. You're far more likely to see things if you walk two miles properly. I'll bet you there are stags at this moment within 500 yards of our tents. Go very slow. Always hide behind a tree or a bush. Stop where you are till you've examined everything all round you. Don't let a blade of grass or a leaf escape you. When you're sure there's nothing in sight, fix on another piece of cover; it mustn't be more than 3 or 4 yards from you. Get to it in three paces, making all the noise you can with your feet. That's how a stag walks. Long pause; three steps. Another pause; another three steps. So you go on, and that way you don't scare the animals. And at last, if you keep your eyes skinned, you'll see the flick of an ear or the point of a tine sticking out among the leaves. Don't hurry then. Maybe you can't see his body and have to judge how he's standing and where the point of his shoulder should be. After that you've got to get your rifle up to your shoulder very, very gently. Then——

'Bath ready, sahib,' says the bearer. I go and wallow, pondering this advice; and then, and thereafter, I find it good. It is slow, laborious work at first. But the interest soon predominates. It is not merely looking for game. It sets you to learning the trees of the jungle, by careful scrutiny appreciating the beauty of their forms and foliage, their lights and shadows, discovering a thousand things which casual observation would never disclose. It sharpens the eyesight and the instincts which we possess but too little use. It is an initiation into the secret rites of the forest.

II

The end of May—the fiercest season of the Indian year, but a good time for sport, and there are two or three of us who realise that ten days' change from files and red roads and dust and stuffy bungalows is essential for the health of our souls and bodies. Four of those ten days will be consumed in the journey to and from a certain beloved valley. For the valley is 100 miles away—100 miles which we partly drive, partly ride, through leafless jungles winnowed by a burning wind and here and there crackling with forest fires But we are content, for, as we go, we see before us, drawing ever nearer, the delectable hills in which our valley lies They are low hills, flat-topped and tree-clad—not particularly inviting at a distance, but we know the beauties and delights which they hide among their folds. Those hills are a continuation of the tract immortalised in *The Jungle Book*, but they are even wilder than the headquarters of the Seeonee pack, more remote from the haunts of men, more frequented by the beasts of the forest, more fully obedient to the jungle law Shere Khan and Baloo (plenty of them) will be there waiting for us, and maybe Bagheera, though Bagheera is rather a rare specimen, being (so the naturalists tell us) just an occasional freak There will be lots of other notorious characters, too; the only people we must definitely expect not to meet are Kala Nag and his family, somehow they do not care to visit in this neighbourhood But we are not specially concerned with any of these. True, if Shere Khan comes along, we shall take a crack at him. But our main objective is the stalking of the deer

It is the evening of the second day. For some time our path has inclined upwards We reach the summit of a low ridge, which runs round like the rim of a giant cup We rein-in our horses and gaze down into that upland valley, where the foot of man seldom intrudes, a sanctuary isolated from the world by the circle of hills and by many miles of rough forest The level rays of the setting sun light up the glistening foliage of the sâl trees and the great open spaces of grey grass Here, in these sequestered glades, there is real stalking to be had They are the haunt of the swamp-deer (*Rucervus duvaucelii*) In some respects he resembles our red deer. A full-grown stag stands 11½ hands, a good pair of antlers bears 12 tines though I have shot several with 14 But the chief point about these deer is that they frequent the open glades and couch in the grass rather than in the depths of the forest Hence you can mark your quarry and arrange a stalk It may almost be said that the swamp-deer is the only large deer found on the plains of India which you can consistently stalk [1]

[1] The nilgai is found in grass as well as jungle In the more open country or

Of course the sport afforded by the swamp-deer differs in many ways from stalking in Scotland. The surroundings, though beautiful enough, lack the majesty of the mountains. The approach to your game will not be planned along a steep hillside where you crawl through ravines, burns and 'slacks.' Here you have an undulating plain, and you will find good cover behind the strands of taller grass. While the means of approach are therefore easier than in the Highlands, the risk, should you be seen, is greater, and the utmost care must be taken not to expose yourself for a moment nor to make any sound Swamp-deer (and the same may be said of sambar and chetel) depend far more than do red deer upon sight On the controversial question of scent I will say only this. While it is definitely asserted by some competent authorities that the Indian species of deer, as also other creatures, such as the tiger, and most particularly the bison, cannot be approached down wind, I have in all cases found the contrary The only beast in India which I can say with assurance has scented me is the elephant I have crawled into the middle of a large herd of bison, who remained quite unconscious of my presence till I fired , and I have several times come down wind upon a solitary bull and lain watching within 100 yards for some minutes I commenced stalking swamp-deer under the impression that it is essential to work up wind But when I had, by pure chance, come down wind upon herds in long grass and found them undisturbed, I cast wind to the winds, and have never known its direction make any difference in the success or failure of a stalk I shall be told that I am all wrong , but one can only give his experiences

Night has descended on our valley We sit out under the quiet stars, drink in the peace of the forest, and ponder on to-morrow's sport The tall sâl trees stand motionless around us, their slender shapes clear-cut against the tropic sky As night deepens the life of the jungle awakes Mysterious sounds steal upon our ears ; a furtive padding—it may be an inquisitive panther reconnoitring our camp , the startled cry of a hind ; the distant 'conk' of a tiger seeking his prey But it is time for us to sleep ; we must be up before the dawn, and our camp beds have already been set out in the clearing

When we mount our horses next morning there is as yet no sign of sunrise Each of us, accompanied by one or two trackers, makes his way to that part of the forest which, by mutual consent, has been assigned to him The sky lightens , a bird awakes and sings No, it is only the false dawn ; darkness closes down again , the bird discovers his mistake and returns to sleep. At

in fields the black buck, the *four horned* antelope, and the chinkâra can be stalked But these are of the antelope or of the gazelle tribe, not of the genus *cervus*.

last a pale grey tinges the east; the girdle of night, a clearly defined band of leaden luridness, narrows and sinks into the western horizon. I dismount and take counsel with Phaganu. He is a delightful aborigine—courageous, humorous, unspoiled, unwashed, almost unclad. We direct the syce to take the horse to a clump of trees where they will be hidden, and we ourselves move forward warily, while the dark foliage turns to brilliant green and subdued tones waken along the strands of grass. We come to the edge of a glade. It is a likely spot. I clutch the branch of a tree, swing myself up, and scan the glade with my binoculars. Yes, there is a herd. A stag is grazing. Two hinds are with him, alternately browsing and keeping watch. Other hinds and young stags are lying near; their heads move, their ears flick; they will have to be reckoned with. The stag is good enough—a 12-pointer. I scramble down; in a whisper I tell what I have seen.

At this point there arises another great difference between stalking in India and the pursuit of the red deer. A defect of the latter is that, unless you have long experience of the terrain, you are too much in the hands of the stalker, who knows all the folds and crevices of the hills. Here, on the other hand, I am master of my own destiny. It is I who have spied out the land and now arrange the campaign. A whispered confabulation with Phaganu, in which I unfold my plans. Then I crawl forward alone. For the most part the herbage is thin, crisp and short—perhaps 1 foot in height. Then comes a long narrow patch of rank stuff, the thick stems measuring 4 to 6 feet high. Probably the ground beneath the more luxuriant growth retains some moisture, for this hill-engirdled valley is the source of many streams. It may, of course, happen that the stag is surrounded on all sides by the former sort of grass. In that case, especially if the natural way of approach is down a 'falling lie,' one must take a long shot. But, with any luck and some careful steering, you should be able, by pulling yourself along through the taller grass, to get within easy range. The two dangers which beset you are the possible presence of a hind couching in, or at the very edge of, one of the strands of long grass which you use as cover; and, when you take your shot, the grass itself. There is something very deceptive in sighting through grass; the presence of blades sticking up on either side of the barrel and slightly overhanging it has the effect of producing a tendency to shoot high.

On this occasion all has gone well. The stag falls, instantaneously killed by a bullet just behind the point of the shoulder. The hinds and younger stags stand and gaze for a moment, then scamper off. The sound of the shot brings Phaganu crawling up behind with my second rifle. (It is prudent in these forests, where anything may happen, to carry two rifles with you, a light one

and a heavy one, and invariably to have one of them in your own hands.) 'Good bullet!' says Phaganu as he examines the mark; and, while I estimate the length of antler, he calculates the amount of meat which, when the stag has been borne to the camp, he will dry in strips upon a neighbouring tree and convert into biltong for future use. Then he looks up at me with a smile. 'We shall eat this when the rains come. But we are hungry and want food *now*. If the sahib should start a sounder this evening and shoot us a fat boar, we could eat it at once.'

Perhaps, however, we are not so lucky, sight no good stag, and find ourselves, by 8 a.m., still empty-handed and far from home. It is useless to stalk after that hour in the hot weather; the deer are invisible, couched under the long grass, and the heat is overwhelming. In that case a frugal meal of sandwiches and cold tea, and we go to sleep under a tree till 3 p.m., when stalking can begin again. Maybe we spend the night also sleeping on the ground, our mattresses dead leaves and herbage. It is this free life, the bivouac in some quiet glade, the opportunities of watching the animal life around you, that make up more than half the fascination of these expeditions. How many a pleasant day and night have I spent in these jungles without firing a shot—the sound and sight of beasts about us, the waking in the brief freshness before dawn! It is then that we may see Baloo busy devouring the luscious blossoms that have fallen from the mahua tree during the hours of dark, or the back of Shere Khan himself as he glides like a snake of clouded amber hue down the grassy slope of a nulla. I remember how, one evening when I was prowling about without intending a stalk, I crawled up among some rocks overhanging a stream which still harboured a few pools of water. Long time I lay there and watched the creatures drinking just below me, fourteen of them I counted—three kinds of deer and a small bison all fraternising together. When I thought they had drunk as much as was good for them I stood upright. For a moment they all stared at me in aggrieved surprise; then the little bison said 'grumph,' threw up his tail, and bolted, and the others followed his example.

III

And now Scotland. How different the scene! Here are no deep glades, no lines of shimmering foliage, no devastating heat. Instead a keen air, treeless mountain-tops, an endless tumble of hills and lochs below, raven, peregrine and eagle circling overhead. Nor is the sport the same. Here your stalker may do more for you than you like. But Duncan is an admirable companion on the hillside. He is long-limbed, lithe and, despite honourable

wounds got with Lovat's Scouts, untiring. And he is a true child of the mountains, revelling in a long day among their crags.

Many years had passed since my last shoot in Indian jungles when I began stalking the red deer. At first I was inclined to be scornful. The creatures seemed to regard my form (viewed at a reasonable distance) with indifference, and I felt inclined to complain, with Alexander Selkirk, that 'their tameness is shocking to me.' I was wrong. You may, subject to certain limitations, of which more anon, take liberties in respect of sight which you could never take with Indian deer. But the red deer has another sense which makes his pursuit far more difficult. It is almost impossible to believe that the stag on yonder hill invisible to the naked eye and, even through the spy-glass, a mere suggestion, will scent us, if a fresh wind is blowing across the two miles that lie between. Yet so it is. Therefore (and here, perhaps because I am a tiro at this form of sport and hence conceited and prone to the laying down of maxims I am going to become tiresomely pedagogic), if there are two ways of approaching a red deer, one of which may give him your wind and the other exposes you to view, unhesitatingly choose the latter even if it involves many miles round and a severe climb. This is an absolutely elementary maxim. The second maxim is not so simple. It is necessary to judge the direction of the wind not only where you are but also where the stag is. In these deep gusty corries it is often not the same. Let me illustrate this point by an occurrence which once befell me, and incidentally shows that the man with the gun need not always be entirely passive in the stalk and that Duncan is no tyrant. We were going up a glorious valley which looks down on one of Scotland's loveliest lochs and is overshadowed by one of her biggest Bens. The way up the valley runs from west to east, and from the east a bright wind is blowing. There is no mistake about it, the little white clouds race to meet us and pass on to cast deep azure shadows on the loch below. We sight two stags and three hinds high up on the hillside to the north. After a long ascent and a painful crawl among jagged rocks we find our way blocked by sheep. Mountain sheep are a terror to the stalker, they are as wild as the deer, and, if they spot you will tear away with a sort of snorting sneeze and give the alarm to any herd in the neighbourhood. We creep hither and thither among those rocks, seeking to elude the sheep. The best we can do is to get to a position where the less desirable of the two stags is visible about 300 yards away, the others are invisible in a deep gully which lies between. An awkward shot; and we both agree that it should not be risked. So we lie watching and waiting. Then suddenly down the hillside above the herd comes a sheep racing. (We discovered afterwards that a party were ascending the big

Ben, and they must have disturbed the sheep.) Off go the herd down the valley, and do not pause till they come to a bend in the hillside about two miles away. We wait to see them disappear round that bend before we stir. Of course, a wary old hind constitutes herself a rearguard, stays at the corner looking back, and will not get out of our view But at last our patience is rewarded. The herd turn left and disappear into the depths of the valley. It is certain that they will not seek the lower ground ; therefore they will probably make their way back up the valley. I suggest descending and cutting them off Duncan dissents ; we shall be to the east of them and they will get our wind This is where the humble man with the gun comes in I had noticed, as we ascended the valley, that the wind at the bottom of it was blowing from west to east—in a direction exactly opposite to the prevailing current I get my way We move cautiously down the mountain-side I crawl forward to a rocky knoll, and am just in time to shoot the bigger of the stags as he passes the foot of a precipitous slope below

So much for scent I am going to inflict on the reader two other maxims which have to do with sight Here also I have been profoundly struck by the difference between the instincts of the Indian and the Highland deer You can take liberties with the red deer which would be fatal with the swamp-deer My third maxim is this if a red deer comes suddenly into sight, never attempt to crouch or hide , stand stock-still There is a good chance that, blending as you do (if you are suitably clad) with your surroundings, you will not be observed The fourth is to approach your quarry if possible, from above but to avoid the skyline The deer keep a lookout on the ground below and on the skyline above , they are curiously unobservant of objects between themselves and the skyline Another anecdote in illustration of this I once spent a whole day zigzagging along the steep face of a glen in a vain endeavour to circumvent a small herd consisting of two old stags and four little ones Once I had got within range But the shot was a difficult one, through rather tall grass. Duncan dissuaded me from it and signed to me to crawl backwards and come up again to a point only half a dozen yards away whence I could get a clearer aim I crawled back unskilfully and ruined the stalk I might add, as a fifth and minor maxim, do not crawl backwards if you can possibly avoid it You can keep your head down quite easily , and, like the proverbial ostrich, you think you are hidden But retrogression has a fatal way of exalting the hinder portions of your anatomy, the merest glimpse of which above the ridge or clump of heather where you are hiding seems to arouse the liveliest apprehensions in the cervine breast Off went the herd, leaving us

tired and disconsolate. We continued our search; but they would not settle, and, whenever we got a sight of them, there were the wretched sheep between, or the approach was impossible for some other reason. Finally, from high up the mountain-side, we saw them far below, and at last they were beginning to browse. The slope between them and us was steep and perfectly bare—scree mixed with thin, short grass. It looked hopeless—to *me* utterly hopeless. Then said Duncan, 'Let's chance it.' We started on our backs down the slope, working ourselves along with our elbows and lying quite flat against the surface of the ground. Our eyes were glued on the six stags below us, and, whenever any one of them lifted his head, we lay motionless till he had begun to crop again. This painful mode of progression lasted, as I afterwards discovered from my watch, three-quarters of an hour, during which we were in full sight of the herd, but *not* on the skyline, and that which was visible of us must have blended with the background. When we found that we could go no further without certain discovery my coat had transferred itself to the back of my head, my arms were bare, my elbows were bleeding. But we were not more than 150 yards from the stags. A tiny platform presented itself on my left; I let myself tumble on to the platform, waited till I was steady, and dropped one of the old stags.

Of course there are many other things to learn about stalking—the equipment, the battery, the precautions to be taken when firing from among rocks or firing downhill or uphill. I have touched on only a few elementary points regarding the stalk itself. For the stalk's the thing! It is the stalk that really pits you against your prey, calls out your powers of observation and resourcefulness and makes you 'go all out'—no circuit too long, no hillside too steep, no crawl too laborious. And in the intervals between concentrated energy and absorbing thrill, when you can rest your limbs and let your eyes rove, then the senses reawaken with surprised delight to the pomp of the prospect, the solemnity of the mountains, the far-flung panorama below, the isolation from all sound save the music of the burn, from all life save the four-footed denizens of the hills and yon eagle that sails out over the glen.

September is upon us. The antlers are almost clean. The showers of August are over. The pearly strands of mist will be lifting from the mountains. Already in anticipation I see the green slopes, the grey screes, the soaring crags. And what are those globes of vapour, like tiny puffs of shrapnel, that break out along the hillside and gleam iridescent in the sunshine? It is the great stags shaking the moisture from their coats. So, to all who love the Highlands and their finest sport, big stags, straight rifles and, above all, long stalks!

H. Sharp.

EUGENICAL REFORM

II THE DEMOCRACY

To reform democracy on eugenical lines will seem to many as fantastic an undertaking as to reform the House of Lords for is it not part of the democratic creed that all men are born free and equal? And is it not a vital part of the meaning of 'eugenics' that some are *better born* than others? To which it may be replied that no doubt if creeds were construed literally and acted on, the task would be hopeless, but fortunately this is no longer usual. Moreover, the democratic creed, in particular, is far from watertight, and still further from agreement with the facts of politics. So we should not be surprised to find that it falls short of absolutely excluding all hope of eugenical reform, for three good and sufficient reasons.

I

In the first place, not all democracies in name are democracies in fact. Because a State is officially denominated a democracy it by no means follows that the will of the people always and in all respects controls it and determines the course of national history. In all democracies that have ever existed there have been provided checks in practice upon the whims of the 'sovereign people' and the theoretical 'omnipotence of Parliament' Thus, as was shown in the preceding article, our modern democracies all have in them a strong infusion of plutocracy, which may easily reduce democracy to a mere *façade*

Again, unlike ancient, modern democracies all employ bureaucracies, and so far have capitulated to the demand (first urged by Socrates) for expert government. Now bureaucracy is quite as potent and insidious an enemy to the freedom and equality of ideal democracy as plutocracy itself. It is practically inevitable in all large-scale government. It can insinuate itself into all institutions and govern in their name. For it can exploit the human weaknesses of the depositaries of power, and it is only when a bureaucracy has long been allowed to rule unchecked and uncontrolled that it grows stupid, and forgets the arts of expert

government, as did the great bureaucracies of Austria, Germany, and Russia, which came to grief in the World War. It is true that in a 'democracy' also the bureaucrats are servants, theoretically, and not masters. From long experience, however, they have become past masters in the art of guiding, and hoodwinking, the rulers from whom they are supposed to take their orders.

Their power rests on the psychological fact that only great intelligence, coupled with perpetual vigilance and unwearying attention to detail, can compel an organised body of officials to carry out a policy they dislike, and prevent them from administering *any* political system in the manner most convenient to themselves. If the ruler is an 'autocrat' (whether a pope, a tsar or a dictator) who desires to know what is actually being done in his name, it is easy to wear him out by making him read all the documents to which his name is to be attached and taking good care to break his teeth and blunt his zeal on plenty of *routine* stuff before showing him anything of critical importance, which can best be slipped in at the end of a tiring day. If he is a politician presiding over a Government office who hesitates to take the advice tendered him by his permanent officials, any trace of laziness, ignorance, or preoccupation with other matters he may show can at once be exploited to his discomfiture.[1] Normally therefore, and in the long run, the permanent officials and the traditions of the office get the better of their nominal superiors, who discover that they are Gullivers securely tied up with red tape by their Lilliputian advisers, and that acquiescence is the way of ease and security. So far as bureaucracy has its way the ultimate ruler will always be found to be the master of pigeon-holes, who knows where every document is kept, and has the routine of the office at his fingers' ends.

If, lastly, the victim of professional skill is the sovereign people itself, and the politicians are the 'experts' deputed to ascertain its will, recourse may be had to many methods of deception. Bribery and corruption, promises and threats, excitants and dopes, are freely used, until such mind as the public has is thrown into utter confusion. The politicians in office have a great initial advantage; they have it in their power to appeal to the people at the time and on the issues that best suit themselves. But this advantage is often more than counterbalanced by the people's grim determination at all costs to oust the party in power and the ever-reviving hope that the Opposition may do better. So the art of engineering a general election becomes on the part of the Government an art of obtaining by false pretences

[1] This appears to have been the inner or office history of the notorious Zinovieff Letter, by means of which the first Ramsay MacDonald Government was beguiled into committing suicide.

a blank cheque to govern for another term, on the part of the Opposition an art of confusing the issue by abundant trails of succulent red herrings.

Even if democracy has been carried to the pitch of allowing direct consultation of the people by means of the referendum, the same principles still hold. It is quite easy to surfeit the sovereign people with this exercise of power by continually referring to it trivial or complicated issues until the masses weary of voting on them, and the expedient is discredited because the politicians can plausibly allege that the referendum is not wanted. This is the exact analogue of the device of stuffing an autocrat with unimportant documents. The whole *modus operandi* of bamboozling a democracy was of course discovered long ago, by the Greeks, and modern methods of electioneering, Press manipulation, etc., have not modified the essential principle of distracting public attention from what it is desired to keep secret by attracting it to something trivial which is calculated to engross it. It is best illustrated by the story of the Molossian hound with which Alcibiades amused the Athenians while he was conducting negotiations that would not bear the light of day.

II

Plutocracy and bureaucracy, then, can always be trusted to put sufficient grit into the wheels of democracy's chariot to prevent them from making too many revolutions. Both these political forces, however, presuppose that the masses are mostly fools or snobs; and this is not altogether true. Not all democrats are utterly impervious to the lessons of science and common sense. It is not impossible, therefore, that sooner or later they may take alarm at the dreadfully dysgenical trend of our civilisation and may give their consent, and even support, to the eugenical measures designed to cure it.

If we proceed to ask in what places democracy may soonest feel the pinch of its dysgenical ordering, we at once encounter three serious problems.

III

In the first place, what is to be done about the survival of the unfit which is tolerated, supported, and stimulated by our present institutions? Is nothing to be done to arrest the proliferation of the feeble-minded and defectives, and the growth and dissemination of insanity? At present civilised societies are doing practically nothing to prevent the deterioration of their germ plasm by the free breeding of the most undesirable sections of their population. So far from being restricted, it is encouraged in a variety

of ways, and financed by the progressive taxation of the classes into which the ability, energy, and industry of a society are more and more enabled to rise. Under this taxation, and other impediments to reproduction which social institutions foster, the classes in which the cream accumulates are more and more rapidly dying out. Thus civilised society is sterilising its ability and extirpating its good stocks, while artificially multiplying its bad ones.

There is no end in sight to this suicidal process, but it is clear that it cannot continue indefinitely. For the breeding and supporting of lunatics and 'morons' is an expensive process, which must more and more absorb all the resources and energies of a society which persists in it, and must end in catastrophe.

So long as democracies are not entirely manned by feeble-minded fools the impossibility of this policy is bound to become apparent. Sensible and hard-working democrats will then revolt against supporting idlers, wasters, and morons in ever-growing numbers at the public expense, which they will more and more understand to be at their own. Perhaps they will begin by eliminating first the idle rich, the froth at the top, before attacking the dregs at the bottom of the social mixture, the 'submerged tenth' and unemployables; but it is hard to believe that the workers can have much love for any sort of drones.

Accordingly, as Mr Henry Sturt has suggested,[2] we need not fear that a Labour Government, animated by trade union principles, will deal too tenderly with the defectives. We may expect rather that their proliferation would speedily be stopped, whether by segregation or by sterilisation, drastically and even ruthlessly. For Labour sentiment would be free from two pernicious delusions which have often affected capitalistic legislation. It would not demand plenty of cheap labour, and it would not believe that anyone was good enough to fight and therefore insist on superabundant cannon fodder. It may be freer also from the stupid conservatism which cannot see the need for new adjustments. So it may even prove that democracies will be readier to listen to the case for eugenics than capitalist plutocracies.

IV

Secondly, the willingness to do something eugenical will be enhanced as the grim spectre of *over-population* comes nearer and nearer. It may not yet be true that Western Europe is as tragically over-populated as China, and that its numbers can be limited only by starvation. But there is little doubt that its population has already far exceeded the *optimum*, and that its

[2] *Socialism and Character*, ch. vi.

growing numbers are supported with increasing difficulty under the law of diminishing returns. No doubt Europe's economic troubles are partly due to its political fatuity in cutting itself up into small areas shut up in lofty tariff walls, and so artificially reducing its production and the efficiency of its industry. But still the fact remains that Europe cannot feed the population it has with the food it can produce To make a living, therefore, it *has* to manufacture for export to the countries which can still produce a surplus of foodstuffs and raw materials But as the population of these countries rises their surplus must diminish, and moreover, under the influence of the same morbid nationalism that is devastating Europe, they, too, are rapidly establishing manufactures and tariff walls to render themselves independent of European imports The export trade of Europe therefore seems destined to diminish, and with it the population Europe can support

But this process might be indefinitely delayed if Europe could contrive to breed *better men*, and to keep them employed at home At present it probably still has some advantage in the *quality* of its population As compared with the non-European stocks the European is still superior, not intrinsically, perhaps, so much as in social organisation and cultural tradition However, the peoples which most nearly approach European standards of efficiency, the Japanese and the Chinese, suffer even more than we do from population pressure, and it seems an open question whether they are losing more by malnutrition of their masses or gaining more by the more extensive elimination of the unfit under their social conditions Probably the adoption of a eugenic policy by either party would prove to be the decisive factor in the struggle for existence of the European and the Mongolian race

As compared with the colonists sent out from Europe to America, Australia, and Africa, the advantage of the European is probably very slight Doubtless Europe at *no* time exported its very best stocks, which could always rise to pre-eminence at home ; but in the early days of European colonisation it certainly exported a large proportion of its more enterprising and energetic types Also under the early colonial conditions it was more difficult to make good in the new countries, and so natural selection was much severer So weaklings and incompetents of all sorts were eliminated much more ruthlessly, and a comparatively high degree of personal efficiency resulted. Then came a period in which the colonies grew most anxious to import labour, and usually *cheap* labour ; so they naturally obtained an inferior sort of immigrant who was willing to do the hard and dirty work the descendants of the first colonists now disdained, and this *lowered* the quality of the population The United States of America

conspicuously pursued this policy throughout the nineteenth century, while Australia kept out immigrants in order to keep up wages. America had her reward in her prodigious economic development, but at the cost of a terrible adulteration of her population, which may yet prove to have been her bane. At any rate, it has filled America with a very mixed crowd, and has reduced the old English stock to an upper stratum, and one, moreover, which is rapidly thinning out and seems doomed to disappear. As regards the future, America has now closed her frontiers to further mass immigration from Europe (though not as yet from Mexico and the Philippines), and the character of her immigration is therefore bound to change. It *may*, however, change greatly for the better. For her financial preponderance puts her in a position to attract whatever European talent she desires. She can drain any ability she may covet among the professional classes of Europe by the offer of more money and a bigger career. In other words, she can buy the best men as she can buy the best works of art, if she chooses. On the other hand, she is likely to *export* to Europe an ever larger proportion of her idle rich and an ever-increasing flood of tourists, for only so will she be able to spend the income on her European investments, so long as she refuses to take payment in manufactured articles. Europe will thus lose professional ability and be turned more and more into a pleasure resort. This of course will be demoralising, and in the long run hardly to the advantage of the European stocks.

The best policy for Europe to pursue, the only hope of staving off stagnation and degeneracy, would therefore seem to be to augment the intrinsic efficiency of the European [illegible]. Only by excising sternly all the traces of dry rot in the social structure, all the superfluities of naughtiness will European man be able to maintain himself or even to survive. We must get rid, therefore, of our unproductive and parasitic classes, alike of the idle rich and of the unemployables, and stimulate the rest to more and more efficiency. The loss of these parasites may no doubt entail a certain loss in numbers, but the loss in quantity will be so amply compensated by the gain in quality that the volume of production will not suffer. And a smaller, less dense, but better paid and more efficient, population will be far better situated to enjoy the amenities of life than the denizens of our crowded city slums.

This is surely a development that might be welcomed by the leaders of our workers. For though not egalitarian, it may fairly be contended that it would be truly democratic. It would afford to all an opportunity to lead a life worth living, and to rise in the social scale according to the measure of their congenital capacity; from all, also, it would exact some useful social service.

V

The same policy would seem to be indicated also by another consideration. Hitherto European labour policies have aimed mainly at limiting the hours and the intensity of labour, in order to relieve the cruel pressure of undue competition. Thus the efficient, with a fine *esprit de corps*, have sacrificed themselves to save the lame ducks They have thereby greatly limited the output and the productivity of labour; yet they have woefully failed to limit competition, because they have not limited the supply of labour. This has always been in excess, and has enabled the greedy capitalist to cut down the rates of pay when his labour seemed to him to grow too efficient Hence no really prosperous class of workers could arise

But there is a possible alternative, which has been elaborated in America and to which its industrial success seems to be largely due. It is to limit the *supply* of labour, while increasing its efficiency. If labour is made scarce and dear, it must be made efficient, for inefficient labour is not worth the high wages that are paid. Hence the cutting off or diminution of the supply of inefficient labour would directly raise the wages of efficient labour, which could then attain and maintain an altogether higher standard of life The workers would no longer be dragged down by the masses of inefficient casual labour which does not limit its reproduction and fills the asylums and floods the labour market with defectives It can hardly be doubted, therefore, that if this class could be stopped from proliferating so much faster than the better workers the conditions of labour could be enormously improved.

VI

An incidental result might be to arrest the growth of population, or even to turn it into a slight decline The cry of depopulation would then be raised, as it has so often been by panic-stricken militarists These have long been accustomed to bewail the 'growing depopulation' of France, although before the war the actual figures showed an increase which averaged 50,000 a year, and although at present the French birth rate is two per thousand above our own The alarmists infer that in a few years a decline of population must set in and continue into irretrievable decay; but they fail to understand that the decline of the birth rate is a reaction to our present overcrowding and unemployment, and means a blind and unscientific attempt of popular intelligence to reach an *optimum* of population. It may well coexist with a potential increase which will be realised so soon as a sufficient improvement is brought about in the conditions of life.

VII

We may take it, then, that these two problems, the proliferation of defectives and over-population, will drive intelligent democracies into eugenical policies. At first sight, however, both these problems seem to call for measures only of negative rather than of positive eugenics—that is, for measures to purify the national stock, and to rid it of defective elements, rather than to raise it to a higher level. In the main this objection would be true, though incidentally the intenser struggle to live in which Europe would be involved would put a premium on a development of higher types which even the most *doctrinaire* democracy could hardly afford to arrest as too aristocratic. There is, however, a third stimulus to eugenics, now pressing upon European democracies, which is definitely aristocratic in tendency and definitely favours *positive* eugenics. This is the competition between European and coloured labour.

This competition is rapidly becoming world-wide, though its effects are not yet felt as intensely as they will be when the masses of Asia, in India, China and Japan, are fully industrialised. At present there is still a great contrast between European and coloured labour. Broadly speaking, the former is better paid, better housed, and better fed. Moreover, the European worker is, pretty obviously, *the better man*. He is, in short, the *aristocrat* of the labour world.

But his position is far from secure. It is being undermined by the short-sighted and unscrupulous capitalists who are industrialising the East. They have already had a large measure of success. The manufacture of jute has already passed from Dundee to Calcutta, and Lancashire is fighting a losing battle to retain that of cotton against Bombay, Shanghai, and Japan. The demand for cheap labour never ceases, and, despite many object-lessons to the contrary, the business man is still ready to believe that the cheapest labour is that of the cheapest man.

So there is no encouragement to the production of better work by better men. Wherever white labour competes with coloured, the latter gains, and drives the former out of business. The white man becomes too proud to work. He leaves the dirty, hard, and low-grade work to his inferiors. He merely oversees, guides and controls.

So soon as he does this he gets into the deadly clutches of Gresham's Law. This sinister law applies as certainly to population as to coinage. As certainly as bad money drives out good do inferior populations crowd out and supplant superior. They fill the inferior jobs, which are plentiful, and restrict their superiors to the higher places, which are few. They compose the lower

strata of the population, which multiply and lift their superiors to the sparsely populated heights, where they peter out and grow extinct.

It would seem that nothing short of a complete reconstruction of our social structure could bring about a reversal of these tendencies. The psychological and economic forces underlying them must be fought with their own weapons and counteracted. For the alternative of repressing the coloured labour *by force*, though it naturally commends itself to the sentiment of the historically and biologically ignorant in all classes, would lead to consequences too terrible to contemplate, even from afar. It is sure to be tried—indeed, it is now being tried in South Africa and elsewhere; but it seems bound to fail there, as it has already failed in the West Indies and in South America. It is bound to fail, because, although a sufficiently brutal *and intelligent* policy of oppression might perhaps succeed in the countries which are now under white rule, it is not very likely that the white rulers will be intelligent enough to devise a biologically effective policy of this sort or persist in it long enough, while it is very unlikely that they will *unite* upon such a policy. The temptation to exploit and enslave coloured labour, rather than to exterminate it, would prove irresistibly attractive to a large and potent faction of the whites; the result would be class wars among the whites, to be followed later by successful slave revolts. These would doubtless be fomented and supported by the States *not* ruled by whites—at present China and Japan—and likely to be more numerous and powerful in future. At the moment world-wide race wars of extermination (which, be it noted, our premier prophet, Mr H. G. Wells, with his uncanny prescience, has already prophesied) might end in the triumph of the whites, *if they were united*; but they are so unlikely to unite, and hate each other so cordially, that their future looks by no means bright.

A policy, therefore, that means injustice, violence, and war is not a solution of the labour problem to recommend to white democracies. It will be safer, easier, and infinitely better for humanity if they will endeavour to maintain themselves, not by oppressing others, but by improving themselves. Let them breed *better men*, and thereby both preserve their position at the head of the human race and set a good example of true—that is, of eugenical—progressiveness to the whole world.

VIII

It is not, therefore, wholly inconceivable that some democracies may be converted to eugenics. Indeed, in this matter also they would probably be easier to convert than capitalistic plutocracies,

still conservatively hankering after war and retaining an obsolete belief in force, slavery, and economic exploitation.

But, even if all the democracies should prove unteachable and unmanageable, there would still be room for hope. For not all democrats are utter fools, utterly impervious to the lessons of common sense and science. The more intelligent would abandon democracy when they saw that it was unalterably opposed to human progress. They would allow themselves to be reminded that, after all, democracy is but a form of government, and that *good* government is the final end of government.

If, therefore, democracy refused to minister to this end, some other expedient would have to be tried. Moreover, the post-war experience of Europe manifestly shows that it is by no means difficult to overthrow democracies, and that quite minute minorities can institute dictatorships, if resolute and favourably situated. True, these dictatorships have hardly introduced any new ideas into politics. Neither the Fascists nor the Communists have exhibited any novelty of political insight or ingenuity. There is nothing new in governing with bombs and bayonets or castor oil and cudgels. But it would be strange if the scientifically selected rulers sprung from a eugenical aristocracy which appealed to all men's noblest ambitions could not progressively improve upon these antiquated and atrocious methods.

IX

And finally, in the very last resort, if the human race should perversely, stupidly, and obstinately persist in refusing to enter upon the pathway of escape from its troubles indicated by eugenics, it will have to be reminded that it cannot hope, after all, to escape from the control of natural law. It can, no doubt, turn a deaf ear to the teaching of biology. A fundamentalist 'reaction may even suppress all instruction in science. It can sustain institutions of all kinds which ignore and defy the conditions of sanity and sanitation. It has often done so in the past, and may do so in the future.

But if it does, it will suffer for its sins, as it has done heretofore. There is *no* way of eluding or deluding laws of Nature. They cannot be set aside by human enactment, and if they are defied they entail their consequences as before; only these will be found to be less acceptable.

Now the laws of Nature do not promise man an assured continuance upon earth, whatever he may choose to do and however he may conduct himself. They do not guarantee his survival nor render his progress inevitable. They leave him free, within wide limits, to determine his future. We need not progress. We can

prefer to stagnate. We can, if we choose, degenerate. We can even, in the end, become extinct.

In fact some or all of these possibilities are likely to be realised, if we go on as we are going True, we are at present more favourably situated than mankind has ever been before. We have much more power over Nature—we have vastly more control over the conditions of our life—because we have far more knowledge, and our institutions of learning have not yet quite choked themselves with the waste products of the knowledge they were designed to transmit We have far greater resources, which we can waste We are farther from the danger line and the limit of subsistence

But in the wickedness of his heart and the perversity of his thought man is quite as poor a creature as he was 10,000 years ago, when he devised his civilisation and failed to observe that he had unwittingly established a dysgenic institution which would arrest his progress Since then he has remained at heart a barbarian, or even a savage, while becoming more of a fool So it is quite on the cards that he may refuse to listen to the gospel of eugenics, and go on eating and drinking and mating, heedless of science and scoffing at the 'prophets of evil' who warn him vainly. In that case, men of the day, shall we not go and join the dinosaurs ?

F C S SCHILLER

HISTORY AND MR. WELLS

In a recent novel, *Mr Blettsworthy on Rampole Island*, Mr Wells warned us of the dangers of militarism and the blind obedience of tradition. He took as his medium an imaginary tribe of Patagonian savages. This tribe lived in a dark and narrow valley, existing miserably without the power of thinking progressively. They are in a state of chronic warfare with the other tribe further up the ravine, and have neither the imagination to conceive of the benefits of peace and union, nor even the intelligence to adopt any new method in strategy or tactics which might give them the satisfaction of victory. He paints a picture of the utter dreariness of these poor savages, cramped alike by the narrowness of their sunless ravine and the narrowness of their brutal and slavish mentality. In his latest novel, *The Autocracy of Mr Parham*,[1] Mr Wells is again a propagandist. He is once more warning us that, unless we can abandon our traditional methods of action and see the problems of politics more realistically, our civilisation will be lost. But in this book Mr Wells has changed the scene slightly, and instructs us not through the medium of Patagonian savages, but of an Oxford history tutor. He shows us what he conceives to be a typical history don, Mr Parham, senior tutor of St Simon's College, arriving fantastically at the position of Dictator or Lord Paramount of England. Installed in this great office, he rules the Empire and takes his part in world politics according to the best traditions of history. He identifies the salient *forces* in world politics; he follows the inherent *logic* of the situation. All that he does is 100 per cent history according to the best standards of Richelieu and the great masters. It is an essential part of the game, or, one might say, essential to the 'composition' of his world picture, to find an enemy. This enemy, of course, is Russia. He organises in the classic manner a combination against her. All seems to be going well when a conflict arises between Britain and America over the question of neutral rights, which Mr Parham, as an historian, might have remembered. The two great navies mutually destroy each other. Then there begins a general revolt of the common uneducated people of England, who are so shamefully lacking in a

[1] Published by William Heinemann, Ltd.

sense of historical form. They refuse to recognise the necessity of acting according to the old diplomatic and military traditions. They will not go through the old steps; they deny the binding force of patriotic obligations and symbols, they blaspheme against History.

In spite of its fantastic and even farcical passages, the book is a serious presentation of a serious danger. In our world both the material forces and moral influences are rapidly changing. Our political forms and our political traditions may easily become obsolete and therefore dangerous. If one may adapt a famous phrase of a famous Oxford historian, 'scientific progress is outrunning administrative order.' Man, in his bewildering and changing environment, is in danger from acting according to what psychologists would call the 'behaviour patterns' of an earlier age; we must get rid of historical 'fixations' on certain ages. And the fixation of which Mr Wells seems to be afraid is fixation on the age of traditional diplomacy and warfare, the age that was ushered in by Richelieu and closed perhaps by Vergennes, but which has become, in a sense, classical. This classical tradition has had its greatest influence in French diplomacy, and it gives to French historical writing that geometricity which is so pleasing in point of style and often so misleading in point of fact. This traditional outlook Mr Wells considers to be still a danger to us. When the very maintenance of civilisation seems to depend on economic and political co-operation, we act according to the meaningless formulæ of diplomatic antagonism. Through sheer sluggishness of the intellect and lethargy of the imagination statesmen go on dressing the lists for a tournament, forgetting that the weapons which are now used are lethal to combatants and to spectators as well.

Now, this deadly tradition which Mr Wells fears so much is, in his opinion, fostered and perpetuated by our present methods of studying history in the universities, more particularly at Oxford. By means of the mythical figure of Mr Parham he presents an indictment against Oxford history. It seems to him to have become classical and therefore dead, unrelated to the pressing problems of political action. He remarks in reference to Mr Parham's mental processes:

> It is one of the endless advantages of a sound classical education that you need never see—you can never see—a human relationship in its vulgar simplicity; there is always the enrichment of these regurgitated factors. You lose all sense of current events; you simply get such history as you have swallowed repeating itself.

Now, this is a very serious indictment. It cannot fail to be of interest to Oxford history tutors, and, as there seems at present to be no means of dissuading the wealthiest and most influential

people in the country from sending their most intelligent sons, and even daughters, to Oxford and Cambridge, it is presumably of general public interest as well. My first feeling on hearing this charge levelled at myself and my fellow-historians at Oxford is one of shocked and injured indignation. With most of Mr. Wells' general thesis I find myself in complete agreement. It seems to me to be one of the most obvious lessons of history that the preservation of States and civilisations lies in the ability to allow for changed conditions Modern history as we teach it in Oxford would appear to me to be an aid to Mr Wells' propaganda. We may at times become immersed in detail because of its convenience for examination purposes But rival schools of history generally accuse us of a broadness and generality in our treatment of history which we call philosophic and others journalistic. It may be that we are traditionalist in some matters, but most of us, at any rate, would claim to be as conscious as most people of the rapidly ascending curve of change in the last century In fact, not only are Mr Wells' assumptions about the spirit of our teaching insulting in themselves, but his charges remind us of all those false analogies, those irrelevant comparisons, those shallow deductions from past to present, that ignorance of modern facts, that indifference to modern problems, that cowardly reliance on mere scholastic technique as a substitute for real education, that I am accustomed to associate with my colleagues and friends the tutors in classics and ancient history Mr Parham appears to be, not one of us, but one of them One asks oneself whether, in dealing with Oxford, Mr Wells may not have committed the cardinal sin against reality by thinking of Oxford as an abstract entity instead of as a complex of individuals with every variation of opinion known to exist among the intelligentsia of to-day.

But not only does Mr Wells ruffle my complacency as a professional teacher of history, he outrages my pride as an academic man in general For he suggests that it is the ordinary man in the street, the average vulgar person, who can see through the outworn forms, the shibboleths and traditions which sway the minds of so-called educated people Mr Wells seems to have a faith, which, were it held by anyone less uncompromisingly rationalistic, I should be tempted to call mystical, in the penetrating vision of the average citizen In the universities we are apt to imagine that it is we who can see further through the set ideas and hardened conventions of life and politics. We do not attribute this merely to those supposed intellectual abilities by which we win distinction in our own examination system, but rather to the possession of leisure. Since we have the opportunity to observe and meditate upon the condition of the world

unharassed by the pressure of business life, we suppose that we are more emancipated from a thoughtless traditionalism. According to us, it is the man in the street, the man in the 'pub.' who requires to be warned of the danger of expecting that things will be in the future as they have been in the past. It is he, we imagine, who says, 'What I always say is that there must always be wars and fighting. It's natural, it's human; and as for that there League of Nations—well, we all know what that amounts to.' It is because it is so much easier to accept traditionalism, to worship symbols, and to re-echo patriotic cries than to peer behind these well-known forms into the complex nature of reality, that we consider that the average man stands in need of enlightenment from the universities. Mr. Wells, however, is of the opinion that the situation is exactly reversed, that the Stock Exchange or the Old Kent Road can by the light of their daily experience see further into the problems of world politics than the reflective scholar. It would be idle to dismiss Mr. Wells' opinion as unfounded He is much more in touch with both worlds than most people He must have good reason for holding the view he does He is much too big a man to be motivated only by the justifiable resentment which one presumably feels when one has been patronised for over forty years by men of more expensive education and vastly inferior understanding But one explanation of the difference of opinion may be that Mr Wells is thinking more of the past products of Oxford teaching than of Oxford teaching as it is He may have seen more of the hardened than of the molten lava of our university education. For it is an unfortunate fact that many men consider that, when they have concluded the formal or university part of their education, they must consolidate what they have learned rather than complete and extend it. There is in all established educational curricula, and in the classical curriculum in particular, one serious danger. This is, that it tends to teach a man that what matters in life is not to know what it is important to know, but rather to be able to prove that what you do not know is unimportant We think of our education as an asset and we cannot bear to have it depreciated. Rather than submit to that we will be ready to depreciate everything else. Mr Wells expresses this forcibly when he makes the vulgar Sir Bussy explode at Mr. Parham.

> Parham, you're infernally well satisfied with the world I'm not You're afraid it may change into something else You want to stop it right here and now. Or else you may have to learn something new and throw away the old bag of tricks. Yes—I know you. That's your whole mind. You're afraid that a time will come when all the important things of to-day will just not matter a rap.

The don, or at any rate the historical don, who can read these

words without a searching of heart must surely have lost his soul. And one's first impulse is to respond with indignation. When assailed by such a menace to his stock-in-trade many a cultured academic man will fight new ideas with all the despairing ferocity of an old hand-loom weaver attacking a steam-driven factory. But for the don as opposed to the university man who has moved on into another profession there is at least this much to be said. He at any rate has his pupils to keep him up to date. Pupils press their tutors hard, and in the effort to keep up to date a man may learn much Mr Wells describes Mr Parham as being used to addressing 'muted' undergraduates, and as a result 'he tended if anything to over-develop his pauses' But in real life undergraduates are anything but muted. Nor does any tutor who is worth his salt want them to be so Quite half of the art of tutoring consists in getting your man to talk, and even argue Dons when they pass into the outer world may appear, may even be, dogmatic, but that is not, like the dogmatism of the schoolmaster, a carry-over from his ordinary work, but a reaction or compensation against it What with pupils who may have been reading all the latest books and critical and erudite colleagues, the chief danger for the don is that he tends to adopt an excessive agnosticism That is why even recognised authorities adopt the habit of prefacing their views with formulæ like 'I think there is something to be said for the view that or 'I had rather imagined . .'

But, to return to the more technical question of academic history, Mr Wells seems to be over-estimating the amount of attention which is given to diplomatic and balance-of-power periods. For one thing, many students give most of their attention to mediæval periods They deal with an age which scarcely knew Powers or nations which condemned as immoral the economics of competition The political theory of this age is the theory of a world-State which, removed from its scholastic setting, is just such a conception as that for which Mr. Wells is fighting It is true that if he is a pure or mere scholar, and interested only in the minutiæ of Chancery writs or entries in *Domesday Book* he may accept Parhamese traditionalism for the present day, but if he allows his mediæval studies to fertilise his thought on other matters it will be a powerful antidote. Other historians are so modern in their interests that they care little for the problems of the age of classical diplomacy They are concerned more with the emergence of economic factors in history and with the problems raised by the Industrial Revolution and the tendency of material wealth to grow at the rate of geometrical progression. And we have even at Oxford our Marxian determinists, dogmatists, and traditionalists indeed,

but of such a kind that they will act as a powerful corrective to Mr. Parham. But coming to the period of Mr. Wells' *bête noir*, Richelieu, it is doubtful whether he is studied mainly as the maker of great diplomatic combinations. At any rate, care will be taken to point out the greatness of his work as the great anti-traditionalist of his day, the man who crushed out the petty separatism of the Huguenots and put an end to the barren bickerings and local sovereignties of the feudal magnates and built up in the world of France a great State on the basis of universal disarmament. But if Mr Wells wants to know how the age of Richelieu is being approached at Oxford, let him read the most recent notable work by an Oxford history tutor, Mr G. N. Clark's study of the seventeenth century [2] Here is a book which treats of every side of human activity during that period from population and commerce to international law and political philosophy, art, and engineering The main purpose of this book is, not to stress the similarity, but to assess the difference between that age and our own. In it the reader will make the interesting discovery that, in the age of Richelieu, frontiers, as the modern world knows them, scarcely existed, the work of exact delimitation and standardisation of territory lay in the future, just as some day our present frontiers may be things of the past. Another point brought out by Mr Clark is that the seventeenth century was the age in which knowledge of the nature of the physical universe increased so greatly that it could only be apprehended by a select few, and therefore there came about that disparity between the outlook and general philosophy of the educated minority as opposed to the masses The cultured man came to live in a world of one more dimension than the vulgar, and was in his outlook on the universe as an adult to a child. In our own day popular education and such powerful agencies as the works of Mr Wells may be bridging the gulf once more, but it was that gulf which gave to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries their intensely aristocratic character as opposed to the Middle Ages and the present day One aspect of this was that specialisation of war and diplomacy in the hands of a few while the masses blindly obeyed, for which Mr Parham stands as a symbol. It is essential to realise that these conditions no longer exist, but it is unfair to academic historians to suppose that they are so unphilosophic as to be ignorant of such a fact.

It is, however, true that all formal courses of history have in the nature of things a tendency to congeal the past and to make students think of it in isolation from the present. Every period must have a termination, and a gap is left between that date and the present day for purely technical reasons of instruction

[2] *The Seventeenth Century* (Oxford University Press).

and examination. This has some advantages in that it may prevent the student from taking with him some of his political or other prejudices. But on the whole it seems to be a necessary evil, and we can only try our best to mitigate it. The best corrective is to be found outside the official study, in general reading, and all those numerous agencies which exist in our universities to interest students in current affairs But Oxford is not blind to the desirability of extending the periods of historical study to as near the present day as possible It has just been suggested that in the new school of philosophy, politics, and economics the period of history set should be from 1870 to 1914 If this is not adopted, it will be for two reasons. Many will object that a period that goes back so short a distance will tend to perpetuate that belief in the continuance of present conditions which it is the function of history to correct And, indeed, it may well be argued that the period of the armed peace between the two Franco-German wars might become misleading and would very soon become classical Others may oppose it on purely technical grounds, because of the lack of good text-books and the difficulty of adding to the enormous range of history which overworked tutors are supposed to cover. If Mr Wells could get us the endowment for some new fellowships for this purpose he would be dealing a great blow at Parhamism

But Mr Parham, to one who knows present-day Oxford, remains something of an abstraction There are no doubt some historians who have his outlook, but that is rather in spite of than because of the fact that they are historians Parhamism is a danger more as dead matter than as a malignant growth in our academic world The real difference, the real struggle, is between those who take a continuous and serious interest in the problems of modern politics and those who do not These must of necessity be a minority—if you like, an aristocracy, but an aristocracy that has very little relation to wealth or birth and even to formal education Many men of great wisdom, talent, and character are by the direction of their interests incapable of making a serious study of our political and economic condition. Among these may be historians, some of them of very great professional competence But, on the whole, historians are compelled, by the nature of their study, to take the question of the political organisation of the modern world seriously They may, on the whole, be classed with the politically conscious classes, as opposed to those who only devote to politics a modicum of frivolous attention—artists, actors, professors of literature, stockbrokers, clergymen, scientists and others I believe that it is not in historical tradition, but in general apathy, that the danger to peace is to be found.

But one more point about the value of the study of history at Oxford remains. I have been concerned to show that Oxford history is less formal and traditional than Mr. Wells imagines. Does it teach anything the value of which Mr. Wells overlooks? There is perhaps just one thing The central interest of the modern history school at Oxford is the study of the English Constitution in its development. One of the most senior of the historical lecturers at Oxford used to remark to his class: 'When you young men write essays about the foreign policy of Richelieu or Wolsey, you are simply talking through your hat; the one thing that really matters is the study of the constitutional history of England.' The first sentence should be highly pleasing to Mr. Wells, but he may doubt the value of the second statement I am not here concerned to discuss whether the constitutional side is not now overweighted to the prejudice of social history But the attention given to the study of institutional history has been of great value Men like Maitland and Pollard have taught us to be institutional biologists and to study the processes by which institutions serve or cease to serve the people of a country. We study the genetics of institutions, the methods and results of transplantations, the unexpected metamorphoses, the process of decay But Mr Wells, in his impatient attitude to the League of Nations, seems to be overlooking some of the lessons of institutional biology He seeks some alchemy which by a stroke of particular creation will give us a world-State And here he seems to be moving away from the world of realities, neglecting his data, misunderstanding the nature of his material It seems strange that Mr. Wells, who has always prided himself on being a biologist, can only look on institutions from the point of view of a chemist

If one considers, not the products of Oxford in the past, but present and probable future products in relation to Mr Wells' problem, it does not appear that their view of world politics is likely to be influenced by excessive traditionalism To take one example, Mr. Wells seems to be afraid of the dangerous effects of the survival of the old rigid conception of State sovereignty It acts as a deadweight on realistic political thinking and corresponds to no modern needs Probably the doctrine is impregnably enthroned in the minds of the older generation. Moreover, in a crude form of jingoism and State-anthropomorphism it remains powerful in the mind of the average citizen, who is not likely to welcome the idea that Britain can no longer be a free agent in world politics. But those who teach in political science at Oxford or elsewhere find that the doctrine of sovereignty has very few defenders among present-day students. If one sets essays on the subject it is rarely that one comes across any pupil bold enough to put up a defence of

sovereignty. Most students seem to grasp very firmly the fact that States are not really absolute and independent of each other or of subordinate societies. The famous dictum of Maitland that 'there seems to be a genus of which States and corporations are species'[3] is accepted as a truism rather than denounced as a heresy. And if students are at a loss how to define or describe just where the limits of the State are to be placed and in exactly what way it can remain the chief focus of political authority, they are no more confused than their most eminent professors. But in the present juridical confusion the historically trained student may remind himself of another dictum of Maitland, a dictum which, with all respect, I submit, might be reflected on by Mr. Wells 'Contract, that greediest of legal categories which once threatened to devour the State, now resents being told that it cannot even painlessly digest a joint stock company'[4] In other words, there is no complete alchemy of political institutions. They are not made of inorganic material, but are born from other institutions, nor can they be swept away in a moment

In observing the attitude of the present generation of students to problems of politics one gets the idea that the most important factors are, not their formal studies, but certain influences altering their fundamental attitude to politics On the surface things seem to go on as before There are the political clubs, the League of Nations Union, smaller and more transitory societies. One sees the same types—the romantic Tory, sometimes a Conservative, sometimes expressing himself through the Labour Party, the rationalistic Radical, generally somewhere very near the Liberal-Labour border, the ardent class-war Socialist who has succeeded in identifying himself with the proletariate; the steady, level-headed Conservative One sees those to whom politics is a career, those to whom it is an ideal those to whom it is an excuse for rhetoric and youthful indignation But behind all this the effects of the study of modern psychology are apparent. We can do little more than speculate on their effects, for we are probably just at the beginning of a change which will stand out as clearly as the Industrial Revolution, the Moral Revolution. The younger generation are going to be self-conscious in regard to their political motivation While they will try to scrutinise the world more objectively than ever before, they will, as a means to this, scrutinise their own minds, they will try to sift out the rational from the merely emotional and instinctive in their political attitude Already they stop short in an argument or a tirade and confess to a complex or an obsession on the subject. Does this mean that we are coming to a golden

[3] Maitland, Introduction to Gierke's *Political Theories of the Middle Age*.
[4] *Ibid.*

age when we will have a [illegible], with an entirely new grip on reality, with a [illegible] political mentality? It would be optimistic to suppose that. Eventually, perhaps; but at present there are serious dangers in this psychological change. There seems to be a curious individualism about the present generation of undergraduates. It is not exactly self-seeking or self-centred, but it is very suspicious of all philanthropic appeals, of all calls to duty or service, for their own sake. Philanthropic or idealistic motives are carefully scrutinised and unmasked as subtle forms of selfishness and vanity. This process, which is only just discernible, must go on. It is useless to be obscurantist about it. If one has any faith in modern knowledge, one must welcome it. Meanwhile one must face the fact that some of the motive power of political action may be lost. The danger and horror of war need very little demonstration to intelligent modern youth. As Freud says on the last page of his most recent work: 'Men have brought their power of subduing the forces of Nature to such a pitch that by using them they could now very easily exterminate each other to the last man. *They know this.* Hence arises a great part of their current unrest, their dejection, their mood of apprehension.' [a]

The old appeal and the old idealisms are losing their power. The influence of religion, and even the ethics of Christianity, grows weaker. Now perhaps secularist humanitarians like Mr. Wells and Mr. Bertrand Russell will realise how much of the strength of the movements they lead was derived from the moderate but firm idealism of Victorian evangelicism. For long people have tried to hold to a Christian code of ethics, in spite of a theology which modern science told them was false. Now they are being further estranged from the ultimate ideal of Christianity by a code of ethics which psychology tells them is unreasonable. In these circumstances the appeals to an absolute sense of duty and an ideal of brotherhood are not listened to; but the need for common concerted action for world peace is stronger than ever. The old motive power of emotionalism is going, but we shall have to hurry up if we are to be in time to save civilisation by intelligence.

R. B. McCALLUM.

[a] *Civilisation and its Discontents*, p. 144.